reasons rule in California

2022If the reasons for defense counsel’s actions are not readily apparent from the record, we will not assume constitutionally inadequate 83. representation and reverse a conviction unless the record discloses “ ‘ “no conceivable tactical purpose” ’ for counsel’s act or omission.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610 , 674–675; accord, People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 , 266–267.) B.

2021If the reasons for defense counsel’s actions are not readily apparent from the record, we will not assume constitutionally inadequate representation and reverse a conviction unless the record discloses “ ‘ “no conceivable tactical purpose” ’ for counsel’s act or omission.” (People v. Lewis (2001) 25 Cal.4th 610 , 674–675; accord, People v. Mendoza Tello (1997) 15 Cal.4th 264 , 266–267.) 13.

2024For claims in which defense trial counsel did not object to prosecutorial misconduct, “the appellate record rarely demonstrates ‘that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.’ [Citations.]” (People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93, 152 .) “‘[D]eciding whether to object is inherently tactical, and the failure to object will rarely establish ineffective assistance.’ [Citation.]” (Peopl

2017If a defendant meets the burden of establishing that counsel's performance was deficient, [second] he or she also must show that counsel's deficiencies resulted in prejudice, that is, a 'reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.' [Citation.]" ' [Citation.]" ( People v. Salcido (2008) 44 Cal.4th 93 , 170, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 54 , 186 P.3d 437 ; Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668 , 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 .) Generally, claims for ineffective assistance of counsel are more appropriately litigated

2006The rule thus fosters the dual goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements. " ( Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 535 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 724 P.2d 486 , italics added.) The Supreme Court had earlier applied the "changed circumstances" rule in In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725 , 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 , 598 P.2d 36 , explaining: "[the] change must be substantial: a child will not be removed from the prior custody of one parent and given to the other `unless the material facts and circumstances occurring subsequently are of a kind to render it essential

2006The rule thus fosters the dual goals of judicial economy and protecting stable custody arrangements. " ( Burchard v. Garay, supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 535 , 229 Cal.Rptr. 800 , 724 P.2d 486 , italics added.) The Supreme Court had earlier applied the "changed circumstances" rule in In re Marriage of Carney (1979) 24 Cal.3d 725 , 157 Cal.Rptr. 383 , 598 P.2d 36 , explaining: "[the] change must be substantial: a child will not be removed from the prior custody of one parent and given to the other `unless the material facts and circumstances occurring subsequently are of a kind to render it essential

2015Under Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 366 , Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 673 and Cox, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pages 337, 361, the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not purposefully discriminatory is supported by the evidence that Juror No. 16 had two sons in prison and one grandson in a gang.

2015Under Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 366 , Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 673 and Cox, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pages 337, 361, the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not purposefully discriminatory is supported by the evidence that Juror No. 16 had two sons in prison and one grandson in a gang.

2015Under Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 366 , Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 673 and Cox, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pages 337, 361, the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not purposefully discriminatory is supported by the evidence that Juror No. 16 had two sons in prison and one grandson in a gang.

2015Under Jones, supra, 51 Cal.4th at page 366 , Watson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at page 673 and Cox, supra, 187 Cal.App.4th at pages 337, 361, the trial court’s finding that the challenges were not purposefully discriminatory is supported by the evidence that Juror No. 16 had two sons in prison and one grandson in a gang.

2026(Stewart, supra, 171 Cal.App.3d at p. 395 .) Stewart relied on our Supreme Court’s decision in People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118 (Marsden).

2013The trial court, however, specifically foreclosed the defendant from stating the specific reasons that defense counsel’s performance was unsatisfactory. ( Marsden, supra, 2 Cal.3d at pp. 121–122.) The court held: “Thus, a judge who denies a motion for substitution of attorneys solely on the basis of his courtroom observations, despite a defendant’s offer to relate specific instances of misconduct, abuses the exercise of his discretion to determine the competency of the attorney.

2025Shoen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 1112 contains a thorough explanation of the relationship between estoppel and the law of irrevocable licenses: “Critically, courts may exercise their power to declare a license irrevocable only if the expenditures in reliance on the license are ‘substantial,’ ‘considerable,’ or ‘great.’ ” (Id. at p. 1119.) One of the reasons for this requirement is that “it mirrors a similar requirement in the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the doctrine that forms the ‘principal’ rationale for our Supreme Court’s recognition of a judicial power to declare licenses irrevocable. [Ci

2025Shoen, supra, 33 Cal.App.5th 1112 contains a thorough explanation of the relationship between estoppel and the law of irrevocable licenses: “Critically, courts may exercise their power to declare a license irrevocable only if the expenditures in reliance on the license are ‘substantial,’ ‘considerable,’ or ‘great.’ ” (Id. at p. 1119.) One of the reasons for this requirement is that “it mirrors a similar requirement in the doctrine of equitable estoppel, the doctrine that forms the ‘principal’ rationale for our Supreme Court’s recognition of a judicial power to declare licenses irrevocable. [Ci

2024“Ineffective assistance of counsel is particularly difficult to demonstrate on direct appeal, where we are limited to the record from the trial court. ‘The appellate record . . . rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more 5 appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professio

