reasons rule in Pennsylvania

1988The reasons for the rule were set forth by Chief Justice Lewis in Paul v. Carver, supra, 26 Pa. at page 225 : ' * * * Where land is laid out in town lots, with streets and alleys, the owner receives a full consideration for the streets and alleys in the increased value of the lots * * * If the streets were to be vacated, of what value would they be to the original grantors, unless for the purposes of annoyance to the lot owners?

1954The reasons for the rule were set forth by Mr. Chief Justice Lewis in Paul v. Carver, supra, at p. 225: . .

1999“The reasons for the challenge need not rise to the level of a ‘for cause’ challenge.” See Rico, supra (citing Jones, supra at 520 n. 31, 668 A.2d at 519 n. 31). ¶ 9 In the instant case, Appellant failed to create an adequate record at the trial level as required by Spence, supra, in that Appellant did not make a record of the race/gender of all (1) venirepersons in the jury pool; (2) venirepersons removed by the Commonwealth; (3) venirepersons remaining after strikes for cause; or, (4) jurors who were acceptable to the Commonwealth but were peremptorily stricken by the defense.

1998Commonwealth v. Jones, 542 Pa. at 520 n. 31, 668 A.2d at 519 n. 31.

1948The reasons for the rule are set forth very fully in Griffith v. Eshleman, 4 Watts, 51 , and it has been recognized and applied in many subsequent cases, [citing cases].” See also Hildeburn v. Curran, 65 Pa. 59 ; Commonwealth v. Clemmer, 190 Pa. 202 , 42 A. 675 ; Conrad v. Werner, 94 Pa. Superior Ct. 37 ; Commonwealth v. Shultz, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 177 , 175 A. 288 ; Berliner v. Schoenberg, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 254 , 178 A. 330 .

1912The reasons for the rule ’are set forth very fully in Griffith v. Eshleman, 4 Watts, 51 , and it has been recognized and applied in many subsequent cases, amongst which may be mentioned Elliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65 ; Wright v. Cumptsy, 41 Pa. 102 ; Hildeburn v. Curran, 65 Pa. 59 ; Erie Railway Co. v. Decker, 78 Pa. 293 ; Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. 139 ; Trussell v. W.

1948The reasons for the rule are set forth very fully in Griffith v. Eshleman, 4 Watts, 51 , and it has been recognized and applied in many subsequent cases, [citing cases].” See also Hildeburn v. Curran, 65 Pa. 59 ; Commonwealth v. Clemmer, 190 Pa. 202 , 42 A. 675 ; Conrad v. Werner, 94 Pa. Superior Ct. 37 ; Commonwealth v. Shultz, 115 Pa. Superior Ct. 177 , 175 A. 288 ; Berliner v. Schoenberg, 117 Pa. Superior Ct. 254 , 178 A. 330 .

1912The reasons for the rule ’are set forth very fully in Griffith v. Eshleman, 4 Watts, 51 , and it has been recognized and applied in many subsequent cases, amongst which may be mentioned Elliott v. Boyles, 31 Pa. 65 ; Wright v. Cumptsy, 41 Pa. 102 ; Hildeburn v. Curran, 65 Pa. 59 ; Erie Railway Co. v. Decker, 78 Pa. 293 ; Hester v. Com., 85 Pa. 139 ; Trussell v. W.

1898The second and third assignments are not considered, as they are in direct violation of Rule 17 of this court; the answer of the witness not being given, we repeat what was said in Commonwealth v. Smith, 2 Pa. Superior Ct., 474, “ The reasons for this rule and the importance of it are so clearly shown in Battles v. Sliney, 126 Pa. 460 , that we need only to refer to that case.” The fourth and fifth assignments are considered together.

1896The reasons for this rule and the importance of conforming to it are so clearly shown in Battles v. Sliney, 126 Pa. 460 , that we need only refer to that case.

