reasons rule in Colorado

2016See People v. Smith , 181 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2007); Pagan , 165 P.3d 724 . ¶90 One of the reasons for this rule is that in determining the proper amount of restitution owed, sentencing courts may consider both uncharged and acquitted criminal conduct that has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence; courts are not limited to considering only the criminal conduct which a defendant was found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed.

2016See People v. Smith, 181 P.3d 324 (Colo. App. 2007); Pagan, 165 P.3d 724 . ¶ 90 One of the reasons for this rule is that in determining the proper amount of restitution owed, sentencing courts may consider both uncharged and acquitted criminal conduct that has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence; courts are not limited to considering only the criminal conduct which a defendant was found beyond a reasonable doubt to have committed.

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914PI. & Pr., p. 780: In Hallack v. Stockdale, 14 Colo. 198 , 23 Pac. 340 , the following language is used: “It is a well settled rule of this court, as well as of all courts of appellate jurisdiction, and a cardinal principle, that the jury is the final and only tribunal to determine questions of 'fact, and that where facts are so- found, their finding will not be disturbed by the appellate court, unless misconstrued by the court, or their verdict is so palpably incorrect as to show bias, prejudice, or a wanton disregard of the duties and obligations of jurors; and this rule is -well established

1914PI. & Pr., p. 780: In Hallack v. Stockdale, 14 Colo. 198 , 23 Pac. 340 , the following language is used: “It is a well settled rule of this court, as well as of all courts of appellate jurisdiction, and a cardinal principle, that the jury is the final and only tribunal to determine questions of 'fact, and that where facts are so- found, their finding will not be disturbed by the appellate court, unless misconstrued by the court, or their verdict is so palpably incorrect as to show bias, prejudice, or a wanton disregard of the duties and obligations of jurors; and this rule is -well established

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1914Where, as in this case, the questions are purely of fact, and the jury being the only tribunal for their determination, appellate courts will not interfere, where there is evidence to support the verdict.” (Italics are ours.) See Chapin v. Goodell, 2 Colo. 608 ; Barker v. Hawley, 4 Colo. 316 ; Coon v. Duckett, 13 Colo. 14 , 21 Pac. 905 ; Johnson v. Jones, 16 Colo. 138 , 26 Pac. 584 ; Conrey v. Nichols, 35 Colo. 473 , 84 Pac. 470 ; Millard v. Loser, 52 Colo. 206 , 121 Pac. 156 ; Haldemam, v. Colorado City, 52 Colo. 238 , 120 Pac. 1042 ; Beggs v. Trump, 52 Colo. 242 , 121 Pac. 167 ; Hafelfinger

1898Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271 ; Edwards v. Smith, 16 Colo. 529 ; Holman v. The Boston Land & Security Co., 8 Colo. App. 282 ; Willard v. Williams, 50 Pac.

1898Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271 ; Edwards v. Smith, 16 Colo. 529 ; Holman v. The Boston Land & Security Co., 8 Colo. App. 282 ; Willard v. Williams, 50 Pac.

1898Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271 ; Edwards v. Smith, 16 Colo. 529 ; Holman v. The Boston Land & Security Co., 8 Colo. App. 282 ; Willard v. Williams, 50 Pac.

1898Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271 ; Edwards v. Smith, 16 Colo. 529 ; Holman v. The Boston Land & Security Co., 8 Colo. App. 282 ; Willard v. Williams, 50 Pac.

1898Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271 ; Edwards v. Smith, 16 Colo. 529 ; Holman v. The Boston Land & Security Co., 8 Colo. App. 282 ; Willard v. Williams, 50 Pac.

1898Wray v. Carpenter, 16 Colo. 271 ; Edwards v. Smith, 16 Colo. 529 ; Holman v. The Boston Land & Security Co., 8 Colo. App. 282 ; Willard v. Williams, 50 Pac.

2003The very reasons for the doctrine's existence and for which we have applied it to applications for designated ground water, see Jaeger v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515 (Colo.1987), therefore simply have no meaning with regard to post-1988 applications by overlying landowners for designated ground water contained in the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, or Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers.

2003The very reasons for the doctrine's existence and for which we have applied it to applications for designated ground water, see Jaeger v. Colorado Ground Water Comm'n, 746 P.2d 515 (Colo.1987), therefore simply have no meaning with regard to post-1988 applications by overlying landowners for designated ground water contained in the Dawson, Denver, Arapahoe, or Laramie-Fox Hills aquifers.

1994One of the reasons this rule is especially warranted when the government is a defendant was succinctly stated by this court in People v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 158 , 25 P. 302 , 302 (1890), where we observed, in reference to the one-year statute of limitations applicable to sheriffs, that, [t]he provision is evidently framed in the interest of the officers mentioned, and their bondsmen.

1994One of the reasons this rule is especially warranted when the government is a defendant was succinctly stated by this court in People v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 158 , 25 P. 302 , 302 (1890), where we observed, in reference to the one-year statute of limitations applicable to sheriffs, that, [t]he provision is evidently framed in the interest of the officers mentioned,, and their bondsmen.

