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14 New Mexico opinions name it 2 courts 1914–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Mexico courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Swafford v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., id. (unitary conduct part of Swafford test “arises from the pragmatic observation that the double jeopardy clause clearly cannot operate to prohibit prosecution, conviction, and punishment in a single trial for discrete acts violative of the same statute (whether actually the same or the same under [the Blockburger test])”); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding that double jeopardy was not violated by multiple convictions for separate acts of sexual assault because “the Legislature, through the language of the statute, has rejected grouping aggrav 2007See, e.g., id. (unitary conduct part of Swafford test "arises from the pragmatic observation that the double jeopardy clause clearly cannot operate to prohibit prosecution, conviction, and punishment in a single trial for discrete acts violative of the same statute (whether actually the same or the same under [the Blockburger test])"); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (holding that double jeopardy was not violated by multiple convictions for separate acts of sexual assault because "the Legislature, through the language of the statute, has rejected grouping aggra | 2 | 3 |
State v. Vigilgreen2 sentences2014Cf. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 24 (discussing the “totality of the evidence in [the] record”); Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, ¶ 18 (analyzing the state’s evidence “individually or collectively”). 3. 2014Cf. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 24 (discussing the “totality of the evidence in [the] record”); Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, ¶ 18 (analyzing the state’s evidence “individually or collectively”). 3. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Floresgreen2 sentences2014Cf. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 24 (discussing the “totality of the evidence in [the] record”); Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, ¶ 18 (analyzing the state’s evidence “individually or collectively”). 3. 2014Cf. Flores, 2010-NMSC-002, ¶ 24 (discussing the “totality of the evidence in [the] record”); Vigil, 2010-NMSC-003, ¶ 18 (analyzing the state’s evidence “individually or collectively”). 3. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Princegreen2 sentences2001See State v. Anaya, 1997 NMSC 010, ¶¶ 30-32, 123 N.M. 14 , 933 P.2d 223 ; Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16 , 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991) (“When it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of an enhanced sentence under particular circumstances, as a corollary to the rule that criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable, State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 18 , 189 P.2d 993, 995 (1948), we presume that the legislature did not so intend.”). 2001See State v. Anaya, 1997 NMSC 010, ¶¶ 30-32, 123 N.M. 14 , 933 P.2d 223 ; Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16 , 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991) (“When it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of an enhanced sentence under particular circumstances, as a corollary to the rule that criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable, State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 18 , 189 P.2d 993, 995 (1948), we presume that the legislature did not so intend.”). | 2 | 2 |
Vick v. Stategreen2 sentences2007See, e.g., id. (unitary conduct part of Swafford test “arises from the pragmatic observation that the double jeopardy clause clearly cannot operate to prohibit prosecution, conviction, and punishment in a single trial for discrete acts violative of the same statute (whether actually the same or the same under [the Blockburger test])”); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.Crim.App.1999) (holding that double jeopardy was not violated by multiple convictions for separate acts of sexual assault because “the Legislature, through the language of the statute, has rejected grouping aggrav 2007See, e.g., id. (unitary conduct part of Swafford test "arises from the pragmatic observation that the double jeopardy clause clearly cannot operate to prohibit prosecution, conviction, and punishment in a single trial for discrete acts violative of the same statute (whether actually the same or the same under [the Blockburger test])"); see also Vick v. State, 991 S.W.2d 830, 833 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999) (holding that double jeopardy was not violated by multiple convictions for separate acts of sexual assault because "the Legislature, through the language of the statute, has rejected grouping aggra | 1 | 1 |
Taxation & Revenue Department v. Bien Mur Indian Market Center, Inc.green2 sentences2002Taxation & Revenue Dep’t v. Bien Mur Indian Market Ctr., Inc., 108 N.M. 228, 230-31 , 770 P.2d 873, 875-76 (1989). {25} Gallegos requests that this Court estop Tesuque from asserting sovereign immunity and lack of state court jurisdiction based on Tesuque’s continued operation of the casino under the federal stay. 2002Taxation & Revenue Dep’t v. Bien Mur Indian Market Ctr., Inc., 108 N.M. 228, 230-31 , 770 P.2d 873, 875-76 (1989). {25} Gallegos requests that this Court estop Tesuque from asserting sovereign immunity and lack of state court jurisdiction based on Tesuque’s continued operation of the casino under the federal stay. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Anayagreen2 sentences2001See State v. Anaya, 1997 NMSC 010, ¶¶ 30-32, 123 N.M. 14 , 933 P.2d 223 ; Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16 , 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991) (“When it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of an enhanced sentence under particular circumstances, as a corollary to the rule that criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable, State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 18 , 189 P.2d 993, 995 (1948), we presume that the legislature did not so intend.”). 