Sixth Amendment violation in Idaho

2026Even though compulsory process protects “the right to present a 10 defense, [and] the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts” at trial, State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628 , 634–35, 167 P.3d 765 , 771–72 (2007) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)), “a mere deprivation of testimony does not establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).

2026Even though compulsory process protects “the right to present a 10 defense, [and] the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts” at trial, State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628 , 634–35, 167 P.3d 765 , 771–72 (2007) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)), “a mere deprivation of testimony does not establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).

2024See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 , 521–22 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit incriminating information); Sinock v. State, 76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 744 (Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating statemen

2024See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 , 521–22 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit incriminating information); Sincock v. State, 76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 744 (Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating stateme

2024See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 , 521–22 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit incriminating information); Sinock v. State, 76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 744 (Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating statemen

2024See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 , 521–22 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit incriminating information); Sincock v. State, 76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 744 (Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating stateme

2024Thus, in Fields, this Court articulated the two-part test for evaluating an alleged Sixth Amendment violation of this nature: “The inquiry . . . requires that this Court determine whether (1) the inmates were acting as agents of the police, and (2) the informants affirmatively and deliberately elicited the incriminating statements.” Id. (citing Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991)).

2024Thus, in Fields, this Court articulated the two-part test for evaluating an alleged Sixth Amendment violation of this nature: “The inquiry . . . requires that this Court determine whether (1) the inmates were acting as agents of the police, and (2) the informants affirmatively and deliberately elicited the incriminating statements.” Id. (citing Depree v. Thomas, 946 F.2d 784, 793 (11th Cir. 1991)).

2024See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 , 521–22 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit incriminating information); Sinock v. State, 76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 744 (Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating statemen

2024See United States v. Lentz, 524 F.3d 501 , 521–22 (4th Cir. 2008) (finding no deliberate elicitation where a jailhouse informant was instructed to, and engaged in, personalized conversations to bring up matters of common interest, but did not directly elicit incriminating information); Sincock v. State, 76 P.3d 323, 333 (Wyo. 2003) (finding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation in the context of a jailhouse informant “if the incriminating statements made by the defendant to the informant are voluntary.”); People v. Williams, 940 P.2d 710, 744 (Cal.1997) (holding that incriminating stateme

2024See Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the informant asking clarifying questions in direct response to the defendant’s voluntary statements did not alter the fundamental nature of the conversation, and thus was not a Sixth Amendment violation); United States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that when an informant asked clarifying questions about the defendant’s role in a plan to tamper with a witness, it did not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation).

2024See Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 880 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding that the informant asking clarifying questions in direct response to the defendant’s voluntary statements did not alter the fundamental nature of the conversation, and thus was not a Sixth Amendment violation); United States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324 (2d Cir. 2012) (finding that when an informant asked clarifying questions about the defendant’s role in a plan to tamper with a witness, it did not rise to the level of a Sixth Amendment violation).

2022“Whether a defendant has waived Miranda rights and whether a confession was voluntary have overlapping—though different—analyses.” State v. Samuel, 165 Idaho 746, 762 , 452 P.3d 768, 784 (2019).

2022“Whether a defendant has waived Miranda rights and whether a confession was voluntary have overlapping—though different—analyses.” State v. Samuel, 165 Idaho 746, 762 , 452 P.3d 768, 784 (2019).

2013See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 , 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834 , 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009).

2013See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 , 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834 , 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009).

2013See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 , 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834 , 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009).

2013See Hernandez v. State, 127 Idaho 685, 687 , 905 P.2d 86, 88 (1995); Smith v. State, 146 Idaho 822, 834 , 203 P.3d 1221, 1233 (2009).

2026Even though compulsory process protects “the right to present a 10 defense, [and] the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts” at trial, State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628 , 634–35, 167 P.3d 765 , 771–72 (2007) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)), “a mere deprivation of testimony does not establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).

2026Even though compulsory process protects “the right to present a 10 defense, [and] the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts” at trial, State v. Dalrymple, 144 Idaho 628 , 634–35, 167 P.3d 765 , 771–72 (2007) (quoting Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 19 (1967)), “a mere deprivation of testimony does not establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 867 (1982)).

2025The United States Supreme Court has made clear that a Sixth Amendment right to counsel exists outside the trial itself, attaching “at or after the initiation of adversary judicial criminal proceedings—whether by way of formal charge, preliminary hearing, indictment, information, or arraignment.” Kirby v. Illinois, 406 U.S. 682, 689 (1972); see also I.C. § 19- 852(1)(a) (2017) (“An indigent person who is . . . under formal charge of having committed, or is being detained under a conviction of, a serious crime is entitled: (a) To be represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person havin

2014However, “restrictions on a criminal defendant’s rights to confront adverse witnesses and to present evidence ‘may not be arbitrary or disproportionate to the purposes they are designed to serve.’” Michigan v. Lucas, 500 U.S. 145, 150 (1991) (quoting Rock, 483 U.S. at 56 ). 12 In this case, the district court did not reach the Sixth Amendment issue and therefore did not weigh the competing interest implicated by the proffered evidence of the third-party rape of G.O.

2010U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2563-64 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409, 419 (2006).

2010U.S. v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 , 126 S.Ct. 2557, 2563-64 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409, 419 (2006).

2010See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130 , 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (applying rule in context of Fourth Amendment claim). 3 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend.

2010See State v. Schaffer, 133 Idaho 126, 130 , 982 P.2d 961, 965 (Ct. App. 1999) (applying rule in context of Fourth Amendment claim). 3 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to . . . have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. CONST. amend.

1995Noting that Lankford had at no point raised a Sixth Amendment violation, this Court nevertheless assumed "that Satterwhite applies equally where a [F]ifth [A]mendment violation is shown." State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 279, 281 , 775 P.2d 593, 595 (1989).

1995Noting that Lankford had at no point raised a Sixth Amendment violation, this Court nevertheless assumed "that Satterwhite applies equally where a [F]ifth [A]mendment violation is shown." State v. Lankford, 116 Idaho 279, 281 , 775 P.2d 593, 595 (1989).