reasons rule in Oregon

2005This court has explained that: ‘The answer to the question of how broad is the exclusionary rule ought to be found in the reasons for the rule.’ State Forester v. Umpqua River *579 Nav., 258 Or 10, 18 , 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert den 404 US 826 (1971) * * *.

2005This court has explained that: ‘The answer to the question of how broad is the exclusionary rule ought to be found in the reasons for the rule.’ State Forester v. Umpqua River *579 Nav., 258 Or 10, 18 , 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert den 404 US 826 (1971) * * *.

2008After reviewing the history of that provision, which codified case law that predated the Oregon Evidence Code, the court concluded that, "[a]lthough one of the reasons for the rule as expressed by this court would logically require the adult victim to testify in order to have her testimony corroborated by her out-of-court complaint, such rationale is not applicable in the case of a child victim." Id. at 644-45 , 705 P.2d 694 .

2008After reviewing the history of that provision, which codified case law that predated the Oregon Evidence Code, the court concluded that, “[a]lthough one of the reasons for the rule as expressed by this court would logically require the adult victim to testify in order to have her testimony corroborated by her out-of-court complaint, such rationale is not applicable in the case of a child victim.” Id. at 644-45 .

2005“This court has stated that, ‘unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which has been based on deterring police misconduct, exclusions under Article I, section 9, have been based on the personal right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure.’ State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987).

2005“This court has stated that, ‘unlike the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, which has been based on deterring police misconduct, exclusions under Article I, section 9, have been based on the personal right to be free from an unlawful search and seizure.’ State v. Kosta, 304 Or 549, 553 , 748 P2d 72 (1987).

2005This court has explained that: ‘The answer to the question of how broad is the exclusionary rule ought to be found in the reasons for the rule.’ State Forester v. Umpqua River *579 Nav., 258 Or 10, 18 , 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert den 404 US 826 (1971) * * *.

1992This court has explained that: “The answer to the question of how broad is the exclusionary rule ought to be found in the reasons for the rule.” State Forester v. Umpqua River Nav., 258 Or 10, 18 , 478 P2d 631 (1970), cert den 404 US 826 (1971); see The Right to Exclude Rlegally Seized Evidence, supra, 25 Willamette L Rev at 705 (explaining principle).

1999Id. (quoting Williams v. SAIF, 310 Or 320, 329 , 797 P2d 1036 (1990) (Unis, J., concurring) (explaining the reasons for the requirement)).

1999Id. (quoting Williams v. SAIF, 310 Or 320, 329 , 797 P2d 1036 (1990) (Unis, J., concurring) (explaining the reasons for the requirement)).

1984In [State v.] Whitman, [ 72 Or 415 , 143 P 1121 (1914)], the Supreme Court explained that testimony about the making of a complaint is admissible ‘in order to corroborate the prosecutrix and to rebut any inference that she consented to the outrage.’ 72 Or at 416 .

1984In [State v.] Whitman, [ 72 Or 415 , 143 P 1121 (1914)], the Supreme Court explained that testimony about the making of a complaint is admissible ‘in order to corroborate the prosecutrix and to rebut any inference that she consented to the outrage.’ 72 Or at 416 .

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont. 372 , 207 P. 993 , 24 A.L.R. 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 N.M. 13 , 177 P.2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P.2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P.2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P.2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

1969The reasons for the rule are set out in Gas Products Co. v. Rankin, 63 Mont 372 , 207 P 993 , 24 ALR 294 (1922); Flaska v. State, 51 NM 13 , 177 P2d 174 (1946); Cordner v. Cordner, 91 Utah 474 , 64 P2d 828 (1937); Rohlfing v. Moses Akiona, Ltd., 45 Hawaii 440 , 369 P2d 114 (1963); but cf. Yoshizaki v. Hilo Hospital, 50 Hawaii 40 , 429 P2d 829 (1967).

