99 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1971–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Ringgreen2 sentences2005Nonetheless, we conclude the trial court's consideration of the other aggravating factors either did not violate Blakely or was harmless. ¶ 31 No Sixth Amendment violation occurs if a trial court aggravates a sentence based on a fact " admitted by the defendant. " Blakely , ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2537; see also Ring III, 204 Ariz. 534, ¶ 93 , 65 P.3d at 944 ("In cases in which a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, we will regard that factor as established."). 2005Nonetheless, we conclude the trial court's consideration of the other aggravating factors either did not violate Blakely or was harmless. ¶ 31 No Sixth Amendment violation occurs if a trial court aggravates a sentence based on a fact " admitted by the defendant. " Blakely , ___ U.S. at ___, 124 S.Ct. at 2537; see also Ring III, 204 Ariz. 534, ¶ 93 , 65 P.3d at 944 ("In cases in which a defendant stipulates, confesses or admits to facts sufficient to establish an aggravating circumstance, we will regard that factor as established."). | 19 | 19 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2023See id. at 659 n.26 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). ¶25 Under the circumstances here, Traverso’s Cronic claim required him to show a complete actual or constructive denial of counsel during plea negotiations. 2023See id. at 659 n.26 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). ¶25 Under the circumstances here, Traverso’s Cronic claim required him to show a complete actual or constructive denial of counsel during plea negotiations. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Freeneygreen2 sentences2021“A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the defendant received insufficient notice and is therefore actually prejudiced by a new or amended charge.” Id. at 115, ¶ 29 . 2021“A Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the defendant received insufficient notice and is therefore actually prejudiced by a new or amended charge.” Id. at 115, ¶ 29 . | 3 | 3 |
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2023See id. at 659 n.26 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). ¶25 Under the circumstances here, Traverso’s Cronic claim required him to show a complete actual or constructive denial of counsel during plea negotiations. 2023See id. at 659 n.26 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)). ¶25 Under the circumstances here, Traverso’s Cronic claim required him to show a complete actual or constructive denial of counsel during plea negotiations. | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Bookergreen2 sentences2005Thus, the ultimate sentence imposed, even relying on other supposed aggravating factors, could not have exceeded the range authorized if the jury had found the 566 grams factor. ¶ 65 That Justice Stevens was not adopting the rule suggested by the majority is further supported by the statement in his dissent that “[bjecause the Guidelines as written possess the virtue of combining a mandatory determination of sentencing ranges and discretionary decisions within those ranges, they allow ample latitude for judicial factfind-ing that does not even arguably raise any Sixth Amendment issue.” Id. (em 2005Thus, the ultimate sentence imposed, even relying on other supposed aggravating factors, could not have exceeded the range authorized if the jury had found the 566 grams factor. ¶ 65 That Justice Stevens was not adopting the rule suggested by the majority is further supported by the statement in his dissent that "[b]ecause the Guidelines as written possess the virtue of combining a mandatory determination of sentencing ranges and discretionary decisions within those ranges, they allow ample latitude for judicial factfinding that does not even arguably raise any Sixth Amendment issue." Id. (emp | 2 | 3 |
State v. Warnergreen2 sentences2008See 150 Ariz. at 125-28 , 722 P.2d at 293-96 . 2008See 150 Ariz. at 125-28 , 722 P.2d at 293-96 . | 2 | 3 |
State v. Murdaughgreen2 sentences2016Id. at 305-08, 110 S.Ct. 1078 ; see State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 33 ¶ 70, 97 P.3d 844, 858 (2004) (citing Blystone to support the conclusion that “[a] defendant may waive the presentation of mitigation if he is legally competent to do so”); see also Hausner, 230 Ariz. at 85 ¶ 118, 280 P.3d at 629 (same, rejecting argument that “Murdaugh misinterpreted in Blystone”). ¶ 246 Nor does the Sixth Amendment require the defense to present mitigation despite the defendant’s waiver. 2016Id. at 305-08, 110 S.Ct. 1078 ; see State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 33 ¶ 70, 97 P.3d 844, 858 (2004) (citing Blystone to support the conclusion that “[a] defendant may waive the presentation of mitigation if he is legally competent to do so”); see also Hausner, 230 Ariz. at 85 ¶ 118, 280 P.3d at 629 (same, rejecting argument that “Murdaugh misinterpreted in Blystone”). ¶ 246 Nor does the Sixth Amendment require the defense to present mitigation despite the defendant’s waiver. | 2 | 2 |
