Sixth Amendment violation in Washington

2009He argues that his counsel (1) did not recall Lindsey Howard for further cross-examination; (2) neglected to ask Z.H. during cross-examination whether she was thinking about suing Wiatt; (3) did not cross-examine Kevin Barlow about whether Z.H. seemed intoxicated or why she was mad when she left Wiatt's house after the rape; (4) asked H.A.K. whether she had reported the rape to anyone for one year, opening the door to rebuttal testimony about her earlier reporting of the crime; and (5) never impeached J.M.B.'s testimony that she did not say she would like to "get with" Wiatt, although Justin A

2009He argues that his counsel (1) did not recall Lindsey Howard for further cross-examination; (2) neglected to ask Z.H. during cross-examination whether she was thinking about suing Wiatt; (3) did not cross-examine Kevin Barlow about whether Z.H. seemed intoxicated or why she was mad when she left Wiatt's house after the rape; (4) asked H.A.K. whether she had reported the rape to anyone for one year, opening the door to rebuttal testimony about her earlier reporting of the crime; and (5) never impeached J.M.B.'s testimony that she did not say she would like to "get with" Wiatt, although Justin A

2009He argues that his counsel (1) did not recall Lindsey Howard for further cross-examination; (2) neglected to ask Z.H. during cross-examination whether she was thinking about suing Wiatt; (3) did not cross-examine Kevin Barlow about whether Z.H. seemed intoxicated or why she was mad when she left Wiatt's house after the rape; (4) asked H.A.K. whether she had reported the rape to anyone for one year, opening the door to rebuttal testimony about her earlier reporting of the crime; and (5) never impeached J.M.B.'s testimony that she did not say she would like to "get with" Wiatt, although Justin A

2009He argues that his counsel (1) did not recall Lindsey Howard for further cross-examination; (2) neglected to ask Z.H. during cross-examination whether she was thinking about suing Wiatt; (3) did not cross-examine Kevin Barlow about whether Z.H. seemed intoxicated or why she was mad when she left Wiatt's house after the rape; (4) asked H.A.K. whether she had reported the rape to anyone for one year, opening the door to rebuttal testimony about her earlier reporting of the crime; and (5) never impeached J.M.B.'s testimony that she did not say she would like to "get with" Wiatt, although Justin A

2019In other words, he contends that his attorney's lack of adequate immigration advice triggered the statute, regardless of whether that representation met the Sixth Amendment test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2019In other words, he contends that his attorney's lack of adequate immigration advice triggered the statute, regardless of whether that representation met the Sixth Amendment test for ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S. Ct. 2052 , 80 L.

2025Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 290 (“ [W]e hold that article I, section 22 requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.”). 26 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S. Ct. 2039 , 80 L.

2025Iniguez, 167 Wn.2d at 290 (“ [W]e hold that article I, section 22 requires a method of analysis substantially the same as the federal Sixth Amendment analysis and does not afford a defendant greater speedy trial rights.”). 26 See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 , 104 S. Ct. 2039 , 80 L.

2024It observed that numerous courts have not regarded delay as exceptionally long where the delay was as long as or longer than 23 months: E.g., United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.1977) (58 months, much attributable to repeated requests by the defense for continuances); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.2002) (28-month delay, all of which was attributable to the defendant); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir.2010) (two-year delay, most of which was attributable to the defense); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir.2011) 11 84803-8-I/12 (assuming 3

2013E.g., United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1977) (58 months, much attributable to repeated requests by the defense for continuances); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2002) (28-month delay, all of which was attributable to the defendant); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2010) (2-year delay, most of which was attributable to the defense); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 2011) (assuming 39-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, no Sixth Amendment violation; “much of the delay . . . was attributable to [defendant’s] own actions” whe

2024It observed that numerous courts have not regarded delay as exceptionally long where the delay was as long as or longer than 23 months: E.g., United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.1977) (58 months, much attributable to repeated requests by the defense for continuances); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.2002) (28-month delay, all of which was attributable to the defendant); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir.2010) (two-year delay, most of which was attributable to the defense); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir.2011) 11 84803-8-I/12 (assuming 3

2013E.g., United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1977) (58 months, much attributable to repeated requests by the defense for continuances); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2002) (28-month delay, all of which was attributable to the defendant); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2010) (2-year delay, most of which was attributable to the defense); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 2011) (assuming 39-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, no Sixth Amendment violation; “much of the delay . . . was attributable to [defendant’s] own actions” whe

2024It observed that numerous courts have not regarded delay as exceptionally long where the delay was as long as or longer than 23 months: E.g., United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir.1977) (58 months, much attributable to repeated requests by the defense for continuances); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir.2002) (28-month delay, all of which was attributable to the defendant); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir.2010) (two-year delay, most of which was attributable to the defense); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir.2011) 11 84803-8-I/12 (assuming 3

2013E.g., United States v. Lane, 561 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1977) (58 months, much attributable to repeated requests by the defense for continuances); Gattis v. Snyder, 278 F.3d 222 (3d Cir. 2002) (28-month delay, all of which was attributable to the defendant); United States v. Hills, 618 F.3d 619, 630-31 (7th Cir. 2010) (2-year delay, most of which was attributable to the defense); United States v. Porchay, 651 F.3d 930, 940 (8th Cir. 2011) (assuming 39-month delay was presumptively prejudicial, no Sixth Amendment violation; “much of the delay . . . was attributable to [defendant’s] own actions” whe

2023The court cited United States Supreme Court precedent to explain that if the government’s misconduct does not “create ‘at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State,’ ” then “ ‘there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.’ ” Id. at 819 (alteration in original) (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557-58 , 97 S. Ct. 837 , 51 L.