2026Cite as 374 Or 699 (2026) 725 to society in general as opposed to injured persons in par- ticular.” Id. at 648- 651; see Horton, 359 Or at 222 -23 (citing Mattson, 39 Or at 580 , for the proposition that the “legisla- ture could immunize cities consistently with Article I, sec- tion 10, as long as the injured plaintiff has a remedy against a city employee”).20 We reiterated that a quid pro quo has not always been “necessary, or even sufficient, to sustain such a statute against a remedy-clause challenge,” Busch, 366 Or at 650 , but that “[t]he failure to provide a quid pro quo to counterbalanc

2026Cite as 374 Or 699 (2026) 725 to society in general as opposed to injured persons in par- ticular.” Id. at 648- 651; see Horton, 359 Or at 222 -23 (citing Mattson, 39 Or at 580 , for the proposition that the “legisla- ture could immunize cities consistently with Article I, sec- tion 10, as long as the injured plaintiff has a remedy against a city employee”).20 We reiterated that a quid pro quo has not always been “necessary, or even sufficient, to sustain such a statute against a remedy-clause challenge,” Busch, 366 Or at 650 , but that “[t]he failure to provide a quid pro quo to counterbalanc

2024“Preservation gives a trial court the chance to consider and rule on a contention, thereby possibly avoiding an error alto- gether or correcting one already made, which in turn may obviate the need for an appeal.” Peeples, 345 Or at 219 ; see also State v. Brown, 310 Or 347, 356 , 800 P2d 259 (1990) (emphasizing that the reasons for the rule requiring pres- ervation in the trial court are to “allow the adversary to present its position and to permit the court to understand and correct any error”).

2022Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22 , 554 P2d 620 (1976) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 US 185 , 89 S Ct 1657 , 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969)); see also Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 630 , 4 P3d 748 , rev den, 331 Or 429 (2000) (recognizing that APA exclusivity serves the same purposes as the exhaustion requirement, because “the APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for the judicial review of administrative decisions” (internal citation omitted)).1 1 We express no opinion on the propriety of the board’s apparent practice of informing license applicants that pursuin

2022Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22 , 554 P2d 620 (1976) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 US 185 , 89 S Ct 1657 , 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969)); see also Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 630 , 4 P3d 748 , rev den, 331 Or 429 (2000) (recognizing that APA exclusivity serves the same purposes as the exhaustion requirement, because “the APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for the judicial review of administrative decisions” (internal citation omitted)).1 1 We express no opinion on the propriety of the board’s apparent practice of informing license applicants that pursuin

2022Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22 , 554 P2d 620 (1976) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 US 185 , 89 S Ct 1657 , 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969)); see also Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 630 , 4 P3d 748 , rev den, 331 Or 429 (2000) (recognizing that APA exclusivity serves the same purposes as the exhaustion requirement, because “the APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for the judicial review of administrative decisions” (internal citation omitted)).1 1 We express no opinion on the propriety of the board’s apparent practice of informing license applicants that pursuin

2022Quality Comm., 26 Or App 717, 721-22 , 554 P2d 620 (1976) (citing McKart v. United States, 395 US 185 , 89 S Ct 1657 , 23 L Ed 2d 194 (1969)); see also Ashland Drilling, Inc. v. Jackson County, 168 Or App 624, 630 , 4 P3d 748 , rev den, 331 Or 429 (2000) (recognizing that APA exclusivity serves the same purposes as the exhaustion requirement, because “the APA establishes a comprehensive pattern for the judicial review of administrative decisions” (internal citation omitted)).1 1 We express no opinion on the propriety of the board’s apparent practice of informing license applicants that pursuin

2015In that discussion, the court cited to various sources about the reasons for the rule and stated that, among other reasons, “it is viewed as unfair to require an accused to be prepared to not only defend against the immediate charge, but also to defend or explain away unrelated acts from the past” and that “courts are concerned with confusion of issues and undue consumption of time through what may be, in effect, a trial within a trial to ascertain the relationship between the purported other crime and the defendant.” Pinnell, 311 Or at 106 .