Blystone v. Pennsylvaniagreen2 sentences2016Id. at 305-08, 110 S.Ct. 1078 ; see State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 33 ¶ 70, 97 P.3d 844, 858 (2004) (citing Blystone to support the conclusion that “[a] defendant may waive the presentation of mitigation if he is legally competent to do so”); see also Hausner, 230 Ariz. at 85 ¶ 118, 280 P.3d at 629 (same, rejecting argument that “Murdaugh misinterpreted in Blystone”). ¶ 246 Nor does the Sixth Amendment require the defense to present mitigation despite the defendant’s waiver. 2016Id. at 305-08, 110 S.Ct. 1078 ; see State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 33 ¶ 70, 97 P.3d 844, 858 (2004) (citing Blystone to support the conclusion that “[a] defendant may waive the presentation of mitigation if he is legally competent to do so”); see also Hausner, 230 Ariz. at 85 ¶ 118, 280 P.3d at 629 (same, rejecting argument that “Murdaugh misinterpreted in Blystone”). ¶ 246 Nor does the Sixth Amendment require the defense to present mitigation despite the defendant’s waiver. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2009See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 . 5 . 2009See Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. at 148 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 . 5 . | 2 | 2 |
State v. Pecardgreen2 sentences2008Whether a Sixth Amendment violation exists depends on whether the intrusions were purposeful and whether the prosecution, either directly or indirectly, obtained evidence or learned of defense strategy from the intrusions." State v. Pecard, 196 Ariz. 371 , 377 ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 453, 459 (App.1999) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). ¶ 52 In Warner , this Court addressed an argument similar to that made by Boggs. 2008Whether a Sixth Amendment violation exists depends on whether the intrusions were purposeful and whether the prosecution, either directly or indirectly, obtained evidence or learned of defense strategy from the intrusions." State v. Pecard, 196 Ariz. 371 , 377 ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 453, 459 (App.1999) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). ¶ 52 In Warner , this Court addressed an argument similar to that made by Boggs. | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jerald Lee Simsgreen2 sentences2006Quoting United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir.1980), amicus argues the QARs are not business records because the “plain language of [Rule] 803(8)[, Ariz. R. 2006Quoting United States v. Sims, 617 F.2d 1371, 1377 (9th Cir. 1980), amicus argues the QARs are not business records because the “plain language of [Rule] 803(8)[, Ariz. R. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rankovichgreen2 sentences2006See State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116 , 122 n. 3, 765 P.2d 518 , 524 n. 3 (1988) (failure to raise or argue claim in opening brief “constitutes abandonment and waiver of that issue”); cf. State v. King, 212 Ariz. 372, ¶ 14 , 132 P.3d 311, 314 (App.2006) (defendant’s objection below that “he would not be able to cross-examine” unavailable witness whose hearsay statements to 911 operator were admitted at trial “were sufficient to avoid waiver of his Confrontation Clause argument”). ¶ 7 A “hearsay” objection does not preserve for appellate review a claim that admission of the evidence violated th 2006See State v. Rankovich, 159 Ariz. 116 , 122 n. 3, 765 P.2d 518 , 524 n. 3 (1988) (failure to raise or argue claim in opening brief “constitutes abandonment and waiver of that issue”); cf. State v. King, 212 Ariz. 372, ¶ 14 , 132 P.3d 311, 314 (App.2006) (defendant’s objection below that “he would not be able to cross-examine” unavailable witness whose hearsay statements to 911 operator were admitted at trial “were sufficient to avoid waiver of his Confrontation Clause argument”). ¶ 7 A “hearsay” objection does not preserve for appellate review a claim that admission of the evidence violated th | 2 | 2 |
State v. Kinggreen2 sentences2006See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 321 n.6, 107 S. Ct. 708 , 712 n.6 (1987); State v. King, 212 Ariz. 372, n.2 , 132 P.3d 311 , 313 n.2 (App. 2006). 4 ground that it was ‘hearsay’ and did not qualify as an ‘excited utterance.’” Neither at trial nor in his appellate briefs filed in this court did Alvarez raise any Sixth Amendment objection to admission of that evidence. 2006See Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314 , 321 n.6, 107 S. Ct. 708 , 712 n.6 (1987); State v. King, 212 Ariz. 372, n.2 , 132 P.3d 311 , 313 n.2 (App. 2006). 4 ground that it was ‘hearsay’ and did not qualify as an ‘excited utterance.’” Neither at trial nor in his appellate briefs filed in this court did Alvarez raise any Sixth Amendment objection to admission of that evidence. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Sansinggreen2 sentences2005See, e.g., State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 30 ¶ 50, 97 P.3d 844, 855 (2004); State v. Montaño, 206 Ariz. 296 , 297 ¶ 3, 77 P.3d 1246, 1247 (2003); State v. Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232 , 235 ¶ 5, 77 P.3d 30, 33 (2003). ¶ 13 Ring III however, considered only the Sixth Amendment violation caused by submitting factual questions legally essential to expose a defendant to a maximum sentence to the wrong factfinder. 2005See, e.g., State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 30 ¶ 50, 97 P.3d 844, 855 (2004); State v. Montaño, 206 Ariz. 296 , 297 ¶ 3, 77 P.3d 1246, 1247 (2003); State v. Sansing, 206 Ariz. 232 , 235 ¶ 5, 77 P.3d 30, 33 (2003). ¶ 13 Ring III however, considered only the Sixth Amendment violation caused by submitting factual questions legally essential to expose a defendant to a maximum sentence to the wrong factfinder. | 2 | 2 |
