33 Tennessee opinions name it 4 courts 1872–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Tennessee courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Nixgreen2 sentences2021See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 5(F)(4) (“A petition may be dismissed without a hearing if it . . . does not state the reasons that the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations.”); see also State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 464-65 (Tenn. 2001). 2015See Tenn. Sup. Ct. R. 28, § 5(F)(4) (“A petition may be dismissed without a hearing if it . . . does not state the reasons that the claim is not barred by the statute of limitations . . . .”); see also State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 464-65 (Tenn. 2001). | 3 | 3 |
Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co.green2 sentences2017In order to determine wheth er a contract “is inconsistent with public policy, courts may consider the purpose of the contract, whether any violation is inherent in the contract itself, as opposed to merely a collateral consequence, and, finally, whether the enforcement of the contract will have a detrimental effect on the public.” Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011)). “‘The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine 2017In order to determine wheth er a contract “is inconsistent with public policy, courts may consider the purpose of the contract, whether any violation is inherent in the contract itself, as opposed to merely a collateral consequence, and, finally, whether the enforcement of the contract will have a detrimental effect on the public.” Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011)). “‘The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine | 2 | 3 |
Home Beneficial Ass'n v. Whitegreen2 sentences2017In order to determine wheth er a contract “is inconsistent with public policy, courts may consider the purpose of the contract, whether any violation is inherent in the contract itself, as opposed to merely a collateral consequence, and, finally, whether the enforcement of the contract will have a detrimental effect on the public.” Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011)). “‘The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine 2017In order to determine wheth er a contract “is inconsistent with public policy, courts may consider the purpose of the contract, whether any violation is inherent in the contract itself, as opposed to merely a collateral consequence, and, finally, whether the enforcement of the contract will have a detrimental effect on the public.” Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011)). “‘The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine | 2 | 2 |
Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Longgreen2 sentences1986In Masters , we quoted the following from Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Long, 569 S.W.2d 444, 449 (Tenn.1978): The reasons for the requirement as to notice of injury are to give the employer an opportunity to make an investigation while the facts are accessible and also to enable him to provide timely and proper treatment for the injured employee. 1980Co. v. Long, Tenn., 569 S.W.2d 444, 449 (1978): “ ‘The reasons for the requirement as to notice of injury are to give the employer an opportunity to make an investigation while the facts are accessible, and also to enable him to provide timely and proper treatment for the injured employee.’ 82 Am.Jur.2d, Workmen’s Compensation § 443, p. 209. | 2 | 2 |
Gluck Brothers, Inc. v. Pollardgreen2 sentences2016“In determining whether an employee has shown a reasonable excuse for failure to give such notice, courts will consider the following criteria in light of the above reasons for the rule: (1) the employer’s actual knowledge of the employee’s injury, (2) lack of prejudice to the employer by an excusing of the requirement, and (3) the excuse or inability of the employee to timely notify the employer.” McCaleb, 910 S.W.2d at 415 (citing Gluck Bros., Inc. v. Pollard, 426 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1968)). 1995See Gluck Brothers, Inc. v. Pollard, 221 Tenn. 383 , 426 S.W.2d 763 (1968). | 1 | 2 |
Feagins v. Stategreen2 sentences1988The reasons for this requirement were ably stated by Judge Tatum, now retired, in Feagins v. State, 596 S.W.2d 108, 110 (Tenn.Crim.App.1979). 1982The reasons for the rule are discussed in Davidson, supra and Feagins, supra. We adhere to the clear and plain provisions of Rule 12(b)(3) and 12(f) as adopted by the Supreme Court and the General Assembly; we reject Lee’s insistance that the rule is not applicable when a violation of a constitutional right is claimed. | 1 | 2 |
