43 Massachusetts opinions name it 4 courts 1875–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Massachusetts courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Calderongreen2 sentences2010We must “make our own [de novo] determination whether the Commonwealth’s reasons for the challenge were race-neutral.” Id. 2002By requiring the prosecutor to explain the reasons for her challenge, the judge implicitly found that the challenge might be improper. 1 See Commonwealth v. Calderon, 431 Mass. 21, 25-26 (2000), and cases cited. | 1 | 3 |
Commonwealth v. Rodriguezgreen1 sentence2025Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 457 Mass. 461, 473 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Gravel v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2025See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972) (Federal speech and debate clause "prohibits inquiry into things done by" member of senator's staff "which would have been legislative acts, and therefore privileged" [citation omitted]). [10] The speech or debate clause of art. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Pruntygreen1 sentence2024See Commonwealth v. Prunty, 462 Mass. 295, 312-313 (2012) (judge's decision on ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents finding of fact). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Laynegreen1 sentence2020See Layne, 386 Mass. at 295-296 , and cases cited. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Issagreen2 sentences2016See also Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1 , 11 n.14 (2013) ("Where, as here, a judge fails to find a prima facie case or otherwise require the prosecutor to provide an explanation, the record on appeal includes no explanation of the prosecutor's reasons for the challenge, the defendant is not given an opportunity to reply to the explanation, and the judge does not make the required findings as to the adequacy and genuineness of the prosecutor's explanation. 2016See also Commonwealth v. Issa, 466 Mass. 1 , 11 n.14 (2013) (“Where, as here, a judge fails to find a prima facie case or otherwise require the prosecutor to provide an explanation, the record on appeal includes no explanation of the prosecutor’s reasons for the challenge, the defendant is not given an opportunity to reply to the explanation, and the judge does not make the required findings as to the adequacy and genuineness of the prosecutor’s explanation. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Benoitgreen1 sentence2010See Commonwealth v. Benoit, 452 Mass. 212, 223 (2008) (“Where the necessary findings by the judge are absent, as an appellate court we must consider more directly the adequacy and genuineness of the prosecutor’s stated reasons, rather than confine ourselves to a review of the judge’s findings”). | 1 | 1 |
Leahy v. L. 1526, AM. FED. OF ST., COUNTY, & MUN. EMP.green1 sentence2006See Leahy v. Local 1526, 399 Mass. at 350-51 (noting that absence of a dispute over the facts removes one of the principal reasons for the doctrine of primary jurisdiction). | 1 | 1 |
Tibbitts v. Wisniewskigreen1 sentence2005See Parrell v. Keenan, 389 Mass. at 815 n.7 (“[t]he reason for relief set forth in Rule 60[b][l] cannot be the basis for relief under Rule 60[b][6]”); Tibbitts v. Wisniewski, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 729, 734 (1989) (“time limits on a [b][l] or [b][3] motion may not be extended by the expedient of bringing it under [b][6]”). | 1 | 1 |
Parrell v. Keenangreen1 sentence2005See Parrell v. Keenan, 389 Mass. at 815 n.7 (“[t]he reason for relief set forth in Rule 60[b][l] cannot be the basis for relief under Rule 60[b][6]”); Tibbitts v. Wisniewski, 27 Mass. App. Ct. 729, 734 (1989) (“time limits on a [b][l] or [b][3] motion may not be extended by the expedient of bringing it under [b][6]”). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Burnettgreen1 sentence2002See Commonwealth v. Burnett, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 , S.C., 418 Mass. 769 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Burnettgreen1 sentence2002See Commonwealth v. Burnett, 36 Mass. App. Ct. 1, 5 , S.C., 418 Mass. 769 (1994). | 1 | 1 |
State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division v. Campbellgreen1 sentence2001See Alaska Dept. of Rev. v. Campbell, 931 P.2d 416, 420 (Alaska 1997); Goold v. Goold, 11 Conn. App. 268, 274 (1987); 24A Am. | 1 | 1 |
Goold v. Gooldgreen1 sentence2001See Alaska Dept. of Rev. v. Campbell, 931 P.2d 416, 420 (Alaska 1997); Goold v. Goold, 11 Conn. App. 268, 274 (1987); 24A Am. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Applegategreen1 sentence1999The reasons for this rule were well stated by the Oregon Court of Appeals in State v. Applegate, 39 Or. | 1 | 1 |
Hastings v. Commissioner of Correctiongreen1 sentence1997See also Hastings, supra at 53 . ‘Abdullah attached to his complaint a “summary/key issues” sheet from the classification board of the department on which there is a typed notation that he was “[pjroperly notified of [the] hearing.” This conclusory statement, which is not attributed to a specific individual or made under oath, fails to state specifically whether ‘Abdullah was informed of the reasons for the hearing. | 1 | 1 |