State v. Miranda-Cabreragreen2 sentences2005State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 34 , 99 P.3d 35, 42-43 (App.2004) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when trial court weighs non-Bfatóy-compliant aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and resulting sentence is below the presumptive); State v. Munninger, 209 Ariz. 473, ¶ 20 , 104 P.3d 204, 211 (App.2005) (commenting that “the use of a judge-found aggravating factor to increase the minimum sentence ... is not a Blakely problem because the right to jury trial applies only if the factor increases the sentence beyond that which can be imposed based solely on the j 2005State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 34 , 99 P.3d 35, 42-43 (App.2004) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when trial court weighs non-Bfatóy-compliant aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and resulting sentence is below the presumptive); State v. Munninger, 209 Ariz. 473, ¶ 20 , 104 P.3d 204, 211 (App.2005) (commenting that “the use of a judge-found aggravating factor to increase the minimum sentence ... is not a Blakely problem because the right to jury trial applies only if the factor increases the sentence beyond that which can be imposed based solely on the j | 2 | 2 |
Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen2 sentences2023Id. at 518 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ). ¶17 An important distinction exists between the Sixth Amendment analysis in Mathis and our Fifth Amendment analysis in State v. Carter, 249 Ariz. 312 (2020). 2023Id. at 518 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 ). ¶17 An important distinction exists between the Sixth Amendment analysis in Mathis and our Fifth Amendment analysis in State v. Carter, 249 Ariz. 312 (2020). | 1 | 4 |
Weatherford v. Burseygreen2 sentences2008Whether a Sixth Amendment violation exists depends on whether the intrusions were purposeful and whether the prosecution, either directly or indirectly, obtained evidence or learned of defense strategy from the intrusions." State v. Pecard, 196 Ariz. 371 , 377 ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 453, 459 (App.1999) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). ¶ 52 In Warner , this Court addressed an argument similar to that made by Boggs. 2008Whether a Sixth Amendment violation exists depends on whether the intrusions were purposeful and whether the prosecution, either directly or indirectly, obtained evidence or learned of defense strategy from the intrusions." State v. Pecard, 196 Ariz. 371 , 377 ¶ 28, 998 P.2d 453, 459 (App.1999) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 558 , 97 S.Ct. 837 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)). ¶ 52 In Warner , this Court addressed an argument similar to that made by Boggs. | 1 | 3 |
Ring v. Arizonagreen2 sentences2003Thus, where the enhancement factor was determined solely and uniquely by the trial judge, the Court held a Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. ¶ 42 The principle was extended to capital cases in Ring II in which the Supreme Court stated “[bjecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Ring II, 536 U.S. at 609 , 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (citation omitted). ¶ 43 Ring II thus instructs that under the Sixth Amendment a jury must determine an aggravator which expose 2003Thus, where the enhancement factor was determined solely and uniquely by the trial judge, the Court held a Sixth Amendment violation had occurred. ¶ 42 The principle was extended to capital cases in Ring II in which the Supreme Court stated “[bjecause Arizona’s enumerated aggravating factors operate as ‘the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense,’ the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by a jury.” Ring II, 536 U.S. at 609 , 122 S.Ct. at 2443 (citation omitted). ¶ 43 Ring II thus instructs that under the Sixth Amendment a jury must determine an aggravator which expose | 1 | 3 |
United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalgreen2 sentences2001In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant "must at least make some plausible showing of how [a proffered witness's] testimony would have been both *127 material and favorable to his defense." Id. at 867 , 102 S.Ct. at 3442 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 1202 . [5] And, courts have upheld that requirement in cases such as this, in which no illegal alien witnesses or countervailing governmental issues such as deportation are involved. 2001In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant "must at least make some plausible showing of how [a proffered witness's] testimony would have been both *127 material and favorable to his defense." Id. at 867 , 102 S.Ct. at 3442 , 73 L.Ed.2d at 1202 . [5] And, courts have upheld that requirement in cases such as this, in which no illegal alien witnesses or countervailing governmental issues such as deportation are involved. | 1 | 3 |
