reasons rule in Arizona

1974The reasons for this rule, however, fail where the action, though nominally for the benefit of the estate, is in reality in the interests of the beneficiary thereunder, whose negligence contributed to the accident resulting in the death, and to deny the defense of imputed negligence where this is true would be equivalent to permitting one to profit by his own wrong.” (Emphasis added) 23 Ariz. at 196-197 , 202 P. at 406 .

1974The reasons for this rule, however, fail where the action, though nominally for the benefit of the estate, is in reality in the interests of the beneficiary thereunder, whose negligence contributed to the accident resulting in the death, and to deny the defense of imputed negligence where this is true would be equivalent to permitting one to profit by his own wrong.” (Emphasis added) 23 Ariz. at 196-197 , 202 P. at 406 .

1942To cite a few: Rose v. Industrial Comm., 52 Ariz. 466 , 83 Pac. (2d) 786 ; Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors and Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 104 , 59 Pac. (2d) 649 ; Blankenship v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 2 , 267 Pac. 203 ; Federal Mutual Liability Ins.

1942To cite a few: Rose v. Industrial Comm., 52 Ariz. 466 , 83 Pac. (2d) 786 ; Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors and Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 104 , 59 Pac. (2d) 649 ; Blankenship v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 2 , 267 Pac. 203 ; Federal Mutual Liability Ins.

1942To cite a few: Rose v. Industrial Comm., 52 Ariz. 466 , 83 Pac. (2d) 786 ; Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors and Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 104 , 59 Pac. (2d) 649 ; Blankenship v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 2 , 267 Pac. 203 ; Federal Mutual Liability Ins.

1942To cite a few: Rose v. Industrial Comm., 52 Ariz. 466 , 83 Pac. (2d) 786 ; Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors and Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 104 , 59 Pac. (2d) 649 ; Blankenship v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 2 , 267 Pac. 203 ; Federal Mutual Liability Ins.

1942To cite a few: Rose v. Industrial Comm., 52 Ariz. 466 , 83 Pac. (2d) 786 ; Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors and Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 104 , 59 Pac. (2d) 649 ; Blankenship v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 2 , 267 Pac. 203 ; Federal Mutual Liability Ins.

1942To cite a few: Rose v. Industrial Comm., 52 Ariz. 466 , 83 Pac. (2d) 786 ; Ison v. Western Vegetable Distributors and Industrial Comm., 48 Ariz. 104 , 59 Pac. (2d) 649 ; Blankenship v. Industrial Comm., 34 Ariz. 2 , 267 Pac. 203 ; Federal Mutual Liability Ins.

2005The court does so with awareness that the instant case will have been pending two (2) years on June 30, 2005.” ¶ 28 In Tonnemacher we expressly noted that one of the reasons it would be error to dismiss a case in which the courts of another sovereignty have jurisdiction is the possibility of “unreasonable delays in the other forum.” 186 Ariz. at 130 , 920 P.2d at 10 .

2005The court does so with awareness that the instant case will have been pending two (2) years on June 30, 2005.” ¶ 28 In Tonnemacher we expressly noted that one of the reasons it would be error to dismiss a case in which the courts of another sovereignty have jurisdiction is the possibility of “unreasonable delays in the other forum.” 186 Ariz. at 130 , 920 P.2d at 10 .

2004This court declined to make such an exception, affirming that "the rule in Arizona against assignments [of personal-injury claims] should remain the same until changed by the legislature." Id. (citations omitted). ¶ 18 Public policy dictates the reasons a claim of legal malpractice is not assignable.

1992In Town of Paradise Valley v. Gulf Leisure Corp., supra, where the property owner had both use and building permits, Division One of this court summarized the reasons for the rule as follows: The position of these courts is succinctly summarized in Deer Park Civil [Civic] Ass’n v. City of Chicago, 347 Ill.

