reasons rule in Kentucky

1890(Martz v. Pfeifer, &c., 80 Ky., 600 ; Kyle v. O’Neil, &c., 88 Ky., 127 .) Section 722 of our Code provides, however, that land can not be levied on or sold under an execution from a quarterly court, and the reason of the above rule, .therefore, requires that if a creditor wishes to base a suit in equity to set aside a conveyance of land as fraudulent upon the ground that he has obtained a return of nulla bona, it must be upon an execution under which land could have been levied upon and .sold.

1889(Barton, &c., v. Barton, &c., 80 Ky., 212 ; Martz v. Pfeifer, &c., 80 Ky., 600 .) It matters not whether the debtor is the grantor, or whether, having paid the consideration, he causes, another to make the conveyance to the third party.

1996As succinctly stated in Fillhardt : The rule is almost universal that an attorney, clothed with no other authority than that arising from his relationship, has no implied power to compromise and settle a client’s claim or cause of action except, perhaps, when he is confronted with an emergency and prompt action is necessary to protect the interest of his client without an opportunity for consultation with him. 165 S.W.2d at 160 .

1996As succinctly stated in Fillhardt : The rule is almost universal that an attorney, clothed with no other authority than that arising from his relationship, has no implied power to compromise and settle a client's claim or cause of action except, perhaps, when he is confronted with an emergency and prompt action is necessary to protect the interest of his client without an opportunity for consultation with him. 165 S.W.2d at 160 .

1996The court determined "[i]n light of modern social and economic conditions, the reasons for the rule no longer outweigh the justifications favoring its abrogation." Rigdon, supra at 923 .

1996The court determined “[i]n light of modern social and economic conditions, the reasons for the rule no longer outweigh the justifications favoring its abrogation.” Rigdon, supra at 923 .

1986See Fleming v. Rife, Ky., 328 S.W.2d 151 (1959); Robinson v. Robinson, Ky. 548 S.W.2d 155 (1977).

1974The order of transfer, as respects the reasons for the waiver of jurisdiction by the juvenile court, simply used the words of the statute, KRS 208.170, that “it would be to the best interest of the child * * * and of the public that the child be tried and disposed of under the regular law governing crimes.” In Hubbs v. Commonwealth, Ky., 511 S. W.2d 664 (decided May 3, 1974, on petition for rehearing), this Court held that a mere parroting of the words of the statute is not *776 a sufficient statement of reasons, and that the waiver order, or an accompanying, statement, or the juvenile court r

1973It is true that in Whitaker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 592 , which involved an offense committed in March 1971, this court held invalid an order of transfer of jurisdiction which did not recite the finding that “the best interests of the child and of the public require that the child be tried and disposed of under the regular law governing crimes.” The basis for that holding was that due process required that the juvenile court order set forth the reasons for the waiver of jurisdiction, as held in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 .

1973This court held, however, in Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 256 , and in Bailey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 468 S.W.2d 304 , that retroactive effect would not be given to the rule in Kent that a juvenile is entitled to counsel in the juvenile court.

1973It is true that in Whitaker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 592 , which involved an offense committed in March 1971, this court held invalid an order of transfer of jurisdiction which did not recite the finding that “the best interests of the child and of the public require that the child be tried and disposed of under the regular law governing crimes.” The basis for that holding was that due process required that the juvenile court order set forth the reasons for the waiver of jurisdiction, as held in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 .

1973It is true that in Whitaker v. Commonwealth, Ky., 479 S.W.2d 592 , which involved an offense committed in March 1971, this court held invalid an order of transfer of jurisdiction which did not recite the finding that “the best interests of the child and of the public require that the child be tried and disposed of under the regular law governing crimes.” The basis for that holding was that due process required that the juvenile court order set forth the reasons for the waiver of jurisdiction, as held in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 .

1973This court held, however, in Smith v. Commonwealth, Ky., 412 S.W.2d 256 , and in Bailey v. Commonwealth, Ky., 468 S.W.2d 304 , that retroactive effect would not be given to the rule in Kent that a juvenile is entitled to counsel in the juvenile court.

1971For a more detailed discussion of arguments for and against the rule, the reader is referred to the exhaustive opinion in Brown v. Gosser, supra. After a careful review of the arguments for and against the parental immunity rule in negligence cases and of the obvious tendency of our recent cases to erode the rule, we are of the opinion that the rule ought to be and is abrogated except in the two following situations: (1) where the negligent act relied on for a recovery involves the reasonable exercise of parental authority over the child, and (2) where the alleged negligent act involves the ex