2023The court cited United States Supreme Court precedent to explain that if the government’s misconduct does not “create ‘at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State,’ ” then “ ‘there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.’ ” Id. at 819 (alteration in original) (quoting Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 557-58 , 97 S. Ct. 837 , 51 L.

2013Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S. Ct. 1708 , 64 L.

2013Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 , 100 S. Ct. 1708 , 64 L.

2010As I noted above, "[r]ather, the remedy should be appropriate to the *807 violation." Waller, 467 U.S. at 50 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 . ¶ 33 The Sixth Amendment violation in Waller was grounded in the closure of the courtroom to the public during a suppression hearing, which closure the prosecution requested, and the trial court granted, over the defendant's objection.

2010As I noted above, "[r]ather, the remedy should be appropriate to the *807 violation." Waller, 467 U.S. at 50 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 . ¶ 33 The Sixth Amendment violation in Waller was grounded in the closure of the courtroom to the public during a suppression hearing, which closure the prosecution requested, and the trial court granted, over the defendant's objection.

2010Recuenco II, 548 U.S. at 220 . ¶60 Now that the Court has held harmless error does apply under a Sixth Amendment analysis, we are free to return to our previous state law approach to sentencing enhancement errors.

2010Recuenco II, 548 U.S. at 220 . ¶60 Now that the Court has held harmless error does apply under a Sixth Amendment analysis, we are free to return to our previous state law approach to sentencing enhancement errors.

2007Randolph, 380 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n. 9, 100 S.Ct. 2183 ).

2007Randolph, 380 F.3d at 1144 (quoting Henry, 447 U.S. at 271 n.9).

2026Restraint of Brown, 143 Wn.2d 431, 451 , 21 P.3d 687 (2001). “[E]ven a lame cross- examination will seldom, if ever, amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.” In re Pers.

2026Restraint of Brown, 143 Wn.2d 431, 451 , 21 P.3d 687 (2001). “[E]ven a lame cross- examination will seldom, if ever, amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.” In re Pers.

2026Restraint of Brown, 143 Wn.2d 431, 451 , 21 P.3d 687 (2001). “[E]ven a lame cross- examination will seldom, if ever, amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.” In re Pers.

2026Restraint of Brown, 143 Wn.2d 431, 451 , 21 P.3d 687 (2001). “[E]ven a lame cross- examination will seldom, if ever, amount to a Sixth Amendment violation.” In re Pers.

2019To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, "a defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." State v. Regan , 143 Wash. App. 419 , 427, 177 P.3d 783 (2008).

2019To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, "a defendant must demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." State v. Regan , 143 Wash. App. 419 , 427, 177 P.3d 783 (2008).

2021“To show a Sixth Amendment violation, the excluded evidence must be of extremely high probative value.” State v. Case, 13 Wn.

2021“To show a Sixth Amendment violation, the excluded evidence must be of extremely high probative value.” State v. Case, 13 Wn.

2015The admissibility of evidence under the rape shield statute, in turn, ` is within the sound discretion of the trial court. "' 168 Wn.2d 350, 3663 , 229 P. 3d 669 ( 2010) ( citations omitted) ( quoting State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 659 P. 2d 514 ( 1983)).In State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 719 , 230 P. 3d 576 ( 2010), decided in the same term as Aguirre, the court held that the standard of review is de novo whenever a defendant alleges a Sixth Amendment violation.

2015The admissibility of evidence under the rape shield statute, in turn, ` is within the sound discretion of the trial court. "' 168 Wn.2d 350, 3663 , 229 P. 3d 669 ( 2010) ( citations omitted) ( quoting State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 659 P. 2d 514 ( 1983)).In State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 719 , 230 P. 3d 576 ( 2010), decided in the same term as Aguirre, the court held that the standard of review is de novo whenever a defendant alleges a Sixth Amendment violation.

2015The admissibility of evidence under the rape shield statute, in turn, ` is within the sound discretion of the trial court. "' 168 Wn.2d 350, 3663 , 229 P. 3d 669 ( 2010) ( citations omitted) ( quoting State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 659 P. 2d 514 ( 1983)).In State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 719 , 230 P. 3d 576 ( 2010), decided in the same term as Aguirre, the court held that the standard of review is de novo whenever a defendant alleges a Sixth Amendment violation.

2015The admissibility of evidence under the rape shield statute, in turn, ` is within the sound discretion of the trial court. "' 168 Wn.2d 350, 3663 , 229 P. 3d 669 ( 2010) ( citations omitted) ( quoting State v. Hudlow, 99 Wn.2d 1, 17 , 659 P. 2d 514 ( 1983)).In State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 719 , 230 P. 3d 576 ( 2010), decided in the same term as Aguirre, the court held that the standard of review is de novo whenever a defendant alleges a Sixth Amendment violation.