reasons rule in Kansas

2004“Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a search and seizure of evidence obtained without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ‘per se unreasonable . . . subject only to few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.’ [Citation omitted.] Inventory searches of vehicles lawfully impounded have been recognized as one of these few exceptions. [Citation omitted.] Inventory searches of vehicles serve three purposes: the protection of the owner’s property while it remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen prop

2004"Under the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, a search and seizure of evidence obtained without a warrant issued upon probable cause is ` per se unreasonable . . . subject only to few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions.' [Citation omitted.] Inventory searches of vehicles lawfully impounded have been recognized as one of these few exceptions. [Citation omitted.] Inventory searches of vehicles serve three purposes: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody, the protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen pro

1996However, the defendant points to State v. Gideon, 257 Kan. 591 , 894 P.2d 850 (1995).

1996However, the defendant points to State v. Gideon, 257 Kan. 591 , 894 P.2d 850 (1995).

1993App. 2d 392 , 699 P.2d 576 (1985), and that the court abused its discretion in revoking her probation.

1993Reed alleges the district com't automatically revoked her probation once the probation violation was established, without con *60 sidering the reasons for the violation, citing State v. Duke, 10 Kan.

1990In Douglas v. Lombardino, 236 Kan. 471 , Syl. ¶ 2, 693 P.2d 1138 (1985), we held: “When a motion in limine is denied, the moving party must object to the evidence at trial to preserve the *45 issue on appeal.” In State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 213 , 768 P.2d 268 (1989), we followed this ruling, stating: “One of the reasons for the rule requiring an objection to the evidence during trial is clearly illustrated by this case.

1990In Douglas v. Lombardino, 236 Kan. 471 , Syl. ¶ 2, 693 P.2d 1138 (1985), we held: “When a motion in limine is denied, the moving party must object to the evidence at trial to preserve the *45 issue on appeal.” In State v. Nunn, 244 Kan. 207, 213 , 768 P.2d 268 (1989), we followed this ruling, stating: “One of the reasons for the rule requiring an objection to the evidence during trial is clearly illustrated by this case.

1989In Thompson , the issue was “whether the district judge erred by permitting the Assistant United States Attorney to state her reasons to him ex parte and then ruling on the objection without divulging the reasons to defense counsel.” 827 F.2d at 1257 .

1989The court discussed each of the arguments of counsel, and concluded “that the district court erred in refusing to allow defense counsel in this case to hear the government’s reasons for excluding the black potential jurors and to present argument thereon.” 827 F.2d at 1261 .

1987Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 14-15 , 577 P.2d 975 (1978): “The reasons for this rule should be obvious.

1987Robins Co., 90 Wash. 2d 9, 14-15 , 577 P.2d 975 (1978): “The reasons for this rule should be obvious.

1983See Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698 , 72 P.2d 981 (1937); Hamilton v. Individual Mausoleum Co., 149 Kan. 216 , 86 P.2d 501 (1939); Prosser, Law of Torts § 54 at 329-30, and cases cited therein; 64 A.L.R.2d 100 , § 8.

1983See Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698 , 72 P.2d 981 (1937); Hamilton v. Individual Mausoleum Co., 149 Kan. 216 , 86 P.2d 501 (1939); Prosser, Law of Torts § 54 at 329-30, and cases cited therein; 64 A.L.R.2d 100 , § 8.

1976Our rule in such a situation is clear: “Where alleged juror misconduct claimed as prejudicial is known by the party or his counsel prior to rendition of a verdict, and no objection is made, nor the matter brought to the court’s attention, the party cannot later assert the misconduct as grounds for a new trial.” (Roy v. State, 213 Kan. 30 , 514 P. 2d 832 , Syl. ¶ 4.) *208 The reasons for the rule are equally clear.

1976Our rule in such a situation is clear: “Where alleged juror misconduct claimed as prejudicial is known by the party or his counsel prior to rendition of a verdict, and no objection is made, nor the matter brought to the court’s attention, the party cannot later assert the misconduct as grounds for a new trial.” (Roy v. State, 213 Kan. 30 , 514 P. 2d 832 , Syl. ¶ 4.) *208 The reasons for the rule are equally clear.

1973Jur., Damages, § 266, p. 700.) The reasons for the rule are fully discussed in Albert Wiley v. Keokuk, supra.” In a more recent case where the subject of punitive damages arose, Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 200 Kan. 96 , 434 P. 2d 828 , we commented tersely on the subject: “In this state exemplary damages are not regarded as compensatory in any degree.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Although this court has never expressly addressed itself to the liability of a bonding company for payment of exemplary damages within the context of K.

1973Jur., Damages, § 266, p. 700.) The reasons for the rule are fully discussed in Albert Wiley v. Keokuk, supra.” In a more recent case where the subject of punitive damages arose, Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 200 Kan. 96 , 434 P. 2d 828 , we commented tersely on the subject: “In this state exemplary damages are not regarded as compensatory in any degree.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Although this court has never expressly addressed itself to the liability of a bonding company for payment of exemplary damages within the context of K.

1973Jur., Damages, § 266, p. 700.) The reasons for the rule are fully discussed in Albert Wiley v. Keokuk, supra.” In a more recent case where the subject of punitive damages arose, Brewer v. Home-Stake Production Co., 200 Kan. 96 , 434 P. 2d 828 , we commented tersely on the subject: “In this state exemplary damages are not regarded as compensatory in any degree.” (Syl. ¶ 1.) Although this court has never expressly addressed itself to the liability of a bonding company for payment of exemplary damages within the context of K.

1971After elaborate review of conflicting precedents, some of the reasons for this rule *27 were cogently stated in Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446 , 197 S.E. 846 , 116 A.L.R. 981 , as follows: "[The majority rule] also overlooks the fact that the creditor has no title or right of possession of the money or property of the debtor.

