44 Missouri opinions name it 2 courts 1891–2024 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Missouri courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ganawaygreen2 sentences1981The inference is not, after all, a substitute for trial preparation or the truth." 556 S.W.2d at 70 (emphasis added). 1979Indeed, this element of the criteria set forth in Collins “should rarely have application in view of the extensive discovery now available in criminal cases . the original reasons for the rule have been largely eliminated by the availability or dis *865 covery to both sides.” State v. Ganaway, 556 S.W.2d 67, 70 (Mo.App.1977). | 2 | 2 |
Westerhold v. Carrollgreen2 sentences2023Moreover, concluding Tyler is liable for the County's failure to meet its statutorily mandated duties would also disincentivize local government contractors from entering into service contracts by creating "obligations and liabilities to others which parties would not voluntarily assume." Id. 4 Although the reasons for the rule of privity are present in this case, Plaintiffs argue the rule does not apply because they pleaded facts showing it was foreseeable Tyler's actions could result in unlawful assessments. 1973Hence, the court concluded that the reasons for the rule of privity were not applicable to the facts, and “ . . . as a matter of logic we perceive no reason why in such a situation privity should be required . ” Westerhold, supra, at 79 . | 1 | 3 |
Wood v. Centermark Properties, Inc.green1 sentence2024On more than one occasion, this Court has listed the reasons for that rule, including: “judicial reluctance to tamper with a traditional, common law concept; the notion that the deliberate criminal act of a third person is the intervening cause of harm to another; the difficulty that often exists in determining the foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard the owner must meet; the economic consequences of imposing such a duty; and conflict with the public policy that 8 protecting citizens is the government’s duty rather than a duty of the private sector.” Wood v. Centermar | 1 | 1 |
Faheen Ex Rel. Hebron v. City Parking Corp.green1 sentence2024On more than one occasion, this Court has listed the reasons for that rule, including: “judicial reluctance to tamper with a traditional, common law concept; the notion that the deliberate criminal act of a third person is the intervening cause of harm to another; the difficulty that often exists in determining the foreseeability of criminal acts; the vagueness of the standard the owner must meet; the economic consequences of imposing such a duty; and conflict with the public policy that 8 protecting citizens is the government’s duty rather than a duty of the private sector.” Wood v. Centermar | 1 | 1 |
Winegar v. Des Moines Independent Community School Districtgreen1 sentence2001“A property interest in employment can also be created by implied contract arising out of customs, practices and de facto policies.” Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 , 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-2700 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). | 1 | 1 |
Call v. Heardgreen1 sentence1998Call v. Heard, 925 S.W.2d 840, 847 (Mo. banc 1996). | 1 | 1 |
Dale v. Hardygreen1 sentence1997One of the reasons for the rule is “to protect the appellate dockets from delay in the resolution of cases with fairly debatable issues.” Dale v. Hardy, 835 S.W.2d 444, 447 (Mo.App. 1992). | 1 | 1 |
Vallejo-Davila v. Osco Drug, Inc.green1 sentence1997This appeal has forced the respondents “to file an unnecessary brief ... and appear for argument.” Vallejo-Davila v. Oseo Drug., 895 S.W.2d 49, 55 (Mo.App. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Yowellgreen1 sentence1977The reasons for this rule are discussed in State v. Yowell, 513 S.W.2d 397, 402-403 (Mo. banc 1974). | 1 | 1 |