1967In Fry v. Commonwealth, 259 Ky. 337 , 82 S.W.2d 431 , it was stated by this Court as follows: “ * * * nor is it proper to cross-examine him as to any fact which is collateral and irrelevant to the issue merely for the purpose of discrediting his testimony in case he denies the fact.” Also in Caulder v. Commonwealth of Ky., Ky., 339 S.W.2d 644 , it was stated thusly, “It is an accepted rule that where the value of evidence for a legitimate purpose is slight and the jury’s probable misuse of that evidence is great, the evidence may be excluded altogether.” We conclude that this case is clearly w

1967In Fry v. Commonwealth, 259 Ky. 337 , 82 S.W.2d 431 , it was stated by this Court as follows: “ * * * nor is it proper to cross-examine him as to any fact which is collateral and irrelevant to the issue merely for the purpose of discrediting his testimony in case he denies the fact.” Also in Caulder v. Commonwealth of Ky., Ky., 339 S.W.2d 644 , it was stated thusly, “It is an accepted rule that where the value of evidence for a legitimate purpose is slight and the jury’s probable misuse of that evidence is great, the evidence may be excluded altogether.” We conclude that this case is clearly w

1967In Fry v. Commonwealth, 259 Ky. 337 , 82 S.W.2d 431 , it was stated by this Court as follows: “ * * * nor is it proper to cross-examine him as to any fact which is collateral and irrelevant to the issue merely for the purpose of discrediting his testimony in case he denies the fact.” Also in Caulder v. Commonwealth of Ky., Ky., 339 S.W.2d 644 , it was stated thusly, “It is an accepted rule that where the value of evidence for a legitimate purpose is slight and the jury’s probable misuse of that evidence is great, the evidence may be excluded altogether.” We conclude that this case is clearly w

1949One of the cases listed above, Davis v. Allen’s Ex’r, 198 Ky. 669 , 249 S. W. 1013 , is cited and relied on by appellants as supporting their contention that debts and costs must come out of the personal property because it is set out in that opinion that the order of marshalling of assets and applying them is as follows: (1) personal estate not exempted expressly or by implication; (2) lands specifically devised and set apart for the payment of debts; (3) lands descended; and (4) lands specifically devised.

1949One of the cases listed above, Davis v. Allen’s Ex’r, 198 Ky. 669 , 249 S. W. 1013 , is cited and relied on by appellants as supporting their contention that debts and costs must come out of the personal property because it is set out in that opinion that the order of marshalling of assets and applying them is as follows: (1) personal estate not exempted expressly or by implication; (2) lands specifically devised and set apart for the payment of debts; (3) lands descended; and (4) lands specifically devised.

1938As stated in Day v. Miles, 204 Ky. 711 , 265 S. W. 282, 283 , “It is a well established rule of this court that when the vendor of a tract of land executes a contract of sale or a title bond which he delivers to the vendee, and places the vendee in possession of the lands, an action in ejectment will not lie in favor of the vendor to recover possession of the land.” The reasons for this rule of practice, which does not obtain in some jurisdictions, are given in Morton v. Dickson, 90 Ky. 572 , 14 S. W. 905 , 12 Ky. Law Rep. 547 .

1938As stated in Day v. Miles, 204 Ky. 711 , 265 S. W. 282, 283 , “It is a well established rule of this court that when the vendor of a tract of land executes a contract of sale or a title bond which he delivers to the vendee, and places the vendee in possession of the lands, an action in ejectment will not lie in favor of the vendor to recover possession of the land.” The reasons for this rule of practice, which does not obtain in some jurisdictions, are given in Morton v. Dickson, 90 Ky. 572 , 14 S. W. 905 , 12 Ky. Law Rep. 547 .

1938As stated in Day v. Miles, 204 Ky. 711 , 265 S. W. 282, 283 , “It is a well established rule of this court that when the vendor of a tract of land executes a contract of sale or a title bond which he delivers to the vendee, and places the vendee in possession of the lands, an action in ejectment will not lie in favor of the vendor to recover possession of the land.” The reasons for this rule of practice, which does not obtain in some jurisdictions, are given in Morton v. Dickson, 90 Ky. 572 , 14 S. W. 905 , 12 Ky. Law Rep. 547 .

1938As stated in Day v. Miles, 204 Ky. 711 , 265 S. W. 282, 283 , “It is a well established rule of this court that when the vendor of a tract of land executes a contract of sale or a title bond which he delivers to the vendee, and places the vendee in possession of the lands, an action in ejectment will not lie in favor of the vendor to recover possession of the land.” The reasons for this rule of practice, which does not obtain in some jurisdictions, are given in Morton v. Dickson, 90 Ky. 572 , 14 S. W. 905 , 12 Ky. Law Rep. 547 .

1935It is true that a poorhouse keeper appointed by order of the fiscal court is an employee or agent of the court and not a public officer, Graves County v. Dowdy, 258 Ky. 544 , 80 S. W. (2d) 597 , but the reasons for the rule given in Divine v. Harvie, and Webb v. McCauley, supra, and approved in later cases, apply with equal force to an employee or agent of the fiscal court.