1971After elaborate review of conflicting precedents, some of the reasons for this rule *27 were cogently stated in Moyers v. State, 186 Ga. 446 , 197 S.E. 846 , 116 A.L.R. 981 , as follows: "[The majority rule] also overlooks the fact that the creditor has no title or right of possession of the money or property of the debtor.

1971In Schreppel v. Campbell Sixty-six Express, Inc., 201 Kan. 448 , 441 P.2d 881 , we stated at page 454: "The reasons for this rule are two-fold: first, it enables the opposing party to judge the sufficiency of the record which has been designated on appeal and second, it informs the members of this court of the specific issues to be considered on appeal.

1971In Schreppel v. Campbell Sixty-six Express, Inc., 201 Kan. 448 , 441 P.2d 881 , we stated at page 454: "The reasons for this rule are two-fold: first, it enables the opposing party to judge the sufficiency of the record which has been designated on appeal and second, it informs the members of this court of the specific issues to be considered on appeal.

1971The rule thus serves a legitimate and important purpose...." (See, also, Board of County Commissioners v. Brookover, 198 Kan. 70, 74 , 422 P.2d 906 .) The rule serves an important and valid purpose and we do not care to relax in its application.

1971The rule thus serves a legitimate and important purpose...." (See, also, Board of County Commissioners v. Brookover, 198 Kan. 70, 74 , 422 P.2d 906 .) The rule serves an important and valid purpose and we do not care to relax in its application.

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1965Claims such as the one we are presently considering have been characterized as "inherently dangerous" ( James v. Lane, 103 Kan. 540 , 175 Pac. 387 ), because they offer a great temptation to set up fraudulent claims against the estates of deceased persons. ( Woltz v. First Trust Co., 135 Kan. 253, 259 , 9 P.2d 665 .) In Walter v. Warner, 298 F.2d 481 , it was stated on page 482: "It is basic in the law of Kansas that an oral contract providing that title to real estate shall pass from one party to another at the death of the former will be enforced by specific performance if the contract was n

1958(Quick, Receiver v. Purcell, 179 Kan. 319 , 295 P. 2d 626 ; North American Finance Corporation v. Circle-B, Inc., 180 Kan. 34 , 299 P. 2d 576 , and cases cited in these opinions.) The foregoing cases undertake a complete discussion of this point and give the specific reasons for the rule.

1958(Quick, Receiver v. Purcell, 179 Kan. 319 , 295 P. 2d 626 ; North American Finance Corporation v. Circle-B, Inc., 180 Kan. 34 , 299 P. 2d 576 , and cases cited in these opinions.) The foregoing cases undertake a complete discussion of this point and give the specific reasons for the rule.

1958(Quick, Receiver v. Purcell, 179 Kan. 319 , 295 P. 2d 626 ; North American Finance Corporation v. Circle-B, Inc., 180 Kan. 34 , 299 P. 2d 576 , and cases cited in these opinions.) The foregoing cases undertake a complete discussion of this point and give the specific reasons for the rule.

1958(Quick, Receiver v. Purcell, 179 Kan. 319 , 295 P. 2d 626 ; North American Finance Corporation v. Circle-B, Inc., 180 Kan. 34 , 299 P. 2d 576 , and cases cited in these opinions.) The foregoing cases undertake a complete discussion of this point and give the specific reasons for the rule.

1956The authorities dealing with the subject and supporting the conclusion just announced are cited "and discussed at pages 174 and 175 in the opinion of Reed v. Mai, 171 Kan. 169 , 231 P. 2d 227 , where they can be found by reference.

1956The authorities dealing with the subject and supporting the conclusion just announced are cited "and discussed at pages 174 and 175 in the opinion of Reed v. Mai, 171 Kan. 169 , 231 P. 2d 227 , where they can be found by reference.

1949The reasons for the doctrine and the philosophy behind its enunciation are set forth and well stated in In re Kailer, 123 Kan. 229 , 255 Pac. 41 , likewise holding that a natural parent is entitled to the custody of his children where he has not forfeited the right to be intrusted therewith because of personal unfitness.

1949The reasons for the doctrine and the philosophy behind its enunciation are set forth and well stated in In re Kailer, 123 Kan. 229 , 255 Pac. 41 , likewise holding that a natural parent is entitled to the custody of his children where he has not forfeited the right to be intrusted therewith because of personal unfitness.

1947A clear statement of the reasons for the rule will be found in the opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Benton in the case of Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758 , 57 S. W. 2d 969 , 88 A. L.

1947A clear statement of the reasons for the rule will be found in the opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Benton in the case of Drury v. Franke, 247 Ky. 758 , 57 S. W. 2d 969 , 88 A. L.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1947(Round v. Power Co., 92 Kan. 894 , 142 Pac. 292 ; Paulsen v. McCormack, 133 Kan. 523 , 1 P. 2d 259 ; Anderson v. Carder, 159 Kan. 1 , 150 P. 2d 754 ; Sisk v. Edmonston, 163 Kan. 394 , 182 P. 2d 891 ; and cases therein cited.) The reasons for the rule which denies the right to appellate review after acquiescence in a judgment are fully treated in our former cases and need not be restated here.

1929All of the considerations which have led courts generally to recognize a presumed intent to have a bound upon a highway, stream, or canal, carry to the middle line, appear to be present in the case of a bound upon a railroad right of way; . . .” (Center Bridge Co. v. Wheeler & Howes Co., 86 Conn. 585, 589 .) The specific question was considered by the circuit couR of appeals for the 8th circuit, in a case involving the same right of way in its relation to blocks 87 and 88 lying immediately north of the Scroggin blocks 89 and 90.