Collins v. Collinsgreen1 sentence1994This conclusion is consistent with our cases indicating that a landowner’s duty of reasonable care “is not violated by a failure to remove a natural accumulation of snow or ice,” Sullivan v. Brookline, supra at 827 , since one of the reasons for that rule is that “in this climate ... a number of conditions might exist which within a very short time could cause the formation of ice . . . without fault of the owner and without reasonable opportunity on his part to remove it or warn against it or even to ascertain its presence.” Aylward v. McCloskey, 412 Mass. 77, 80-81 (1992), quoting Collins v. | 1 | 1 |
Aylward v. McCloskeygreen1 sentence1994This conclusion is consistent with our cases indicating that a landowner’s duty of reasonable care “is not violated by a failure to remove a natural accumulation of snow or ice,” Sullivan v. Brookline, supra at 827 , since one of the reasons for that rule is that “in this climate ... a number of conditions might exist which within a very short time could cause the formation of ice . . . without fault of the owner and without reasonable opportunity on his part to remove it or warn against it or even to ascertain its presence.” Aylward v. McCloskey, 412 Mass. 77, 80-81 (1992), quoting Collins v. | 1 | 1 |
Cranberry Realty & Mortgage Co. v. Ackerley Communications, Inc.green1 sentence1989Cranberry Realty & Mortgage Co. v. Ackerley Communications, Inc., 17 Mass. App. Ct. 255, 258 (1983). | 1 | 1 |
Goes v. Feldmangreen1 sentence1989Goes v. Feldman, 8 Mass. App. Ct. 84, 87-89 (1979), which discusses some of the reasons for the rule. | 1 | 1 |
Toussie v. United Statesred2 sentences1988I dissent. 4 In Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970), Justice Black stated for the Court the reasons for such a principle: “In deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a given case several considerations guide our decision. 1988Super. 385 (1982) (statute of limitations is substantive and may not be applied to offenses commited prior to effective date). [1] In Toussie v. United States, 397 U.S. 112, 114-115 (1970), Justice Black stated for the Court the reasons for such a principle: "In deciding when the statute of limitations begins to run in a given case several considerations guide our decision. | 1 | 1 |
Commonwealth v. Heskethgreen1 sentence1988We quote at length from Commonwealth v. Hesketh, 386 Mass. 153, 160-161 (1982): “As a matter of right, a defendant is entitled to reasonable cross-examination of witnesses to show bias or prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Blausteingreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Manngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cowley v. Pulsifergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Casella v. Sneiersongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Murphy v. Mart Realty of Brockton, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Bessey v. Salemmegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. McCangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bourke v. Callanangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bradley v. Fishergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Massachusetts. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Gilman v. Congregational Home Missionary Society
green
2 sentences1943The reasons for this rule, apart from the natural meaning of the word, are stated in Whall v. Converse, 146 Mass. 345 , Jewett v. Jewett, 200 Mass. 310, 316 , and Gilman v. Congregational Home Missionary Society, 276 Mass. 580, 583 . 1935It is unnecessary to discuss the reasons for this rule or to cite the long line of cases in which the rule has been applied, running down to the present time (Gilman v. Congregational Home Mission ary Society, 276 Mass. 580 , Calder v. Bryant, 282 Mass. 231 ), for the appellants do not dispute the rule itself, but rest their cause upon the contention that this is one of the comparatively few cases in which the will does indicate that the testator intended that his heirs at law should be ascertained as of the date of the death of his son instead of the date, of his own death. | 2 | 1935–1943 |
Calder v. Bryant
green
2 sentences1943Later cases applying this general rule are Calder v. Bryant, 282 Mass. 231 , Old Colony Trust Co. v. Clarke, 291 Mass. 17 , and Corey v. Guarente, 303 Mass. 569 . 1935It is unnecessary to discuss the reasons for this rule or to cite the long line of cases in which the rule has been applied, running down to the present time (Gilman v. Congregational Home Mission ary Society, 276 Mass. 580 , Calder v. Bryant, 282 Mass. 231 ), for the appellants do not dispute the rule itself, but rest their cause upon the contention that this is one of the comparatively few cases in which the will does indicate that the testator intended that his heirs at law should be ascertained as of the date of the death of his son instead of the date, of his own death. | 2 | 1935–1943 |
Zeitlin v. Zeitlin
green
2 sentences1941Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass. 205 . 1927It was said in Renwick v. Macomber, 233 Mass. 530 , at page 534, following the decisions in Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, 202 Mass. 205 , and Boyd v. Boyd, 226 Mass. 542 , that “The suppression or concealment of material facts as distinguished from the introduction of false and fabricated testimony does not, and in principle should not, change the accepted rule of public policy that litigation should cease when parties have had a day in court.” The reasons for the rule so established are fully set forth in Zeitlin v. Zeitlin, supra, and must be regarded as the settled law in this Commonwealth. | 2 | 1927–1941 |
Evans v. Multicon Construction Corp.
