corollary principle in Colorado

1912It, therefore, follows as a corollary that the doctrine announced in Lee v. Stahl, supra, controls here, and that the tax deed before us must be considered good on its face in conformity with the ruling in Herr v. Graden, supra. In the following cited cases the doctrine of the “Law of the Case” was uniformly adhered to, and in most of them the same situation existed as exists in the case at bar, that is to say, the first appeal was decided by the supreme court and the second appeal by a different appellate court; viz., Tipton County Commissioners v. Indiana P. C.

1912It, therefore, follows as a corollary that the doctrine announced in Lee v. Stahl, supra, controls here, and that the tax deed before us must be considered good on its face in conformity with the ruling in Herr v. Graden, supra. In the following cited cases the doctrine of the “Law of the Case” was uniformly adhered to, and in most of them the same situation existed as exists in the case at bar, that is to say, the first appeal was decided by the supreme court and the second appeal by a different appellate court; viz., Tipton County Commissioners v. Indiana P. C.

1912It, therefore, follows as a corollary that the doctrine announced in Lee v. Stahl, supra, controls here, and that the tax deed before us must be considered good on its face in conformity with the ruling in Herr v. Graden, supra. In the following cited cases the doctrine of the “Law of the Case” was uniformly adhered to, and in most of them the same situation existed as exists in the case at bar, that is to say, the first appeal was decided by the supreme court and the second appeal by a different appellate court; viz., Tipton County Commissioners v. Indiana P. C.

1912It, therefore, follows as a corollary that the doctrine announced in Lee v. Stahl, supra, controls here, and that the tax deed before us must be considered good on its face in conformity with the ruling in Herr v. Graden, supra. In the following cited cases the doctrine of the “Law of the Case” was uniformly adhered to, and in most of them the same situation existed as exists in the case at bar, that is to say, the first appeal was decided by the supreme court and the second appeal by a different appellate court; viz., Tipton County Commissioners v. Indiana P. C.

2021People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, ¶ 16 . ¶ 44 In People v. Wambolt, a division of this court applied the tests articulated in Reyna-Abarca and Rock to the question of whether DUR is a lesser included offense of DARP, the very issue raised by Tun here. 2018 COA 88 , ¶ 49.

2021People v. Rock, 2017 CO 84, ¶ 16 . ¶ 44 In People v. Wambolt, a division of this court applied the tests articulated in Reyna-Abarca and Rock to the question of whether DUR is a lesser included offense of DARP, the very issue raised by Tun here. 2018 COA 88 , ¶ 49.

2020Id. ¶8 Because “the [C]GIA requires the trial court to definitively resolve all issues of immunity before trial, regardless of whether the issues have been classified as jurisdictional,” district courts are to “employ the procedures used in [Trinity] and its progeny to . . . determine the facts necessary to resolve all disputed issues of immunity, including those deemed non-jurisdictional.” Finnie v. Jefferson Cty.

2002See People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983) (rule of lenity, as a tool of statutory construction, requires that courts resolve ambiguities in a penal code in the defendant's favor; it is a corollary of the rule of statutory construction that requires penal statutes to be construed against the government), overruled in part on other grounds by Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1984); see also People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182 (Colo.1988) (rule of lenity requires that construction favoring the liberty interests of the accused should be adopted); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo.1980); P

2002See People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983) (rule of lenity, as a tool of statutory construction, requires that courts resolve ambiguities in a penal code in the defendant's favor; it is a corollary of the rule of statutory construction that requires penal statutes to be construed against the government), overruled in part on other grounds by Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1984); see also People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182 (Colo.1988) (rule of lenity requires that construction favoring the liberty interests of the accused should be adopted); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo.1980); P

2002See People v. Lowe, 660 P.2d 1261 (Colo.1983) (rule of lenity, as a tool of statutory construction, requires that courts resolve ambiguities in a penal code in the defendant's favor; it is a corollary of the rule of statutory construction that requires penal statutes to be construed against the government), overruled in part on other grounds by Callis v. People, 692 P.2d 1045 (Colo.1984); see also People v. Newton, 764 P.2d 1182 (Colo.1988) (rule of lenity requires that construction favoring the liberty interests of the accused should be adopted); People v. Roybal, 618 P.2d 1121 (Colo.1980); P

1993Cf. Hill v. Benevolent League of Colorado Travelers Ass’n, 133 Colo. 349 , 295 P.2d 231 (1956) (the jurisdiction of the district courts does not extend to the review of judgments entered by a court of coordinate jurisdiction).

1993Cf. Hill v. Benevolent League of Colorado Travelers Ass’n, 133 Colo. 349 , 295 P.2d 231 (1956) (the jurisdiction of the district courts does not extend to the review of judgments entered by a court of coordinate jurisdiction).

1988Pioneer Construction Co., 152 Colo. at 125 , 381 P.2d at 24 ; see also Melody Homes, Inc. v. Lay, 44 Colo.App. at 50-51 , 610 P.2d at 1082 (“The issue of whether an employee would ordinarily accomplish the work with his own employees is simply a corollary to the inquiry ‘is the work performed part of the employer’s regular business,’ and is not to be determined solely by proof of the employment practices of similar businesses.”).

1988Pioneer Construction Co., 152 Colo. at 125 , 381 P.2d at 24 ; see also Melody Homes, Inc. v. Lay, 44 Colo.App. at 50-51 , 610 P.2d at 1082 (“The issue of whether an employee would ordinarily accomplish the work with his own employees is simply a corollary to the inquiry ‘is the work performed part of the employer’s regular business,’ and is not to be determined solely by proof of the employment practices of similar businesses.”).

1988This rule of consistent usage, which is a corollary of the principle that a statute should be interpreted so as to give consistent and harmonious effect to all of its parts, see People v. District Court, 713 P.2d at 921 ; Massey, 180 Colo. at 364 , 506 P.2d at 130 , should have even more force where the identical words or phrases appear within the same sentence of a statutory definition.

1988This rule of consistent usage, which is a corollary of the principle that a statute should be interpreted so as to give consistent and harmonious effect to all of its parts, see People v. District Court, 713 P.2d at 921 ; Massey, 180 Colo. at 364 , 506 P.2d at 130 , should have even more force where the identical words or phrases appear within the same sentence of a statutory definition.

1988This rule of consistent usage, which is a corollary of the principle that a statute should be interpreted so as to give consistent and harmonious effect to all of its parts, see People v. District Court, 713 P.2d at 921 ; Massey, 180 Colo. at 364 , 506 P.2d at 130 , should have even more force where the identical words or phrases appear within the same sentence of a statutory definition.

1985Hoehne Ditch Co., 76 Colo, at 508-09, 233 P. at 170-71 .

1983The bifurcated system in section 16-13-103, which incorporated the same-jury requirement discussed above, was not instituted until after our decision in People v. Chavez, 621 P.2d 1362 (Colo.1981).