Sixth Amendment violation in Delaware

2026(March 4, 2024) at 15:15-16:10. 29 See, prosecutor’s sentencing comments, id. at 18:6-14. 30 D.I. 16. 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 32 Id. at 667-68. 33 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 7 ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice. 34 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 35 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason

2026(March 4, 2024) at 15:15-16:10. 29 See, prosecutor’s sentencing comments, id. at 18:6-14. 30 D.I. 16. 31 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 32 Id. at 667-68. 33 Wright v. State, 671 A.2d 1353, 1356 (Del. 1996). 7 ineffective assistance; a defendant must make and substantiate concrete claims of actual prejudice. 34 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.” 35 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s

2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason

2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason

2024July 5, 2007). 4 the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results. 27 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.28 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.29 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”30 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability t

2025To successfully bring an IAC claim, a claimant must demonstrate: (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient; and (2) that the deficiencies prejudiced the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results.37 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.38 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. 39 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reason

2024July 5, 2007). 4 the claimant by depriving him or her of a fair trial with reliable results. 27 To prove counsel’s deficiency, a defendant must show that counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.28 Moreover, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal.29 “[A] court must indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.”30 A successful Sixth Amendment claim of IAC requires a showing “that there is a reasonable probability t

2018An accused’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel for his or her defense is “fundamental to our system of justice” and “is meant to assure fairness 26 in the adversary criminal process.”68 The underlying purpose of the right to the assistance of counsel is to allow a defendant to make informed choices about his defense.69 To that end, “Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the [S]ixth [A]mendment is to be meaningful.”70 This Court previously addressed the legal standards applicable to finding a Sixth Amend

2018An accused’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel for his or her defense is “fundamental to our system of justice” and “is meant to assure fairness 26 in the adversary criminal process.”68 The underlying purpose of the right to the assistance of counsel is to allow a defendant to make informed choices about his defense.69 To that end, “Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the [S]ixth [A]mendment is to be meaningful.”70 This Court previously addressed the legal standards applicable to finding a Sixth Amend

2016While some courts have bled all four Barker v. Wingo factors into Rule 48(b) 1 U.S. v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 324 (1977). 2 Id. 3 Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972). 2 analyses, the standard for dismissal pursuant to Rule 48(b) requires that there be a sufficiently long unnecessary delay, and that the defendant suffer prejudice as a result.4 Delaware courts have consistently applied the three factors used to evaluate prejudice in Sixth Amendment analysis to the prejudice requirement for Rule 48(b) dismissals.5 5.

1989Defendant concedes that the nine month trial delay is neither chargeable to prosecu-torial acts or omissions nor is the delay sufficient to support a Sixth Amendment claim of denial of right to a speedy trial, requiring application of Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2018Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558 (finding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in part because there was no “purposeful intrusion” by the undercover agent); see also State v. Cannon, ID.

2018Cir. 1979), rev’d on other grounds, 449 U.S. 361 (1981); Weatherford, 429 U.S. at 558 (finding that there was no Sixth Amendment violation in part because there was no “purposeful intrusion” by the undercover agent); see also State v. Cannon, ID.

2019Id. at 364 , 101 S.Ct. 665 ("The United States initially urges that absent some showing of prejudice, there could be no Sixth Amendment violation to be remedied.

2019Id. at 364 , 101 S.Ct. 665 ("The United States initially urges that absent some showing of prejudice, there could be no Sixth Amendment violation to be remedied.

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2022See Hughes, 437 A.2d at 566–73 (remanding for a new trial after finding prosecutorial errors substantially affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial); Hunter, 815 A.2d at 738 (reversing the conviction following a finding of prosecutorial misconduct which compromised the judicial process); Trala v. State, 244 A.3d 989 , 998–99 (Del. 2020) (discussing the ability to reverse under the Hughes and Hunter tests). 59 209 A.3d 25 (Del. 2019). 60 See id. at 58. 14 prosecutorial misconduct there involved a Sixth Amendment violation of defendant’s attorney-client privilege, 61 the Supreme Court dete

2022See Hughes, 437 A.2d at 566–73 (remanding for a new trial after finding prosecutorial errors substantially affected the defendant’s right to a fair trial); Hunter, 815 A.2d at 738 (reversing the conviction following a finding of prosecutorial misconduct which compromised the judicial process); Trala v. State, 244 A.3d 989 , 998–99 (Del. 2020) (discussing the ability to reverse under the Hughes and Hunter tests). 59 209 A.3d 25 (Del. 2019). 60 See id. at 58. 14 prosecutorial misconduct there involved a Sixth Amendment violation of defendant’s attorney-client privilege, 61 the Supreme Court dete

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2018See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 89 F.R.D. 523, 533 (D.

