47 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1902–2026 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Delacruz v. Stategreen2 sentences2026Accord Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 396 (3) ( 627 SE2d 579 ) (2006). 13 proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the accused.”14 Moreover, it is the underlying reasons for the rule “which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”15 And only if the allegations “fail to meet these tests is the variance 2026Accord Delacruz v. State, 280 Ga. 392, 396 (3) ( 627 SE2d 579 ) (2006). 13 proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to affect the substantial rights of the accused.”14 Moreover, it is the underlying reasons for the rule “which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.”15 And only if the allegations “fail to meet these tests is the variance | 4 | 5 |
Denson v. Stategreen2 sentences1995It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 884 (2) ( 443 SE2d 300 ) (1994). 1995It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Denson v. State, 212 Ga. App. 883, 884 (2) ( 443 SE2d 300 ) (1994). | 2 | 2 |
De Palma v. Stategreen2 sentences1992"Based on DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469 (3) ( 169 SE2d 801 ) (1969), our courts have departed from an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. "`"The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to `affect the substantial rights' of the accused."' [Cits.] . . . [I]t is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense [and] not to b 1992"Based on DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469 (3) ( 169 SE2d 801 ) (1969), our courts have departed from an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. "`"The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to `affect the substantial rights' of the accused."' [Cits.] . . . [I]t is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense [and] not to b | 2 | 2 |
Partridge v. Stategreen2 sentences1992"Based on DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469 (3) ( 169 SE2d 801 ) (1969), our courts have departed from an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. "`"The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to `affect the substantial rights' of the accused."' [Cits.] . . . [I]t is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense [and] not to b 1992"Based on DePalma v. State, 225 Ga. 465, 469 (3) ( 169 SE2d 801 ) (1969), our courts have departed from an overly technical application of the fatal variance rule, focusing instead on materiality. "`"The true inquiry, therefore, is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether there has been such a variance as to `affect the substantial rights' of the accused."' [Cits.] . . . [I]t is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense [and] not to b | 2 | 2 |
Dixon v. Stategreen2 sentences2024On appeal, the State raises two sentencing issues, which the State claims should have resulted in a longer sentence for Starks.8 8 In Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017), we held that “when a merger error benefits a defendant and the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, we henceforth will exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our own initiative only in exceptional circumstances.” One of the primary reasons for this rule is the perceived “unfairness in a practice that effectively penalizes defendants for exercising their right to seek appellate review of t 2024On appeal, the State raises two sentencing issues, which the State claims should have resulted in a longer sentence for Starks.8 8 In Dixon v. State, 302 Ga. 691, 698 (4) (808 SE2d 696) (2017), we held that “when a merger error benefits a defendant and the State fails to raise it by cross-appeal, we henceforth will exercise our discretion to correct the error upon our own initiative only in exceptional circumstances.” One of the primary reasons for this rule is the perceived “unfairness in a practice that effectively penalizes defendants for exercising their right to seek appellate review of t | 1 | 1 |
Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLCgreen2 sentences2022Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (135 SCt 2401, 192 LEd2d 463) (2015). 2022Kimble v. Marvel Entm’t, LLC, 576 U.S. 446, 455 (135 SCt 2401, 192 LEd2d 463) (2015). | 1 | 1 |
Green v. Stategreen2 sentences2015(Citation omitted.) Green v. State, 301 Ga. App. 343, 344 ( 687 SE2d 623 ) (2009). 2015(Citation omitted.) Green v. State, 301 Ga. App. 343, 344 ( 687 SE2d 623 ) (2009). | 1 | 1 |
Hernandez v. Stategreen2 sentences2014Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” *618 (Citation omitted.) Hernandez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 876, 878 (1) ( 738 SE2d 701 ) (2013). 2014Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” *618 (Citation omitted.) Hernandez v. State, 319 Ga. App. 876, 878 (1) ( 738 SE2d 701 ) (2013). | 1 | 1 |
Weeks v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Weeks v. State, 274 Ga. App. 122, 125 (1) ( 616 SE2d 852 ) (2005). 2013Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” (Citation, punctuation, and footnote omitted.) Weeks v. State, 274 Ga. App. 122, 125 (1) ( 616 SE2d 852 ) (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Flanagan v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” (Citations omitted.) Flanagan v. State, 265 Ga. App. 122, 125 (2) ( 592 SE2d 894 ) (2004). 2007Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” (Citations omitted.) Flanagan v. State, 265 Ga. App. 122, 125 (2) ( 592 SE2d 894 ) (2004). | 1 | 1 |
