reasons rule in Iowa

2019Id. (quoting Henderson v. State, 218 S.E.2d 612, 615 (Ga. 1975)).

2019Id. (quoting Henderson v. State , 234 Ga. 827 , 218 S.E.2d 612 , 615 (1975) ).

2019Id. (quoting Henderson v. State , 234 Ga. 827 , 218 S.E.2d 612 , 615 (1975) ).

1977“The reasons for the rule prohibiting proof of specific acts of violence appear to be at least threefold: (1) A single act may have been exceptional, unusual, and not characteristic and thus a specific act does not necessarily establish one’s general character; (2) although the state is bound to foresee that the general character of the deceased may be put in issue, it cannot anticipate and prepare to rebut each and every specific act of violence; and (3) permitting proof of specific acts would multiply the issues, prolong the trial and confuse the jury.” Henderson v. State, supra, 234 Ga. at

1971The reasons for the rule are well stated in State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153 , 216 N.W. 787, 788 .

1971The reasons for the rule are well stated in State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153 , 216 N.W. 787, 788 .

1971The reasons for the rule are well stated in State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153 , 216 N.W. 787, 788 .

1971The reasons for the rule are well stated in State v. McTague, 173 Minn. 153 , 216 N.W. 787, 788 .

1937The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dewey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 , 126 N. W. 168 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 , 128 N. W. 338 .

1930The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dowey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 .” Again, in Sheridan Bros. v. Dealy, 198 Iowa 877 , we said: “The granting of a new trial is a matter resting largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion will not be interfered with, where a new trial has been granted, unless it appears to have been abused.

1937The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dewey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 , 126 N. W. 168 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 , 128 N. W. 338 .

1937The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dewey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 , 126 N. W. 168 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 , 128 N. W. 338 .

1937The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dewey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 , 126 N. W. 168 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 , 128 N. W. 338 .

1937The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dewey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 , 126 N. W. 168 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 , 128 N. W. 338 .

1937“Again, in Sheridan Bros. v. Dealy, 198 Iowa 877 , 200 N. W. 335 , 336, we said: “ ‘The granting of a new trial is a matter resting largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion will not be interfered with, where a new trial has been granted, unless it appears to have been abused.

1930The reasons for this rule have so many times been given that it is needless to do more than cite some of the cases in support thereof: Dowey v. Railroad Co., 31 Iowa 373 ; Royer v. Plaster Co., 147 Iowa 277 ; Holland v. Kelly, 149 Iowa 391 .” Again, in Sheridan Bros. v. Dealy, 198 Iowa 877 , we said: “The granting of a new trial is a matter resting largely in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the exercise of this discretion will not be interfered with, where a new trial has been granted, unless it appears to have been abused.

2020Thacker, 862 N.W.2d at 408 .

2017Ct., 688 N.W.2d 790 , 795–96 (Iowa 2004) (“[W]hen the circumstances of a 6 particular case meet the standard set forth in Gagnon [v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973)], due process requires that counsel be appointed to represent indigent parolees.”).

2011The reasons for this rule are that “after alighting, the passenger’s individual choice directs where he or she will walk,” and “the passenger is in a better position to guard against the dangers of moving vehicles.” Id.

2011By contrast, the “law has estab-' lished some specific duties owed by a school bus driver to pupil/passengers.” Id. at 700 .

1994As to juror Rekemeyer, defense counsel said, “Thanks, Your Honor, I would like to challenge this juror for cause.” As to juror Jacobson, defense counsel stated, ‘Tour Honor, I would like to challenge this juror for cause.” Under similar circumstances, this court in State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 , 100 S.Ct. 1859 , 64 L.Ed.2d 277 (1980), held that it could not review the court’s ruling because the challenge was not sufficient to preserve any error.

1994As to juror Rekemeyer, defense counsel said, “Thanks, Your Honor, I would like to challenge this juror for cause.” As to juror Jacobson, defense counsel stated, ‘Tour Honor, I would like to challenge this juror for cause.” Under similar circumstances, this court in State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 , 100 S.Ct. 1859 , 64 L.Ed.2d 277 (1980), held that it could not review the court’s ruling because the challenge was not sufficient to preserve any error.

1994As to juror Rekemeyer, defense counsel said, “Thanks, Your Honor, I would like to challenge this juror for cause.” As to juror Jacobson, defense counsel stated, ‘Tour Honor, I would like to challenge this juror for cause.” Under similar circumstances, this court in State v. Williams, 285 N.W.2d 248, 267 (Iowa 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 921 , 100 S.Ct. 1859 , 64 L.Ed.2d 277 (1980), held that it could not review the court’s ruling because the challenge was not sufficient to preserve any error.