1992App. 346 , 106 N.E.2d 823 (1952), wherein it was stated: “The general rule is that any substantial change of position, expenditures, or incurrence of obligations under a building permit entitles the permittee to complete the construction and use the premises for the purpose authorized irrespective of subsequent zoning or changes in zoning. 8 McQuillin Municipal Corporations, 272 (3rd ed.).” 347 IlLApp. at 351, 106 N.E.2d at 825 .

1988To begin with, the concept or rule of sovereign immunity from torts was abolished in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963), in a well-reasoned opinion based upon the premise that when the reasons for a rule no longer exist, the rule should be abandoned.

1988To begin with, the concept or rule of sovereign immunity from torts was abolished in Stone v. Arizona Highway Commission, 93 Ariz. 384 , 381 P.2d 107 (1963), in a well-reasoned opinion based upon the premise that when the reasons for a rule no longer exist, the rule should be abandoned.

1983In Sandoval we discussed the reasons for this rule and stated: “It seems to be settled that after recovering a judgment against an insured under a liability policy, the injured third person may collect such judgment by instituting garnishment proceedings against the liability insurer. * * * [T]he rendition of judgment against the insured serves a dual purpose; that it not only creates a judgment debt in favor of the injured party, but at the same time it creates a debt under the insurance contract between the judgment debtor and his insurer; and that for this reason, the insurer should have a

1983In Sandoval we discussed the reasons for this rule and stated: “It seems to be settled that after recovering a judgment against an insured under a liability policy, the injured third person may collect such judgment by instituting garnishment proceedings against the liability insurer. * * * [T]he rendition of judgment against the insured serves a dual purpose; that it not only creates a judgment debt in favor of the injured party, but at the same time it creates a debt under the insurance contract between the judgment debtor and his insurer; and that for this reason, the insurer should have a

1983For the same reasons that we rule that the taped confession is inadmissible, we also conclude these confessions were gained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel as discussed in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

1983For the same reasons that we rule that the taped confession is inadmissible, we also conclude these confessions were gained in violation of the defendant's right to counsel as discussed in Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981).

1982We agree with the New Jersey court which stated: "[T]here is something wanting in a system of justice which permits strangers, friends, relatives, and emancipated children to recover for injuries suffered as a result of their driver's negligence but denies this right to the driver's spouse and minor children who are also passengers in the same vehicle." Immer v. Risko, supra, 56 N.J. at 495 , 267 A.2d at 488 .

1982We agree with the New Jersey court which stated: "[T]here is something wanting in a system of justice which permits strangers, friends, relatives, and emancipated children to recover for injuries suffered as a result of their driver's negligence but denies this right to the driver's spouse and minor children who are also passengers in the same vehicle." Immer v. Risko, supra, 56 N.J. at 495 , 267 A.2d at 488 .

1972See also: Michie v. Calhoun, 85 Ariz. 270 , 336 P.2d 370 (1959); Annot. 2 A.L.R.2d 785 et seq.

1972See also: Michie v. Calhoun, 85 Ariz. 270 , 336 P.2d 370 (1959); Annot. 2 A.L.R.2d 785 et seq.

1970“We agree with the government: ‘ * * * in order for the doctrine to be applied in those states that recognize it, two things must occur: First, the water-course must move across and submerge riparian land so that land formerly non-riparian is made riparian; then the water-course must return to or near its original bed so that the riparian land that had been submerged is uncovered, or re-emerges. ;jí ij; Hí ‘The United • States’ land ' to which the tract has accreted was riparian originally and one of the reasons for the doctrine of accretion is to allow that land to remain riparian. ‘ Philadel

1970“We agree with the government: ‘ * * * in order for the doctrine to be applied in those states that recognize it, two things must occur: First, the water-course must move across and submerge riparian land so that land formerly non-riparian is made riparian; then the water-course must return to or near its original bed so that the riparian land that had been submerged is uncovered, or re-emerges. ;jí ij; Hí ‘The United • States’ land ' to which the tract has accreted was riparian originally and one of the reasons for the doctrine of accretion is to allow that land to remain riparian. ‘ Philadel