2001See State v. Anaya, 1997 NMSC 010, ¶¶ 30-32, 123 N.M. 14 , 933 P.2d 223 ; Swafford v. State, 112 N.M. 3, 16 , 810 P.2d 1223, 1236 (1991) (“When it cannot be said with certainty that the legislature intended to authorize the imposition of an enhanced sentence under particular circumstances, as a corollary to the rule that criminal statutes must be sufficiently clear and definite to inform a person of ordinary intelligence what conduct is punishable, State v. Prince, 52 N.M. 15, 18 , 189 P.2d 993, 995 (1948), we presume that the legislature did not so intend.”). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Weinergreen1 sentence1995See United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir.1993) (it is error to allow an expert to testify on a routine inference that jurors could draw for themselves); cf. State v. Hall, 103 N.M. 207, 210 , 704 P.2d 461, 464 (Ct.App.1985) (expert testimony admissible in cases where “average juror would have no basis for evaluating the evidence without the assistance of an expert”). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Hallgreen2 sentences1995See United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir.1993) (it is error to allow an expert to testify on a routine inference that jurors could draw for themselves); cf. State v. Hall, 103 N.M. 207, 210 , 704 P.2d 461, 464 (Ct.App.1985) (expert testimony admissible in cases where “average juror would have no basis for evaluating the evidence without the assistance of an expert”). 1995See United States v. Weiner, 3 F.3d 17, 21-22 (1st Cir.1993) (it is error to allow an expert to testify on a routine inference that jurors could draw for themselves); cf. State v. Hall, 103 N.M. 207, 210 , 704 P.2d 461, 464 (Ct.App.1985) (expert testimony admissible in cases where “average juror would have no basis for evaluating the evidence without the assistance of an expert”). | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. Cunninghamgreen2 sentences1993Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 330 , 657 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1983) (quoting Cunningham v. Cunningham, 96 N.M. 529, 531 , 632 P.2d 1167, 1169 (1981)). 1993Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 330 , 657 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1983) (quoting Cunningham v. Cunningham, 96 N.M. 529, 531 , 632 P.2d 1167, 1169 (1981)). | 1 | 1 |
Hertz v. Hertzgreen2 sentences1993Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 330 , 657 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1983) (quoting Cunningham v. Cunningham, 96 N.M. 529, 531 , 632 P.2d 1167, 1169 (1981)). 1993Hertz v. Hertz, 99 N.M. 320, 330 , 657 P.2d 1169, 1179 (1983) (quoting Cunningham v. Cunningham, 96 N.M. 529, 531 , 632 P.2d 1167, 1169 (1981)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1933See State v. Smith, 190 Mo. 706 , 90 S. W. 440 ; State v. Perry (Iowa) 105 N. W. 507 . 1933See State v. Smith, 190 Mo. 706 , 90 S. W. 440 ; State v. Perry (Iowa) 105 N. W. 507 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Mexico. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, in Its Corporate Capacity v. Jack H. Harrison and Frederick G. Rixey
green
1 sentence2002Id. at 410 . 5 Indeed, the principle that the state is rarely equitably estopped “has often been regarded as a corollary of the principle of sovereign immunity” in New Mexico. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Southwest Community Health Services v. Smith
green
2 sentences1990Rather, a corollary of that doctrine is asserted: "[A]ny conflict between court rules and statutes that relate to procedure are [sic] today resolved * * * in favor of the rules." Southwest Community Health Services, 107 N.M. at 198 , 755 P.2d at 42 . 1990Rather, a corollary of that doctrine is asserted: "[A]ny conflict between court rules and statutes that relate to procedure are [sic] today resolved * * * in favor of the rules." Southwest Community Health Services, 107 N.M. at 198 , 755 P.2d at 42 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Peltz ex rel. Robillard v. New Mexico Department of Health & Social Services
green
1 sentence1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
City of Carlsbad v. Neal
green
2 sentences1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. 1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Peltz v. NM DEPT. OF HEALTH & SOC. SERV.
green
1 sentence1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
United States v. Bureau of Revenue
green
2 sentences1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. 1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Silver City Consolidated School District No. 1 v. Board of Regents of New Mexico Western College
green
2 sentences1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. 1977No. 1 v. Board of Regents, 75 N.M. 106 , 401 P.2d 95 (1965); City of Carlsbad v. Neal, 56 N.M. 465 , 245 P.2d 384 (1952); Peltz v. New Mexico Dept. of Health and Social Services, 89 N.M. 276, 277 , 551 P.2d 100 , 101 (Ct.App. 1976) and United States v. Bureau of Revenue, 87 N.M. 164 , 531 P.2d 212 (Ct.App. 1975) all recognize the corollary rule that estoppel will nevertheless be applied where “right and justice demand it.” In United States v. Bureau of Revenue, supra, the court held that right and justice required that the Bureau of Revenue be estopped from collecting a compensating tax. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Baldwin Motor Co.
green
1 sentence1968Travelers Insurance Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W2d 888 (Tex.Civ.App.1961) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Baldwin Motor Co., 34 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Com.App.1931). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Travelers Insurance Company v. Newsom
green
1 sentence1968Travelers Insurance Co. v. Newsom, 352 S.W2d 888 (Tex.Civ.App.1961) ; United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Baldwin Motor Co., 34 S.W.2d 815 (Tex.Com.App.1931). | 1 | 1968–1968 |
Massie v. Harrison County
neutral
1 sentence1933See State v. Smith, 190 Mo. 706 , 90 S. W. 440 ; State v. Perry (Iowa) 105 N. W. 507 . | 1 | 1933–1933 |
Rodgers v. United States
green
1 sentence1914U. S., 185 U. S. 83 , and authorities cited. | 1 | 1914–1914 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.