53 Indiana opinions name it 2 courts 1875–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Indiana courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Ulmer v. Stategreen2 sentences2013Willner, 602 N.E.2d at 508 (citing Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind. 52, 55 (1859)). 2010Willner, 602 N.E.2d at 508 (citing Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind. 52, 55 (1859)). | 3 | 3 |
Indiana Department of Environmental Management v. Twin Eagle LLCgreen2 sentences2019Mgmt. v. Twin Eagle LLC , 798 N.E.2d 839 , 844 (Ind. 2003). 2017Even if the *696 ground of the complaint is the unconstitutionality of the statute, which may be beyond the agency’s power to resolve, exhaustion of administrative remedies may still be required because administrative action may resolve the case on other grounds without confronting broader legal issues. 798 N.E.2d at 844 (citations omitted). | 2 | 3 |
Brown v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Another sound reason for such a rule is that a party should be required to promptly raise error in the trial court at the time it occurs rather than remain silent, hoping for an acquittal, and if that does not occur, then raise the question of error for the first time.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 42A05-1511-CR-1958 | August 16, 2016 Page 5 of 8 (Internal citations omitted, quoting Brown v. State, 254 Ind. 504, 506-07 , 260 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1970)). [10] In Galbraith v. State, 468 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), the defendant challenged his conviction on appeal by ar 2016Another sound reason for such a rule is that a party should be required to promptly raise error in the trial court at the time it occurs rather than remain silent, hoping for an acquittal, and if that does not occur, then raise the question of error for the first time.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 42A05-1511-CR-1958 | August 16, 2016 Page 5 of 8 (Internal citations omitted, quoting Brown v. State, 254 Ind. 504, 506-07 , 260 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1970)). [10] In Galbraith v. State, 468 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), the defendant challenged his conviction on appeal by ar | 1 | 2 |
Green v. Obledogreen2 sentences2019Cf. Green v. Obledo , 29 Cal.3d 126 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 , 267 (1981) (in bank) ("[T]he policy underlying the exception may be outweighed in a proper case by competing considerations of a more urgent nature ...."). 2019Cf. Green v. Obledo , 29 Cal.3d 126 , 172 Cal.Rptr. 206 , 624 P.2d 256 , 267 (1981) (in bank) ("[T]he policy underlying the exception may be outweighed in a proper case by competing considerations of a more urgent nature ...."). | 1 | 1 |
Ashley Bell v. State of Indianagreen1 sentence2018See, e.g., Bell v. State, 13 N.E.3d 543, 545 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied. | 1 | 1 |
Galbraith v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Another sound reason for such a rule is that a party should be required to promptly raise error in the trial court at the time it occurs rather than remain silent, hoping for an acquittal, and if that does not occur, then raise the question of error for the first time.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 42A05-1511-CR-1958 | August 16, 2016 Page 5 of 8 (Internal citations omitted, quoting Brown v. State, 254 Ind. 504, 506-07 , 260 N.E.2d 876, 877 (1970)). [10] In Galbraith v. State, 468 N.E.2d 575, 578 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984), the defendant challenged his conviction on appeal by ar | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. Stategreen1 sentence2016Brown v. State, 442 N.E.2d 1109, 1114 (Ind. 1982), reh’g denied. | 1 | 1 |
Hardley v. Stategreen2 sentences2009As Judge Patrick Sullivan pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals, Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1140, 1148-49 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), the issue the State seeks to raise is not apparent on the face of the judgment. 2009As Judge Patrick Sullivan pointed out in his dissent in the Court of Appeals, Hardley v. State, 893 N.E.2d 1140, 1148-49 (Ind.Ct.App.2008), the issue the State seeks to raise is not apparent on the face of the judgment. | 1 | 1 |