Jackson v. Stategreen2 sentences1997The State then argued that other jurors who had been seated on the jury had done home renovations, were going to serve in the military, and had been victims of crime. 1 At this point,.the court determined that the reasons Pickett offered were not race-neutral. “ ‘[Although the proponent of the strike must provide a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, what is meant by a “legitimate reason” is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 265 G 1997The State then argued that other jurors who had been seated on the jury had done home renovations, were going to serve in the military, and had been victims of crime. 1 At this point,.the court determined that the reasons Pickett offered were not race-neutral. “ ‘[Although the proponent of the strike must provide a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, what is meant by a “legitimate reason” is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 265 G | 1 | 1 |
Hutchison v. Stategreen2 sentences1996It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hutchison v. State, 218 Ga. App. 601, 602 ( 462 SE2d 648 ) (1995). 1996It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Hutchison v. State, 218 Ga. App. 601, 602 ( 462 SE2d 648 ) (1995). | 1 | 1 |
Sparkman v. Stategreen2 sentences1994It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sparkman v. State, 209 Ga. App. 763, 766 (4) ( 434 SE2d 564 ) (1993). 1994It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Sparkman v. State, 209 Ga. App. 763, 766 (4) ( 434 SE2d 564 ) (1993). | 1 | 1 |
Gordon v. Stategreen2 sentences1993It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gordon v. State, 206 Ga. App. 450, 453 (2) (b) ( 425 SE2d 906 ) (1992). 1993It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.” (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Gordon v. State, 206 Ga. App. 450, 453 (2) (b) ( 425 SE2d 906 ) (1992). | 1 | 1 |
Lawhorn v. Stategreen2 sentences1993It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.’ [Cit.]” Lawhorn v. State, 200 Ga. App. 451, 453-454 (1) ( 408 SE2d 425 ) (1991). 1993It is the underlying reasons for the rule which must be served: 1) the allegations must definitely inform the accused as to the charges against him so as to enable him to present his defense and not to be taken by surprise, and 2) the allegations must be adequate to protect the accused against another prosecution for the same offense.’ [Cit.]” Lawhorn v. State, 200 Ga. App. 451, 453-454 (1) ( 408 SE2d 425 ) (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Wallace v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Some of the reasons for this rule were stated in Henderson v. State, [ 234 Ga. 827 ( 218 SE2d 612 ) (1975)], at p. 829, as follows: "(1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one's general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury." [ Milton v. 1989Some of the reasons for this rule were stated in Henderson v. State, [ 234 Ga. 827 ( 218 SE2d 612 ) (1975)], at p. 829, as follows: "(1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one's general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury." [ Milton v. | 1 | 1 |
Milton v. Stategreen2 sentences1989Some of the reasons for this rule were stated in Henderson v. State, [ 234 Ga. 827 ( 218 SE2d 612 ) (1975)], at p. 829, as follows: "(1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one's general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury." [ Milton v. 1989Some of the reasons for this rule were stated in Henderson v. State, [ 234 Ga. 827 ( 218 SE2d 612 ) (1975)], at p. 829, as follows: "(1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one's general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury." [ Milton v. | 1 | 1 |
Webb v. McDanielgreen2 sentences1982Besides, the present plaintiff was in no sense a party (to the criminal prosecution); she had not part nor lot in it; she could not even examine or cross-examine a witness.’ ” Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 368 ( 127 SE2d 900 ) (1962). 1982Besides, the present plaintiff was in no sense a party (to the criminal prosecution); she had not part nor lot in it; she could not even examine or cross-examine a witness.’ ” Webb v. McDaniel, 218 Ga. 366, 368 ( 127 SE2d 900 ) (1962). | 1 | 1 |
Price v. High Shoals Manufacturing Co.green2 sentences1980Co., 132 Ga. 246, 248-249 ( 64 SE 87 ) (1909): "Under a proper construction [of the pertinent Code sections], every riparian owner is entitled to a reasonable use of the water in the stream. 1980Co., 132 Ga. 246, 248-249 ( 64 SE 87 ) (1909): "Under a proper construction [of the pertinent Code sections], every riparian owner is entitled to a reasonable use of the water in the stream. | 1 | 1 |
| Shockley v. Storeygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Yancey v. Graftongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Andrews v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Davis v. Arthurgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McGinty v. Gormleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mutual Canning Co. v. DeGuenthergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sovereign Camp of the Woodmen of the World v. Winngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Great Western Mining & Manufacturing Co. v. Harrisgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Turner v. State
green
