reasons rule in Alabama

2011As explained by our supreme court, “ ‘the reasons for this rule are stated to be that the owner of land, when selling to another, may insist on such covenants as he pleases touching its use and has the right to define the injury for himself; and that, when the covenant is broken, an injunction should issue because, from the very nature of the case, the remedy at law is inadequate.’ “Reetz, 279 Ala. at 460 , 186 So.2d at 921 .

2011As explained by our supreme court, “ ‘the reasons for this rule are stated to be that the owner of land, when selling to another, may insist on such covenants as he pleases touching its use and has the right to define the injury for himself; and that, when the covenant is broken, an injunction should issue because, from the very nature of the case, the remedy at law is inadequate.’ “Reetz, 279 Ala. at 460 , 186 So.2d at 921 .

1979Former Chief Justice Heflin commented in Fulmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment , 286 Ala. 667 , 244 So.2d 797 (1971) that: "`. . . [O]ne of the reasons for the requirement that a transcript of the proceedings before said board be certified to the court is to inform the court of the issues involved.' In our view, this is the only real function of the statutory requirement that the *Page 1128 transcript be certified to the circuit court, i.e. to delineate the issues before the circuit court.

1979Former Chief Justice Heflin commented in Fulmer v. Board of Zoning Adjustment , 286 Ala. 667 , 244 So.2d 797 (1971) that: "`. . . [O]ne of the reasons for the requirement that a transcript of the proceedings before said board be certified to the court is to inform the court of the issues involved.' In our view, this is the only real function of the statutory requirement that the *Page 1128 transcript be certified to the circuit court, i.e. to delineate the issues before the circuit court.

1977Skelton v. Superior Court of Orange County, 1 Cal.3d 144 , 81 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 460 P.2d 485 .

1977Skelton v. Superior Court of Orange County, 1 Cal.3d 144 , 81 Cal.Rptr. 613 , 460 P.2d 485 .

1977This court there stated: “In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “ ‘An evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that “the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants * * * are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers * * * who may happen to make arrests.” United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 , 52 S.Ct. 420, 423 , 76 L.Ed. 877 : The reasons for this rule go to the foundations of the Fourth Amendment.’ “[1, 2] In order for a search warra

1977This court there stated: “In Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , the U.S. Supreme Court stated: “ ‘An evaluation of the constitutionality of a search warrant should begin with the rule that “the informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants * * * are to be preferred over the hurried action of officers * * * who may happen to make arrests.” United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 , 52 S.Ct. 420, 423 , 76 L.Ed. 877 : The reasons for this rule go to the foundations of the Fourth Amendment.’ “[1, 2] In order for a search warra

2025The reasons for that rule were explained in Davis v. Williams, 130 Ala. 530 , 30 So. 488 (1901): " 'For reasons of public policy a tenant is never allowed to dispute his landlord's title after having accepted possession under him.

2006Ex parte Carlton , 867 So.2d 332 , 338 (Ala. 2003). 2 "This Court recognized in Mitchell v. Davis , 598 So.2d 801 , 806 (Ala. 1992), that a county department of human resources is considered to be a State agency for purposes of asserting the defense of sovereign immunity." Ex parte Franklin County Dep't of Human Res. , 674 So.2d 1277 , 1279(Ala. 1996). 3 The reasons for this rule are self-evident — the perpetrator might have nefarious motives for concealing the existence of other children in the household. 4 Where the trial court has not identified a controlling question of law, this Court wil

2006The reasons for this requirement are just as clear: `The obvious reason the Legislature required *Page 365 appointment of experienced counsel was to ensure that persons subject to the most severe form of punishment are provided with competent and effective representation.' Ex parte Berryhill , [ 801 So.2d 7 ] (Ala. 2001), cert denied , [ 534 U.S. 1022 ,] 122 S.Ct. 549 (2001).

2006The reasons for this requirement are just as clear: `The obvious reason the Legislature required *Page 365 appointment of experienced counsel was to ensure that persons subject to the most severe form of punishment are provided with competent and effective representation.' Ex parte Berryhill , [ 801 So.2d 7 ] (Ala. 2001), cert denied , [ 534 U.S. 1022 ,] 122 S.Ct. 549 (2001).

2006The reasons for this requirement are just as clear: `The obvious reason the Legislature required *Page 365 appointment of experienced counsel was to ensure that persons subject to the most severe form of punishment are provided with competent and effective representation.' Ex parte Berryhill , [ 801 So.2d 7 ] (Ala. 2001), cert denied , [ 534 U.S. 1022 ,] 122 S.Ct. 549 (2001).

