corollary requirement in Georgia

2019Alternatively, the trial court also correctly concluded that Cochran had failed to demonstrate prejudice. "[T]he rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the [S]tate prove each element of the offense charged." Muhammad v. State , 243 Ga. 404 , 406, 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979).

2019Alternatively, the trial court also correctly concluded that Cochran had failed to demonstrate prejudice. "[T]he rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the [S]tate prove each element of the offense charged." Muhammad v. State , 243 Ga. 404 , 406, 254 S.E.2d 356 (1979).

2023See Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 574-575 (783 SE2d 622) (2016) (holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the omission of jury instructions on knowledge and shared intent, because the charges as a whole “were sufficient to cover the knowledge and shared intent required” for the defendant to be convicted); Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (646 SE2d 55) (2007) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and guilt by association, because “mere presence is only a corollary to the requirement that the State prove

2023See Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 574-575 (783 SE2d 622) (2016) (holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the omission of jury instructions on knowledge and shared intent, because the charges as a whole “were sufficient to cover the knowledge and shared intent required” for the defendant to be convicted); Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (646 SE2d 55) (2007) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and guilt by association, because “mere presence is only a corollary to the requirement that the State prove

2014Finally, and even when a defendant requests a charge on spatial proximity, a trial court does not err in refusing to give such a charge when the jury instructions as a whole, including charges on requisite intent and a mere conjecture of guilt, “adequately covered that principle.” (Citation omitted.) Smoot v. State, 316 Ga. App. 102, 115 (7) ( 729 SE2d 416 ) (2012).

2014Finally, and even when a defendant requests a charge on spatial proximity, a trial court does not err in refusing to give such a charge when the jury instructions as a whole, including charges on requisite intent and a mere conjecture of guilt, “adequately covered that principle.” (Citation omitted.) Smoot v. State, 316 Ga. App. 102, 115 (7) ( 729 SE2d 416 ) (2012).

2009But “(t)he rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged.” Parker v. State[, 270 Ga. 256, 258 (2) ( 507 SE2d 744 ) (1998)].

2009But “(t)he rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged.” Parker v. State[, 270 Ga. 256, 258 (2) ( 507 SE2d 744 ) (1998)].

2005Defendant's contention that he was merely present at the scene is not an affirmative defense; rather the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Id. at 713, 423 S.E.2d 393 ; see generally OCGA § 16-3-28.

1994It is not an affirmative defense but rather "`a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.'" Jones v. State, 205 Ga. App. 711, 713 (4) ( 423 SE2d 393 ) (1992).

2023See Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 574-575 (783 SE2d 622) (2016) (holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the omission of jury instructions on knowledge and shared intent, because the charges as a whole “were sufficient to cover the knowledge and shared intent required” for the defendant to be convicted); Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (646 SE2d 55) (2007) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and guilt by association, because “mere presence is only a corollary to the requirement that the State prove

2023See Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 574-575 (783 SE2d 622) (2016) (holding that trial counsel did not perform deficiently by failing to object to the omission of jury instructions on knowledge and shared intent, because the charges as a whole “were sufficient to cover the knowledge and shared intent required” for the defendant to be convicted); Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (646 SE2d 55) (2007) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on mere presence and guilt by association, because “mere presence is only a corollary to the requirement that the State prove

2014Rather, the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.’ ” (Punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 789, 792 (2) ( 658 SE2d 400 ) (2008), quoting Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 189 (2) ( 630 SE2d 783 ) (2006) and Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 406 (1) ( 254 SE2d 356 ) (1979).

2014Rather, the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.’ ” (Punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 789, 792 (2) ( 658 SE2d 400 ) (2008), quoting Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 189 (2) ( 630 SE2d 783 ) (2006) and Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 406 (1) ( 254 SE2d 356 ) (1979).

2014Rather, the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.’ ” (Punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 789, 792 (2) ( 658 SE2d 400 ) (2008), quoting Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 189 (2) ( 630 SE2d 783 ) (2006) and Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 406 (1) ( 254 SE2d 356 ) (1979).

2014Rather, the rule that mere presence without more is insufficient to convict is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.’ ” (Punctuation omitted.) Russell v. State, 289 Ga. App. 789, 792 (2) ( 658 SE2d 400 ) (2008), quoting Kelley v. State, 279 Ga. App. 187, 189 (2) ( 630 SE2d 783 ) (2006) and Muhammad v. State, 243 Ga. 404, 406 (1) ( 254 SE2d 356 ) (1979).

2014“It is not reversible error to fail to charge in the exact language requested when the charge given adequately covers the correct legal principles.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Head v. State, 261 Ga. App. 185, 187-188 (2) ( 582 SE2d 164 ) (2003).

2014“It is not reversible error to fail to charge in the exact language requested when the charge given adequately covers the correct legal principles.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Head v. State, 261 Ga. App. 185, 187-188 (2) ( 582 SE2d 164 ) (2003).