State of Arizona v. Dale Shawn Hausnergreen2 sentences2024CHRISTOPHER MICHAEL MONTOYA Opinion of the Court rejected the argument that “the Sixth Amendment requires the defense to present mitigation despite the defendant’s waiver.” State v. Hausner, 230 Ariz. 60 , 85 ¶ 119 (2012); see also Roscoe, 184 Ariz. at 499 (holding a defendant’s decision to not present mitigating evidence is a “personal decision . . . within his discretion” and does not result “in ineffective assistance or an invalid waiver of counsel”); State v. Kayer, 194 Ariz. 423 , 437 ¶ 46 (1999) (holding a defendant is allowed “not to cooperate with a mitigation specialist and thereby po 2016Id. at 305-08, 110 S.Ct. 1078 ; see State v. Murdaugh, 209 Ariz. 19 , 33 ¶ 70, 97 P.3d 844, 858 (2004) (citing Blystone to support the conclusion that “[a] defendant may waive the presentation of mitigation if he is legally competent to do so”); see also Hausner, 230 Ariz. at 85 ¶ 118, 280 P.3d at 629 (same, rejecting argument that “Murdaugh misinterpreted in Blystone”). ¶ 246 Nor does the Sixth Amendment require the defense to present mitigation despite the defendant’s waiver. | 1 | 2 |
Irving Sheppard v. Robert Reesgreen2 sentences2003A Sixth Amendment violation arising from an amendment to the nature of the charge during trial is included in this category because "[a] trial cannot be fair unless the nature of the charges against a defendant are adequately made known to him or her in a timely fashion." Sheppard, 909 F.2d at 1237 . *441 ¶ 22 There is a practical underpinning to the reversible per se rule. 2003A Sixth Amendment violation arising from an amendment to the nature of the charge during trial is included in this category because "[a] trial cannot be fair unless the nature of the charges against a defendant are adequately made known to him or her in a timely fashion." Sheppard, 909 F.2d at 1237 . *441 ¶ 22 There is a practical underpinning to the reversible per se rule. | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Morrisongreen2 sentences2006See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 , 101 S.Ct. 665 , 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) ("The United States initially urges that absent some showing of prejudice, there could be no Sixth Amendment violation to be remedied. 2006See United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 , 101 S.Ct. 665 , 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981) ("The United States initially urges that absent some showing of prejudice, there could be no Sixth Amendment violation to be remedied. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Munningergreen2 sentences2005State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 34 , 99 P.3d 35, 42-43 (App.2004) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when trial court weighs non-Bfatóy-compliant aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and resulting sentence is below the presumptive); State v. Munninger, 209 Ariz. 473, ¶ 20 , 104 P.3d 204, 211 (App.2005) (commenting that “the use of a judge-found aggravating factor to increase the minimum sentence ... is not a Blakely problem because the right to jury trial applies only if the factor increases the sentence beyond that which can be imposed based solely on the j 2005State v. Miranda-Cabrera, 209 Ariz. 220, ¶ 34 , 99 P.3d 35, 42-43 (App.2004) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when trial court weighs non-Bfatóy-compliant aggravating circumstances against mitigating circumstances and resulting sentence is below the presumptive); State v. Munninger, 209 Ariz. 473, ¶ 20 , 104 P.3d 204, 211 (App.2005) (commenting that “the use of a judge-found aggravating factor to increase the minimum sentence ... is not a Blakely problem because the right to jury trial applies only if the factor increases the sentence beyond that which can be imposed based solely on the j | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Kayergreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Roscoegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sullivan v. Louisianagreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gary Allen Lott, United States of America v. Johnny Marton Lott, AKA Johnny Martin Lottgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ronald Arthur Ofshegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Riggsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Huttongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Snellinggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sotogreen | 1 | 1 |
| State of Arizona v. Steven John Parkergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Schriro v. Landrigangreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hill v. Lockhartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hamiltongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Reedgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Johnsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Odomgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Dennis L. STEPHENS, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Robert G. BORG, Warden, Respondent-Appelleegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Witherspoon v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2013Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (finding Sixth Amendment violation). 2013Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 , 88 S.Ct. 1770 , 20 L.Ed.2d 776 (1968) (finding Sixth Amendment violation). | 3 | 2009–2013 |
State v. Gomez
green
2 sentences2014Id. at 170 ¶¶ 23-24, 244 P.3d at 1168 ; see also State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182 , 187 ¶ 20, 236 P.3d 409, 414 (2010) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a testifying medical examiner offered opinions about cause of death based on review of photographs of the victim and autopsy report prepared by another pathologist). ¶66 Unlike the situation in Gomez , it is unclear whether Walton testified about his own opinions or simply relayed those of a fellow analyst, Emily Jeskie. 2014Id. at 170 ¶¶ 23-24, 244 P.3d at 1168 ; see also State v. Snelling, 225 Ariz. 182 , 187 ¶ 20, 236 P.3d 409, 414 (2010) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a testifying medical examiner offered opinions about cause of death based on review of photographs of the victim and autopsy report prepared by another pathologist). ¶66 Unlike the situation in Gomez , it is unclear whether Walton testified about his own opinions or simply relayed those of a fellow analyst, Emily Jeskie. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