2006Ex parte Carlton , 867 So.2d 332 , 338 (Ala. 2003). 2 "This Court recognized in Mitchell v. Davis , 598 So.2d 801 , 806 (Ala. 1992), that a county department of human resources is considered to be a State agency for purposes of asserting the defense of sovereign immunity." Ex parte Franklin County Dep't of Human Res. , 674 So.2d 1277 , 1279(Ala. 1996). 3 The reasons for this rule are self-evident — the perpetrator might have nefarious motives for concealing the existence of other children in the household. 4 Where the trial court has not identified a controlling question of law, this Court wil

2006Ex parte Carlton , 867 So.2d 332 , 338 (Ala. 2003). 2 "This Court recognized in Mitchell v. Davis , 598 So.2d 801 , 806 (Ala. 1992), that a county department of human resources is considered to be a State agency for purposes of asserting the defense of sovereign immunity." Ex parte Franklin County Dep't of Human Res. , 674 So.2d 1277 , 1279(Ala. 1996). 3 The reasons for this rule are self-evident — the perpetrator might have nefarious motives for concealing the existence of other children in the household. 4 Where the trial court has not identified a controlling question of law, this Court wil

2005If this were not the case, a large proportion of unsuccessful civil actions would be followed by suits for malicious prosecution, and there would be a piling of litigation on litigation without end."'" Bryant , 738 So.2d at 832 (quoting Delchamps, Inc. v. Morgan , 601 So.2d 442 , 445 (Ala. 1992), quoting in turn Liberty Loan Corp. of Gadsden v. Mizell , 410 So.2d 45 , 48 (Ala. 1982)). 5 To prevail, Waldrop must present substantial evidence indicating that Favorite Market lacked probable cause when it initiated the prior proceeding.

2003Id. at 300-02 . [1] My review of the standard articulated in Ex parte McLendon and the reasons for that standard impel me to conclude that the overwhelming-necessity standard of Klapal is inconsistent with the Ex parte McLendon standard and that it "sets the bar" for changes of custody at a level higher than does Ex parte McLendon —a level that sometimes will be too high if we are truly serious about pursuing each child's best interests.

2003Id. at 300-02 . 1 My review of the standard articulated in Ex parte McLendon and the reasons for that standard impel me to conclude that the overwhelming-necessity standard of Klapal is inconsistent with the Ex parte McLendon standard and that it "sets the bar" for changes of custody at a level higher than does Ex parte McLendon — a level that sometimes will be too high if we are truly serious about pursuing each child's best interests.

1994This Court said in Calogrides [v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (Ala.1995) ]: “ ‘ “ ‘For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits.... [[Image here]] [TJhere is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort liability

1993This Court said in Calogrides [v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (Ala.1985)]: "`For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits.... "`".... "`"...[T]here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort liability for po

1993This Court said in Calogrides [v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (Ala.1985)]: "`For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits.... "`".... "`"...[T]here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort liability for po

1993This Court said in Calogrides [v. City of Mobile, 475 So.2d 560 (Ala.1985)]: "`For the courts to proclaim a new and general duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated and without predictable limits.... "`".... "`"...[T]here is no warrant in judicial tradition or in the proper allocation of the powers of government for the courts, in the absence of legislation, to carve out an area of tort liability for po

1991Williams , 530 So.2d at 885 -86 . 4 The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." 5 Fla. Const. art.

1991Williams, 530 So.2d at 885-86 . [4] The Sixth Amendment guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been committed." [5] Fla. Const. art.

1988The reasons for this rule are sound and were stated in United States v. Griffin , 699 F.2d 1102 , 1108-09 (11th Cir. 1983): "Because the issue was not presented to the district court, the record on appeal is necessarily inadequate to determine the merits of the allegations on that issue at the appellate level.

1988The reasons for this rule are well set out by Presiding Judge Bowen in Waldrop v. State, 424 So.2d 1345 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), appeal after remand, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 , 105 S.Ct. 3483 , 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985).

1988The reasons for this rule are well set out by Presiding Judge Bowen in Waldrop v. State, 424 So.2d 1345 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), appeal after remand, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 , 105 S.Ct. 3483 , 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985).

1988The reasons for this rule are well set out by Presiding Judge Bowen in Waldrop v. State, 424 So.2d 1345 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), appeal after remand, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 , 105 S.Ct. 3483 , 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985).

1988The reasons for this rule are well set out by Presiding Judge Bowen in Waldrop v. State, 424 So.2d 1345 (Ala.Cr.App.1982), appeal after remand, 462 So.2d 1021 (Ala.Cr.App.1984), cert. denied, 472 U.S. 1019 , 105 S.Ct. 3483 , 87 L.Ed.2d 618 (1985).

1988This reasoning was also applied by us in Tarver v. State, 492 So.2d 328 (Ala.Cr.App.1986), which relied on Waldrop.