reasons rule in Illinois

2008See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers' Compensation Program, 20 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent case and that the reasons for the doctrine are "hardly served" where the effort of litigation has already been undertaken).

2008See Freeman United Coal Mining Co. v. Office of Workers’ Compensation Program, 20 F.3d 289, 294 (7th Cir. 1994) (noting that the purpose of collateral estoppel is to prevent relitigation of the same issues in a subsequent case and that the reasons for the doctrine are “hardly served” where the effort of litigation has already been undertaken).

2006However, the reasons for the rule that the directions in the court’s mandate must be obeyed is “that it would be impossible to negate every conceivable issue in an opinion and that a decision which failed to exclude a particular result did not include it by implication.” City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 574-75 , 413 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1980).

2006However, the reasons for the rule that the directions in the court’s mandate must be obeyed is “that it would be impossible to negate every conceivable issue in an opinion and that a decision which failed to exclude a particular result did not include it by implication.” City of Springfield v. Allphin, 82 Ill. 2d 571, 574-75 , 413 N.E.2d 394, 396 (1980).

2006See People v. McClain, 60 Ill.

2006See People v. McClain, 60 Ill.

1995People v. Henry (1970), 47 Ill.2d 312 , 265 N.E.2d 876 ; see People v. McIntosh (1979), 70 Ill.App.3d 188 , 26 Ill.Dec. 518 , 388 N.E.2d 142 .

1995People v. Henry (1970), 47 Ill. 2d 312 , 265 N.E.2d 876 ; see People v. McIntosh (1979), 70 Ill.

2012See People v. Henry, 47 Ill. 2d 312, 321-22 (1970) (explaining that the conventional and formal method of establishing an adequate foundation -19- for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements need not be rigidly applied where the reasons for this rule–to “protect the witness against unfair surprise and to permit his explanation of the prior statement”–are substantially satisfied).

1973In Henry ( 47 Ill.2d 312, 322 ) we recognized that in certain situations the conventional method of establishing an adequate foundation for the introduction of prior inconsistent statements need not be rigidly applied where the reasons for this rule are substantially satisfied.

1977Reasonable notice of the motion shall be served upon the State. (c) The motion for a new trial shall specify the grounds therefor." • 1 It has been well established that the failure to raise an issue in a written post-trial motion constitutes generally a waiver of that issue. ( People v. Pickett, 54 Ill.2d 280 , 296 N.E.2d 856 ; People v. Hairston, 46 Ill.2d 348 , 263 N.E.2d 840 , cert. denied, 402 U.S. 972 , 29 L.Ed.2d 136 , 91 S.Ct. 1658 ; People v. Irwin, 32 Ill.2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 760 .) The reasons for the waiver rule are two-fold: to inform a trial court of a possible *709 mistake so as

1977Ed. 2d 136 , 91 S. Ct. 1658 ; People v. Irwin, 32 Ill. 2d 441 , 207 N.E.2d 760 .) The reasons for the waiver rule are two-fold: to inform a trial court of a possible mistake so as to give it an opportunity to correct the mistake, and to not allow a defendant to object to that which he has acquiesced in.

2026See Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (1984) (“Rule 272 was intended ‘to resolve the difficulties which had arisen regarding the timeliness of an appeal where an oral announcement of judgment from the bench antedated the entry of a written judgment order’ ” (quoting West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1979)). ¶ 37 But our supreme court has now made clear that the overriding purpose of Rule 272 is “to establish a uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered,” and “the record date is the controlling date for the entry of all judgments.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927,

2026See Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (1984) (“Rule 272 was intended ‘to resolve the difficulties which had arisen regarding the timeliness of an appeal where an oral announcement of judgment from the bench antedated the entry of a written judgment order’ ” (quoting West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1979)). ¶ 37 But our supreme court has now made clear that the overriding purpose of Rule 272 is “to establish a uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered,” and “the record date is the controlling date for the entry of all judgments.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927,

2026See Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (1984) (“Rule 272 was intended ‘to resolve the difficulties which had arisen regarding the timeliness of an appeal where an oral announcement of judgment from the bench antedated the entry of a written judgment order’ ” (quoting West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1979)). ¶ 37 But our supreme court has now made clear that the overriding purpose of Rule 272 is “to establish a uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered,” and “the record date is the controlling date for the entry of all judgments.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927,

2026See Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (1984) (“Rule 272 was intended ‘to resolve the difficulties which had arisen regarding the timeliness of an appeal where an oral announcement of judgment from the bench antedated the entry of a written judgment order’ ” (quoting West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1979)). ¶ 37 But our supreme court has now made clear that the overriding purpose of Rule 272 is “to establish a uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered,” and “the record date is the controlling date for the entry of all judgments.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927,