Ex parte Creasygreen2 sentences1975Having found the order of commitment insufficient for that reason, the court said: “The order of adjudication of contempt is likewise insufficient, when tested by the same rules.” See also: Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679 , 148 S.W. 914, 922-23 [4] (Mo.banc 1912) for a more detailed discussion of the reasons for the rule that the facts and circumstances of the contempt must be particularized in both the judgment and the execution. 1975Having found the order of commitment insufficient for that reason, the court said: “The order of adjudication of contempt is likewise insufficient, when tested by the same rules.” See also: Ex parte Creasy, 243 Mo. 679 , 148 S.W. 914, 922-23 [4] (Mo.banc 1912) for a more detailed discussion of the reasons for the rule that the facts and circumstances of the contempt must be particularized in both the judgment and the execution. | 1 | 1 |
Ex Parte Fullergreen1 sentence1975In Ex parte Fuller, 50 S.W.2d 654, 657 [3] (Mo.banc 1932), the court, citing Ex parte Creasy, supra, said: “ * ⅜ * the facts and circumstances constituting the contempt should be recited in the judgment.” Each district of the court of appeals has held that in contempt proceedings “ * * * the facts and circumstances constituting the offense, and not simply legal conclusions, must be recited not only in the judgment * * * but also in the commitment * ⅜ *" Glenn v. Hendrix, 349 S.W.2d 532, 533 [2] (Mo.App.1961 [Springfield]); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557, 574 [15] (Mo.App.1964 [St. | 1 | 1 |
Curtis v. Tozergreen1 sentence1975In Ex parte Fuller, 50 S.W.2d 654, 657 [3] (Mo.banc 1932), the court, citing Ex parte Creasy, supra, said: “ * ⅜ * the facts and circumstances constituting the contempt should be recited in the judgment.” Each district of the court of appeals has held that in contempt proceedings “ * * * the facts and circumstances constituting the offense, and not simply legal conclusions, must be recited not only in the judgment * * * but also in the commitment * ⅜ *" Glenn v. Hendrix, 349 S.W.2d 532, 533 [2] (Mo.App.1961 [Springfield]); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557, 574 [15] (Mo.App.1964 [St. | 1 | 1 |
Glenn v. Hendrixgreen1 sentence1975In Ex parte Fuller, 50 S.W.2d 654, 657 [3] (Mo.banc 1932), the court, citing Ex parte Creasy, supra, said: “ * ⅜ * the facts and circumstances constituting the contempt should be recited in the judgment.” Each district of the court of appeals has held that in contempt proceedings “ * * * the facts and circumstances constituting the offense, and not simply legal conclusions, must be recited not only in the judgment * * * but also in the commitment * ⅜ *" Glenn v. Hendrix, 349 S.W.2d 532, 533 [2] (Mo.App.1961 [Springfield]); Curtis v. Tozer, 374 S.W.2d 557, 574 [15] (Mo.App.1964 [St. | 1 | 1 |
Slate v. Boone County Abstract Companygreen1 sentence1973See also Slate v. Boone County Abstract Co., Mo., 432 S.W.2d 305 . | 1 | 1 |
City of Olivette v. Graelergreen2 sentences1965Among the cases cited was City of Olivette v. Graeler, Mo., 338 S.W.2d 827, 836 [14]. 1965Among the cases cited was City of Olivette v. Graeler, Mo., 338 S.W.2d 827, 836 [14]. | 1 | 1 |
McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeleygreen2 sentences1965In the recent annexation case of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, Mo., 367 S.W.2d 498, 503 [4], this court reviewed cases and held: "Therefore, our conclusion is that annexation of additional territory is a matter of more than merely municipal affairs and concern and that the reasons for applying the test of unreasonableness amounting to arbitrary, capricious action and abuse of discretion are equally applicable to annexations by constitutional charter cities and those organized under general statutes." Italics added. 1965In the recent annexation case of McDonnell Aircraft Corporation v. City of Berkeley, Mo., 367 S.W.2d 498, 503 [4], this court reviewed cases and held: “Therefore, our conclusion is that annexation of additional territory is a matter of more than merely municipal affairs and concern and that the reasons for applying the test of unreasonableness amounting to arbitrary, capricious action and abuse of discretion are equally applicable to annexations by constitutional charter cities and those organized under general statutes.” Italics added. | 1 | 1 |