1969The reasons for this rule are stated in Bankers’ Mortgage Company of Topeka, Kansas v. McComb, 10 Cir., 60 F.2d 218 , as follows: “The reason for the rule is that to require such a person [the clerk] to respond in garnishment would result in an interruption of the orderly progress of judicial proceedings, and in an invasion of the jurisdiction of the court which has legal custody of such property.” * * * * * * “Such a person, with the consent of the court having custody of such property, may be held as garnishee after the purposes of the law’s custody have been accomplished, and such court has

1967In a sound, analytical opinion, the Utah court sets forth the reasons for this rule in the case of Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264 , 67 P.2d 632, 635 , 111 A.L.R. 331 , wherein a contract to construct a trailer especially for a traveling salesman, which was not readily salable to others in the manufacturer’s regular course of business, was held to be a contract for work, labor and materials, and not a contract to sell.

1967In a sound, analytical opinion, the Utah court sets forth the reasons for this rule in the case of Sidney Stevens Implement Co. v. Hintze, 92 Utah 264 , 67 P.2d 632, 635 , 111 A.L.R. 331 , wherein a contract to construct a trailer especially for a traveling salesman, which was not readily salable to others in the manufacturer’s regular course of business, was held to be a contract for work, labor and materials, and not a contract to sell.

1935In Maximilian v. Mayor, etc. [ 62 N. Y. 160 , 20 Am.

1930Therefore, without entering further into the reasons for the rule, we are clear that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in a foreign jurisdiction, which is by law of the place where acquired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, continues to be the separate property of that spouse, when brought within this state; and, it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received in exchange for it, or purchased by it, if it be money, is also the separate property of such spouse.” This

1930Therefore, without entering further into the reasons for the rule, we are clear that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in a foreign jurisdiction, which is by law of the place where acquired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, continues to be the separate property of that spouse, when brought within this state; and, it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received in exchange for it, or purchased by it, if it be money, is also the separate property of such spouse.” This

1930Therefore, without entering further into the reasons for the rule, we are clear that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in a foreign jurisdiction, which is by law of the place where acquired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, continues to be the separate property of that spouse, when brought within this state; and, it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received in exchange for it, or purchased by it, if it be money, is also the separate property of such spouse.” This

1930Therefore, without entering further into the reasons for the rule, we are clear that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in a foreign jurisdiction, which is by law of the place where acquired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, continues to be the separate property of that spouse, when brought within this state; and, it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received in exchange for it, or purchased by it, if it be money, is also the separate property of such spouse.” This

1930Therefore, without entering further into the reasons for the rule, we are clear that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in a foreign jurisdiction, which is by law of the place where acquired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, continues to be the separate property of that spouse, when brought within this state; and, it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received in exchange for it, or purchased by it, if it be money, is also the separate property of such spouse.” This

1930Therefore, without entering further into the reasons for the rule, we are clear that personal property acquired by either husband or wife in a foreign jurisdiction, which is by law of the place where acquired the separate property of one or the other of the spouses, continues to be the separate property of that spouse, when brought within this state; and, it being the separate property of that spouse owning and bringing it here, property in this state, whether real or personal, received in exchange for it, or purchased by it, if it be money, is also the separate property of such spouse.” This

1922Many eminent courts have held under such circumstances that the criticism of a judicial officer, even though made with respect to a cause which has terminated, is a contempt which may be punished, and the reasons for such rule are very strongly set forth in these decisions, being especially the cases of State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 ; Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838 , 106 Am.

1922Many eminent courts have held under such circumstances that the criticism of a judicial officer, even though made with respect to a cause which has terminated, is a contempt which may be punished, and the reasons for such rule are very strongly set forth in these decisions, being especially the cases of State v. Morrill, 16 Ark. 384 ; Burdett v. Commonwealth, 103 Va. 838 , 106 Am.