reasons immunity in West Virginia

2013In short, “ ‘[w]here liability insurance is present, the reasons for immunity completely disappear.’” Id. (quoting Gooden v. County Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 171 W.Va. 130, 132 , 298 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1982)).

2013In short, “‘[w]here liability insurance is present, the reasons for immunity completely disappear.’” Id. (quoting Gooden v. County Comm’n of Webster Cnty., 171 W.

1950It is now regarded as the privileges of persons attending court in their several capacities as well as the privilege of the court. * * *" That such immunity does now exist against service of civil process in certain cases is well established by the Whited case, supra, and by Lang et al. v. Shaw, Judge, etc., 113 W.Va. 628 , 169 S.E. 444 , wherein it was held: "A party who is charged with a criminal offense in a county other than that in which he resides, and who was released on his own personal recognizance, and who, in pursuance thereof, appears and answers to the charge on the day set for tr

1950It is now regarded as the privileges of persons attending court in their several capacities as well as the privilege of the court. * * *" That such immunity does now exist against service of civil process in certain cases is well established by the Whited case, supra, and by Lang et al. v. Shaw, Judge, etc., 113 W.Va. 628 , 169 S.E. 444 , wherein it was held: "A party who is charged with a criminal offense in a county other than that in which he resides, and who was released on his own personal recognizance, and who, in pursuance thereof, appears and answers to the charge on the day set for tr

1950Godby v. Chambers, Judge, 130 W.Va. 115 , 42 S.E.2d 255 , we held that a person brought in from another county and placed in jail was not immume from the service of civil process while serving a term of imprisonment, but it was stated in that case that the reasons for the immunity rule did not apply after conviction and sentence.

1950Godby v. Chambers, Judge, 130 W.Va. 115 , 42 S.E.2d 255 , we held that a person brought in from another county and placed in jail was not immume from the service of civil process while serving a term of imprisonment, but it was stated in that case that the reasons for the immunity rule did not apply after conviction and sentence.

1998Es-toppel of this character is not sustainable unless a party has been induced to rely upon asserted facts or representations and thereby moved or acted to his detriment, or in a manner he would not have done but for his reliance upon such asserted facts or representations.”); ABCD...Vision v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 84 Or.App. 645 , 734 P.2d 1376 (1987) (recognizing that doctrine of estoppel requires showing that insured was prejudiced *317 by the insurer’s attempt to' assert an alternate ground for declination when it had earlier denied coverage on a different, yet specific, ground), overruled,

1998Es-toppel of this character is not sustainable unless a party has been induced to rely upon asserted facts or representations and thereby moved or acted to his detriment, or in a manner he would not have done but for his reliance upon such asserted facts or representations.”); ABCD...Vision v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 84 Or.App. 645 , 734 P.2d 1376 (1987) (recognizing that doctrine of estoppel requires showing that insured was prejudiced *317 by the insurer’s attempt to' assert an alternate ground for declination when it had earlier denied coverage on a different, yet specific, ground), overruled,

1998Es-toppel of this character is not sustainable unless a party has been induced to rely upon asserted facts or representations and thereby moved or acted to his detriment, or in a manner he would not have done but for his reliance upon such asserted facts or representations.”); ABCD...Vision v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 84 Or.App. 645 , 734 P.2d 1376 (1987) (recognizing that doctrine of estoppel requires showing that insured was prejudiced *317 by the insurer’s attempt to' assert an alternate ground for declination when it had earlier denied coverage on a different, yet specific, ground), overruled,

1998Es-toppel of this character is not sustainable unless a party has been induced to rely upon asserted facts or representations and thereby moved or acted to his detriment, or in a manner he would not have done but for his reliance upon such asserted facts or representations.”); ABCD...Vision v. Fireman’s Fund Ins., 84 Or.App. 645 , 734 P.2d 1376 (1987) (recognizing that doctrine of estoppel requires showing that insured was prejudiced *317 by the insurer’s attempt to' assert an alternate ground for declination when it had earlier denied coverage on a different, yet specific, ground), overruled,

1995As this Court recently stated in Gooden v. County Comm’n of Webster County, 171 W.Va. 130 , 298 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1982): “Where liability insurance is present, the reasons for immunity completely disappear.” The exception was addressed more recently in Eggleston v. West Virginia Department of Highways, 189 W.Va. 230 , 429 S.E.2d 636 (1993).

1995As this Court recently stated in Gooden v. County Comm’n of Webster County, 171 W.Va. 130 , 298 S.E.2d 103, 105 (1982): “Where liability insurance is present, the reasons for immunity completely disappear.” The exception was addressed more recently in Eggleston v. West Virginia Department of Highways, 189 W.Va. 230 , 429 S.E.2d 636 (1993).

