reasons rule in Montana

2023In re S.E., 2022 MT 205, ¶ 18 , 410 Mont. 345 , 519 P.3d 11 ; In re R.W.K., 2013 MT 54, ¶ 18 , 369 Mont. 193 , 297 P.3d 318 (citations omitted). ¶10 Pursuant to § 53-21-119(1), MCA, J.D.L. could have validly waived his right to be physically present at his commitment hearing in two ways: (1) if J.D.L. was capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, J.D.L. could have waived his own right to be physically present; or (2) if J.D.L. was not capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, that right could have been waived by J.D.L.’s counsel and appointed friend acting together if

2022In re R.W.K., 2013 MT 54, ¶ 18 , 369 Mont. 193 , 297 P.3d 318 (citations omitted). ¶12 Pursuant to § 53-21-119(1), MCA, T.A. could have validly waived her rights in two ways: (1) if T.A. was capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, T.A. could have waived her own rights; or (2) if T.A. was not capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, those rights may be waived by T.A.’s counsel and appointed friend acting together if a record was made of the reasons for the waiver.

2023In re S.E., 2022 MT 205, ¶ 18 , 410 Mont. 345 , 519 P.3d 11 ; In re R.W.K., 2013 MT 54, ¶ 18 , 369 Mont. 193 , 297 P.3d 318 (citations omitted). ¶10 Pursuant to § 53-21-119(1), MCA, J.D.L. could have validly waived his right to be physically present at his commitment hearing in two ways: (1) if J.D.L. was capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, J.D.L. could have waived his own right to be physically present; or (2) if J.D.L. was not capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, that right could have been waived by J.D.L.’s counsel and appointed friend acting together if

2022In re R.W.K., 2013 MT 54, ¶ 18 , 369 Mont. 193 , 297 P.3d 318 (citations omitted). ¶12 Pursuant to § 53-21-119(1), MCA, T.A. could have validly waived her rights in two ways: (1) if T.A. was capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, T.A. could have waived her own rights; or (2) if T.A. was not capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, those rights may be waived by T.A.’s counsel and appointed friend acting together if a record was made of the reasons for the waiver.

2003Rather, the trial court “must clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to order a Rule 54(b) certification.” Roy, 188 Mont. at 86 , 610 P.2d at 1189 .

2003Rather, the trial court “must clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to order a Rule 54(b) certification.” Roy, 188 Mont. at 86 , 610 P.2d at 1189 .

2025Section 27-1-221(7)(b), MCA (2021); 5 Osman v. Cavalier, 2011 MT 60, ¶ 16 , 360 Mont. 17 , 251 P.3d 686 . ¶27 The District Court found that the Workmans had actual and constructive notice of the Easement, acted without consulting an attorney or doing any legal research despite their experience selling real estate, and were aware the well provided the only source of water to Lot 4.

2025Section 27-1-221(7)(b), MCA (2021); 5 Osman v. Cavalier, 2011 MT 60, ¶ 16 , 360 Mont. 17 , 251 P.3d 686 . ¶27 The District Court found that the Workmans had actual and constructive notice of the Easement, acted without consulting an attorney or doing any legal research despite their experience selling real estate, and were aware the well provided the only source of water to Lot 4.

2023In re S.E., 2022 MT 205, ¶ 18 , 410 Mont. 345 , 519 P.3d 11 ; In re R.W.K., 2013 MT 54, ¶ 18 , 369 Mont. 193 , 297 P.3d 318 (citations omitted). ¶10 Pursuant to § 53-21-119(1), MCA, J.D.L. could have validly waived his right to be physically present at his commitment hearing in two ways: (1) if J.D.L. was capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, J.D.L. could have waived his own right to be physically present; or (2) if J.D.L. was not capable of making an intentional and knowing decision, that right could have been waived by J.D.L.’s counsel and appointed friend acting together if

2021We agree. ¶24 “When considering whether to review an IAC claim on direct appeal, we first must determine whether the claim is based on the trial record.” State v. Sawyer, 2019 MT 93, ¶ 13 , 395 Mont. 309 , 439 P.3d 931 .

2021We agree. ¶24 “When considering whether to review an IAC claim on direct appeal, we first must determine whether the claim is based on the trial record.” State v. Sawyer, 2019 MT 93, ¶ 13 , 395 Mont. 309 , 439 P.3d 931 .

2018In re N.A., 2014 MT 257 , ¶ 10, 376 Mont. 379 , 334 P.3d 915 .

2018In re N.A., 2014 MT 257 , ¶ 10, 376 Mont. 379 , 334 P.3d 915 .

2018In re N.A., 2014 MT 257 , ¶ 10, 376 Mont. 379 , 334 P.3d 915 .

2014A district court must inquire into whether the person who is the subject of a petition for involuntary commitment is capable of making an intentional and knowing waiver of rights. 5 In re A.M., 2014 MT 221, ¶ 11 , __ Mont. __, __ P.3d __ (citation omitted).

