reasons rule in New York

2026Rather, the court must determine in each case whether the reasons for the doctrine are present and whether the purposes of the doctrine will be served by its application" ( Heller v Coca-Cola Co. , 230 AD2d 768, 769 [2d Dept 1996] [citation omitted], lv dismissed & denied 89 NY2d 856 [1996]; see Lauer v New York Tel.

2019Rather, the court must determine in each case whether the reasons for the doctrine are present and whether the purposes of the doctrine will be served by its application" ( Heller v Coca-Cola Co. , 230 AD2d 768, 769 [1996]).

2016After reviewing the affirmations submitted, the court grants the following awards as reasonable compensation based upon the reasons and factors (see Matter of Loftman [Mae R.], 123 AD3d 1034, 1036 [2014]) set forth below: Marianne Simoni, Esq., the Court Evaluator, is awarded the reasonable sum of $22,748, inclusive of disbursements, for 82.72 hours of professional services rendered (at $275 per hour) for appearing on numerous conferences and for preparing her excellent and thorough 53-page report (see Matter of Marion C.W. [Lisa K.-Maguire], 83 AD3d 1089, 1090 [2011]; Matter of Charles X., 66

2015After reviewing the entire record and history of this proceeding, the court grants the following awards as reasonable compensation based upon the reasons and factors (see Matter of Loftman [Mae R.], 123 AD3d 1034, 1036 [2014]) set forth below: Alan M.

1964Livingston v. Wyatt, supra, p. 392 ; see Matter of Blum, 9 Misc. 57 ; see, also, U. S. Const., 4th Arndt., and Civil Rights Law, § 8), and that such probable cause is not shown where the information is based solely on information and belief without a statement of the sources thereof and the grounds of belief. “ In People v. Scott (3 N Y 2d 148), handed down after the County Court had decided the instant case, we dealt with a problem closely analogous to that presented here.

1958Livingston v. Wyatt, supra, p. 392 ; see Matter of Blum, 9 Misc. 57 ; see, also, U. S. Const., 4th Amdt., and Civil Eights Law, § 8), and that such probable cause is not shown where the information is based solely on information and belief without a statement of the sources thereof and the grounds of belief.

2003Such a finding is entitled to great deference (see People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350 [1990], affd 500 US 352 [1991]).

1998Were we to review them, we would find, from the totality of the record, that the trial court properly followed the protocols required by Batson v Kentucky ( 476 US 79 ), and correctly concluded that the reasons provided by defense counsel for exercising a peremptory challenge were pretextual (see, People v Hernandez, 75 NY2d 350 , affd 500 US 352 ; People v Warwick, 239 AD2d 124 , lv denied 90 NY2d 865 ).

1966Co., supra.) As a final word on the matter, the Supreme Court of the United States in Twin City Co. v. Harding Glass Co. ( 283 U. S. 353, 356-357 ) stated that “ the principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine rests.” Even with this caution in mind, in the light of the cases cited and in the light of the facts of this ease, the court must conclude that the contracts being sued upon here are unenforcible because they were made in contravention of the public polic

1963In Twin City Co. v. Harding Glass Co. ( 283 U. S. 353, 356-357 [1931]) the United States Supreme Court said: “ The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not enforceable should be applied with caution and only in cases plainly within the reasons on which that doctrine rests.” Since the major protection afforded the insured is that of the existence of an insurable interest, in the life of the assured, the lack of written consent (there is evidence that the insured was consulted orally before the policy was issued) is merely an incident of the public policy and does not g

2026Co. , 231 AD2d 126, 129 [3d Dept 1997]).

2026Rather, the court must determine in each case whether the reasons for the doctrine are present and whether the purposes of the doctrine will be served by its application" ( Frasier v Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. , ___ AD3d at ___, 2026 NY Slip Op 01110, *2 [internal quotation marks and citations omitted]).

2017Regardless, even under the longer time period, plaintiffs’ claims for breach of fiduciary duty are untimely for the same reasons their claim for fraud is untimely (see Gonik v Israel Discount Bank of N.Y., 80 AD3d 437, 438 [1st Dept 2011]).