Baugh v. Novakgreen1 sentence2017In order to determine wheth er a contract “is inconsistent with public policy, courts may consider the purpose of the contract, whether any violation is inherent in the contract itself, as opposed to merely a collateral consequence, and, finally, whether the enforcement of the contract will have a detrimental effect on the public.” Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011)). “‘The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine | 1 | 1 |
Leonard Edward Smith v. State of Tennesseegreen1 sentence2015“Whether due process considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 355 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
Ricky HARRIS v. STATE of Tennesseered1 sentence2015“Whether due process considerations require tolling of a statute of limitations is a mixed question of law and fact, which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness.” Smith v. State, 357 S.W.3d 322, 355 (Tenn. 2011) (quoting Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141, 145 (Tenn. 2010)). | 1 | 1 |
Vintage Health Resources, Inc. v. Guiangangreen1 sentence2011McCallum v. McIsaac, 159 Tenn. 655, 658 , 21 S.W.2d 392, 393 (1929) (indicating that "[t]o invalidate a contract for illegality, the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral”); Vintage Health Res., Inc. v. Guiangan, 309 S.W.3d at 466 (declaring that "Tennessee law is clear that, for a contract to be deemed unenforceable as violative of public policy, ‘the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral’ ”). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Evans v. Sheridengreen2 sentences2011See Home Beneficial Ass'n v. White, 180 Tenn. 585, 589 , 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (1944) (quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 , 51 S.Ct. 476 , 75 L.Ed. 1112 (1931) (stating that “[t]he principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine rests”)); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. at 190 , 246 S.W. at 522 (indicating that “[c]ourts will not declare contracts void on grounds of public policy except in cases free from doubt; a prejudice to the 2011See Home Beneficial Ass'n v. White, 180 Tenn. 585, 589 , 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (1944) (quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 , 51 S.Ct. 476 , 75 L.Ed. 1112 (1931) (stating that “[t]he principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine rests”)); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. at 190 , 246 S.W. at 522 (indicating that “[c]ourts will not declare contracts void on grounds of public policy except in cases free from doubt; a prejudice to the | 1 | 1 |
McCallum v. McIsaacgreen2 sentences2011McCallum v. McIsaac, 159 Tenn. 655, 658 , 21 S.W.2d 392, 393 (1929) (indicating that "[t]o invalidate a contract for illegality, the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral”); Vintage Health Res., Inc. v. Guiangan, 309 S.W.3d at 466 (declaring that "Tennessee law is clear that, for a contract to be deemed unenforceable as violative of public policy, ‘the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral’ ”). 9 . 2011McCallum v. McIsaac, 159 Tenn. 655, 658 , 21 S.W.2d 392, 393 (1929) (indicating that "[t]o invalidate a contract for illegality, the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral”); Vintage Health Res., Inc. v. Guiangan, 309 S.W.3d at 466 (declaring that "Tennessee law is clear that, for a contract to be deemed unenforceable as violative of public policy, ‘the illegality must be inherent, not merely collateral’ ”). 9 . | 1 | 1 |
Paschall's, Inc. v. Doziergreen1 sentence2010“The most significant requirement for a recovery on quasi contract is that the enrichment . . . be unjust.” Paschall’s, Inc. v. J.P.Dozier, 407 S.W.2d 150, 155 (Tenn. 1966). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Dyegreen1 sentence2000State v. Dye, 715 S.W.2d 36, 39-41 (Tenn. 1986)(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-668 , 672- 674, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2069-2070, 2073-2074 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Browngreen1 sentence2000The most important interest served by election, however, is to ensure that the jurors deliberate over and render a verdict based on the same offense[.] Id. at 391 (citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Bearden v. Georgiagreen2 sentences2000State v. Dye, 715 S.W.2d 36, 39-41 (Tenn. 1986)(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-668 , 672- 674, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2069-2070, 2073-2074 (1983)). 2000State v. Dye, 715 S.W.2d 36, 39-41 (Tenn. 1986)(citing Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-668 , 672- 674, 103 S.Ct. 2064, 2069-2070, 2073-2074 (1983)). | 1 | 1 |
Masters v. Industrial Garments Manufacturing Co.green1 sentence1995See Masters v. Industrial Garments Manufacturing Co., 595 S.W.2d 811 (Tenn.1980). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Tennessee. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Lewis v. Palmer
