reasons rule in Virginia

1993The Virginia Supreme Court in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 102 , 189 S.E.2d 678 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973), explained the purpose of the “knock and announce” doctrine as follows: *766 The reasons for the requirement of notice of purpose and authority have been said to be that the law abhors unnecessary breaking or destruction of any house, because the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the person breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right to resist seeming aggression on his private property.

1992The Virginia Supreme Court in Johnson v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 102 , 189 S.E.2d 678 (1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1116 (1973), acknowledged that the Code of Virginia is silent on the formalities of the execution of search warrants, and explained the purpose of the “knock and announce” doctrine as follows: The reasons for the requirement of notice of purpose and authority have been said to be that the law abhors unnecessary breaking or destruction of any house, because the dweller in the house would not know the purpose of the person breaking in, unless he were notified, and would have a right

2016The Court relied upon a decision from 1958 that articulated the reasons for this rule: “(1) The parties are different in a criminal proceeding from those in a civil action; (2) the objects of the two proceedings are different; (3) the results and procedures of the two trials are different; and (4) there is a lack of mutuality.” Id., at 263-64, 355 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Aetna, 200 Va. at 388 , 105 S.E.2d at 872 ).

1987The reasons for the rule “that a judgment rendered in a criminal prosecution, whether of conviction or acquittal, does not establish in a subsequent civil action the truth of the facts on which it is rendered,” Aetna v. Czoka, 200 Va. 385 , 388, 105 S.E.2d 869, 872 (1958), have also been articulated as follows: “(1) The parties are different in a criminal proceeding from those in a civil action; (2) the objects of the two proceedings are different; (3) the results and procedures of the two trials are different; and (4) there is a lack of mutuality.” Id. at 389, 105 S.E.2d at 872 .

2010The reasons for this exception are the ready mobility of the vehicle as well as the fact that "`the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.'" California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2069 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2010The reasons for this exception are the ready mobility of the vehicle as well as the fact that "`the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.'" California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2069 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2016The Court relied upon a decision from 1958 that articulated the reasons for this rule: “(1) The parties are different in a criminal proceeding from those in a civil action; (2) the objects of the two proceedings are different; (3) the results and procedures of the two trials are different; and (4) there is a lack of mutuality.” Id., at 263-64, 355 S.E.2d at 581 (quoting Aetna, 200 Va. at 388 , 105 S.E.2d at 872 ).

2010"If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). "[P]robable cause exists when `there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 , 670 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2009) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 , 126 S.Ct. 1494, 1499 , 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006)).

2010"If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). "[P]robable cause exists when `there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 , 670 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2009) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 , 126 S.Ct. 1494, 1499 , 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006)).

2010This was the rationale of the first case to acknowledge the doctrine, Smith v. United States, [ 94 U.S. 97 ,] 97 [(1876)]: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” See also Bohanan [Bonahan] v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 [ 8 S.Ct. 1390 , 31 L.Ed. 854 ] (1887); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 [ 69 S.Ct. 1453 , 93 L.Ed. 1897 ] (1949).

2010This was the rationale of the first case to acknowledge the doctrine, Smith v. United States, [ 94 U.S. 97 ,] 97 [(1876)]: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” See also Bohanan [Bonahan] v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 [ 8 S.Ct. 1390 , 31 L.Ed. 854 ] (1887); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 [ 69 S.Ct. 1453 , 93 L.Ed. 1897 ] (1949).

2010This was the rationale of the first case to acknowledge the doctrine, Smith v. United States, [ 94 U.S. 97 ,] 97 [(1876)]: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” See also Bohanan [Bonahan] v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 [ 8 S.Ct. 1390 , 31 L.Ed. 854 ] (1887); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 [ 69 S.Ct. 1453 , 93 L.Ed. 1897 ] (1949).

2010This was the rationale of the first case to acknowledge the doctrine, Smith v. United States, [ 94 U.S. 97 ,] 97 [(1876)]: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” See also Bohanan [Bonahan] v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 [ 8 S.Ct. 1390 , 31 L.Ed. 854 ] (1887); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 [ 69 S.Ct. 1453 , 93 L.Ed. 1897 ] (1949).

2010This was the rationale of the first case to acknowledge the doctrine, Smith v. United States, [ 94 U.S. 97 ,] 97 [(1876)]: “It is clearly within our discretion to refuse to hear a criminal case in error, unless the convicted party, suing out the writ, is where he can be made to respond to any judgment we may render.” See also Bohanan [Bonahan] v. Nebraska, 125 U.S. 692 [ 8 S.Ct. 1390 , 31 L.Ed. 854 ] (1887); Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. 189 [ 69 S.Ct. 1453 , 93 L.Ed. 1897 ] (1949).

2010"If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). "[P]robable cause exists when `there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 , 670 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2009) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 , 126 S.Ct. 1494, 1499 , 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006)).

2010"If a car is readily mobile and probable cause exists to believe it contains contraband, the Fourth Amendment thus permits police to search the vehicle without more." Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 , 116 S.Ct. 2485, 2487 , 135 L.Ed.2d 1031 (1996). "[P]robable cause exists when `there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place.'" Jones v. Commonwealth, 277 Va. 171, 178 , 670 S.E.2d 727, 731 (2009) (quoting United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 , 126 S.Ct. 1494, 1499 , 164 L.Ed.2d 195 (2006)).

2010The reasons for this exception are the ready mobility of the vehicle as well as the fact that "`the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.'" California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2069 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2010The reasons for this exception are the ready mobility of the vehicle as well as the fact that "`the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office.'" California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 391 , 105 S.Ct. 2066, 2069 , 85 L.Ed.2d 406 (1985) (quoting South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 , 96 S.Ct. 3092, 3096 , 49 L.Ed.2d 1000 (1976)).

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

2009McMillion v. Dryvit Sys., 262 Va. 463 , 469, 552 S.E.2d 364 , 367 (2001); Waterfront Marine Constr. v. North End 49ers, 251 Va. 417 , 427 n. 2, 468 S.E.2d 894 , 900 n. 2 (1996); Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260 , 280-81, 257 S.E.2d 808 , 822 (1979); McBride, 24 Va. App. at 35 , 480 S.E.2d at 128 .

1989The instincts of human nature, revolting at this unnatural and heinous crime, compels the victim to cry out and denounce its foul perpetrator Id. at 947 .