Sixth Amendment claim in Vermont

2024“While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim 30 without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id. at 655-56 (citation omitted).

2024“While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim 30 without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id. at 655-56 (citation omitted).

2011See Nix, 467 U.S. at 442 (“The [United States Supreme] Court has applied the [fruit of the poisonous tree] doctrine where the violations were of the Sixth Amendment as well as of the Fifth Amendment.” (citation omitted)).

2011The Court specifically rejected that the Sixth Amendment right extends to uncharged, related offenses, except in the very narrow instance that the charged and uncharged crimes “would be considered the same offense.” Id. at 173 ; see also Henderson v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 654, 662-64 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that, where defendant was charged with kidnapping child, interrogation without counsel about whether child was murdered did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights); United States v. Johnson, 352 F.3d 339, 344 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where defendant char

2011The Court specifically rejected that the Sixth Amendment right extends to uncharged, related offenses, except in the very narrow instance that the charged and uncharged crimes “would be considered the same offense.” Id. at 173 ; see also Henderson v. Quarterman, 460 F.3d 654, 662-64 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that, where defendant was charged with kidnapping child, interrogation without counsel about whether child was murdered did not violate defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights); United States v. Johnson, 352 F.3d 339, 344 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where defendant char

2008See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 28 (1973) (holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker); State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 420 , 612 A.2d 1119, 1126 (1992) (rejecting claim of per se speedy-trial violation where trial court inaction for eleven months contributed to twenty-eight

2008See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 28 (1973) (holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker); State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 420 , 612 A.2d 1119, 1126 (1992) (rejecting claim of per se speedy-trial violation where trial court inaction for eleven months contributed to twenty-eight

2008See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 28 (1973) (holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker); State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 420 , 612 A.2d 1119, 1126 (1992) (rejecting claim of per se speedy-trial violation where trial court inaction for eleven months contributed to twenty-eight

2008See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 28 (1973) (holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker); State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 420 , 612 A.2d 1119, 1126 (1992) (rejecting claim of per se speedy-trial violation where trial court inaction for eleven months contributed to twenty-eight

2008See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 28 (1973) (holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker); State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 420 , 612 A.2d 1119, 1126 (1992) (rejecting claim of per se speedy-trial violation where trial court inaction for eleven months contributed to twenty-eight

2008See Barker, 407 U.S. at 534 (holding that five-year delay attributable to prosecution, including ten months of incarceration, was extraordinary, but did not justify writ of habeas corpus for lack of speedy trial when defendant acquiesced to three years of delay without prejudice); see also Moore v. Arizona, 414 U.S. 25, 28 (1973) (holding that a three year delay warranted remand for an assessment, under Barker); State v. Percy, 158 Vt. 410, 420 , 612 A.2d 1119, 1126 (1992) (rejecting claim of per se speedy-trial violation where trial court inaction for eleven months contributed to twenty-eight

2004P. 32, Advisory Committee Notes, 1994 Amendments (“Although the courts have not held that presentence interviews are a critical stage of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the [1994 Amendment] reflects case law which has indicated that requests for counsel to be present should be honored.”), and by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation, court relied on its supervisory power in holding that probation officers must honor request for counsel’s presence); United Stat

2004“The presentence interview plays a crucial role in determining the probation officer’s recommended sentence____[A] single finding by the probation officer can significantly affect the ultimate sentencing range.” Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d at 1434 .

2004P. 32, Advisory Committee Notes, 1994 Amendments (“Although the courts have not held that presentence interviews are a critical stage of the trial for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the [1994 Amendment] reflects case law which has indicated that requests for counsel to be present should be honored.”), and by the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, United States v. Herrera-Figueroa, 918 F.2d 1430, 1433-37 (9th Cir. 1991) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation, court relied on its supervisory power in holding that probation officers must honor request for counsel’s presence); United Stat

2004It argues that in this respect the case is indistinguishable from State v. Cyr, 169 Vt. 50, 56 , 726 A.2d 488, 492-93 (1999) (considering-possible Sixth Amendment issue with denial of counsel at presentence interview, but holding that no Sixth Amendment issue arises from facts).

2004It argues that in this respect the case is indistinguishable from State v. Cyr, 169 Vt. 50, 56 , 726 A.2d 488, 492-93 (1999) (considering-possible Sixth Amendment issue with denial of counsel at presentence interview, but holding that no Sixth Amendment issue arises from facts).

1995See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. at 1718 (to establish Sixth Amendment violation, defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that actual conflict of interest adversely affected attorney's performance).

1995See Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 348 (to establish Sixth Amendment violation, defendant who raised no objection at trial must demonstrate that actual conflict of interest adversely affected attorney’s performance).

1979For this same reason, the appellant’s reliance on Massiah v. United States, supra, for his Sixth Amendment claim is misplaced. “[T]he clear rule of Massidh is that once adversary proceedings have commenced against an individual, he has a right to legal representation when the government interrogates him.” Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 401 (1977) (emphasis added).