corollary requirement in Texas

2025Nevertheless, “we may not simply disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding; to do so would not comport with the heightened burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.L.M., 513 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).

2024Nevertheless, “we may not simply disregard undisputed facts that do not support the finding; to do so would not comport with the heightened -3- 04-23-00689-CV burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence.” In re S.L.M., 513 S.W.3d 746, 748 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.).

2026“A corollary to this requirement is that a [reviewing] court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.

2026“A corollary to this requirement is that a [reviewing] court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id.

2018“A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (citation omitted).

2018“A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (citation omitted).

2013“There exists, however, a corollary to this rule[, which is] . . . that the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence is not cured by the fact that the defendant sought to meet, destroy, or explain it by the introduction of rebutting evidence.” Id.

2002The corollary to this doctrine is that "the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence is not cured by the fact that the defendant sought to meet, destroy, or explain it by the introduction of rebutting evidence." Id.

2010In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.2002); In re T.N.F., 205 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex.App.-Waco 2006, pet. denied).

2010In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002); In re T.N.F. , 205 S.W.3d 625, 630 (Tex. App.—Waco 2006, pet. denied).

2016Code § 101.007; see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 . 4 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-66 (Tex. 2002). 2 “In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.”5 “To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolv

2015Code § 101.007; see C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25 . 5 See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-66 (Tex. 2002). 2 “In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true.”6 “To give appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the factfinder resolv

2009See Morin v. Boecker , 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that "when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party's attorney") (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio , 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) ("[The] rules suggest that . . . notice . . . [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.")); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, "our prim

2009See Morin v. Boeck er, 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that “when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party’s attorney”) (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (“[The] rules suggest that ... notice ... [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.”)); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, “our primary objec

2009See Morin v. Boecker , 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that "when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party's attorney") (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio , 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) ("[The] rules suggest that . . . notice . . . [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.")); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, "our prim

2009See Morin v. Boeck er, 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that “when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party’s attorney”) (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (“[The] rules suggest that ... notice ... [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.”)); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, “our primary objec

2009See Morin v. Boecker , 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that "when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party's attorney") (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio , 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) ("[The] rules suggest that . . . notice . . . [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.")); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez , 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex. 2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, "our prim

2009See Morin v. Boeck er, 122 S.W.3d 911, 914 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (holding that “when a party is represented by counsel who has made an appearance, rules 8 and 21a require that all communications be sent to the party’s attorney”) (citing Bruneio v. Bruneio, 890 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ) (“[The] rules suggest that ... notice ... [be] sent to the attorney in charge if the party is represented, or to the party himself if pro se.”)); see also McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d 741, 745 (Tex.2003) (stating that, in construing a statute, “our primary objec

2014See Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (“Every word of a statute is presumed to have been used for a -purpose, and a cardinal rule of statutory construction requires that each sentence, clause, phrase and word be given effect if reasonably possible.”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez —Machain, 542 U.S. 692 , 711 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 2739 , 2754 n. 9, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (reasoning that different words used in the same, or a similar, statute are assigned different meanings whenever possible); DeWitt v. Harris Cnty., 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1995) (“DeWitt’s' argument is founded on

2014See Morter v. State, 551 S.W.2d 715, 718 (Tex.Crim.App.1977) (“Every word of a statute is presumed to have been used for a purpose, and a cardinal rule of statutory construction requires that each sentence, clause, phrase and word be given effect if reasonably possible.”); see also Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 , 711 n. 9, 124 S.Ct. 2739 , 2754 n. 9, 159 L.Ed.2d 718 (2004) (reasoning that different words used in the same, or a similar, statute are assigned different meanings whenever possible); DeWitt v. Harris County, 904 S.W.2d 650, 653 (Tex.1995) (“DeWitt’s argument is founded on th

1995Even so, the Nicholas court recognized a corollary to the rule that “presentation of other evidence which does not prove those facts erroneously admitted but only tends to meet, destroy, or explain the erroneously admitted evidence, can hardly be considered to cure the error within the rationale of the first rule.” Id.

1986Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493, 495, 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (opinions on rehearing); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (opinion on rehearing).

1998Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing); Thomas v. State, supra; Nicholas v. State, supra. In Thomas v. State, supra, this Court altered the Texas rule on curative admissibility in light of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). [[Image here]] “We find that Harrison does in fact add a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility, i.e., the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence which is obtained by illegal police practices is not cured when a defendant gives testimony on direct ex

1998Howard v. State, 599 S.W.2d 597, 605 (Tex.Cr.App.1979) (Opinion on State’s Motion for Rehearing); Thomas v. State, supra; Nicholas v. State, supra. In Thomas v. State, supra, this Court altered the Texas rule on curative admissibility in light of Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 , 88 S.Ct. 2008 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1047 (1968). [[Image here]] “We find that Harrison does in fact add a corollary to the doctrine of curative admissibility, i.e., the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence which is obtained by illegal police practices is not cured when a defendant gives testimony on direct ex

2019The corollary to this rule is that “an insured who establishes a right to benefits under the policy can recover those benefits as actual damages resulting from a statutory violation.” Id.; see also Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 496 (“If an insurer’s wrongful denial of a valid claim for benefits results from or constitutes a statutory violation, the resulting damages will necessarily include ‘at least the amount of policy benefits wrongfully withheld.’”).