green
2 sentences1872Hence Mr. Edwards at p. 59 of his work on Bills & Notes, after laying down the general proposition, adds: “But as between the drawer and the holder there are many circumstances that will excuse a delay or a failure to demand payment,” and as examples he says: “As if he have no funds on which he drew, or having funds there, withdrawing them to his own use;” and at page 377, he adds another example: “If the bank itself be restrained by an order of court from paying out money or transacting business, presentment is excused;” and he then gives the reasons for the exception: “because the law does n 1872Hence Mr. Edwards at p. 59 of his work on Bills & Notes, after laying down the general proposition, adds: “But as between the drawer and the holder there are many circumstances that will excuse a delay or a failure to demand payment,” and as examples he says: “As if he have no funds on which he drew, or having funds there, withdrawing them to his own use;” and at page 377, he adds another example: “If the bank itself be restrained by an order of court from paying out money or transacting business, presentment is excused;” and he then gives the reasons for the exception: “because the law does n | 3 | 1872–1872 |
Murray v. Judah
green
2 sentences1872Hence Mr. Edwards at p. 59 of his work on Bills & Notes, after laying down the general proposition, adds: “But as between the drawer and the holder there are many circumstances that will excuse a delay or a failure to demand payment,” and as examples he says: “As if he have no funds on which he drew, or having funds there, withdrawing them to his own use;” and at page 377, he adds another example: “If the bank itself be restrained by an order of court from paying out money or transacting business, presentment is excused;” and he then gives the reasons for the exception: “because the law does n 1872Hence Mr. Edwards at p. 59 of his work on Bills & Notes, after laying down the general proposition, adds: “But as between the drawer and the holder there are many circumstances that will excuse a delay or a failure to demand payment,” and as examples he says: “As if he have no funds on which he drew, or having funds there, withdrawing them to his own use;” and at page 377, he adds another example: “If the bank itself be restrained by an order of court from paying out money or transacting business, presentment is excused;” and he then gives the reasons for the exception: “because the law does n | 3 | 1872–1872 |
Artis Whitehead v. State of Tennessee
green
2 sentences2025Counsel in Whitehead erroneously advised the petitioner of the deadline for filing a pro se post-conviction petition and failed to deliver promptly to the petitioner the litigation files necessary to prepare the petition. 402 S.W.3d at 632-33 . 2021“Issues regarding whether due process require[s] the tolling of the post-conviction statute of limitations are mixed questions of law and fact and are, therefore, subject to de novo review.” Whitehead, 402 S.W.3d at 621 . | 2 | 2021–2025 |
York v. Federal Chemical Co.
green
2 sentences1978Black Diamond Collieries v. Deal, 144 Tenn. 465 , 234 S.W. 322 (1921); Brookside Mills v. Harrison, 158 Tenn. 86 , 11 S.W.2d 679 (1928); Hartwell Motor Co. v. Hickerson, 160 Tenn. 513 , 26 S.W.2d 153 (1930); York v. Federal Chemical Co., 188 Tenn. 63 , 216 S.W.2d 725 (1949); Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Industries, Inc., 212 Tenn. 291 , 369 S.W.2d 721 (1963); International Playing Card & Label Co., Inc. v. Broyles, supra. “The reasons for the requirement as to notice of injury are to give the employer an opportunity to make an investigation while the facts are accessible, and also to enable hi 1978Black Diamond Collieries v. Deal, 144 Tenn. 465 , 234 S.W. 322 (1921); Brookside Mills v. Harrison, 158 Tenn. 86 , 11 S.W.2d 679 (1928); Hartwell Motor Co. v. Hickerson, 160 Tenn. 513 , 26 S.W.2d 153 (1930); York v. Federal Chemical Co., 188 Tenn. 63 , 216 S.W.2d 725 (1949); Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Industries, Inc., 212 Tenn. 291 , 369 S.W.2d 721 (1963); International Playing Card & Label Co., Inc. v. Broyles, supra. “The reasons for the requirement as to notice of injury are to give the employer an opportunity to make an investigation while the facts are accessible, and also to enable hi | 2 | 1978–1980 |
In Re Baby
green
1 sentence2017In order to determine wheth er a contract “is inconsistent with public policy, courts may consider the purpose of the contract, whether any violation is inherent in the contract itself, as opposed to merely a collateral consequence, and, finally, whether the enforcement of the contract will have a detrimental effect on the public.” Baby, 447 S.W.3d at 823 (citing Baugh v. Novak, 340 S.W.3d 372, 382 (Tenn. 2011)). “‘The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine | 1 | 2017–2017 |
McCaleb v. Saturn Corp.
