reasons rule in Florida

1988See Taylor v. State, 485 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), citing Williams v. State, 480 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (certifying to this Court identical questions); Monti v. State, 480 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Gordon v. State, 483 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

1987See Taylor v. State, 485 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), citing Williams v. State, 480 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (certifying to this Court identical questions); Monti v. State, 480 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Gordon v. State, 483 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

1988See Taylor v. State, 485 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), citing Williams v. State, 480 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (certifying to this Court identical questions); Monti v. State, 480 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Gordon v. State, 483 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

1987See Taylor v. State, 485 So.2d 900 (Fla. 4th DCA 1986), citing Williams v. State, 480 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1st DCA 1985) (certifying to this Court identical questions); Monti v. State, 480 So.2d 223 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985); Gordon v. State, 483 So.2d 22 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985).

1999The reasons for the rule precluding a judge from delving into the jury's numerical division are those articulated in Brasfield : the inquiry serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained through less intrusive questions; the inquiry has a tendency to be coercive; and it interferes with the proper relation of the judge to the jury. 272 U.S. at 450 , 47 S.Ct. at 135-36 .

1999The reasons for the rule precluding a judge from delving into the jury's numerical division are those articulated in Brasfield : the inquiry serves no useful purpose that cannot be attained through less intrusive questions; the inquiry has a tendency to be coercive; and it interferes with the proper relation of the judge to the jury. 272 U.S. at 450 , 47 S.Ct. at 135-36 .

1979In our opinion Bencomo v. Bencomo, 200 So.2d 171 (Fla. 1967) and Corren v. Corren, 47 So.2d 774 (Fla. 1950) should be overruled and the doctrine of interspousal tort immunity should be abrogated so as to permit a married person to sue his or her spouse for any torts committed by the marital partner.

1972I simply think the reasons for the rule are absent under the factual situation here and the trial judge's order dismissing should be reversed. *21 Basically, however, I would adopt the reasoning in Justice Ervin's dissent in Bencomo v. Bencomo, Fla. 1967, 200 So.2d 171 , where he quoted from Harper and James On Torts, Vol. I, 1956, Sec. 8.10 p. 646. "`The metaphysical and practical reasons which prevented [suit between husband and wife] at common law are no longer applicable.

1960However, as we have frequently held, the ruling of the full Commission does not reach the Circuit Court with a presumption of correctness, Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472 , 18 So.2d 251 , as is true when ‘a case’' is before this Court on appeal, but the Commission’s judgment upon review of the Deputy Commissioner’s findings and award should be tested by the Circuit •Court in the manner hereinafter outlined when it is clear that the answer to the question presented depends upon an appraisal of conflicting evidence. “ * * * The fact-finding arbiter is •usually in a be

1960However, as we have frequently held, the ruling of the full Commission does not reach the Circuit Court with a presumption of correctness, Florida Forest and Park Service v. Strickland, 154 Fla. 472 , 18 So.2d 251 , as is true when ‘a case’' is before this Court on appeal, but the Commission’s judgment upon review of the Deputy Commissioner’s findings and award should be tested by the Circuit •Court in the manner hereinafter outlined when it is clear that the answer to the question presented depends upon an appraisal of conflicting evidence. “ * * * The fact-finding arbiter is •usually in a be

1937Pr. 428 ; 5 Dev. 367 ; 12 Kan. 539 ; 48 Cal. 85 ; 37 Iowa 339 .) It is needless to discuss the reasons for the rule.

1878Pr., 428 ; 5 Dev., 367 ; 12 Han., 539; 48 Cal., 85 ; 37 Iowa, 339 .) It is needless to discuss the reasons for the rule.

1937Pr. 428 ; 5 Dev. 367 ; 12 Kan. 539 ; 48 Cal. 85 ; 37 Iowa 339 .) It is needless to discuss the reasons for the rule.

1878Pr., 428 ; 5 Dev., 367 ; 12 Han., 539; 48 Cal., 85 ; 37 Iowa, 339 .) It is needless to discuss the reasons for the rule.

2024One of the reasons for this rule of preservation is to prevent the complaining party from strategically avoiding the risk of “having the award unfavorably adjusted.” Id.

2018The reasons for this rule are twofold: first, such testimony "indicates a group consensus based on hearsay that would not be conveyed by testimony that the expert relied on records, tests, or reports from ... medical providers directly involved in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient." Id.

