reasons rule in Washington

1983As stated in In re Harbert, supra at 723-24: Moreover, both Kent [v. United States, supra and Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331 , 413 P.2d 940 , 422 P.2d 783 (1966), recognize the necessity that a waiver order must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons for the waiver order of sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.

1983As stated in In re Harbert, supra at 723-24: Moreover, both Kent [v. United States, supra and Dillenburg v. Maxwell, 70 Wn.2d 331 , 413 P.2d 940 , 422 P.2d 783 (1966), recognize the necessity that a waiver order must be accompanied by a statement of the reasons for the waiver order of sufficient specificity to permit meaningful review.

2013In general, an increased sentence following a successful appeal violates due process if vindictiveness played a role in the resentencing.14 When the same judge imposes both the original and post-appeal sentences, a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness arises.15 The presumption does not arise, however, when the increased sentence is imposed by a different judge.16 We explained the reasons for this rule in State v. Parmelee: Concerns about judicial vindictiveness arise when the judge fully considers a sentence and renders a decision, and then, after a successful appeal, changes the sentence

2013In general, an increased sentence following a successful appeal violates due process if vindictiveness played a role in the resentencing.14 When the same judge imposes both the original and post-appeal sentences, a rebuttable presumption of vindictiveness arises.15 The presumption does not arise, however, when the increased sentence is imposed by a different judge.16 We explained the reasons for this rule in State v. Parmelee: Concerns about judicial vindictiveness arise when the judge fully considers a sentence and renders a decision, and then, after a successful appeal, changes the sentence

2007The reasons for this exception were explained in Bowers v. Fibreboard Corp., 66 Wn.

2007The reasons for this exception were explained in Bowers v. Fibreboard Corp., 66 Wash.App. 454, 461-63 , 832 P.2d 523 (1992), rev. denied, 120 Wash.2d 1017 , 844 P.2d 436 (1992).

2005It was precisely because the reasons for applying this rule are identical that the application of the common enemy rule to Puget Sound has not been questioned in the more than 100 years since this court first acknowledged that the rule applied in Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75 , 44 P. 113 (1896). 20 ¶50 Although the majority fails to anchor its holding on the rationale underlying the common enemy rule, that rationale is set forth in Cass and is worth recalling: The rule is based upon the principle that such water is a part of the land upon which it lies, or over which it temporarily flows, and tha

2005It was precisely because the reasons for applying this rule are identical that the application of the common enemy rule to Puget Sound has not been questioned in the more than 100 years since this court first acknowledged that the rule applied in Cass v. Dicks, 14 Wash. 75 , 44 P. 113 (1896). 20 ¶50 Although the majority fails to anchor its holding on the rationale underlying the common enemy rule, that rationale is set forth in Cass and is worth recalling: The rule is based upon the principle that such water is a part of the land upon which it lies, or over which it temporarily flows, and tha

2002The reasons for this rule are well settled: (1) to ensure that “an appellant ‘ha[s] an opportunity to elect to stand on his theory or apply to the court to amend his theory and present some other one’ ”; and (2) to “encourage parties to raise issues before the Court of Appeals, thereby ensuring the ‘benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.’ ” Clark, 124 Wn.2d at 105 (alteration in original) (quoting Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Peterson, 82 Wn.2d 822, 830 , 514 P.2d 159 (1973) and Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 , 112

2002The reasons for this rule are well settled: (1) to ensure that “an appellant ‘ha[s] an opportunity to elect to stand on his theory or apply to the court to amend his theory and present some other one’ ”; and (2) to “encourage parties to raise issues before the Court of Appeals, thereby ensuring the ‘benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.’ ” Clark, 124 Wn.2d at 105 (alteration in original) (quoting Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Peterson, 82 Wn.2d 822, 830 , 514 P.2d 159 (1973) and Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 , 112

2002The reasons for this rule are well settled: (1) to ensure that “an appellant ‘ha[s] an opportunity to elect to stand on his theory or apply to the court to amend his theory and present some other one’ ”; and (2) to “encourage parties to raise issues before the Court of Appeals, thereby ensuring the ‘benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.’ ” Clark, 124 Wn.2d at 105 (alteration in original) (quoting Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Peterson, 82 Wn.2d 822, 830 , 514 P.2d 159 (1973) and Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 , 112

2002The reasons for this rule are well settled: (1) to ensure that “an appellant ‘ha[s] an opportunity to elect to stand on his theory or apply to the court to amend his theory and present some other one’ ”; and (2) to “encourage parties to raise issues before the Court of Appeals, thereby ensuring the ‘benefit of developed arguments on both sides and lower court opinions squarely addressing the question.’ ” Clark, 124 Wn.2d at 105 (alteration in original) (quoting Peoples Nat’l Bank of Wash. v. Peterson, 82 Wn.2d 822, 830 , 514 P.2d 159 (1973) and Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 , 112

2001As we noted in Price, the reasons for this rule are as follows: "(a) that parties are free to decide whether they wish to use arbitration in lieu of the judicial process, (b) that they may agree on what matters they wish to submit to an arbitrator, (c) that a party is only required to arbitrate those matters which are the subject of such an arbitration agreement, and (d) that the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist coverage terms is a clear and unambiguous agreement to submit certain specified questions—and only disputes involving those questions—to arbitration." Price, 133 Wash.2d at

2001As we noted in Price, the reasons for this rule are as follows: “(a) that parties are free to decide whether they wish to use arbitration in lieu of the judicial process, (b) that they may agree on what matters they wish to submit to an arbitrator, (c) that a party is only required to arbitrate those matters which are the subject of such an arbitration agreement, and (d) that the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist coverage terms is a clear and unambiguous agreement to submit certain specified questions—and only disputes involving those questions—to arbitration.” Price, 133 Wn.2d at 4

1978Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 , 90 L.Ed. 652 , 66 S.Ct. 574 .