1994One of the reasons this rule is especially warranted when the government is a defendant was succinctly stated by this court in People v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 158 , 25 P. 302 , 302 (1890), where we observed, in reference to the one-year statute of limitations applicable to sheriffs, that, [t]he provision is evidently framed in the interest of the officers mentioned, and their bondsmen.

1994One of the reasons this rule is especially warranted when the government is a defendant was succinctly stated by this court in People v. Cramer, 15 Colo. 155, 158 , 25 P. 302 , 302 (1890), where we observed, in reference to the one-year statute of limitations applicable to sheriffs, that, [t]he provision is evidently framed in the interest of the officers mentioned,, and their bondsmen.

1986See also People v. Anderson, 340 N.W.2d at 636 ; Platt v. State, 8 N.W.2d at 855 .

1986When alleged coconspirators are tried in separate proceedings, however, the reasons for the rule lose much if not all of their force. 4 There is no inherent inconsistency when different juries return different verdicts in separate trials, because the acquittal of one of the conspirators “ ‘could [result] from a multiplicity of factors completely unrelated to the actual existence of a conspiracy.’ ” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d at 177 (quoting United States v. Strother, 458 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 , 93 S.Ct. 456 , 34 L.Ed.2d 305 (1972)).

1986When alleged coconspirators are tried in separate proceedings, however, the reasons for the rule lose much if not all of their force. 4 There is no inherent inconsistency when different juries return different verdicts in separate trials, because the acquittal of one of the conspirators “ ‘could [result] from a multiplicity of factors completely unrelated to the actual existence of a conspiracy.’ ” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d at 177 (quoting United States v. Strother, 458 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 , 93 S.Ct. 456 , 34 L.Ed.2d 305 (1972)).

1986When alleged coconspirators are tried in separate proceedings, however, the reasons for the rule lose much if not all of their force. 4 There is no inherent inconsistency when different juries return different verdicts in separate trials, because the acquittal of one of the conspirators “ ‘could [result] from a multiplicity of factors completely unrelated to the actual existence of a conspiracy.’ ” Commonwealth v. Byrd, 417 A.2d at 177 (quoting United States v. Strother, 458 F.2d 424, 426 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1011 , 93 S.Ct. 456 , 34 L.Ed.2d 305 (1972)).

1980I find the reasons and the rule articulated in People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287 , 391 N.E.2d 1274 , 418 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1979) most persuasive, and conclude that a person must be admitted formally to the practice of law in some jurisdictions before that person can satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right to assistance of counsel.

1980I find the reasons and the rule articulated in People v. Felder, 47 N.Y.2d 287 , 391 N.E.2d 1274 , 418 N.Y.S.2d 295 (1979) most persuasive, and conclude that a person must be admitted formally to the practice of law in some jurisdictions before that person can satisfy a defendant’s constitutional right to assistance of counsel.

1980The results reached in Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125 (W.D.Mo.1970) aff’d, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 402 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 1639 , 29 L.Ed.2d 116 (1971), and Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458 , 590 P.2d 1082 (1979), relied upon by the majority here, can be achieved by careful application of this formulation of a per se rule; hence, those decisions are not contrary to such principle.

1980The results reached in Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125 (W.D.Mo.1970) aff’d, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 402 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 1639 , 29 L.Ed.2d 116 (1971), and Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458 , 590 P.2d 1082 (1979), relied upon by the majority here, can be achieved by careful application of this formulation of a per se rule; hence, those decisions are not contrary to such principle.

1980The results reached in Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125 (W.D.Mo.1970) aff’d, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 402 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 1639 , 29 L.Ed.2d 116 (1971), and Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458 , 590 P.2d 1082 (1979), relied upon by the majority here, can be achieved by careful application of this formulation of a per se rule; hence, those decisions are not contrary to such principle.

1980The results reached in Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125 (W.D.Mo.1970) aff’d, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 402 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 1639 , 29 L.Ed.2d 116 (1971), and Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458 , 590 P.2d 1082 (1979), relied upon by the majority here, can be achieved by careful application of this formulation of a per se rule; hence, those decisions are not contrary to such principle.

1980The results reached in Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125 (W.D.Mo.1970) aff’d, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 402 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 1639 , 29 L.Ed.2d 116 (1971), and Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458 , 590 P.2d 1082 (1979), relied upon by the majority here, can be achieved by careful application of this formulation of a per se rule; hence, those decisions are not contrary to such principle.

1980The results reached in Farr v. United States, 314 F.Supp. 1125 (W.D.Mo.1970) aff’d, 436 F.2d 975 (8th Cir.), cert. denied 402 U.S. 947 , 91 S.Ct. 1639 , 29 L.Ed.2d 116 (1971), and Johnson v. State, 225 Kan. 458 , 590 P.2d 1082 (1979), relied upon by the majority here, can be achieved by careful application of this formulation of a per se rule; hence, those decisions are not contrary to such principle.

1977Public policy and public necessity require prompt and efficient action from such officers [county assessors], and when intrusted with the assessment of taxes and the collection and disbursement of revenue, they have no right to refuse to perform ministerial duties prescribed by law because of any apprehension on their part that others may be injuriously affected by it, or that the statute prescribing such duties may be unconstitutional." 26 Colo. at 90 , 56 P. at 658 (emphasis added).