| Haguewood v. Britaingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Crabtree v. Kurngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Missouri. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Adams v. Children's Mercy Hospital
green
2 sentences2022Id. 2022Id. | 2 | 2022–2022 |
City of Hannibal v. Winchester
green
2 sentences1970That position was rejected by this court which stated, l.c. 502, that ‘[t]he policy of the state in this respect as to all cities is stated in Sec. 71.015 (statutory references are to RSMo and V.A.M.S.) in the requirement “[t]hat such action is reasonable and necessary to the proper development” of the city.’ Subsequently, 1.c. 503, the opinion states: ‘Therefore, our conclusion is that annexation of additional territory is a matter of more than merely municipal affairs and concern and that the reasons for applying the test of unreasonableness amounting to arbitrary, capricious action and abus 1970That position was rejected by this court which stated, 1. c. 502, that `[t]he policy of the state in this respect as to all cities is stated in Sec. 71.015 (statutory references are to RSMo and V.A.M.S.) in the requirement "[t]hat such action is reasonable and necessary to the proper development" of the city.' Subsequently, 1. c. 503, the opinion states: `Therefore, our conclusion is that annexation of additional territory is a matter of more than merely municipal affairs and concern and that the reasons for applying the test of unreasonableness amounting to arbitrary, capricious action and ab | 2 | 1965–1970 |
Missouri Veterans Home v. Bohrer
green
1 sentence2006BBCB further claims that this placing of the burden of proof on the licensee violates due process, rendering the ordinance void as being unconstitutional, citing Mo. Veterans Home v. Bohrer, 849 S.W.2d 77 (Mo.App.1993), and Gamble v. Hoffman, 695 S.W.2d 503 (Mo.App.1985), the former involving the dismissal of a nursing home administrator, in accordance with Chapter 36, dealing with State personnel laws, and the latter involving the dismissal of a Trooper by the Missouri Highway Patrol, pursuant to Chapter 43, dealing with the Missouri Highway Patrol. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Gamble v. Hoffman
green
1 sentence2006BBCB further claims that this placing of the burden of proof on the licensee violates due process, rendering the ordinance void as being unconstitutional, citing Mo. Veterans Home v. Bohrer, 849 S.W.2d 77 (Mo.App.1993), and Gamble v. Hoffman, 695 S.W.2d 503 (Mo.App.1985), the former involving the dismissal of a nursing home administrator, in accordance with Chapter 36, dealing with State personnel laws, and the latter involving the dismissal of a Trooper by the Missouri Highway Patrol, pursuant to Chapter 43, dealing with the Missouri Highway Patrol. | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Perry v. Sindermann
green
2 sentences2001“A property interest in employment can also be created by implied contract arising out of customs, practices and de facto policies.” Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 , 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-2700 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). 2001“A property interest in employment can also be created by implied contract arising out of customs, practices and de facto policies.” Winegar, 20 F.3d at 899; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-02 , 92 S.Ct. 2694, 2699-2700 , 33 L.Ed.2d 570 (1972). | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc.
green
2 sentences1990An extensive analysis of the rationale behind the fireman’s rule is found in Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 62 Md.App. 116 , 488 A.2d 523 (1985), cert. granted, 303 Md. 418 , 494 A.2d 211 (1985), and in Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347 , 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987). 1990An extensive analysis of the rationale behind the fireman’s rule is found in Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 62 Md.App. 116 , 488 A.2d 523 (1985), cert. granted, 303 Md. 418 , 494 A.2d 211 (1985), and in Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347 , 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co.