1978Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 , 90 L.Ed. 652 , 66 S.Ct. 574 .

2023First, the final judgment “can be tested upon the record made at trial, not the record made at the time summary judgment was denied.” Id. at 306 (quoting Evans v. Jensen, 103 Idaho 937 , 655 P.2d 454, 459 (1982)).

2022In State v. Simon, 64 Wn.

2017State v. Miller, 180 Wn.

2015State v. Lewis, 130 Wn.2d 700, 704-05, 707 , 927 P.2d 235 (1996). 8 Internal quotation marks omitted. 9 Internal quotation marks omitted. 24 No. 70799-0-1/25 Here, in response to the defense closing argument, the prosecutor addressed each of the reasons the defense attorney cited as to why M.N.'s testimony was not credible.

2010Id. at 239-40, 148 P.3d 1098 . ¶ 9 Erickson essentially argues that under Parks, a judge does not have authority to issue an arrest warrant unless a formal finding of probable cause has previously been made on the underlying reasons for the hearing, in this case the probation violation allegations.

2010Id. at 239-40 . ¶9 Erickson essentially argues that under Parks, a judge does not have authority to issue an arrest warrant unless a formal finding of probable cause has previously been made on the underlying reasons for the hearing, in this case the probation violation allegations.

2001As we noted in Price, the reasons for this rule are as follows: "(a) that parties are free to decide whether they wish to use arbitration in lieu of the judicial process, (b) that they may agree on what matters they wish to submit to an arbitrator, (c) that a party is only required to arbitrate those matters which are the subject of such an arbitration agreement, and (d) that the arbitration clause in the uninsured motorist coverage terms is a clear and unambiguous agreement to submit certain specified questions—and only disputes involving those questions—to arbitration." Price, 133 Wash.2d at

1990Woolbright cites Seattle v. Orwick, 53 Wn.

1979The term 'excited utterance' more clearly represents the reason for the exception and should be used." (Footnote omitted.) State v. Canida, 4 Wn.

1972Co., 112 F.2d 577 (D.D.C. 1940).

1965Each request was based upon this court’s decision in Earley v. State, 48 Wn.2d 667 , 296 P.2d 530 (1956).

1965Each request was based upon this court’s decision in Earley v. State, 48 Wn.2d 667 , 296 P.2d 530 (1956).

1964In Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694 , 66 P. (2d) 1152 , 110 A.L.R. 1110 (1937), we recognized that all of the reasons for such immunity had been subjected to vigorous attack, but said that "`... the doctrine has become fixed as a matter of public policy, regardless of the reason upon which the rule is made to rest, and ... any change therein must be sought from the legislature.' "That opinion was written almost sixteen years ago.

1964In Hagerman v. Seattle, 189 Wash. 694 , 66 P. (2d) 1152 , 110 A.L.R. 1110 (1937), we recognized that all of the reasons for such immunity had been subjected to vigorous attack, but said that "`... the doctrine has become fixed as a matter of public policy, regardless of the reason upon which the rule is made to rest, and ... any change therein must be sought from the legislature.' "That opinion was written almost sixteen years ago.

1961To permit fragmentary appeals would delay the administration of justice, to the detriment of litigants, and would throw an unnecessary burden on appellate courts.” Crosthwaite v. Crosthwaite, 56 Wn. (2d) 838, 358 P. (2d) 978 (1961).

1961Goodnow v. O’Phelan, 6 Wn. (2d) 146, 106 P. (2d) 1073 (1940)), and the application of the rule is mandatory and not discretionary (State ex rel.

1958Fire Underwriters, 72 Mont. 69 , 232 Pac. 198 , as follows: “It is a matter of common knowledge that' insurance companies prepare their own contracts of insurance.

1958Fire Underwriters, 72 Mont. 69 , 232 Pac. 198 , as follows: “It is a matter of common knowledge that' insurance companies prepare their own contracts of insurance.

1956In the Blasick case, supra, this court stated the reasons for the rule and referred to Eckerson v. Ford's Prairie School Dist., 3 Wn. (2d) 475, 101 P. (2d) 345 , where Judge Steinert, speaking for the court, explained the distinction with which we are here concerned as follows: "There is, of course, a distinction between an actual cause, or cause in fact, and a proximate, or legal, cause.

1956In the Blasick case, supra, this court stated the reasons for the rule and referred to Eckerson v. Ford’s Prairie School Dist., 3 Wn. (2d) 475, 101 P. (2d) 345 , where Judge Steinert, speaking for the court, explained the distinction with which we are here concerned as follows: “There is, of course, a distinction between an actual cause, or cause in fact, and a proximate, or legal, cause.

1953Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452 , 34 Pac. 201 , 23 L.R.A. 340 (1893).

1953Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash. 452 , 34 Pac. 201 , 23 L.R.A. 340 (1893).