2016After reviewing the affirmations submitted, the court grants the following awards as reasonable compensation based upon the reasons and factors (see Matter of Loftman [Mae R.], 123 AD3d 1034, 1036 [2014]) set forth below: Marianne Simoni, Esq., the Court Evaluator, is awarded the reasonable sum of $22,748, inclusive of disbursements, for 82.72 hours of professional services rendered (at $275 per hour) for appearing on numerous conferences and for preparing her excellent and thorough 53-page report (see Matter of Marion C.W. [Lisa K.-Maguire], 83 AD3d 1089, 1090 [2011]; Matter of Charles X., 66

2016After reviewing the affirmations submitted, the court grants the following awards as reasonable compensation based upon the reasons and factors (see Matter of Loftman [Mae R.], 123 AD3d 1034, 1036 [2014]) set forth below: Marianne Simoni, Esq., the Court Evaluator, is awarded the reasonable sum of $22,748, inclusive of disbursements, for 82.72 hours of professional services rendered (at $275 per hour) for appearing on numerous conferences and for preparing her excellent and thorough 53-page report (see Matter of Marion C.W. [Lisa K.-Maguire], 83 AD3d 1089, 1090 [2011]; Matter of Charles X., 66

2015(People v James, 4 NY2d 482, 485 [1958] [“The reasons for this rule are said to be that a reasonable guarantee of probable cause is required before interference with a person’s liberty ... is justified]; People v Hussain, 25 Misc 3d 1245[A] , 2009 NY Slip Op 52588[U] [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2009] [accusatory instrument charging criminal contempt for violating order of protection dismissed because the accusatory instrument failed to identify the protected person]; People v Quinones, 190 Misc 2d 648 [Crim Ct, Kings County 2002] [accusatory instrument not disclosing the name of complaining witness

2015(See People v Dreyden, 15 NY3d 100, 104 [2010] [accusatory instrument dismissed because it contained only complainant’s conclusory statement that object recovered from defendant was a gravity knife with no allegation as to the basis of complainant’s belief]; People ex rel.

2011In other words, where no ambiguity or doubt appears in a statute, the court should confine its attention to the statute and not allow extrinsic circumstances to introduce a difficulty in the interpretation of plain language.” (Id. § 120, Comment.) So the Court of Appeals has held that “[r]esort to legislative history will be countenanced only where the language is ambiguous or where a literal construction would lead to absurd or un reasonable consequences that are contrary to the purpose of the enactment” (Matter of Auerbach v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 86 NY2d 198, 2

2011In other words, where no ambiguity or doubt appears in a statute, the court should confine its attention to the statute and not allow extrinsic circumstances to introduce a difficulty in the interpretation of plain language.” (Id. § 120, Comment.) So the Court of Appeals has held that “[r]esort to legislative history will be countenanced only where the language is ambiguous or where a literal construction would lead to absurd or un reasonable consequences that are contrary to the purpose of the enactment” (Matter of Auerbach v Board of Educ. of City School Dist. of City of N.Y., 86 NY2d 198, 2

2011Of particular relevance here are decisions finding that corporate ownership of a property, in and of itself, does not preclude application of the homeowner exception to sections 240 and 241 (6) (see Baez v Cow Bay Constr., 303 AD2d 528, 528-529 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]; Telfer v Gunnison Lakeshore Orchards, 245 AD2d 620, 621 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 803 [1998]; see also Castellanos v United Cerebral Palsy Assn. of Greater Suffolk, Inc., 77 AD3d 879, 880 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 704 [2011]; Uddin v Three Bros.

2011This exception to those Labor Law sections was enacted for essentially the same reasons as the exception to section 7-210, and the Court of Appeals has held that its remedial purpose requires that it be applied flexibly and pragmatically (see Bartoo v Buell, 87 NY2d 362, 367-368 [1996]).

2011Of particular relevance here are decisions finding that corporate ownership of a property, in and of itself, does not preclude application of the homeowner exception to sections 240 and 241 (6) (see Baez v Cow Bay Constr., 303 AD2d 528, 528-529 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]; Telfer v Gunnison Lakeshore Orchards, 245 AD2d 620, 621 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 803 [1998]; see also Castellanos v United Cerebral Palsy Assn. of Greater Suffolk, Inc., 77 AD3d 879, 880 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 704 [2011]; Uddin v Three Bros.

2011Of particular relevance here are decisions finding that corporate ownership of a property, in and of itself, does not preclude application of the homeowner exception to sections 240 and 241 (6) (see Baez v Cow Bay Constr., 303 AD2d 528, 528-529 [2003], lv denied 2 NY3d 701 [2004]; Telfer v Gunnison Lakeshore Orchards, 245 AD2d 620, 621 [1997], lv denied 92 NY2d 803 [1998]; see also Castellanos v United Cerebral Palsy Assn. of Greater Suffolk, Inc., 77 AD3d 879, 880 [2010], lv denied 16 NY3d 704 [2011]; Uddin v Three Bros.