2018The reasons for this rule are twofold: first, such testimony “indicates a group consensus based on hearsay that would not be - 18 - conveyed by testimony that the expert relied on records, tests, or reports from . . . medical providers directly involved in the diagnosis or treatment of the patient.” Id.

2009CONCLUSION For the reasons provided in our analysis, we quash the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Wallace v. Dean, 970 So.2d 864 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), approve and reaffirm the decisions listed in footnote 2, supra, to the extent that they are consistent with our analysis and holding, and conclude that the Sheriff undertook and owed the decedent a common-law duty of care.

2009CONCLUSION For the reasons provided in our analysis, we quash the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Wallace v. Dean, 970 So.2d 864 (Fla. 5th DCA 2007), approve and reaffirm the decisions listed in footnote 2, supra, to the extent that they are consistent with our analysis and holding, and conclude that the Sheriff undertook and owed the decedent a common-law duty of care.

2009CONCLUSION For the reasons provided in our analysis, we approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in System Components Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 985 So.2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), and disapprove the decision of the Fourth District in State Department of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC, 895 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

2009CONCLUSION For the reasons provided in our analysis, we approve the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in System Components Corp. v. Department of Transportation, 985 So.2d 687 (Fla. 5th DCA 2008), and disapprove the decision of the Fourth District in State Department of Transportation v. Tire Centers, LLC, 895 So.2d 1110 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005).

2008The rule "not only affords trial judges the opportunity to address and possibly redress a claimed error, it also prevents counsel from allowing errors in the proceedings to go unchallenged and later using the error to a client's tactical advantage." F.B. v. State, 852 So.2d 226 , 229 (Fla.2003).

2001L.Rev. 297, 333 n. 146 (1982) (explaining the constitutional right to reasoned judicial decisions, but observing, at the outset, that the author would not discuss "the more problematic issue of the application of a reasons requirement to jury as opposed to judicial decisions," because the "values that would be served by requiring explanations of jury verdicts might well be outweighed by the values served by the traditional reluctance to invade the `sacred province' of the jury's deliberative process") (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); United Stat

2001L.Rev. 297, 333 n. 146 (1982) (explaining the constitutional right to reasoned judicial decisions, but observing, at the outset, that the author would not discuss "the more problematic issue of the application of a reasons requirement to jury as opposed to judicial decisions," because the "values that would be served by requiring explanations of jury verdicts might well be outweighed by the values served by the traditional reluctance to invade the `sacred province' of the jury's deliberative process") (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); United Stat

2001L.Rev. 297, 333 n. 146 (1982) (explaining the constitutional right to reasoned judicial decisions, but observing, at the outset, that the author would not discuss "the more problematic issue of the application of a reasons requirement to jury as opposed to judicial decisions," because the "values that would be served by requiring explanations of jury verdicts might well be outweighed by the values served by the traditional reluctance to invade the `sacred province' of the jury's deliberative process") (citing Dunn v. United States, 284 U.S. 390 , 52 S.Ct. 189 , 76 L.Ed. 356 (1932); United Stat

1999The reasons for this rule change are set out in Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j) — Time Limit for Service, 720 So.2d 505 (Fla.1998). 1 Additionally, in the opinion adopting the rule, we stated that the amended rule shall apply where “just and practicable, to all civil cases pending as of the date of this opinion [Mar. 4, 1999].” Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j)-Time Limit for Service, 746 So.2d at 1084 .

1999The reasons for this rule change are set out in Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j) — Time Limit for Service, 720 So.2d 505 (Fla.1998). 1 Additionally, in the opinion adopting the rule, we stated that the amended rule shall apply where “just and practicable, to all civil cases pending as of the date of this opinion [Mar. 4, 1999].” Amendment to Florida Rule of Civil Procedure 1.070(j)-Time Limit for Service, 746 So.2d at 1084 .

1998Id. at 514 .

1995Id. at 456 (citations omitted); see also Buchman, 381 So.2d at 230 ; Florida Power Corp. v. Barron, 481 So.2d 1309 (Fla. 2d DCA), review dismissed, 488 So.2d 829 (Fla. 1986).

1995Clemons, 629 So.2d at 1068 (citing Barr v. State, 474 So.2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).

1995Clemons, 629 So.2d at 1068 (citing Barr v. State, 474 So.2d 417 (Fla. 2d DCA 1985)).