2014Hall, 339 Or at 23 ; State ex rel Juv.

2009State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. W.P., 345 Or. 657 , 202 P.3d 167 ; State Forester v. Umpqua River Nav., 258 Or. 10, 18 , 478 P.2d 631 (1970), cited in State ex rel Juv.

2009State ex rel Dept. of Human Services v. W.P., 345 Or. 657 , 202 P.3d 167 ; State Forester v. Umpqua River Nav., 258 Or. 10, 18 , 478 P.2d 631 (1970), cited in State ex rel Juv.

2007LUBA agreed with cross-petitioners’ contentions and held: “As [cross-petitioners] note, OAR 660-004-0000(1) states that OAR chapter 660, division 004 interprets the exception process as it applies to statewide Goals 3 to 19, ‘[e]xcept as provided for in OAR chapter 660, division 14[.]’ Similarly, OAR 660-004-0022(1) appears to exempt from that rule ‘uses not specifically provided for in * * * OAR chapter 660, division 14[.]’ * * * Reading those rules together, it is reasonably clear that the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) intends that a reasons exception for proposed urban

2007LUBA agreed with cross-petitioners’ contentions and held: “As [cross-petitioners] note, OAR 660-004-0000(1) states that OAR chapter 660, division 004 interprets the exception process as it applies to statewide Goals 3 to 19, ‘[e]xcept as provided for in OAR chapter 660, division 14[.]’ Similarly, OAR 660-004-0022(1) appears to exempt from that rule ‘uses not specifically provided for in * * * OAR chapter 660, division 14[.]’ * * * Reading those rules together, it is reasonably clear that the Land Conservation and Development Commission (LCDC) intends that a reasons exception for proposed urban

2004Id. at 453 .

2003Id. at 608 n 7.

1996We stated in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Marion County, 116 Or App 584 , 589 n 2, 842 P2d 441 (1992): “Petitioners also place some reliance on a provision of the county’s comprehensive plan in connection with their argument that the reasons exception was sufficient.

1996We stated in 1000 Friends of Oregon v. Marion County, 116 Or App 584 , 589 n 2, 842 P2d 441 (1992): “Petitioners also place some reliance on a provision of the county’s comprehensive plan in connection with their argument that the reasons exception was sufficient.

1996LUBA noted, correctly, that the local provision ‘lends [no] support to [petitioners’] position.’ The sufficiency of the exception to a statewide planning goal, taken in conjunction with a comprehensive plan amendment, is a question of state law to be answered by reference to ORS 197.732, LCDC’s implementing rules and the applicable goals themselves.” (Citations omitted.) See also Reeves v. Yamhill County, 132 Or App 263 , 268 n 2, 888 P2d 79 (1995).

1996LUBA noted, correctly, that the local provision ‘lends [no] support to [petitioners’] position.’ The sufficiency of the exception to a statewide planning goal, taken in conjunction with a comprehensive plan amendment, is a question of state law to be answered by reference to ORS 197.732, LCDC’s implementing rules and the applicable goals themselves.” (Citations omitted.) See also Reeves v. Yamhill County, 132 Or App 263 , 268 n 2, 888 P2d 79 (1995).

1994Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., supra, noted that an appellate court’s decision to recognize unpreserved error “undercuts the established manner in which an appellate court ordinarily considers an issue, i.e., through competing arguments of adversary parties with an opportunity to submit both written and oral arguments to the court.” 312 Or at 382 .

1994Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc., supra , noted that an appellate court's decision to recognize unpreserved error "undercuts the established manner in which an appellate court ordinarily considers an issue, i.e., through competing arguments of adversary parties with an opportunity to submit both written and oral arguments to the court." 312 Or. at 382 , 823 P.2d 956 .