Lottie v. Stategreen2 sentences2002I acknowledge, however, that this Court has allowed similar instructions to survive appellate review. *387 In Lottie v. State, 273 Ind. 529, 532-33 , 406 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ind.1980), this Court declined to find error in the giving of a similar instruction. [1] It rejected the claim that the instruction "invited the jury to give undue weight to the testimony of the victim," noting the adequacy of other instructions, the fact that the challenged instruction was not mandatory, and that the instruction was likely helpful to the jury. 2002I acknowledge, however, that this Court has allowed similar instructions to survive appellate review. *387 In Lottie v. State, 273 Ind. 529, 532-33 , 406 N.E.2d 632, 636 (Ind.1980), this Court declined to find error in the giving of a similar instruction. [1] It rejected the claim that the instruction "invited the jury to give undue weight to the testimony of the victim," noting the adequacy of other instructions, the fact that the challenged instruction was not mandatory, and that the instruction was likely helpful to the jury. | 1 | 1 |
Shields v. Stategreen2 sentences2002See Shields v. State, 523 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Ind. 1988) ("A peremptory challenge is one exercised without reason stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's control. 2002See Shields v. State, 523 N.E.2d 411, 413 (Ind.1988) ("A peremptory challenge is one exercised without reason stated, without inquiry, and without being subject to the court's control. | 1 | 1 |
State Ex Rel. Hale v. Marion County Municipal Courtgreen2 sentences2001But the fact that Justice O’Connor’s opinion also had four votes demonstrates that the thinking behind Terry has not faded so much that it is “a case where the reasons for the rule have ceased to exist, or there never was any reason for the rule in the first place.” Hale, 127 N.E.2d at 905 . 2001But the fact that Justice O'Connor's opinion also had four votes demonstrates that the thinking behind Terry has not faded so much that it is "a case where the reasons for the rule have ceased to exist, or there never was any reason for the rule in the first place." Hale, 127 N.E.2d at 905 . | 1 | 1 |
| Ketelsen v. Stilzgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Indiana. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Cox v. State
green
2 sentences1881This rule is settled by an almost unbroken line of the decisions of this court.” The reasons of this rule will be found in Gox v. The State, 49 Ind. 568 , and in The Fort Wayne, etc., R. 1876The reasons for the rule are stated, clearly and explicitly, by Biddle, J., in the case of Cox v. The State, 49 Ind. 568 , and it would be useless to repeat them here. | 5 | 1876–1894 |
Demps v. Florida
green
2 sentences2011The reasons for this rule are our supreme court's concerns that polygraphs are "not sufficiently accurate to mandate [their] admission" and that juries may "give undue weight to a polygraph test's validity." Id. 2011The reasons for this rule are our supreme court's concerns that polygraphs are "not sufficiently accurate to mandate [their] admission" and that juries may "give undue weight to a polygraph test's validity." Id. | 3 | 1987–2011 |
Rudolph v. Lane
neutral
2 sentences1885Cox v. State, 49 Ind. 568 ; Rudolph v. Lane, 57 Ind. 115 ; Fort Wayne, etc., R. 1884Rudolph v. Lane, 57 Ind. 115 ; Fort Wayne, etc., R. | 3 | 1882–1885 |
Willner v. State
green
2 sentences2013Willner, 602 N.E.2d at 508 (citing Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind. 52, 55 (1859)). 2010Willner, 602 N.E.2d at 508 (citing Ulmer v. State, 14 Ind. 52, 55 (1859)). | 2 | 2010–2013 |
Hardin v. State
green
2 sentences1995In Hardin v. State (1993), Ind., 611 N.E.2d 123, 128 , our supreme court stated the reasons for the rule: If a court were to indiscriminately admit proof of criminal activity beyond that specifically charged, then the burden on the defense would be intolerably enlarged and the court would effectively negate the due process presumption of innocence that our system of justice accords to every accused. 1995In Hardin v. State (1993), Ind., 611 N.E.2d 123, 128 , our supreme court stated the reasons for the rule: If a court were to indiscriminately admit proof of criminal activity beyond that specifically charged, then the burden on the defense would be intolerably enlarged and the court would effectively negate the due process presumption of innocence that our system of justice accords to every accused. | 2 | 1993–1995 |
State of Indiana v. James Parrott
green