2022“Ineffective assistance of counsel is particularly difficult to demonstrate on direct appeal, where we are limited to the record from the trial court. 23 ‘The appellate record . . . rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.’ [Citation.] ‘ “Unless a defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that ‘counsel’s performance fell within the wide range of professi

2021The appellate record, however, rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 .) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that “(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial,

2020The appellate record, however, rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 .) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that “ ‘(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicia

2021(People v. Duarte (2000) 24 Cal.4th 603 , 618–619.) Under that standard, reversal is not warranted unless “it is reasonably probable that a result more favorable to [defendant] would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 836 .) For many of the same reasons the error was not of constitutional magnitude, there is no reasonable probability the verdict would have been more favorable to defendant absent admission of the out-of-court statements.

2016(Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 687, 694 ; Chapman, supra, 386 U.S. at p. 24 ; Watson, supra, 46 Cal.2d at p. 838 .) “In Pennsylvania v. Muniz (1990) 496 U.S. 582 [ 110 L.Ed.2d 528 , 110 S. Ct. 2638 , 110 L.Ed.2d 528 ] (Muniz), the plurality opinion recognized a ‘ “routine booking question” exception which exempts from Miranda’s coverage questions to secure the “biographical data necessary to complete booking or pretrial services.” ’ (Muniz, at p. 601 (plur. opn. of Brennan, J.).) Quoting an amicus curiae brief, the plurality noted: ‘ “recognizing a ‘booking exception’ to Mirand

2021The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 749 .) In other words, because “[t]he appellate record . . . rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; . . . such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.” (People v. Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966 .) Thus, reversal on direct appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel i

2020The choice of when to object is inherently a matter of trial tactics not ordinarily reviewable on appeal.” (People v. Frierson (1991) 53 Cal.3d 730, 749 .) In other words, because “[t]he appellate record . . . rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence . . . , such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.” (Lopez, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 966 .) Thus, reversal on direct appeal for ineffective assistance of counsel is warrant

2021The appellate record, however, rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 .) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that “(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicial,

2020The appellate record, however, rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel’s incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions can be explored.” (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 .) To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must show that “ ‘(1) counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, and (2) counsel’s deficient performance was prejudicia

2020While the reasons for this exception to the mootness rule have been set forth in various ways, it is discussed “with varying degrees of emphasis on the importance of the issue presented and the likelihood that it will recur.” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 653 .) “Despite the nuanced variation in these articulations of when an appellate court may proceed to decide an otherwise moot appeal, the common thread running through the cases is that doing so is appropriate only if a ruling on the merits will affect future proceedings between the parties or will have some precedential consequenc

2019While the reasons for this exception to the mootness rule have been set forth in various ways, it is discussed “with varying degrees of emphasis on the importance of the issue presented and the likelihood that it will recur.” (David B., supra, 12 Cal.App.5th at p. 653 .) “Despite the nuanced variation in these articulations of when an appellate court may proceed to decide an otherwise moot appeal, the common thread running through the cases is that doing so is appropriate only if a ruling on the merits will affect future proceedings between the parties or will have some precedential consequenc

2015The appellate record, however, rarely shows that the failure to object was the result of counsel's incompetence; generally, such claims are more appropriately litigated on habeas corpus, which allows for an evidentiary hearing where the reasons for defense counsel's actions or omissions can be explored." (People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 .) "Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel." (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 .) A defend

2015(People v. Lopez (2008) 42 Cal.4th 960, 966 .) "Under both the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 15, of the California Constitution, a criminal defendant has the right to the assistance of counsel." (People v. Ledesma (1987) 43 Cal.3d 171, 215 .) A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel has the burden to show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient, falling below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and (2) the deficient performance resulted in prejudice.

2013(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936 .) “ ‘Because the appellate record ordinarily does not show the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be made in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692 , 728–729.) We agree with defendant that the constitutional right to competent representation applies at all critical stages of a criminal action in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake, including the presentation of a new trial motion and

2013(People v. Wilson (1992) 3 Cal.4th 926, 936 .) “ ‘Because the appellate record ordinarily does not show the reasons for defense counsel’s actions or omissions, a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel should generally be made in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, not on appeal.’ [Citation.]” (People v. Lucero (2000) 23 Cal.4th 692 , 728–729.) We agree with defendant that the constitutional right to competent representation applies at all critical stages of a criminal action in which the substantial rights of a defendant are at stake, including the presentation of a new trial motion and

2013(See People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80 , 90–91;People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362 ; People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 695 ; People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155 .) We also know from the record that the trial court granted defendant’s Marsden motion, and appointed new counsel to present the new trial motion and represent defendant at the sentencing hearing.

2013(See People v. Sanchez (2011) 53 Cal.4th 80 , 90–91;People v. Crayton (2002) 28 Cal.4th 346, 362 ; People v. Smith (1993) 6 Cal.4th 684, 695 ; People v. Bauer (2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 150, 155 .) We also know from the record that the trial court granted defendant’s Marsden motion, and appointed new counsel to present the new trial motion and represent defendant at the sentencing hearing.