2018See, e.g., United States v. Boffa, 89 F.R.D. 523, 533 (D.

2018An accused’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel for his or her defense is “fundamental to our system of justice” and “is meant to assure fairness 26 in the adversary criminal process.”68 The underlying purpose of the right to the assistance of counsel is to allow a defendant to make informed choices about his defense.69 To that end, “Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the [S]ixth [A]mendment is to be meaningful.”70 This Court previously addressed the legal standards applicable to finding a Sixth Amend

2018An accused’s Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel for his or her defense is “fundamental to our system of justice” and “is meant to assure fairness 26 in the adversary criminal process.”68 The underlying purpose of the right to the assistance of counsel is to allow a defendant to make informed choices about his defense.69 To that end, “Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the [S]ixth [A]mendment is to be meaningful.”70 This Court previously addressed the legal standards applicable to finding a Sixth Amend

2017See, ag., sykes v_ sze, 147 A.3d 201, 216 (Del. 2015) (discussing prior version of Rule 61(i)(4); defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claim, arguing his right of allocution Was violated, Was formerly adjudicated on direct appeal). 3 61(1)(5).13 The contentions in a Rule 61 motion must be considered on a “claim- by-claim” basis.14 Proceduml Bars 4.

2017See, e.g., Sykes v. State, 147 A.3d 201, 216 (Del. 2015) (discussing prior version of Rule 61(i)(4); defendant’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claim, arguing his right of allocution Was violated, was formerly adjudicated on direct appeal). 14 Rule 61(i)(5).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2019Williams v. State , 56 A.3d 1053 , 1055 (Del. 2012) (reviewing de novo a denial of self-representation structural error); Lewis v. State , 757 A.2d 709 , 710 (Del. 2000) (reviewing a Sixth Amendment claim not raised below on the merits "because it presents important questions relating to the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, attorney ethics, judicial responsibility, and fundamental fairness in the administration of justice throughout a criminal proceeding."). 33 977 A.2d 803 (Del. 2009). 34 Id. at 840-41 (quoting Wainwright v. Sykes , 433 U.S. 72 , 93, 97 S.Ct. 2497 , 53 L.Ed.2d 594 (1977) ).

2000Lilly leaves to the state courts the determination of whether a Sixth Amendment error in admitting evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. at 1901, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (quoting Chapman v. Calif, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); see also Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 11 (1987) (adopting the Chapman standard and holding that reversal is required whenever a reviewing court could not find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

2000Lilly leaves to the state courts the determination of whether a Sixth Amendment error in admitting evidence was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” 527 U.S. 116 , 119 S.Ct. at 1901, 144 L.Ed.2d 117 (quoting Chapman v. Calif, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967)); see also Van Arsdall v. State, Del.Supr., 524 A.2d 3, 11 (1987) (adopting the Chapman standard and holding that reversal is required whenever a reviewing court could not find that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt).

1987See Bailey, supra at 1079 ; Fensterer v. State, Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 959, 964 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1986).

1987See Bailey, supra at 1079 ; Fensterer v. State, Del.Supr., 493 A.2d 959, 964 (1985), rev'd on other grounds, — U.S. -, 106 S.Ct. 292 , 88 L.Ed.2d 15 (1986).

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026On that score, I am persuaded by the dissent in Craig that the Sixth Amendment establishes “a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court” 73 and that, by concluding otherwise, the Craig majority improperly “subordinat[ed] . . . explicit constitutional text to currently favored public policy[.]” 74 Moreover, because the Delaware Constitution’s Confrontation Clause is more explicit than the Sixth Amendment in its requirement of face-to-face 71 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 72 781 A.2d 534 (Del. 2001). 73 Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 74 Id. at 861 . 20 confrontation, I woul

2026On that score, I am persuaded by the dissent in Craig that the Sixth Amendment establishes “a defendant’s right to face his or her accusers in court” 73 and that, by concluding otherwise, the Craig majority improperly “subordinat[ed] . . . explicit constitutional text to currently favored public policy[.]” 74 Moreover, because the Delaware Constitution’s Confrontation Clause is more explicit than the Sixth Amendment in its requirement of face-to-face 71 497 U.S. 836 (1990). 72 781 A.2d 534 (Del. 2001). 73 Craig, 497 U.S. at 860 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 74 Id. at 861 . 20 confrontation, I woul

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an

2026Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 487 (2000) (calling Almendarez-Torres “at best an exceptional departure from [ ] historic practice”); Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 27 (2005) (“Almendarez-Torres . . . has been eroded by this Court’s subsequent Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, and a majority of the Court now recognizes that Almendarez-Torres was wrongly decided.”) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Pereida v. Wilkinson, 592 U.S. 224, 238 (2021) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489– 90) (“[W]e have remarked that ‘the fact of a prior conviction’ supplies an