1 sentence2018First, the need for officer safety is one of the reasons for the rule allowing warrantless searches incident to arrest, Parrott, 69 N.E.3d at 542 n.3; therefore, 7 Although there is no evidence that the police formally stated, “You are under arrest,” Green admits there was probable cause for the arrest; and, even if he was not formally placed under arrest at the time of the search, that does not invalidate the search. | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Dimmick v. Follis
green
1 sentence2011The reasons for this rule were "the want of mutuality arising from the fact that the parties to the two records are not the same; that the course of the proceedings and rules of decision in the two courts are different and that a higher degree of proof is required in criminal than in civil cases." Id. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
Hall v. State
green
2 sentences1992Hall v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1265 . 1992Hall v. State (1987), Ind., 514 N.E.2d 1265 . | 1 | 1992–1992 |
McLochlin v. Miller
green
2 sentences1990McLochlin v. Miller (1966), 139 Ind. App. 443 , 217 N.E.2d 50, 52 . 1990McLochlin v. Miller (1966), 139 Ind. App. 443 , 217 N.E.2d 50, 52 . | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Kimmel v. State
green
2 sentences1987Kimmel v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 575, 584 , 418 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 , cert. denied 454 U.S. 932 , 102 S.Ct. 430 , 70 L.Ed.2d 239 ; Moritz v. State (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 748, 758 . 1987Kimmel v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 575, 584 , 418 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 , cert. denied 454 U.S. 932 , 102 S.Ct. 430 , 70 L.Ed.2d 239 ; Moritz v. State (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 748, 758 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Moritz v. State
green
1 sentence1987Kimmel v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 575, 584 , 418 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 , cert. denied 454 U.S. 932 , 102 S.Ct. 430 , 70 L.Ed.2d 239 ; Moritz v. State (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 748, 758 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Exxon Corp. v. Georgia Ass'n of Petroleum Retailers
green
2 sentences1987Kimmel v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 575, 584 , 418 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 , cert. denied 454 U.S. 932 , 102 S.Ct. 430 , 70 L.Ed.2d 239 ; Moritz v. State (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 748, 758 . 1987Kimmel v. State (1981), 275 Ind. 575, 584 , 418 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 , cert. denied 454 U.S. 932 , 102 S.Ct. 430 , 70 L.Ed.2d 239 ; Moritz v. State (1984), Ind.App., 465 N.E.2d 748, 758 . | 1 | 1987–1987 |
Bey v. State
neutral
2 sentences1982Bey v. State (1979), Ind.App., 385 N.E.2d 1153 . 1982Bey v. State (1979), Ind. App., 385 N.E.2d 1153 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Kent v. United States
green
2 sentences1981The rationale for requiring detailed waiver orders was originally stated in Kent v. U. S., (1966) 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 , and emphasized that due process requirements necessitate that a juvenile have access to relevant records considered by a court, that he is entitled to a hearing, and entitled to a statement of the court’s reasons for waiver. 1981The rationale for requiring detailed waiver orders was originally stated in Kent v. U. S., (1966) 383 U.S. 541 , 86 S.Ct. 1045 , 16 L.Ed.2d 84 , and emphasized that due process requirements necessitate that a juvenile have access to relevant records considered by a court, that he is entitled to a hearing, and entitled to a statement of the court’s reasons for waiver. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Kalen v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis Railroad
green
2 sentences1981The reasons for the rule and its exception is a subject which has *1309 received little attention in our case law; that is true even though Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas, (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222, the English authority upon which this jurisdiction relied in part in adopting the “impact” rule in Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., (1897) 18 Ind.App. 202 , 47 N.E. 694 , was expressly rejected by the King’s Bench in 1901. 1981The reasons for the rule and its exception is a subject which has *1309 received little attention in our case law; that is true even though Victorian Railway Commissioners v. Coultas, (1888) 13 App. Cas. 222, the English authority upon which this jurisdiction relied in part in adopting the “impact” rule in Kalen v. Terre Haute & I.R.R., (1897) 18 Ind.App. 202 , 47 N.E. 694 , was expressly rejected by the King’s Bench in 1901. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Redding v. State
