reasons rule in Michigan

1946Kaminski v. Wayne County Board of Auditors, 287 Mich. 62 . ‘One of the reasons for the rule that an official’s salary cannot be reduced during his definite term is to prevent the use of an indirect method t.o discharge an official during such term by the subterfuge of reducing his salary.’ Bodell v. City of Battle Creek, 270 Mich. 445, 448 . ‘The wisdom of a provision prohibiting any change either by increase or reduction of a public officer’s salary during his term has been universally recognized.

1939“One of the reasons for the rule that an official’s salary cannot be reduced during his definite term is to prevent the use of an indirect method to discharge an official during such term by the subterfuge of reducing his salary.” Bodell v. City of Battle Creek, 270 Mich. 445, 448 . ‘ ‘ The wisdom of a provision prohibiting any change either by increase or reduction of a public officer’s salary during his term has been universally recognized.

2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 116 ; Kachar, 400 Mich at 95-96 . 8 subject to judicial reliability screening, due process concerns require such screening for an initial in-court identification that is equivalent to a one-man showup”) (citation omitted); United States v Greene, 704 F3d 298, 308 (CA 4, 2013), cert den 571 US 952 (2013) (applying the Biggers constitutional analysis to in-court identifications); United States v Rogers, 126 F3d 655, 658 (CA 5, 1997) (applying the Biggers analysis to in-court identification); United States v Hill, 967 F2d 226, 232 (CA 6, 1992), cert den 506 US 964 (1992) (ho

2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 116 ; Kachar, 400 Mich at 95-96 . 8 subject to judicial reliability screening, due process concerns require such screening for an initial in-court identification that is equivalent to a one-man showup”) (citation omitted); United States v Greene, 704 F3d 298, 308 (CA 4, 2013), cert den 571 US 952 (2013) (applying the Biggers constitutional analysis to in-court identifications); United States v Rogers, 126 F3d 655, 658 (CA 5, 1997) (applying the Biggers analysis to in-court identification); United States v Hill, 967 F2d 226, 232 (CA 6, 1992), cert den 506 US 964 (1992) (ho

2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 116 ; Kachar, 400 Mich at 95-96 . 8 subject to judicial reliability screening, due process concerns require such screening for an initial in-court identification that is equivalent to a one-man showup”) (citation omitted); United States v Greene, 704 F3d 298, 308 (CA 4, 2013), cert den 571 US 952 (2013) (applying the Biggers constitutional analysis to in-court identifications); United States v Rogers, 126 F3d 655, 658 (CA 5, 1997) (applying the Biggers analysis to in-court identification); United States v Hill, 967 F2d 226, 232 (CA 6, 1992), cert den 506 US 964 (1992) (ho

2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 116 ; Kachar, 400 Mich at 95-96 . 8 subject to judicial reliability screening, due process concerns require such screening for an initial in-court identification that is equivalent to a one-man showup”) (citation omitted); United States v Greene, 704 F3d 298, 308 (CA 4, 2013), cert den 571 US 952 (2013) (applying the Biggers constitutional analysis to in-court identifications); United States v Rogers, 126 F3d 655, 658 (CA 5, 1997) (applying the Biggers analysis to in-court identification); United States v Hill, 967 F2d 226, 232 (CA 6, 1992), cert den 506 US 964 (1992) (ho

2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 116 ; Kachar, 400 Mich at 95-96 . 8 subject to judicial reliability screening, due process concerns require such screening for an initial in-court identification that is equivalent to a one-man showup”) (citation omitted); United States v Greene, 704 F3d 298, 308 (CA 4, 2013), cert den 571 US 952 (2013) (applying the Biggers constitutional analysis to in-court identifications); United States v Rogers, 126 F3d 655, 658 (CA 5, 1997) (applying the Biggers analysis to in-court identification); United States v Hill, 967 F2d 226, 232 (CA 6, 1992), cert den 506 US 964 (1992) (ho

2023See Gray, 457 Mich at 116 ; Kachar, 400 Mich at 95-96 . 8 subject to judicial reliability screening, due process concerns require such screening for an initial in-court identification that is equivalent to a one-man showup”) (citation omitted); United States v Greene, 704 F3d 298, 308 (CA 4, 2013), cert den 571 US 952 (2013) (applying the Biggers constitutional analysis to in-court identifications); United States v Rogers, 126 F3d 655, 658 (CA 5, 1997) (applying the Biggers analysis to in-court identification); United States v Hill, 967 F2d 226, 232 (CA 6, 1992), cert den 506 US 964 (1992) (ho

2020Douglas, 496 Mich at 585-586 .