1970These reasons were most strongly articulated by Justice Rutledge in McKenna v. Austin, 1943, 77 App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659, 662 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 : “The rule’s results are incongruous.

1970These reasons were most strongly articulated by Justice Rutledge in McKenna v. Austin, 1943, 77 App.D.C. 228 , 134 F.2d 659, 662 , 148 A.L.R. 1253 : “The rule’s results are incongruous.

1967In support see Zarrella v. Miller, supra. As to the contention that there must be a common liability to the injured person before there can be contribution, I would adopt here what was said in the dissent in Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., supra, with reference to the concept of common liability and common culpability or fault without repeating and apply it to the instant case. "* * * Any right to common law contribution is of rather recent origin in the United States and it is proper for the courts to prescribe the terms under which it may be exercised. * * * `[I]t is the

1967In support see Zarrella v. Miller, supra. As to the contention that there must be a common liability to the injured person before there can be contribution, I would adopt here what was said in the dissent in Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., supra, with reference to the concept of common liability and common culpability or fault without repeating and apply it to the instant ease. * * Amy right to common law contribution is of rather recent origin in the United States and it is proper for the courts to prescribe the terms under which it may be exercised. * * It is the same sys

1967In Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., 259 Iowa 314, 321 , 144 N.W.2d 303, 307 , in speaking of inter-spousal immunity we said: “While the analogy between this special defense and that of a compensable injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws is appropriate, the rationale back of the two special defenses is entirely different.” Although there may be a difference between the rationale back of the special defense under Workmen’s Compensation Laws and that under interspousal immunity, I believe there is an analogy between the reasons for the immunity resulting from family rela

1967In Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., 259 Iowa 314, 321 , 144 N.W.2d 303, 307 , in speaking of inter-spousal immunity we said: “While the analogy between this special defense and that of a compensable injury under the Workmen’s Compensation Laws is appropriate, the rationale back of the two special defenses is entirely different.” Although there may be a difference between the rationale back of the special defense under Workmen’s Compensation Laws and that under interspousal immunity, I believe there is an analogy between the reasons for the immunity resulting from family rela

1967In support see Zarrella v. Miller, supra. As to the contention that there must be a common liability to the injured person before there can be contribution, I would adopt here what was said in the dissent in Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., supra, with reference to the concept of common liability and common culpability or fault without repeating and apply it to the instant ease. * * Amy right to common law contribution is of rather recent origin in the United States and it is proper for the courts to prescribe the terms under which it may be exercised. * * It is the same sys

1967In support see Zarrella v. Miller, supra. As to the contention that there must be a common liability to the injured person before there can be contribution, I would adopt here what was said in the dissent in Iowa Power and Light Co. v. Abild Construction Co., supra, with reference to the concept of common liability and common culpability or fault without repeating and apply it to the instant ease. * * Amy right to common law contribution is of rather recent origin in the United States and it is proper for the courts to prescribe the terms under which it may be exercised. * * It is the same sys

1943In State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 258 , 98 P. 122, 131 , 22 L.

1943In State v. Keefe, 17 Wyo. 227, 258 , 98 P. 122, 131 , 22 L.

1943“And of course when the reason of the rule ceases, the rule has no application.” Wilkes v. Hood, 237 Ala. 72, 76 , 185 So. 748, 752 , and cases cited; 1 Am.

1943“And of course when the reason of the rule ceases, the rule has no application.” Wilkes v. Hood, 237 Ala. 72, 76 , 185 So. 748, 752 , and cases cited; 1 Am.

1943S. 1340, section 106b; Marine Trust Co. v. Roden, 218 Mich. 693 , 188 N. W. 397 . -One of the underlying reasons for the rule against splitting a cause of action is' that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits or subjected to costs and expenses incident to two or more suits on the same cause of action.

1943S. 1340, section 106b; Marine Trust Co. v. Roden, 218 Mich. 693 , 188 N. W. 397 . -One of the underlying reasons for the rule against splitting a cause of action is' that no person should be unnecessarily harassed with a multiplicity of suits or subjected to costs and expenses incident to two or more suits on the same cause of action.

1940U. W., 244 Mass. 556, 566 , 138 N. E. 918 , 924, the court expresses the reasons for the rule, as follows: “It doubtless was designed to prevent hostile attacks upon an institution in which large numbers of persons are interested, except through the instrumentality of a public officer, and to render impossible the harm which might come to a solvent and worthy beneficiary corporation insuring great numbers of people through ill-considered proceedings.