reasons rule in Arkansas

1994If local government fails, the state government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the state must itself meet its continuing obligation.' 279 Ark. at 349 , citing Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).

1983If local government fails, the state government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the state must itself meet its continuing obligation. ’ ’ Robinson, supra, at 295 and cited with approval in Pauley, supra at 873 .

1994If local government fails, the state government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the state must itself meet its continuing obligation.' 279 Ark. at 349 , citing Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273 (N.J. 1973).

1992After discussion of the reasons for the standard we concluded: We do not reverse decisions made by the Arkansas Supreme Court Board of Law Examiners, which we also review de novo, unless we find the board's decision to be clearly erroneous, Scales v. State Board of Law Examiners, 282 Ark. 578 , 669 S.W.2d 895 (1984), and we will treat the findings of our committee on professional conduct the same way.

1992After discussion of the reasons for the standard we concluded: We do not reverse decisions made by the Arkansas Supreme Court Board of Law Examiners, which we also review de novo, unless we find the board's decision to be clearly erroneous, Scales v. State Board of Law Examiners, 282 Ark. 578 , 669 S.W.2d 895 (1984), and we will treat the findings of our committee on professional conduct the same way.

1992Id. 291 Ark. at 36 , 722 S.W.2d at 284 .

1992Id. 291 Ark. at 36 , 722 S.W.2d at 284 .

1983If local government fails, the state government must compel it to act, and if the local government cannot carry the burden, the state must itself meet its continuing obligation. ’ ’ Robinson, supra, at 295 and cited with approval in Pauley, supra at 873 .

1971The reasons for the rule were stated with clarity in Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147 , 34 Atl. 1025 (1895): But, when the guarantee has knowledge of the death of the guarantor, such knowledge works a revocation of the guaranty.

1971The reasons for the rule were stated with clarity in Gay v. Ward, 67 Conn. 147 , 34 Atl. 1025 (1895): But, when the guarantee has knowledge of the death of the guarantor, such knowledge works a revocation of the guaranty.

1967The interruption of `the trial for such auxiliary inquiries impedes the momentum of the main proceeding and breaks the continuity of the jury's attention.' Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).

1967The interruption of `the trial for such auxiliary inquiries impedes the momentum of the main proceeding and breaks the continuity of the jury's attention.' Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 342 , 60 S.Ct. 266, 268 , 84 L.Ed. 307 (1939).

1967Some of the reasons for hearing the motion before the trial were given in the Blalock case, supra: “Rule 41 (e) ‘is designed to eliminate from the trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt.’ Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 264 , 80 S. Ct. 725, 732 , 4 L.

1967Some of the reasons for hearing the motion before the trial were given in the Blalock case, supra: “Rule 41 (e) ‘is designed to eliminate from the trial disputes over police conduct not immediately relevant to the question of guilt.’ Jones v. United States, 362 U. S. 257, 264 , 80 S. Ct. 725, 732 , 4 L.

1951Appellant contends that the rule applies only in actions in replevin, but in this he is mistaken, as the case just quoted from was not such an action, but a simple action for damages for conversion. ’ ’ Brewer v. Fletcher, 210 Ark. 110 , 194 S. W. 2d 668 , the most recent case, involved a willful trespass, but as dictum the court states the United States rule.

1951Appellant contends that the rule applies only in actions in replevin, but in this he is mistaken, as the case just quoted from was not such an action, but a simple action for damages for conversion. ’ ’ Brewer v. Fletcher, 210 Ark. 110 , 194 S. W. 2d 668 , the most recent case, involved a willful trespass, but as dictum the court states the United States rule.

1946It was there said, under similar facts to those here, “So it appears that appellant was consenting to or acquiescing in the delay, and made no demand for a trial or disposition of the case against him.” In Ware v. State, 159 Ark. 540 , 252 S. W. 934 , the Stewart and Dillard cases were cited as also the later case of Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393 , 144 S. W. 516 , and the construction of the statute as given in the Stewart case was again approved.

1946It was there said, under similar facts to those here, “So it appears that appellant was consenting to or acquiescing in the delay, and made no demand for a trial or disposition of the case against him.” In Ware v. State, 159 Ark. 540 , 252 S. W. 934 , the Stewart and Dillard cases were cited as also the later case of Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393 , 144 S. W. 516 , and the construction of the statute as given in the Stewart case was again approved.

1946In the early case of Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720 , it was held that, in order to justify a discharge of the accused on such a motion,'“he must have placed himself on the record in the attitude of demanding a trial, or at least of resisting postponements.” In Dillard v. State, 65 Ark. 404 , 46 S. W. 533 , the Stewart case, supra, was erroneously cited as being in the 23 Ark., and the language above quoted is there quoted with approval with other language of Chief Justice Watkins giving the reasons for the rule.

1946In the early case of Stewart v. State, 13 Ark. 720 , it was held that, in order to justify a discharge of the accused on such a motion,'“he must have placed himself on the record in the attitude of demanding a trial, or at least of resisting postponements.” In Dillard v. State, 65 Ark. 404 , 46 S. W. 533 , the Stewart case, supra, was erroneously cited as being in the 23 Ark., and the language above quoted is there quoted with approval with other language of Chief Justice Watkins giving the reasons for the rule.