2018Douglas, 496 Mich at 585-586 .

2018United States v.Yemitan , 70 F.3d 746 , 748 (C.A. 2, 1995) ("Plea agreements are subject to the public policy constraints that bear upon the enforcement of other kinds of contracts."). " 'Contracts contrary to public policy, that is those which tend to be injurious to the public or against the public good, are illegal and void, even though actual injury does not result therefrom.' " Federoff v. Ewing , 386 Mich. 474 , 481, 192 N.W.2d 242 (1971), quoting 17 CJS, Contracts, § 211, pp 563-565. " 'The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not **674 enforceable should be ap

2018United States v.Yemitan , 70 F.3d 746 , 748 (C.A. 2, 1995) ("Plea agreements are subject to the public policy constraints that bear upon the enforcement of other kinds of contracts."). " 'Contracts contrary to public policy, that is those which tend to be injurious to the public or against the public good, are illegal and void, even though actual injury does not result therefrom.' " Federoff v. Ewing , 386 Mich. 474 , 481, 192 N.W.2d 242 (1971), quoting 17 CJS, Contracts, § 211, pp 563-565. " 'The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not **674 enforceable should be ap

1926See, also, In re Bailey’s Estate, 186 Mich. 677 ; Pritchard v. Hutton, 187 Mich. 346; In re Browne’s Estate, 217 Mich. 621 , The relationship which existed between the doctor and the deceased, and the circumstances under which the will was executed, justify the application of this rule in this case.

1926See, also, In re Bailey's Estate , 186 Mich. 677 ; Pritchard v. Hutton , 187 Mich. 346 ; In re Browne's Estate , 217 Mich. 621 .

1926In Re Hartlerode’s Estate, 183 Mich. 51, 60 , it was said: “There are certain cases in which the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence has been used, as where a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a client in favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor of a priest or spiritual adviser, whether for his own personal advantage, or for the advantage of some interest of which he is a representative.” The reasons for the rule thus announced are discussed at length by Mr. Justice Stone and many authorities cited in its support.

1926In Re Hartlerode's Estate , 183 Mich. 51 , 60 , it was said: "There are certain cases in which the law indulges in the presumption that undue influence has been used, as where a patient makes a will in favor of his physician, a client in favor of his lawyer, or a sick person in favor of a priest or spiritual adviser, whether for his own personal advantage, or for the advantage of some interest of which he is a representative." The reasons for the rule thus announced are discussed at length by Mr. Justice STONE and many authorities cited in its support.

1926See, also, In re Bailey’s Estate, 186 Mich. 677 ; Pritchard v. Hutton, 187 Mich. 346; In re Browne’s Estate, 217 Mich. 621 , The relationship which existed between the doctor and the deceased, and the circumstances under which the will was executed, justify the application of this rule in this case.

1926See, also, In re Bailey's Estate , 186 Mich. 677 ; Pritchard v. Hutton , 187 Mich. 346 ; In re Browne's Estate , 217 Mich. 621 .

2026Id. at 180 .