Donald W. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security
green
2 sentences2007In support of his argument, John relies heavily on Donald W., Sr. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 215 Ariz. 199 , 159 P.3d 65 (App.2007), but the supreme court has since vacated relevant portions of the decision and redesignated the remaining portions as a memorandum decision. 215 Ariz. 199 , 159 P.3d 65 (October 19, 2007). 2007In support of his argument, John relies heavily on Donald W., Sr. v. Arizona Department of Economic Security, 215 Ariz. 199 , 159 P.3d 65 (App.2007), but the supreme court has since vacated relevant portions of the decision and redesignated the remaining portions as a memorandum decision. 215 Ariz. 199 , 159 P.3d 65 (October 19, 2007). | 2 | 2007–2007 |
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2006Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. at 1364 . ¶28 We are not persuaded by Bohsancurt’s arguments that the seminal issue under Crawford is whether the declarant can reasonably anticipate that his or her statement will likely be used at trial. 2006Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52 , 124 S.Ct. at 1364 . ¶28 We are not persuaded by Bohsancurt’s arguments that the seminal issue under Crawford is whether the declarant can reasonably anticipate that his or her statement will likely be used at trial. | 2 | 2006–2006 |
United States v. Martinez-Salazar
green
2 sentences2003Instead, the Court concluded that “Martinez-Salazar had the option of letting [the venireperson] sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction, pursuing a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal.” Id. at 315 , 120 S.Ct. 774 . 2003Instead, the Court concluded that “Martinez-Salazar had the option of letting [the venireperson] sit on the petit jury and, upon conviction, pursuing a Sixth Amendment challenge on appeal.” Id. at 315 , 120 S.Ct. 774 . | 2 | 2001–2003 |
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences1995Finally, it reiterated the importance of presumptive prejudice in speedy trial claims by stating that “[wjhile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other ... criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id. (citations omitted). 1995Finally, it reiterated the importance of presumptive prejudice in speedy trial claims by stating that “[wjhile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other ... criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id. (citations omitted). | 2 | 1993–1995 |
State v. Cromwell
green
2 sentences2026To show a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must allege more than personality conflicts or strategy disagreements with counsel; he must allege facts showing an “irreconcilable conflict exists,” risking “an unfair trial.” Id. at 187 ¶ 30. 2026To show a Sixth Amendment violation, a defendant must allege more than personality conflicts or strategy disagreements with counsel; he must allege facts showing an “irreconcilable conflict exists,” risking “an unfair trial.” Id. at 187 ¶ 30. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
| State of Arizona v. Bobby Ray Carter Jr green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Mathis v. United States green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Fushek v. State green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Alleyne v. United States green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Michigan v. Lucas green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| Davis v. Alaska green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State Ex Rel. Romley v. Superior Court green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Rosengren green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Barker v. Wingo green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Wainwright v. Witt green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Adams v. Texas green | 1 | 2013–2013 |
| Boykin v. Alabama green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Sanders green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Commonwealth v. Manning green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Weaver v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Charles Silagy, Cross-Appellant v. Howard Peters, Iii, Warden, Pontiac Correctional Center, Cross-Appellee green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Ronald Wayne Brewer v. Crispus Nix green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Sellers v. State green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Blunt green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| State v. Rogers green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Kimmelman v. Morrison green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State Ex Rel. Mendez v. AMERICAN SUPPORT green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Jones v. United States green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Blakely v. Washington green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.