green
2 sentences1990An extensive analysis of the rationale behind the fireman’s rule is found in Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 62 Md.App. 116 , 488 A.2d 523 (1985), cert. granted, 303 Md. 418 , 494 A.2d 211 (1985), and in Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347 , 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987). 1990An extensive analysis of the rationale behind the fireman’s rule is found in Flowers v. Sting Security, Inc., 62 Md.App. 116 , 488 A.2d 523 (1985), cert. granted, 303 Md. 418 , 494 A.2d 211 (1985), and in Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co., 429 Mich. 347 , 415 N.W.2d 178 (1987). | 1 | 1990–1990 |
State v. Roberts
green
2 sentences1971In State v. Roberts, 294 Mo. 284 , 242 S.W. 669, 675 , the court approved a quotation from Greenleaf on Evidence which discussed the reasons for the rule, as follows: “It has long been settled that testimony from other witnesses of particular instances of misconduct is an improper mode of discrediting, because of the confusion of issues and waste of time that would thus be involved, and because of the unfair surprise to the witness, who cannot know what variety of false charges may be specified, and cannot be prepared to expose their falsity. 1971In State v. Roberts, 294 Mo. 284 , 242 S.W. 669, 675 , the court approved a quotation from Greenleaf on Evidence which discussed the reasons for the rule, as follows: “It has long been settled that testimony from other witnesses of particular instances of misconduct is an improper mode of discrediting, because of the confusion of issues and waste of time that would thus be involved, and because of the unfair surprise to the witness, who cannot know what variety of false charges may be specified, and cannot be prepared to expose their falsity. | 1 | 1971–1971 |
City of St. Joseph v. Hankinson
green
1 sentence1965Joseph v. Hankinson, Mo., 312 S.W.2d 4, 8 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
McHugh v. Providence Gas Co.
green
1 sentence1963In State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453 , 80 A. 12, 15 , the court said, “The attorney for the defendant, not only had the right, but it was his plain duty towards his client, to fully investigate the case and to interview and examine as many as possible of the eyewitnesses to the assault in question, together with any other persons who might be able to assist him in' ascertaining the truth concerning the event in controversy. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
State v. Papa
green
1 sentence1963In State v. Papa, 32 R.I. 453 , 80 A. 12, 15 , the court said, “The attorney for the defendant, not only had the right, but it was his plain duty towards his client, to fully investigate the case and to interview and examine as many as possible of the eyewitnesses to the assault in question, together with any other persons who might be able to assist him in' ascertaining the truth concerning the event in controversy. | 1 | 1963–1963 |
Dunlap v. Dunlap
green
2 sentences1960Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11 , 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17 , 166 S.E. 538 ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 , 71 A.L.R. 1055 . 1960Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11 , 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17 , 166 S.E. 538 ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 , 71 A.L.R. 1055 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Ennis Ex Rel. Munday v. Truhitte green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Hamilton v. Fulkerson green | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Lusk v. Lusk
green
2 sentences1960Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11 , 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17 , 166 S.E. 538 ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 , 71 A.L.R. 1055 . 1960Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11 , 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17 , 166 S.E. 538 ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 , 71 A.L.R. 1055 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Worrell v. Worrell
green
2 sentences1960Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11 , 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17 , 166 S.E. 538 ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 , 71 A.L.R. 1055 . 1960Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11 , 4 S.E.2d 343, 350 ; Lusk v. Lusk, 113 W.Va. 17 , 166 S.E. 538 ; Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352 , 150 A. 905 , 71 A.L.R. 1055 . | 1 | 1960–1960 |
| Turner v. Bondalier neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Poston v. Williams neutral | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Nicholas v. Evangelical Deaconess Home & Hospital green | 1 | 1946–1946 |
| Bakersfield News v. Ozark County neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Gardner v. Robertson neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Blair v. Paterson neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Eberson v. Continental Investment Co. green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Gannon v. Laclede Gas Light Co. green | 1 | 1931–1931 |
| Blanton v. Dolb green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Klebe v. Parker Distilling Co. green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Removich v. Bambrick Bros. Construction Co. green | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Sabol v. St. Louis Cooperage Co. neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| Hamilton v. Kansas City Southern Railway Co. neutral | 1 | 1927–1927 |
| State ex rel. Carter v. Clymer neutral | 1 | 1924–1924 |
| Stanton v. Gibbins neutral | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Griesel v. Jones green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| Austin v. Shipman green | 1 | 1921–1921 |
| State ex rel. Goodnow v. Police Commissioners green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| State ex rel. Reynolds v. Jost green | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| State ex rel. Truman v. Jost neutral | 1 | 1920–1920 |
| State v. Kodat green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Turney v. Sparks green | 1 | 1919–1919 |
| Clow v. Chapman green | 1 | 1914–1914 |
| State Ex Rel. Billingsley v. Spencer green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.