2014Moreover, “[t]he rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hulsey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 461, 462 (2) ( 643 SE2d 888 ) (2007).

2014Moreover, “[t]he rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hulsey v. State, 284 Ga. App. 461, 462 (2) ( 643 SE2d 888 ) (2007).

2013Rather, the “mere presence” rule “is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.” Id.; see State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 513, n. 3 ( 630 SE2d 377 ) (2006) (“equal access” by others to defendant’s car was not “sole defense”; properly viewed, the defense was that the State failed to prove the elements of the charged offense).

2013Rather, the “mere presence” rule “is really a corollary to the requirement that the state prove each element of the offense charged.” Id.; see State v. Johnson, 280 Ga. 511, 513, n. 3 ( 630 SE2d 377 ) (2006) (“equal access” by others to defendant’s car was not “sole defense”; properly viewed, the defense was that the State failed to prove the elements of the charged offense).

2007The rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged. [Cit.] In the present case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed the jury fully on the law of circumstantial evidence. [Cit.] Chung v. State, 240 Ga. App. 394, 396 (2) ( 523 SE2d 615 ) (1999).

2007The rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged. [Cit.] In the present case, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed the jury fully on the law of circumstantial evidence. [Cit.] Chung v. State, 240 Ga. App. 394, 396 (2) ( 523 SE2d 615 ) (1999).

1999Huzzie contends the trial court erred by failing to give an unrequested charge on mere association. “[S]ince the trial court instructed the jury that the [S]tate must prove every element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and the mere association principle is just a corollary of this requirement, this argument is without merit.” Hy v. State, 232 Ga. App. 247, 250 ( 501 SE2d 583 ) (1998); Roberts v. State, 223 Ga. App. 167,168 ( 477 SE2d 345 ) (1996). . 6.

1999Huzzie contends the trial court erred by failing to give an unrequested charge on mere association. “[S]ince the trial court instructed the jury that the [S]tate must prove every element of the offenses charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and the mere association principle is just a corollary of this requirement, this argument is without merit.” Hy v. State, 232 Ga. App. 247, 250 ( 501 SE2d 583 ) (1998); Roberts v. State, 223 Ga. App. 167,168 ( 477 SE2d 345 ) (1996). . 6.

1998See Roberts v. State, 223 Ga. App. 167, 168 (4) ( 477 SE2d 345 ) (1996); Lamunyon v. State, 218 Ga. App. 782, 784 (3) ( 463 SE2d 365 ) (1995).

1998See Roberts v. State, 223 Ga. App. 167, 168 (4) ( 477 SE2d 345 ) (1996); Lamunyon v. State, 218 Ga. App. 782, 784 (3) ( 463 SE2d 365 ) (1995).

2019Here, the "trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed the jury fully on the law of circumstantial evidence." Parker v. State , 270 Ga. 256 , 258, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998), disapproved on other grounds, Linson v. State , 287 Ga. 881 (4), 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010).

2019Here, the "trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt and instructed the jury fully on the law of circumstantial evidence." Parker v. State , 270 Ga. 256 , 258, 507 S.E.2d 744 (1998), disapproved on other grounds, Linson v. State , 287 Ga. 881 (4), 700 S.E.2d 394 (2010).

2023However, even if the trial court had clearly and obviously erred in not charging the jury on mere presence, Greene has failed to demonstrate that “any such error likely affected the outcome of the trial,” and thus, “he has failed to establish plain error.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 440 (4) (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 54 As detailed above, the evidence presented by the State in this case was substantial, and Greene “has not met his burden of affirmatively showing that the [trial court’s] failure to give” a mere presence instruction “probably affected the outcome

2023However, even if the trial court had clearly and obviously erred in not charging the jury on mere presence, Greene has failed to demonstrate that “any such error likely affected the outcome of the trial,” and thus, “he has failed to establish plain error.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 440 (4) (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 54 As detailed above, the evidence presented by the State in this case was substantial, and Greene “has not met his burden of affirmatively showing that the [trial court’s] failure to give” a mere presence instruction “probably affected the outcome

2023See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 314 Ga. 477, 483 (877 SE2d 582) (2022) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on grave suspicion, “because the concept was covered in other jury instructions”); Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 574 (783 SE2d 622) (2016) (explaining that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the omission of a jury instruction on knowledge, because the charge as a whole sufficiently informed the jury of the knowledge required for a defendant to be convicted as a party to the crimes); Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (646 SE2d 55)

2023See, e.g., Adkins v. State, 314 Ga. 477, 483 (877 SE2d 582) (2022) (holding that the trial court did not err by failing to instruct the jury on grave suspicion, “because the concept was covered in other jury instructions”); Downey v. State, 298 Ga. 568, 574 (783 SE2d 622) (2016) (explaining that trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object to the omission of a jury instruction on knowledge, because the charge as a whole sufficiently informed the jury of the knowledge required for a defendant to be convicted as a party to the crimes); Simmons v. State, 282 Ga. 183, 188 (646 SE2d 55)