green
2 sentences1979Redding v. State (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 397 ; Seay v. State (1975), Ind.App., 337 N.E.2d 489 ; Clemons v. State, supra. The record reveals allegations that on April 17, 1974, several black youths approached the truck of Mr. and Mrs. Casmir Smolinski as it was stopped for a traffic light at 21st Street and Martin Luther King Drive in Gary, Indiana. 1979Redding v. State (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 397 ; Seay v. State (1975), Ind. App., 337 N.E.2d 489 ; Clemons v. State, supra . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Seay v. State
green
2 sentences1979Redding v. State (1977), Ind.App., 370 N.E.2d 397 ; Seay v. State (1975), Ind.App., 337 N.E.2d 489 ; Clemons v. State, supra. The record reveals allegations that on April 17, 1974, several black youths approached the truck of Mr. and Mrs. Casmir Smolinski as it was stopped for a traffic light at 21st Street and Martin Luther King Drive in Gary, Indiana. 1979Redding v. State (1977), Ind. App., 370 N.E.2d 397 ; Seay v. State (1975), Ind. App., 337 N.E.2d 489 ; Clemons v. State, supra . | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Hartsock v. Reddick
green
1 sentence1979The reasons for this rule were set forth by Judge Dewey in Hartsock v. Reddick (1842), 6 Blackf. 255 : “There are several occasions, on which words may be spoken or written, that destroy the implication of malice, which would otherwise arise from the words themselves. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
| Wolfe v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals
green
2 sentences1978Financml Institutions v. State Bank of Lizton (1969), 253 Ind. 172 , 252 N.E.2d 248 ; Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1969), 252 Ind. 56 , 245 N.E.2d 337 ; Wolfe v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1978), 176 Ind.App. 287 , 375 N.E.2d 652 ; City of Indianapolis v. Ingram (1978), 176 Ind.App. 645 , 377 N.E.2d 877 . *684 The reasons for such a requirement have been said to be: to facilitate judicial review, avoid judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assure more careful administrative consideration, help parties plan their case for rehearing and judicial revie 1978Financml Institutions v. State Bank of Lizton (1969), 253 Ind. 172 , 252 N.E.2d 248 ; Carlton v. Board of Zoning Appeals (1969), 252 Ind. 56 , 245 N.E.2d 337 ; Wolfe v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Division (1978), 176 Ind.App. 287 , 375 N.E.2d 652 ; City of Indianapolis v. Ingram (1978), 176 Ind.App. 645 , 377 N.E.2d 877 . *684 The reasons for such a requirement have been said to be: to facilitate judicial review, avoid judicial usurpation of administrative functions, assure more careful administrative consideration, help parties plan their case for rehearing and judicial revie | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Department of Financial Institutions v. State Bank green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| City of Indianapolis v. Ingram green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Clemons v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Long v. State green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Atkins v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Summers v. State green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Bailey v. Washington Theatre Co. green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Deal v. State green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Gary Fish Co. v. Leisure neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| United States v. Wiltberger green | 1 | 1952–1952 |
| Zigler v. Menges green | 1 | 1951–1951 |
| In re Coleman & Titus Corp. neutral | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| Fourth National Bank v. McArthur green | 1 | 1937–1937 |
| State v. Cryer neutral | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Herman v. People green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Chaplin v. Freeland neutral | 1 | 1900–1900 |
| Lawrence v. Van Buskirk neutral | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Hoskinson v. Cavender neutral | 1 | 1897–1897 |
| Carver v. Smith green | 1 | 1893–1893 |
| Shuee v. Shuee green | 1 | 1886–1886 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.