reasons bar in Maine

1999This tort is more frequently called “wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance.” The key allegation of this count is that: “Defendant, by and through his overt actions described above, improperly and without justification, by means of fraud, intimidation and undue influence, interfered with plaintiff Umbaugh’s expectancy.” This paragraph, and the terminology of count VI, generally track the cause of action for wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance as outlined in our recent cases, Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 7 , 712 A.2d 1039, 1041 ; Plimpton v. Ge

1999This tort is more frequently called "wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance." The key allegation of this count is that: "Defendant, by and through his overt actions described above, improperly and without justification, by means of fraud, intimidation and undue influence, interfered with plaintiff Umbaugh's expectancy." This paragraph, and the terminology of count VI, generally track the cause of action for wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance as outlined in our recent cases, Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 7 , 712 A.2d 1039, 1041 ; Plimpton v. Ge

1999Co., 1999 ME 106, ¶¶ 4-5 , 733 A.2d at 978-79 , it also appears that at least some of the items alleged to have been converted, for example bank accounts, were not "tangible property." Thus, their conversion or misuse was not "property damage" under the York policy. [¶ 18] The same reasons would bar a claim under the York policy for the losses alleged in the conversion count, count V. [¶ 19] Similar difficulties are faced in comparison of the terms of the policy and the interference with expectancy of inheritance count.

1999Co., 1999 ME 106, ¶¶ 4-5 , 733 A.2d at 978-79 , it also appears that at least some of the items alleged to have been converted, for example bank accounts, were not "tangible property." Thus, their conversion or misuse was not "property damage" under the York policy. [¶ 18] The same reasons would bar a claim under the York policy for the losses alleged in the conversion count, count V. [¶ 19] Similar difficulties are faced in comparison of the terms of the policy and the interference with expectancy of inheritance count.

1999This tort is more frequently called "wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance." The key allegation of this count is that: "Defendant, by and through his overt actions described above, improperly and without justification, by means of fraud, intimidation and undue influence, interfered with plaintiff Umbaugh's expectancy." This paragraph, and the terminology of count VI, generally track the cause of action for wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance as outlined in our recent cases, Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 7 , 712 A.2d 1039, 1041 ; Plimpton v. Ge

1999This tort is more frequently called "wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance." The key allegation of this count is that: "Defendant, by and through his overt actions described above, improperly and without justification, by means of fraud, intimidation and undue influence, interfered with plaintiff Umbaugh's expectancy." This paragraph, and the terminology of count VI, generally track the cause of action for wrongful interference with the expectancy of an inheritance as outlined in our recent cases, Morrill v. Morrill, 1998 ME 133, ¶ 7 , 712 A.2d 1039, 1041 ; Plimpton v. Ge

1981It is essential .. . that a reviewing court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boilerplate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law ... ’ 521 F.2d at 364 (footnote omitted), quoting, Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434 , 88 S.Ct. 1157, 1168 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968).

1981It is essential .. . that a reviewing court have some basis for distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere boilerplate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law ... ’ 521 F.2d at 364 (footnote omitted), quoting, Protective Committee v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 434 , 88 S.Ct. 1157, 1168 , 20 L.Ed.2d 1 (1968).

1971Second, where the Commissioner’s findings are básed entirely upon the printed record, without the benefit of testimonial evidence, the reasons for the rule disappear and the court will review the facts. 2 Matthews, supra. Here, substantially all of the evidence was testimonial; therefore, under the reasoning of Matthews, supra, only the “clearly erroneous” rule has application.

1971Second, where the Commissioner’s findings are básed entirely upon the printed record, without the benefit of testimonial evidence, the reasons for the rule disappear and the court will review the facts. 2 Matthews, supra. Here, substantially all of the evidence was testimonial; therefore, under the reasoning of Matthews, supra, only the “clearly erroneous” rule has application.

1971Furthermore, except in extraordinary cases the court will rely upon the presumption of the constitutionality of legislative action and not even examine the question unless a determination thereof is strictly necessary to a decision disposing of the cause before it for determination.” (Emphasis supplied.) In Johnson v. Maine Wetlands Control Board (1969) (Me.) 250 A.2d 825 , 827 we said, “It has long been the judicial policy of this Court to decline to pass upon the question of constitutionality of a statute unless this is entirely necessary to a decision of the cause in which it is raised.

1963I feel that the underlying reasons for the rule as set forth in Hubert v. Cloutier, supra, are as convincing today as they were when expressed in that opinion.

1911To create a lien the materials must be used for erecting, altering or repairing the building; must be so applied as to constitute a part of the building.” In Ames v. Dyer, 41 Maine, 397, in support of the conclusion that the moulds of a vessel cannot be regarded as a part of the materials with which it is constructed, the court cited Phillips v. Wright, 5 Sandf. 342 , and quoted from the opinion as follows: "The whole theory of a lien for labor and materials rests upon the basis that such labor and materials have entered into and contributed to the production or equipment of the thing upon whi

1905In Marston v. Hobbs, 2 Mass. 433 , cited with approval, in Wait v. Maxwell, 4 Pick. 87 , and Blanchard v. Hoxie, 34 Maine, 376, the different covenants are critically distinguished and the reasons for the rule and the exceptions above stated, fully considered and explained.

1822The same principle is stated in Johnson v. Johnson, 11 Mass. 359 .