reasons rule in Maryland

2025The Court explained that in addressing an ineffective assistance claim based upon an unpreserved structural error, it is important to recognize that “the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim premised on the failure to object to that error.” Id.

2023This is so because, although “[t]he purpose of the structural error doctrine - 27 - is to ensure insistence on certain basic, constitutional guarantees that should define the framework of any criminal trial[,]” in some instances, “the reasons an error is deemed structural may influence the proper standard used to evaluate an ineffective-assistance claim premised on the failure to object to that error.” Weaver, 582 U.S. at 294-95 .

1978“Wrong directions which do not put the traveler out of his way, furnish no reason for repeating the journey.” Cherry v. Davis, 59 Ga. 454, 465 (1877).’ ” *363 We have no quarrel with these statements as abstract principles of law.

1974One of the reasons for such a rule is that sometimes a trial court will err in some of the legal propositions announced to the jury, but the errors are harmless. ‘Wrong directions which do not put the traveler out of his way, furnish no reason for repeating the journey.’ Cherry v. Davis, 59 Ga. 454, 456 (1877).” Our perusal of Judge Shure’s instructions to the jury convinces us that he adequately informed them as to the Maryland law.

2009The reasons for the rule have been stated by this Court in Brinsfield v. Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 530 [, 73 A. 289 ] [ (1909) ], in these impressive words: “Such evidence is forbidden by public policy, since it would disclose the secrets of the jury room and afford an opportunity for fraud and perjury.

2009The reasons for the rule have been stated by this Court in Brinsfield v. Howeth, 110 Md. 520, 530 [, 73 A. 289 ] [ (1909) ], in these impressive words: “Such evidence is forbidden by public policy, since it would disclose the secrets of the jury room and afford an opportunity for fraud and perjury.

2010Corp., 144 Md.App. 384, 394 , 798 A.2d 1149, 1154 (2002) (“The court should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant ... certification.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Canterbury Riding Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 *223 Md.App. 635, 651, 505 A.2d 858, 866 (1986) (“Although we stop short of adding any rigid requirement, ... when a trial judge certifies a case as final under Rule 2-602, we nonetheless find it more difficult to affirm the exercise of discretion where no reasons for that exercise are given.”).

2010Corp., 144 Md.App. 384, 394 , 798 A.2d 1149, 1154 (2002) (“The court should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant ... certification.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Canterbury Riding Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 *223 Md.App. 635, 651, 505 A.2d 858, 866 (1986) (“Although we stop short of adding any rigid requirement, ... when a trial judge certifies a case as final under Rule 2-602, we nonetheless find it more difficult to affirm the exercise of discretion where no reasons for that exercise are given.”).

2010Corp., 144 Md.App. 384, 394 , 798 A.2d 1149, 1154 (2002) (“The court should clearly articulate the reasons and factors underlying its decision to grant ... certification.” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); Canterbury Riding Condo. v. Chesapeake Investors, Inc., 66 *223 Md.App. 635, 651, 505 A.2d 858, 866 (1986) (“Although we stop short of adding any rigid requirement, ... when a trial judge certifies a case as final under Rule 2-602, we nonetheless find it more difficult to affirm the exercise of discretion where no reasons for that exercise are given.”).

1999See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689 , 694 n. 6, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978)(“[w]here the record makes clear that all parties and the court understood the reason for the objection,” the grounds need not be stated).

1999See Exxon Corp. v. Kelly, 281 Md. 689 , 694 n. 6, 381 A.2d 1146 (1978)(“[w]here the record makes clear that all parties and the court understood the reason for the objection,” the grounds need not be stated).

1998See Hunt, 345 Md. at 143-16 , 691 A.2d 1255 (preventing, under § 8-211(a), the criminal equivalent of § 8-211(b), defendant in capital murder case from raising challenge post-voir dire).

1998See Hunt, 345 Md. at 143-16 , 691 A.2d 1255 (preventing, under § 8-211(a), the criminal equivalent of § 8-211(b), defendant in capital murder case from raising challenge post-voir dire).

1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle).

1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle).

1990As a result, there is no parental authority or family tranquility to be preserved”); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo.1960); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551 , 215 A.2d 695, 696 (1965); Dorsey v. State Farm Mut.

1990As a result, there is no parental authority or family tranquility to be preserved”); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo.1960); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551 , 215 A.2d 695, 696 (1965); Dorsey v. State Farm Mut.

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990As a result, there is no parental authority or family tranquility to be preserved”); Brennecke v. Kilpatrick, 336 S.W.2d 68, 73 (Mo.1960); Gaudreau v. Gaudreau, 106 N.H. 551 , 215 A.2d 695, 696 (1965); Dorsey v. State Farm Mut.

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant, 300 Md. 690, 701 , 481 A.2d 186 (1984); Carbaugh v. State, 294 Md. 323, 328 , 449 A.2d 1153 (1982); Lewis v. Lewis, 290 Md. 175, 184-185 , 428 A.2d 454 (1981); Montgomery Co. v. Ian Corp., 282 Md. 459, 467-468 , 385 A.2d 80 (1978); Wylie v. Johnston, et al., 29 Md. 298, 303 (1868) (explaining the reasons for the principle).

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990See, e.g., Johnson v. Myers, 2 Ill.App.3d 844 , 277 N.E.2d 778, 779 (1972) (“when the family relationship has been dissolved by death the stated policy behind the rule of family immunity ceases”); Plumley v. Klein, 31 Mich.App. 26 , 187 N.W.2d 250, 252-253 (1971), aff'd, 388 Mich. 1 , 199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (“the reasons for the doctrine of intra-family immunity have been terminated by death”); Palcsey v. Tepper, 71 N.J.Super. 294 , 176 A.2d 818, 819 (1962) (“It is self-evident that if the family relationship no longer exists, having been dissolved by death, then the public policy consideration

1990In Nehbras v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.Ed.2d, 241, 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1957), the New York Court of Appeals set forth the reasons for this rule: *123 “In the very nature of things, a municipality must have the power to select the site of buildings or other structures for the performance of its governmental duties.” In Kedroff v. Town of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624 , 256 A.2d 457 (1969), the Supreme Court of Vermont, citing Nehbras, supra, held that a municipality is not subject to zoning restrictions in the performance of its governmental activities.

1990In Nehbras v. Village of Lloyd Harbor, 2 N.Y.2d 190, 140 N.Ed.2d, 241, 242, 159 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1957), the New York Court of Appeals set forth the reasons for this rule: *123 “In the very nature of things, a municipality must have the power to select the site of buildings or other structures for the performance of its governmental duties.” In Kedroff v. Town of Springfield, 127 Vt. 624 , 256 A.2d 457 (1969), the Supreme Court of Vermont, citing Nehbras, supra, held that a municipality is not subject to zoning restrictions in the performance of its governmental activities.