1987Thus, the statute which incorporated the in loco parentis doctrine is unrelated to and perhaps inconsistent with the concepts underlying our child neglect and abuse statute. 6 Furthermore, as the court in Pennsylvania State Education Ass’n, 449 A.2d at 92 , points out in regard to its similar statute: “It is our opinion that the statutory provision invests authority in public school teachers; it does not impose a duty upon them.

1971No one is permitted to be present, when they are voting on an indictment, not even the prosecuting attorney, or the judge of the court, and no person, not a witness sworn and sent before them to give evidence, or the prosecuting attorney for the purpose of advising them upon questions of law only, is permitted to be present at any time while they are considering evidence.” For an enlightening discussion of the reasons for the rule which rejects the evidence of petit jurors to impeach their verdict, see the opinion of Judge Brannon in Pickens v. Boom Company, 58 W.Va. 11 , 50 S.E. 872 , 6 Ann.

1971No one is permitted to be present, when they are voting on an indictment, not even the prosecuting attorney, or the judge of the court, and no person, not a witness sworn and sent before them to give evidence, or the prosecuting attorney for the purpose of advising them upon questions of law only, is permitted to be present at any time while they are considering evidence.” For an enlightening discussion of the reasons for the rule which rejects the evidence of petit jurors to impeach their verdict, see the opinion of Judge Brannon in Pickens v. Boom Company, 58 W.Va. 11 , 50 S.E. 872 , 6 Ann.

1968Commenting on the rule stated immediately above in the Adkinson case, the Court, in Browning v. Monongahela Transport Company, 126 W.Va. 195 , 27 S.E.2d 481 , said: "The reasons for this rule, so far as they apply to the evidence, are familiar.

1968Commenting on the rule stated immediately above in the Adkinson case, the Court, in Browning v. Monongahela Transport Company, 126 W.Va. 195 , 27 S.E.2d 481 , said: "The reasons for this rule, so far as they apply to the evidence, are familiar.

1968As stated in Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.

1962“Under the modem view, building restrictions are regarded more as a protection to the property owner and the public rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies.” Brandon v. Price (Ky.), 314 S. W. 2d 521, 523 ; Macy v. Wormald (Ky.), 329 S. W. 2d 212, 214 . *390 “Accordingly, in legal contemplation the servitude imposed on each lot runs to and attaches itself to each of the rest of the lots in the restricted area, thus forming a network of cross-easements or cross-servitudes, the aggregate effect of which is to impose a

1962“Under the modem view, building restrictions are regarded more as a protection to the property owner and the public rather than as a restriction on the use of property, and the old-time doctrine of strict construction no longer applies.” Brandon v. Price (Ky.), 314 S. W. 2d 521, 523 ; Macy v. Wormald (Ky.), 329 S. W. 2d 212, 214 . *390 “Accordingly, in legal contemplation the servitude imposed on each lot runs to and attaches itself to each of the rest of the lots in the restricted area, thus forming a network of cross-easements or cross-servitudes, the aggregate effect of which is to impose a

1950It is now regarded as the privileges of persons attending court in their several capacities as well as the privilege of the court. * * *" That such immunity does now exist against service of civil process in certain cases is well established by the Whited case, supra, and by Lang et al. v. Shaw, Judge, etc., 113 W.Va. 628 , 169 S.E. 444 , wherein it was held: "A party who is charged with a criminal offense in a county other than that in which he resides, and who was released on his own personal recognizance, and who, in pursuance thereof, appears and answers to the charge on the day set for tr

1950It is now regarded as the privileges of persons attending court in their several capacities as well as the privilege of the court. * * *" That such immunity does now exist against service of civil process in certain cases is well established by the Whited case, supra, and by Lang et al. v. Shaw, Judge, etc., 113 W.Va. 628 , 169 S.E. 444 , wherein it was held: "A party who is charged with a criminal offense in a county other than that in which he resides, and who was released on his own personal recognizance, and who, in pursuance thereof, appears and answers to the charge on the day set for tr

1931The reasons for this rule were stated many years ago in McMechen v. McMechen, 17 W.

1918The reasons for the exception are stated so fully and aptly in Allen v. Lopinsky, 94 S. E. 369 , and Hess v. Marinari, decided January 22, 1918, that repitition is not required.

1913The reasons for this rule and the legal principles underlying it .are sufficiently covered by the opinions in the cases cited, and particularly in the cases of Dunfee v. Childs and Perlcins v. Pfalzgraf, supra, and we need not reiterate them.

1913These cases or some of them apply this rule to infants as well as adults proceeding by prochein ami before majority, as they may, Poling v. Poling, 61 W.