2 sentences2004(Cit.) Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Turner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 747 -748 (1) ( 500 SE2d 628 ) (1998). 2004(Cit.) Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” (Punctuation and footnotes omitted.) Turner v. State, 231 Ga. App. 747 -748 (1) ( 500 SE2d 628 ) (1998). | 2 | 1999–2004 |
Delaney v. State
green
2 sentences1991In Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827 (1) ( 218 SE2d 612 ) (1975), this court noted that the reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one’s general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the is 1991In *675 Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827 (1), 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975), this court noted that the reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one's general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply th | 2 | 1989–1991 |
Henderson v. State
green
2 sentences1991In Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827 (1) ( 218 SE2d 612 ) (1975), this court noted that the reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one’s general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the is 1991In *675 Henderson v. State, 234 Ga. 827 (1), 218 S.E.2d 612 (1975), this court noted that the reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one's general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply th | 2 | 1989–1991 |
Harris v. Harris
green
2 sentences1991Co., 248 Ga. 306 ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981) (setting forth the `traditional policy reasons favoring retention of the common-law immunity rule')], that the reasons for the immunity rule simply do not exist here, and that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not apply to bar [this] claim." (Emphasis supplied.) Harris, supra. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722 ( 371 SE2d 265 ) (1988), cited in the special concurrence, is an aberration unless construed simply as a holding that, unlike the situation in Harris, supra, the evidence in Stanfield was not sufficient to show that the reason 1991Co., 248 Ga. 306 ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981) (setting forth the `traditional policy reasons favoring retention of the common-law immunity rule')], that the reasons for the immunity rule simply do not exist here, and that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not apply to bar [this] claim." (Emphasis supplied.) Harris, supra. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722 ( 371 SE2d 265 ) (1988), cited in the special concurrence, is an aberration unless construed simply as a holding that, unlike the situation in Harris, supra, the evidence in Stanfield was not sufficient to show that the reason | 2 | 1988–1991 |
Chambers v. State
green
1 sentence2015Only if the allegations fail to meet these tests is the variance “fatal.” Id. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Batson v. Kentucky
green
1 sentence1997The State then argued that other jurors who had been seated on the jury had done home renovations, were going to serve in the military, and had been victims of crime. 1 At this point,.the court determined that the reasons Pickett offered were not race-neutral. “ ‘[Although the proponent of the strike must provide a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, what is meant by a “legitimate reason” is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 265 G | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Purkett v. Elem
green
1 sentence1997The State then argued that other jurors who had been seated on the jury had done home renovations, were going to serve in the military, and had been victims of crime. 1 At this point,.the court determined that the reasons Pickett offered were not race-neutral. “ ‘[Although the proponent of the strike must provide a clear and reasonably specific explanation of his legitimate reasons for exercising the challenges, what is meant by a “legitimate reason” is not a reason that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection.’ (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Jackson v. State, 265 G | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Stanfield v. Stanfield
green
2 sentences1991Co., 248 Ga. 306 ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981) (setting forth the `traditional policy reasons favoring retention of the common-law immunity rule')], that the reasons for the immunity rule simply do not exist here, and that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not apply to bar [this] claim." (Emphasis supplied.) Harris, supra. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722 ( 371 SE2d 265 ) (1988), cited in the special concurrence, is an aberration unless construed simply as a holding that, unlike the situation in Harris, supra, the evidence in Stanfield was not sufficient to show that the reason 1991Co., 248 Ga. 306 ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981) (setting forth the `traditional policy reasons favoring retention of the common-law immunity rule')], that the reasons for the immunity rule simply do not exist here, and that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not apply to bar [this] claim." (Emphasis supplied.) Harris, supra. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722 ( 371 SE2d 265 ) (1988), cited in the special concurrence, is an aberration unless construed simply as a holding that, unlike the situation in Harris, supra, the evidence in Stanfield was not sufficient to show that the reason | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Robeson v. International Indemnity Co.