2024The federal doctrine creates a requirement in addition to a showing that plaintiffs are aggrieved. 19 “[E]ven when the plaintiff has alleged injury sufficient to meet the ‘case or controversy’ requirement,” the High Court holds that “the plaintiff generally must assert his own legal rights and interests, and cannot rest his claim to relief on the legal rights or interests of third parties.” Warth, 422 U.S. at 499 ; see also Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 125, 129 (2004) (providing that one of the main reasons for the doctrine is concern that 19 Though the Commonwealth Court referred to it as the

2020In holding that the defendant did not show prejudice, the Court in Reaves specifically noted that the court in denying the PCRA petition gave an explanation for the length of the sentence. 923 A.2d at 1132 .

2018Weaver stated that "The two doctrines are intertwined; for the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim premised on the failure to object to that error." Id. at 1907 .

2016Id. ____________________________________________ 3 Additionally, Appellant states that “[t]he standard of review for a claim challenging that the sentence [is] illegal, unconstitutional, and cruel and unusual is whether or not there was an abuse of discretion by the [c]ourt.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

2016Id. ____________________________________________ 3 Additionally, Appellant states that “[t]he standard of review for a claim challenging that the sentence [is] illegal, unconstitutional, and cruel and unusual is whether or not there was an abuse of discretion by the [c]ourt.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v Booze, 953 A.2d 1263, 1278 (Pa. Super. 2008)).

2014The specific reasons for this challenge are that Section 704(2), as applied to the [pjroperty, is: (a) unreasonable, arbitrary, unduly restrictive, exclusionary, and not a valid exercise of the Township’s police power; (b) an unreasonable infringement upon an affected landowner’s constitutionally protected right to freely use and enjoy the landowner’s property; (c) is not consistent with the ‘Urban Growth Boundary’ designation of the [pjroperty; and (d) is contrary to the holding in [.Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Gotta, 499 Pa. 246 , 452 A.2d 1337 (1982) ], which invalidated a zon

2014The specific reasons for this challenge are that Section 704(2), as applied to the [pjroperty, is: (a) unreasonable, arbitrary, unduly restrictive, exclusionary, and not a valid exercise of the Township’s police power; (b) an unreasonable infringement upon an affected landowner’s constitutionally protected right to freely use and enjoy the landowner’s property; (c) is not consistent with the ‘Urban Growth Boundary’ designation of the [pjroperty; and (d) is contrary to the holding in [.Hopewell Township Board of Supervisors v. Gotta, 499 Pa. 246 , 452 A.2d 1337 (1982) ], which invalidated a zon

2011On the other hand, it would be altogether unreasonable to shift the burden of explanation if the objection is so tardily made that the challenging attorney cannot be reasonably expected to remember.” Uderra, 862 A.2d at 86 (citing McCrory v. Henderson, 82 F.3d 1243, 1251 (2d Cir.1996)).

1987Brown v. Eastburn, 351 Pa.Super. 479 , 506 A.2d 449 (1986). [2] The majority states in footnote 2 that, whatever the state of the relationship between the parties at the March 24, 1984 hearing, the testimony offered at the March 3, 1986 hearing demonstrated that by then the mother and father's cooperation had dwindled away to nothing.

1987Brown v. Eastburn, 351 Pa.Super. 479 , 506 A.2d 449 (1986). [2] The majority states in footnote 2 that, whatever the state of the relationship between the parties at the March 24, 1984 hearing, the testimony offered at the March 3, 1986 hearing demonstrated that by then the mother and father's cooperation had dwindled away to nothing.

1986Id.

1986Id.

1985Pace v. Kroger, supra. The failure of the trial court to consider the issue raised by appellants constitutes reversible error under the Pace decision.

1982These are the reasons for the rule: Com. v. Duncan, 257 Pa. Super. 277 , 390 A. 2d 820 (1978).

1982These are the reasons for the rule: Com. v. Duncan, 257 Pa. Super. 277 , 390 A. 2d 820 (1978).