green
2 sentences2019Corp ., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291 , 295, 375 N.E.2d 338 (1978) : "the judge should not take it upon [herself or] himself to nullify a jury's verdict by granting a new trial unless it appears on a survey of the whole case that otherwise a miscarriage of justice would result." The reasons this standard is used should be clear. 2019Corp ., 6 Mass. App. Ct. 291 , 295, 375 N.E.2d 338 (1978) : "the judge should not take it upon [herself or] himself to nullify a jury's verdict by granting a new trial unless it appears on a survey of the whole case that otherwise a miscarriage of justice would result." The reasons this standard is used should be clear. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Federal Election Commission v. Beaumont
green
2 sentences2018But this time, the **441 plaintiffs seek to avail themselves of a more rigorous standard of review, contending that -- although under the First Amendment, § 8 need only be "closely drawn" to advance a "sufficiently important interest," Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 162 , 123 S.Ct. 2200 -- under equal protection principles, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling interest." See Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340 , 130 S.Ct. 876 . 2018But this time, the **441 plaintiffs seek to avail themselves of a more rigorous standard of review, contending that -- although under the First Amendment, § 8 need only be "closely drawn" to advance a "sufficiently important interest," Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 162 , 123 S.Ct. 2200 -- under equal protection principles, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling interest." See Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340 , 130 S.Ct. 876 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
cluster 1741
green
2 sentences2018But this time, the **441 plaintiffs seek to avail themselves of a more rigorous standard of review, contending that -- although under the First Amendment, § 8 need only be "closely drawn" to advance a "sufficiently important interest," Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 162 , 123 S.Ct. 2200 -- under equal protection principles, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling interest." See Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340 , 130 S.Ct. 876 . 2018But this time, the **441 plaintiffs seek to avail themselves of a more rigorous standard of review, contending that -- although under the First Amendment, § 8 need only be "closely drawn" to advance a "sufficiently important interest," Beaumont , 539 U.S. at 162 , 123 S.Ct. 2200 -- under equal protection principles, it is subject to strict scrutiny, and therefore must be "narrowly tailored" to serve a "compelling interest." See Citizens United , 558 U.S. at 340 , 130 S.Ct. 876 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Department of Youth Services v. a Juvenile
green
1 sentence2014Id. at 526 . | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Sullivan v. Town of Brookline
green
1 sentence1994This conclusion is consistent with our cases indicating that a landowner’s duty of reasonable care “is not violated by a failure to remove a natural accumulation of snow or ice,” Sullivan v. Brookline, supra at 827 , since one of the reasons for that rule is that “in this climate ... a number of conditions might exist which within a very short time could cause the formation of ice . . . without fault of the owner and without reasonable opportunity on his part to remove it or warn against it or even to ascertain its presence.” Aylward v. McCloskey, 412 Mass. 77, 80-81 (1992), quoting Collins v. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Commonwealth v. Blondin green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Commonwealth v. McNeil green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Marshal House, Inc. v. Rent Control Board of Brookline green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| Carter v. Yardley & Co. green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Galbraith v. Levin green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Hanscom v. Malden & Melrose Gas Light Co. green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| James v. City of Newton green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Whall v. Converse green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Jewett v. Jewett green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Old Colony Trust Co. v. Clarke green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Gorey v. Guarente green | 1 | 1943–1943 |
| Boyd v. Boyd neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Wright v. Macomber green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Renwick v. Macomber green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Burgess v. Burgess green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Morgan v. Smith green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad v. Hardy green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Boston Safe Deposit & Trust Co. v. Parker neutral | 1 | 1908–1908 |
| State v. Courtemarch green | 1 | 1907–1907 |
| Rosenthal v. Schneider green | 1 | 1903–1903 |
| Tyler v. Old Colony Railroad green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Alvord v. Cook green | 1 | 1899–1899 |
| Curry v. Porter green | 1 | 1887–1887 |
| Andrews v. Inhabitants of Boylston green | 1 | 1875–1875 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.