1946It was there said, under similar facts to those here, “So it appears that appellant was consenting to or acquiescing in the delay, and made no demand for a trial or disposition of the case against him.” In Ware v. State, 159 Ark. 540 , 252 S. W. 934 , the Stewart and Dillard cases were cited as also the later case of Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393 , 144 S. W. 516 , and the construction of the statute as given in the Stewart case was again approved.

1946It was there said, under similar facts to those here, “So it appears that appellant was consenting to or acquiescing in the delay, and made no demand for a trial or disposition of the case against him.” In Ware v. State, 159 Ark. 540 , 252 S. W. 934 , the Stewart and Dillard cases were cited as also the later case of Fox v. State, 102 Ark. 393 , 144 S. W. 516 , and the construction of the statute as given in the Stewart case was again approved.

1939The recent case of Security Benefit Association v. Farmer, 193 Ark. 370 , 99 S. W. 2d 580 , quotes with approval from that work as follows: “ ‘Where the facts have been truthfully stated to its agent, but by his fraud, negligence, or mistake are misstated in the application, the company cannot, according to the generally accepted rule, after accepting the premium and issuing the policy, set up such misstatements in the application in avoidance of its liability, where the agent is acting within his real or apparent authority, and there is no fraud or collusion upon the part of insured. . . .’ ”

1939The recent case of Security Benefit Association v. Farmer, 193 Ark. 370 , 99 S. W. 2d 580 , quotes with approval from that work as follows: “ ‘Where the facts have been truthfully stated to its agent, but by his fraud, negligence, or mistake are misstated in the application, the company cannot, according to the generally accepted rule, after accepting the premium and issuing the policy, set up such misstatements in the application in avoidance of its liability, where the agent is acting within his real or apparent authority, and there is no fraud or collusion upon the part of insured. . . .’ ”

1938It is, however, inconsistent with the family relation, while it exists, to permit the maintenance of such an action as that at bar of a minor child against his father to recover damage's for the alleged negligence of the father.” ' • The reasons for the rule are stated somewhat differently in Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260 , 212 N. W. 787 , 52 A. L.

1938It is, however, inconsistent with the family relation, while it exists, to permit the maintenance of such an action as that at bar of a minor child against his father to recover damage's for the alleged negligence of the father.” ' • The reasons for the rule are stated somewhat differently in Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260 , 212 N. W. 787 , 52 A. L.

1928Again this court has said: ‘ ‘ Covenants of warranty of title are universally held to run with the land, and ordinarily a right of action does not arise in favor of the grantee or subsequent holder of the title until there has been an eviction under paramount title; but an exception to this rulé is that where the title is in the government the covenant of warranty is deemed to be broken as soon as it is made, and the right of action is complete at that time, and the statute of limitations begins to run. # * * Judge Riddick, speaking for the court in Dillahunty v. Railway Company, supra, said t

1928Again this court has said: ‘ ‘ Covenants of warranty of title are universally held to run with the land, and ordinarily a right of action does not arise in favor of the grantee or subsequent holder of the title until there has been an eviction under paramount title; but an exception to this rulé is that where the title is in the government the covenant of warranty is deemed to be broken as soon as it is made, and the right of action is complete at that time, and the statute of limitations begins to run. # * * Judge Riddick, speaking for the court in Dillahunty v. Railway Company, supra, said t

1924This court said in the case of Shirey v. Shirey, 87 Ark. 175 (quoting from syllabus 6): “The amount to be allowed as alimony is within the sound discretion of the trial court; and all the circumstances of the particular case should be considered in fixing it, such as the husband’s ability to pay, the station in life of the parties, and the conduct of the wife bearing upon the cause of separation.” A good discussion by the Supreme Court of Alabama of the reasons for this rule will be found in the case of Jones v. Jones, 11 So. 11 .

1918The reasons for the rule are given in Barnett Bros. v. Western Assurance Co., 126 Ark. 562 .

1913Co. v. Wolf, 100 Ark. 22 , we held (quoting from the syllabus) that “where a railway agent by mistake inserted in a bill of lading for an interstate shipment a rate less than the published rate, the railroad company is not bound thereby; and it is immaterial in such case that the shipper and the agent were both ignorant of the published rate.” The authorities are fully reviewed in that case and need not be again restated, nor the reasons for the doctrine there announced.

1892From a number of .cases, Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis., 635 , Randal v. Elder, 12 Kas., 260 , and Kresin v. Mau, 15 Minn., 116 , may be selected as stating the reasons for the rule.

1892From a number of .cases, Bunker v. Locke, 15 Wis., 635 , Randal v. Elder, 12 Kas., 260 , and Kresin v. Mau, 15 Minn., 116 , may be selected as stating the reasons for the rule.

1892The question is ably discussed, and the reasons for the rule clearly stated, in the case of Witzler v. Collins, 70 Me. 290 .