2012Lobatz, 222 F.3d at 1148; Hemphill, 225 F.R.D. at 621-22 . ¶69 The Court reasons that the requirement for an objector to *198 demonstrate evidence of collusion from other sources “begs the question of just how such evidence could be obtained in a closed proceeding.” Opinion, ¶ 34.1 am aware of no cases, however, in which the settlement negotiations have been open to all comers.

2011Ward, 236 Mont. at 320-21 , 769 P.2d at 1233-34 . ¶17 A district court, having heard the evidence and observed the witnesses, sits in the best position to determine whether the facts of a case justify an award of punitive damages.

2011Ward, 236 Mont. at 320-21 , 769 P.2d at 1233-34 . ¶17 A district court, having heard the evidence and observed the witnesses, sits in the best position to determine whether the facts of a case justify an award of punitive damages.

1984“The reasonableness of such an award can only be determined after there has been an equitable division of the marital estate . . ” In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61 , 580 P.2d 439 ; it serves to determine value of property when “the parties themselves cannot agree as to what the court found their net worth to be.” Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178 Mont. 341 , 583 P.2d 1072 ; “. . . such a determination of net worth provides a basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review . . . “ In re the Marriage of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282 , 607 P.2d 102 , 37 St.Rep. 247 .

1984“The reasonableness of such an award can only be determined after there has been an equitable division of the marital estate . . ” In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61 , 580 P.2d 439 ; it serves to determine value of property when “the parties themselves cannot agree as to what the court found their net worth to be.” Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178 Mont. 341 , 583 P.2d 1072 ; “. . . such a determination of net worth provides a basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review . . . “ In re the Marriage of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282 , 607 P.2d 102 , 37 St.Rep. 247 .

1984“The reasonableness of such an award can only be determined after there has been an equitable division of the marital estate . . ” In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61 , 580 P.2d 439 ; it serves to determine value of property when “the parties themselves cannot agree as to what the court found their net worth to be.” Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178 Mont. 341 , 583 P.2d 1072 ; “. . . such a determination of net worth provides a basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review . . . “ In re the Marriage of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282 , 607 P.2d 102 , 37 St.Rep. 247 .

1984“The reasonableness of such an award can only be determined after there has been an equitable division of the marital estate . . ” In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61 , 580 P.2d 439 ; it serves to determine value of property when “the parties themselves cannot agree as to what the court found their net worth to be.” Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178 Mont. 341 , 583 P.2d 1072 ; “. . . such a determination of net worth provides a basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review . . . “ In re the Marriage of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282 , 607 P.2d 102 , 37 St.Rep. 247 .

1984“The reasonableness of such an award can only be determined after there has been an equitable division of the marital estate . . ” In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61 , 580 P.2d 439 ; it serves to determine value of property when “the parties themselves cannot agree as to what the court found their net worth to be.” Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178 Mont. 341 , 583 P.2d 1072 ; “. . . such a determination of net worth provides a basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review . . . “ In re the Marriage of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282 , 607 P.2d 102 , 37 St.Rep. 247 .

1984“The reasonableness of such an award can only be determined after there has been an equitable division of the marital estate . . ” In re Marriage of Kramer (1978), 177 Mont. 61 , 580 P.2d 439 ; it serves to determine value of property when “the parties themselves cannot agree as to what the court found their net worth to be.” Vivian v. Vivian (1978), 178 Mont. 341 , 583 P.2d 1072 ; “. . . such a determination of net worth provides a basis for this Court to conduct meaningful review . . . “ In re the Marriage of Hamilton v. Hamilton (1980), 186 Mont. 282 , 607 P.2d 102 , 37 St.Rep. 247 .

1981It must accept the allegations of the petitioner or, at best, the uncross-examined testimony of the petitioner . . . ’ Rankin , at 536, 458 P.2d at 178 .

1947Co., supra, with approval and gave as one of the reasons for the rule the statement from Hains v. Parkersburg, M. & I, Railway Co., 71 W.

1947Va. 453 , 76 S. E. 843, 844 .

1924The reasons for the exception are well presented in State v. Hendricks, 15 Mont. 194 , 48 Am.

1922Co., reported in 22 Mont. 340 , 56 Pac. 592 , gives expression to this rule, together with the reasons for the rule as follows: “The true rule, with the reasons underlying it, may, we think, be thus stated: The losing party has a right to ask for a new trial upon any one or more of the grounds recognized by the statute; it is the duty of the court to grant a new trial whenever it shall appear that statutory grounds exist therefor; the statement or bill of exceptions resembles, in its nature, a complaint, and this is attacked by the specifications very much as the complaint is assailed by a dem

1922Co., reported in 22 Mont. 340 , 56 Pac. 592 , gives expression to this rule, together with the reasons for the rule as follows: “The true rule, with the reasons underlying it, may, we think, be thus stated: The losing party has a right to ask for a new trial upon any one or more of the grounds recognized by the statute; it is the duty of the court to grant a new trial whenever it shall appear that statutory grounds exist therefor; the statement or bill of exceptions resembles, in its nature, a complaint, and this is attacked by the specifications very much as the complaint is assailed by a dem