2019The corollary to this rule is that “an insured who establishes a right to benefits under the policy can recover those benefits as actual damages resulting from a statutory violation.” Id.; see also Menchaca, 545 S.W.3d at 496 (“If an insurer’s wrongful denial of a valid claim for benefits results from or constitutes a statutory violation, the resulting damages will necessarily include ‘at least the amount of policy benefits wrongfully withheld.’”).

2015Marmion, 246 S.W.2d at 706 ("[I]f the judgment now appealed from merely followed that [first] decree, then the error, if error it be, would be in the former, and not in the latter, ruling."); Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 951 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (quoting Marmion).

2015Marmion, 246 S.W.2d at 706 ("[I]f the judgment now appealed from merely followed that [first] decree, then the error, if error it be, would be in the former, and not in the latter, ruling."); Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 951 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (quoting Marmion).

2015Marmion, 246 S.W.2d at 706 ("[I]f the judgment now appealed from merely followed that [first] decree, then the error, if error it be, would be in the former, and not in the latter, ruling."); Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 951 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (quoting Marmion).

2015Marmion, 246 S.W.2d at 706 ("[I]f the judgment now appealed from merely followed that [first] decree, then the error, if error it be, would be in the former, and not in the latter, ruling."); Martin v. Dosohs I, Ltd., 951 S.W.2d 821, 824 (Tex. App. – San Antonio 1997, no pet.) (quoting Marmion).

2011See Beaumont Bank, N.A. v. Buller , 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex. 1991); Downer , 701 S.W.2d at 242 . mutually exclusive remedies To sustain its first issue, Dayton Reavis relies exclusively on Jackson v. The Praetorians for the proposition that valid and existing injunctive relief precludes the appointment of a receiver.

2004See Beaumont Bank, N.A v. Buller, 806 S.W.2d 223, 226 (Tex.1991); Downer, 701 S.W.2d at 242 .

2007TDI has not suggested that any other issue would be relevant to Reconveyance’s entitlement to the declaratory relief it seeks. 10 A longstanding corollary or exception to the primary jurisdiction doctrine recognizes that “[wjhere the issue is one inherently judicial in nature ... the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature, by a valid statute, has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body.” Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26 , 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (1961).

2007TDI has not suggested that any other issue would be relevant to Reconveyance’s entitlement to the declaratory relief it seeks. 10 A longstanding corollary or exception to the primary jurisdiction doctrine recognizes that “[wjhere the issue is one inherently judicial in nature ... the courts are not ousted from jurisdiction unless the Legislature, by a valid statute, has explicitly granted exclusive jurisdiction to the administrative body.” Gregg v. Delhi-Taylor Oil Corp., 162 Tex. 26 , 344 S.W.2d 411, 415 (1961).

2023In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ; see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 . 24 In a factual sufficiency review, we “give due consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and convincing[]” and must determine “‘whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.’” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (quoting In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002)).

2022In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 ; see also In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 802 .

2011"Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence." Id.; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817 ("[W]e have held that a legal sufficiency review must consider all the evidence (not just that favoring the verdict) in reviewing cases of . . . punitive damages.

2011“Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing evidence.” Id.; see also City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 817 (“[W]e have held that a legal sufficiency review must consider all the evidence (not just that favoring the verdict) in reviewing cases of ... punitive damages.

2023“A corollary to this requirement is that [we] should disregard all evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have been incredible.” Id. (citation omitted).

2023“If, after conducting [our] legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, [we] determine[] that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then [we] must conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.” Id. (citation omitted).

1986Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493, 495, 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (opinions on rehearing); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (opinion on rehearing).

1986Alvarez v. State, 511 S.W.2d 493, 495, 498 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (opinions on rehearing); Nicholas v. State, 502 S.W.2d 169, 173 (Tex.Cr.App.1973) (opinion on rehearing).

2022Thus, as a corollary of that rule, the Court further explained that “judicial review of administrative orders is not available unless all administrative remedies have been pursued to the fullest extent.” Id. (citing City of Sherman v. Pub.

2005See id.

1999See also Bush v. State, 697 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (when court erroneously admits evidence, but objecting party introduces same evidence through some other means, error is rendered harmless). [13] There exists, however, a corollary to this rule, that "the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence is not cured by the fact that the defendant sought to *286 meet, destroy, or explain it by the introduction of rebutting evidence." Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985).

1999See also Bush v. State, 697 S.W.2d 397, 404 (Tex.Crim.App.1985) (when court erroneously admits evidence, but objecting party introduces same evidence through some other means, error is rendered harmless). 13 There exists, however, a corollary to this rule, that “the harmful effect of improperly admitted evidence is not cured by the fact that the defendant sought to meet, destroy, or explain it by the introduction of rebutting evidence.” Maynard v. State, 685 S.W.2d 60, 65 (Tex.Crim.App. 1985).

2024In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005) (per curiam) (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002)).

2018Id.