green
2 sentences1991Co., 248 Ga. 306 ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981) (setting forth the `traditional policy reasons favoring retention of the common-law immunity rule')], that the reasons for the immunity rule simply do not exist here, and that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not apply to bar [this] claim." (Emphasis supplied.) Harris, supra. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722 ( 371 SE2d 265 ) (1988), cited in the special concurrence, is an aberration unless construed simply as a holding that, unlike the situation in Harris, supra, the evidence in Stanfield was not sufficient to show that the reason 1991Co., 248 Ga. 306 ( 282 SE2d 896 ) (1981) (setting forth the `traditional policy reasons favoring retention of the common-law immunity rule')], that the reasons for the immunity rule simply do not exist here, and that the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity does not apply to bar [this] claim." (Emphasis supplied.) Harris, supra. Stanfield v. Stanfield, 187 Ga. App. 722 ( 371 SE2d 265 ) (1988), cited in the special concurrence, is an aberration unless construed simply as a holding that, unlike the situation in Harris, supra, the evidence in Stanfield was not sufficient to show that the reason | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cottingham v. Weeks
neutral
1 sentence1982Held: “The general rule in this country is that the record in a criminal prosecution is no bar to a subsequent civil action arising from the same occurrence, and is not competent evidence in the civil action. [Cit.] This is the rule in Georgia [Cits.] The reasons for the rule were enunciated in [Cottingham v. Weeks, 54 Ga. 275 (1875)] as follows: ‘It *772 (the subsequent civil action) is not between the same parties; different rules, as to the competency of witnesses and as to the weight of evidence necessary to the finding, exist. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Johnson v. United States
green
2 sentences1980A contrary rule 'that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.’ Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 . 1980A contrary rule `that evidence sufficient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion of police officers.' Johnson v. United States, 333 U. S. 10, 14 . | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Hutchins v. Nash green | 1 | 1971–1971 |
| Ark. La. Lumber Co. v. Causey green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Ozan Lumber Company v. McNeely green | 1 | 1967–1967 |
| Kirtland v. Mayor of Macon green | 1 | 1962–1962 |
| Bee v. Cooper green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| Metropolitan Life Insurance v. Saul green | 1 | 1945–1945 |
| Perry v. McLendon green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| High v. Hollis green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Farmer v. Baird green | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Port Royal Railroad v. Hammond neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Rogers v. Johns neutral | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Hudson v. Hudson green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| State Ex Rel. City of Wolf Point v. McFarlan neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Ames v. People ex rel. Temple green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Estus v. State Ex Rel. Dinwiddie neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Gustine v. Westenberger neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Smith v. Machesney neutral | 1 | 1928–1928 |
| Booth v. Clark green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Sims v. Sims green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Hale v. Allinson green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Keatley v. Furey green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Hall v. State green | 1 | 1911–1911 |
| State v. Scott green | 1 | 1902–1902 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.