2018United States v.Yemitan , 70 F.3d 746 , 748 (C.A. 2, 1995) ("Plea agreements are subject to the public policy constraints that bear upon the enforcement of other kinds of contracts."). " 'Contracts contrary to public policy, that is those which tend to be injurious to the public or against the public good, are illegal and void, even though actual injury does not result therefrom.' " Federoff v. Ewing , 386 Mich. 474 , 481, 192 N.W.2d 242 (1971), quoting 17 CJS, Contracts, § 211, pp 563-565. " 'The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not **674 enforceable should be ap

2018United States v.Yemitan , 70 F.3d 746 , 748 (C.A. 2, 1995) ("Plea agreements are subject to the public policy constraints that bear upon the enforcement of other kinds of contracts."). " 'Contracts contrary to public policy, that is those which tend to be injurious to the public or against the public good, are illegal and void, even though actual injury does not result therefrom.' " Federoff v. Ewing , 386 Mich. 474 , 481, 192 N.W.2d 242 (1971), quoting 17 CJS, Contracts, § 211, pp 563-565. " 'The principle that contracts in contravention of public policy are not **674 enforceable should be ap

2018PT Today, 270 Mich App at 143 .

2018"The public policy of Michigan is not merely the equivalent of the personal preferences of a majority of this Court; rather, such a policy must ultimately be clearly rooted in the law." Terrien , 467 Mich. at 67 , 648 N.W.2d 602 .

2018"The public policy of Michigan is not merely the equivalent of the personal preferences of a majority of this Court; rather, such a policy must ultimately be clearly rooted in the law." Terrien , 467 Mich. at 67 , 648 N.W.2d 602 .

2016Id. at 198 .

2002See Shelley-Jey v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const, Am XIV); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 , 68 S.Ct. 847 , 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866); the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq.; Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; and the housing provisions of Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2501 et seq. [11] We note that, besides constitutions, statutes, and the common law, administrative rules and regulations, and public rules of professional conduct may also

2002See Shelley-Jey v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const, Am XIV); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 , 68 S.Ct. 847 , 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866); the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq.; Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; and the housing provisions of Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2501 et seq. [11] We note that, besides constitutions, statutes, and the common law, administrative rules and regulations, and public rules of professional conduct may also

2002See Shelley-Jey v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const, Am XIV); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 , 68 S.Ct. 847 , 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866); the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq.; Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; and the housing provisions of Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2501 et seq. [11] We note that, besides constitutions, statutes, and the common law, administrative rules and regulations, and public rules of professional conduct may also

2002See Shelley-Jey v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 , 68 S.Ct. 836 , 92 L.Ed. 1161 (1948)(interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, U.S. Const, Am XIV); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 , 68 S.Ct. 847 , 92 L.Ed. 1187 (1948) (interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1866); the federal Fair Housing Act, 42 USC 3601 et seq.; Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2101 et seq.; and the housing provisions of Michigan's Civil Rights Act, M.C.L. § 37.2501 et seq. [11] We note that, besides constitutions, statutes, and the common law, administrative rules and regulations, and public rules of professional conduct may also

2002The explanation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109 ; 92 S Ct 2294 ; 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972), clearly points out the reasons for the doctrine: It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.

2002The explanation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine enunciated by the United States Supreme Court in Grayned v City of Rockford, 408 US 104, 108-109 ; 92 S Ct 2294 ; 33 L Ed 2d 222 (1972), clearly points out the reasons for the doctrine: It is a basic principle of due process that an enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not clearly defined.

1999The trial court in the instant case, like the trial courts in Koss, supra, and Langworthy, supra, attempted to justify its reinstatement of the obligation to pay the filing fees by explaining that it had initially waived these fees “to ensure [petitioner] a timely review of his Complaint,” but that “the reasons for the waiver no longer exist[ed] . . . .” The trial court explained its decision to reinstate the filing fees obligation as follows: In making its determination, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that [respondent] supplies housing, food, clothing, medical care, transportatio

1999The trial court in the instant case, like the trial courts in Koss, supra, and Langworthy, supra, attempted to justify its reinstatement of the obligation to pay the filing fees by explaining that it had initially waived these fees “to ensure [petitioner] a timely review of his Complaint,” but that “the reasons for the waiver no longer exist[ed] . . . .” The trial court explained its decision to reinstate the filing fees obligation as follows: In making its determination, the Court takes judicial notice of the fact that [respondent] supplies housing, food, clothing, medical care, transportatio

1996Id. at 168, 171-172, 243 N.W.2d 292 .