1935It is true that a poorhouse keeper appointed by order of the fiscal court is an employee or agent of the court and not a public officer, Graves County v. Dowdy, 258 Ky. 544 , 80 S. W. (2d) 597 , but the reasons for the rule given in Divine v. Harvie, and Webb v. McCauley, supra, and approved in later cases, apply with equal force to an employee or agent of the fiscal court.

1935It is true that a poorhouse keeper appointed by order of the fiscal court is an employee or agent of the court and not a public officer, Graves County v. Dowdy, 258 Ky. 544 , 80 S. W. (2d) 597 , but the reasons for the rule given in Divine v. Harvie, and Webb v. McCauley, supra, and approved in later cases, apply with equal force to an employee or agent of the fiscal court.

1933See Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Justice, 214 Ky. 451 , 283 S. W. 399 ; Avondale Heights Co. v. Proctor, 224 Ky. 188 , 5 S. W. (2d) 1054 .

1933See Elkhorn Coal Co. v. Justice, 214 Ky. 451 , 283 S. W. 399 ; Avondale Heights Co. v. Proctor, 224 Ky. 188 , 5 S. W. (2d) 1054 .

1932Co. v. Rustin, 151 Ky. 103 , 151 S. W. 366, 368 , the court after stating the reasons for the rule thus laid it down.

1932Co. v. Rustin, 151 Ky. 103 , 151 S. W. 366, 368 , the court after stating the reasons for the rule thus laid it down.

1930This identical question was discussed and decided, as the appellant contends it should be, in the ease of Carroll v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 557 , 299 S. W. 183 , to which reference is made for a discussion of the reasons on which the doctrine rests.

1930This identical question was discussed and decided, as the appellant contends it should be, in the ease of Carroll v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 557 , 299 S. W. 183 , to which reference is made for a discussion of the reasons on which the doctrine rests.

1930Cf. Payton v. McQuown, 97 Ky. 757 , 31 S. W. 874 , 17 Ky. Law Rep. 518 , 31 L.

1930Cf. Payton v. McQuown, 97 Ky. 757 , 31 S. W. 874 , 17 Ky. Law Rep. 518 , 31 L.

1929She could not live on the vacant lot before the house was built, and she cannot hold a homestead therein against its debt, for she can only use the property as a home by living'in one of these houses. *560 Thacker v. Booth, 6 S. W. 460 , 9 Ky. Law Rep. 745 ; Butler v. Davis, 23 S. W. 220 , 15 Ky. Law Rep. 273 ; Robards v. Robards, 85 S. W. 718, 27 Ky. Law Rep. 494 .

1922In .stating the reasons for the rule the above -mentioned text says: “Where the parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing in such terms as import a legal obligation, without .any .uncertainty as to the object or intent of their engagements, all previous negotiations and agreements with reference to the subject matter are presumed, to have been merged in the written contracts, and the whole engagements of the parties and the extent of their undertaking is presumed to have been reduced to writing.” Creitz v. Gallenstein, 170 Ky. 16 ; Citizens Trust Co. v. Farmers Bank, 166 Ky.

1922In .stating the reasons for the rule the above -mentioned text says: “Where the parties have deliberately put their engagements into writing in such terms as import a legal obligation, without .any .uncertainty as to the object or intent of their engagements, all previous negotiations and agreements with reference to the subject matter are presumed, to have been merged in the written contracts, and the whole engagements of the parties and the extent of their undertaking is presumed to have been reduced to writing.” Creitz v. Gallenstein, 170 Ky. 16 ; Citizens Trust Co. v. Farmers Bank, 166 Ky.

1905In this State the doctrine prevails that partnership real estate is deemed personalty for the purposes of the partnership (Spalding v. Wilson, 80 Ky., 589 , 4 Ky. Law Rep., 575 ; Casky v. Casky, 5 Ky. Law Rep., 775 ; Flanagan v. Shuck, 82 Ky., 617 , 6 Ky. Law Rep., 699 ), which is sometimes given as one of the reasons for the rule that agreements to become partners in dealing in lands is not within the statute (Flower v. Barnekoff, 20 Or., 132 , 25 Pac., 370 , 11 L.

1905In this State the doctrine prevails that partnership real estate is deemed personalty for the purposes of the partnership (Spalding v. Wilson, 80 Ky., 589 , 4 Ky. Law Rep., 575 ; Casky v. Casky, 5 Ky. Law Rep., 775 ; Flanagan v. Shuck, 82 Ky., 617 , 6 Ky. Law Rep., 699 ), which is sometimes given as one of the reasons for the rule that agreements to become partners in dealing in lands is not within the statute (Flower v. Barnekoff, 20 Or., 132 , 25 Pac., 370 , 11 L.