2026See Stoermer v. Edgar, 104 Ill. 2d 287, 293 (1984) (“Rule 272 was intended ‘to resolve the difficulties which had arisen regarding the timeliness of an appeal where an oral announcement of judgment from the bench antedated the entry of a written judgment order’ ” (quoting West v. West, 76 Ill. 2d 226, 233 (1979)). ¶ 37 But our supreme court has now made clear that the overriding purpose of Rule 272 is “to establish a uniform date for determining when judgments are considered entered,” and “the record date is the controlling date for the entry of all judgments.” People v. Perez, 2014 IL 115927,

2023A motion to reconsider, or a response to a motion to reconsider, based on the submission - 10 - 1-22-0875 of new matters, such as new arguments or legal theories not presented during the pendency of the trial essentially seeks “a ‘second bite at the apple,’ i.e., requiring the trial court to determine whether it should admit these new matters into evidence.” See Daniels v. Corrigan, 382 Ill.

2023Akin v. Southern Gem Co., 332 Ill. 370, 372 (1928) (while reviewing court “will - 14 - No. 1-21-1327 examine the record for the purpose of affirming a judgment it will not do so for the purpose of reversing it”). ¶ 56 Among the many reasons for this principle is that searching the record for unargued errors “transform[s] the court’s role from that of jurist to advocate” and forces the court “to speculate about the arguments the parties might have presented had the issues been raised.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 328, 329 . ¶ 57 Thus, the only question before us is whether the court correctly found

2023Akin v. Southern Gem Co., 332 Ill. 370, 372 (1928) (while reviewing court “will - 14 - No. 1-21-1327 examine the record for the purpose of affirming a judgment it will not do so for the purpose of reversing it”). ¶ 56 Among the many reasons for this principle is that searching the record for unargued errors “transform[s] the court’s role from that of jurist to advocate” and forces the court “to speculate about the arguments the parties might have presented had the issues been raised.” Givens, 237 Ill. 2d at 328, 329 . ¶ 57 Thus, the only question before us is whether the court correctly found

2021As our supreme court has written: 15 No. 1-19-2499 “ ‘It is well established in this State, and almost universally recognized, that a jury may not impeach its verdict by affidavit or testimony which shows the motive, method, or process by which the verdict was reached. [Citations.] Thus, it is impermissible to challenge a verdict following the jury’s discharge by explaining the basis for the jury's findings [citation] or by asserting that the jury was mistaken.’ ” Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill. 2d 622, 635 (2005) (quoting Chalmers v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill.2d 532, 534 (1982)). ¶ 51 The reasons fo

2021Id. at 636 (quoting People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 468 (2002), in turn quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987)). ¶ 52 Plaintiff concedes that he may not use juror affidavits to impeach the verdict but insists that, instead, he is merely using them to show the confusing nature of the interrogatories.

2021As our supreme court has written: 15 No. 1-19-2499 “ ‘It is well established in this State, and almost universally recognized, that a jury may not impeach its verdict by affidavit or testimony which shows the motive, method, or process by which the verdict was reached. [Citations.] Thus, it is impermissible to challenge a verdict following the jury’s discharge by explaining the basis for the jury's findings [citation] or by asserting that the jury was mistaken.’ ” Redmond v. Socha, 216 Ill. 2d 622, 635 (2005) (quoting Chalmers v. City of Chicago, 88 Ill.2d 532, 534 (1982)). ¶ 51 The reasons fo

2021Id. at 636 (quoting People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 468 (2002), in turn quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987)). ¶ 52 Plaintiff concedes that he may not use juror affidavits to impeach the verdict but insists that, instead, he is merely using them to show the confusing nature of the interrogatories.

2021Id. at 636 (quoting People v. Pitsonbarger, 205 Ill. 2d 444, 468 (2002), in turn quoting Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 120 (1987)). ¶ 52 Plaintiff concedes that he may not use juror affidavits to impeach the verdict but insists that, instead, he is merely using them to show the confusing nature of the interrogatories.

2020See Foutch, 99 Ill. 2d at 391-92 . - 22 - 1-19-1851 ¶ 66 Notwithstanding, for all the reasons stated in our analysis of the trial court’s parenting time order, we find the best interest factors support the trial court’s award of the right of first refusal for only non-work related overnights.

2010Co. v. Martin Brothers Container & Timber Products Corp., 87 Ill.

2010Co. v. Martin Brothers Container & Timber Products Corp., 87 Ill.App.3d 327, 334 , 42 Ill.Dec. 322 , 408 N.E.2d 1031 (1980).