green
1 sentence2016“In determining whether an employee has shown a reasonable excuse for failure to give such notice, courts will consider the following criteria in light of the above reasons for the rule: (1) the employer’s actual knowledge of the employee’s injury, (2) lack of prejudice to the employer by an excusing of the requirement, and (3) the excuse or inability of the employee to timely notify the employer.” McCaleb, 910 S.W.2d at 415 (citing Gluck Bros., Inc. v. Pollard, 426 S.W.2d 763 (Tenn. 1968)). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
State v. Leiderman
green
1 sentence2011This court has noted “ where, as here, the transcript demonstrates the trial court provided adequate findings at the conclusion of the probation revocation hearing showing both the grounds for the revocation and reasons for the court’s findings, the due process requirement of a ‘written statement’ is satisfied.” Id. at 591 ; see also State v. Shawn Mitchell, No. M2008-00913-CCA-R3-CD, 2009 WL 3031183 , at *8 (Tenn. Crim. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
White v. McMath
neutral
1 sentence2011See Home Beneficial Ass'n v. White, 180 Tenn. 585, 589 , 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (1944) (quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 , 51 S.Ct. 476 , 75 L.Ed. 1112 (1931) (stating that “[t]he principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine rests”)); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. at 190 , 246 S.W. at 522 (indicating that “[c]ourts will not declare contracts void on grounds of public policy except in cases free from doubt; a prejudice to the | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Stansell v. Roach
green
1 sentence2011See Home Beneficial Ass'n v. White, 180 Tenn. 585, 589 , 177 S.W.2d 545, 546 (1944) (quoting Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356-57 , 51 S.Ct. 476 , 75 L.Ed. 1112 (1931) (stating that “[t]he principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine rests”)); Stansell v. Roach, 147 Tenn. at 190 , 246 S.W. at 522 (indicating that “[c]ourts will not declare contracts void on grounds of public policy except in cases free from doubt; a prejudice to the | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Badgett v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2003The reasons for the rule, as given in the Patten case, were variously stated to be that “Courts do not sit to declare abstract propositions of law” and that, “[in matters common to all citizens], the law confers upon the duly-elected representatives of the people the sole right to appeal to the courts for redress” and that “if cities could not exercise public powers, even erroneously or unwisely, when lawfully done by their constituted legislative authority, without the concurrence of every citizen or taxpayer, it *504 would be impossible to have municipal governments.... ” In the rather recen 2003The reasons for the rule, as given in the Patten case, were variously stated to be that “Courts do not sit to declare abstract propositions of law” and that, “[in matters common to all citizens], the law confers upon the duly-elected representatives of the people the sole right to appeal to the courts for redress” and that “if cities could not exercise public powers, even erroneously or unwisely, when lawfully done by their constituted legislative authority, without the concurrence of every citizen or taxpayer, it *504 would be impossible to have municipal governments.... ” In the rather recen | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Key v. Harris
green
1 sentence1992The reasons for the presumption are that “family life abounds in acts of reciprocal kindness which tend to promote the comfort and convenience of the family, and that the introduction of commercial considerations into the relations of persons so closely bound together would expel this spirit of mutual beneficence and to that extent mar family unity.” Kay v. Harris, 116 Tenn. at 171 , 92 S.W. at 237. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Burlison v. State
green
1 sentence1991Id. at 137 . | 1 | 1991–1991 |
| State v. Mitchell green | 1 | 1988–1988 |
State v. Fears
green
1 sentence1988Burlison has been followed in State v. Fears, 659 S.W.2d 370 (Tenn.Cr.App.1983) and in State v. Mitchell, 737 S.W.2d 298 (Tenn.Cr.App.1987), stating that the necessity for requiring the State to make an election of the particular offense it will rely on for conviction is fundamental, immediately trenching [on] the constitutional rights of an accused. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
| State v. Davidson green | 1 | 1982–1982 |
| Sherman v. United States green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Black Diamond Collieries v. Deal neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Smith v. Tennessee Furniture Industries, Inc. green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Brookside Mills & American Mutual Liability Ins. v. Harrison neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Hartwell Motor Co., Inc. v. Hickerson green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Williams v. Brown Manufacturing Co. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Defelice v. Ford Motor Co. green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Williams v. Ford Motor Company green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Tisdale v. Tisdale green | 1 | 1963–1963 |
| Carter v. Pickwick Greyhound Lines, Inc. green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Curran v. State green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Perkins v. Johnson green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Parker v. Bethel Hotel Co. green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Poteete v. State green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Wheelock v. Moulton green | 1 | 1896–1896 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.