2023However, even if the trial court had clearly and obviously erred in not charging the jury on mere presence, Greene has failed to demonstrate that “any such error likely affected the outcome of the trial,” and thus, “he has failed to establish plain error.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423, 440 (4) (883 SE2d 317) (2023) (citation and punctuation omitted). 54 As detailed above, the evidence presented by the State in this case was substantial, and Greene “has not met his burden of affirmatively showing that the [trial court’s] failure to give” a mere presence instruction “probably affected the outcome

2023However, even if the trial court had clearly and obviously erred in not charging the jury on mere presence, Greene has failed to demonstrate that “any such error likely affected the outcome of his trial,” and thus, “he has failed to establish plain error.” Clark v. State, 315 Ga. 423 , 440 (4) ( 883 SE2d 317 ) (2023).

2021See, e.g., Wilson, 118 Ga. at 103 (“[T]here can be no action for damages [against a municipality] where the nuisance is maintained by a private individual upon 18 private property.”); Head v. City Council of Augusta, 46 Ga. App. 705, 705 ( 169 SE 48 ) (1933) (“A municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from a nuisance maintained by individuals on their own property, notwithstanding such a nuisance might be abated or removed[.]”).

2021See, e.g., Wilson, 118 Ga. at 101 18 (“[T]here can be no action for damages [against a municipality] where the nuisance is maintained by a private individual on private property.”); Head v. City Council of Augusta, 46 Ga. App. 705, 705 (1) (169 SE 48) (1933) (“A municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from a nuisance maintained by individuals on their own property, notwithstanding such a nuisance might be abated or removed[.]”).

2021See, e.g., Wilson, 118 Ga. at 101 18 (“[T]here can be no action for damages [against a municipality] where the nuisance is maintained by a private individual on private property.”); Head v. City Council of Augusta, 46 Ga. App. 705, 705 (1) (169 SE 48) (1933) (“A municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from a nuisance maintained by individuals on their own property, notwithstanding such a nuisance might be abated or removed[.]”).

2021See, e.g., Wilson, 118 Ga. at 101 18 (“[T]here can be no action for damages [against a municipality] where the nuisance is maintained by a private individual on private property.”); Head v. City Council of Augusta, 46 Ga. App. 705, 705 (1) (169 SE 48) (1933) (“A municipality is not liable for injuries resulting from a nuisance maintained by individuals on their own property, notwithstanding such a nuisance might be abated or removed[.]”).

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2020Acquiescence deprives him of the right to complain further.”13 A corollary to this rule is the proposition that “one cannot complain of a judgment, order, or ruling that his own procedure or conduct procured or aided in causing.”14 Whether an issue has been tried 12 Sedehi v. Chamberlin, 344 Ga. App. 512 , 522 (1) ( 811 SE2d 24 ) (2018). 13 Appling v. Tatum, 295 Ga. App. 78, 83 (4) ( 670 SE2d 795 ) (2008) (punctuation omitted). 14 Saravia, 303 Ga. App. at 762 (1) (punctuation omitted); see Sadler v. Rigsby, 343 Ga. App. 269, 271-72 (1) (a) ( 808 SE2d 11 ) (2017) (observing that a party cannot

2013Here, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id.; see also Torres v. State, 298 Ga. App. 158, 158-159 (1) ( 679 SE2d 757 ) (2009) (no error in failing to charge jury on sole defense of “mere presence” where trial court instructed jury as to State’s burden to prove each element of the offense).

2013Here, the trial court correctly instructed the jury on the duty of the State to prove each element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 7 (Punctuation and footnote omitted.) Id.; see also Torres v. State, 298 Ga. App. 158, 158-159 (1) ( 679 SE2d 757 ) (2009) (no error in failing to charge jury on sole defense of “mere presence” where trial court instructed jury as to State’s burden to prove each element of the offense).

2012See Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 (2) ( 574 SE2d 896 ) (2002). 24 While Smoot asserts that she was entitled to a charge on mere presence because her written request for the charge was a correct statement of the law and there was at least slight evidence to support it, the rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged.

2012See Wiggins v. State, 258 Ga. App. 703, 704-705 (2) ( 574 SE2d 896 ) (2002). 24 While Smoot asserts that she was entitled to a charge on mere presence because her written request for the charge was a correct statement of the law and there was at least slight evidence to support it, the rule that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient to convict is actually a corollary to the requirement that the State prove each element of the offense charged.

2007See, e.g., Rucker v. Troll Book Fairs, 232 Ga. App. 189, 190 (1) ( 501 SE2d 301 ) (1998) (despite employee’s presence on employer’s property sometime after departing for the day, employee’s actions found to be personal in this negligence case).

2007See, e.g., Rucker v. Troll Book Fairs, 232 Ga. App. 189, 190 (1) ( 501 SE2d 301 ) (1998) (despite employee’s presence on employer’s property sometime after departing for the day, employee’s actions found to be personal in this negligence case).