Sixth Amendment violation in District of Columbia

2001Under Cuyler and Strickland , the question of whether Malede is entitled to relief for a Sixth Amendment violation turns on whether his counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and whether “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

2001Under Cuyler and Strickland , the question of whether Malede is entitled to relief for a Sixth Amendment violation turns on whether his counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and whether “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

1993Cf. Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 (length of delay is "to some extent a triggering mechanism” for inquiry into the other factors); Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, - & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 2690-91 & n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1091 & n. 7 (citing cases finding no Sixth Amendment violation even where greater than twenty-five months of delay); Bolden, supra, 381 A.2d at 627 (twelve month delay triggers analysis); Bowman v. United States, 385 A.2d 28 , 30 n. 3 (D.C.1978). 13 .

1993Cf. Barker, supra, 407 U.S. at 530 , 92 S.Ct. at 2192 (length of delay is "to some extent a triggering mechanism” for inquiry into the other factors); Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, - & n. 1, 112 S.Ct. 2686 , 2690-91 & n. 1, 120 L.Ed.2d 520 (1992); Graves, supra, 490 A.2d at 1091 & n. 7 (citing cases finding no Sixth Amendment violation even where greater than twenty-five months of delay); Bolden, supra, 381 A.2d at 627 (twelve month delay triggers analysis); Bowman v. United States, 385 A.2d 28 , 30 n. 3 (D.C.1978). 13 .

1982Day v. United States, D.C.App., 390 A.2d 957 , 971 n.7 (1978); see United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 , 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 , 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). (“The essence of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged.

1982Day v. United States, D.C.App., 390 A.2d 957 , 971 n.7 (1978); see United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860 , 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552 , 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978). (“The essence of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment claim in the usual case is that the passage of time has frustrated his ability to establish his innocence of the crime charged.

2023In Bado, the en banc court considered whether deportation is a penalty for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis and held that “the penalty of deportation, when viewed together with the 180-day maximum period of incarceration for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, overc[ame] the 13 presumption that [the] appellant was charged with a petty offense and trigger[ed] the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.” 186 A.3d at 1262 . 1 The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty,”’ equating it to ‘banishment.’” Id. at 1251 (qu

2023In Bado, the en banc court considered whether deportation is a penalty for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis and held that “the penalty of deportation, when viewed together with the 180-day maximum period of incarceration for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, overc[ame] the 13 presumption that [the] appellant was charged with a petty offense and trigger[ed] the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.” 186 A.3d at 1262 . 1 The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty,”’ equating it to ‘banishment.’” Id. at 1251 (qu

2018See Brown v. United States , 675 A.2d 953 , 954 (D.C. 1996).

2018See Brown v. United States , 675 A.2d 953 , 954 (D.C. 1996).

2018“Instead, other measures must be employed to assure that appellant’s right to a fair trial is preserved.” Id. at 834-35 . “[I]n the absence of' extreme circumstances, ‘the Sixth Amendment inquiry [usually] turns on the- adequacy of the voir dire.” Id. at 835 (citations omitted).

2018“Instead, other measures must be employed to assure that appellant’s right to a fair trial is preserved.” Id. at 834-35 . “[I]n the absence of' extreme circumstances, ‘the Sixth Amendment inquiry [usually] turns on the- adequacy of the voir dire.” Id. at 835 (citations omitted).

2016Compare Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 843-44 (D.C.2006) (en banc) (applying Chapman where court failed to instruct on an element), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10, 12 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (characterizing misde-scription of an element as a Sixth Amendment violation), with Jenkins v. United States, 877 A.2d 1062, 1068-70 (D.C.2005) (applying Kotteakos where court’s erroneous definition of a term “impermissibly broadened” the meaning of an element). .In deciding to give the instruction, the court relied on the recording of the call Mr. Brown made from j

2016Compare Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818, 843-44 (D.C.2006) (en banc) (applying Chapman where court failed to instruct on an element), and Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 10, 12 , 119 S.Ct. 1827 , 144 L.Ed.2d 35 (1999) (characterizing misde-scription of an element as a Sixth Amendment violation), with Jenkins v. United States, 877 A.2d 1062, 1068-70 (D.C.2005) (applying Kotteakos where court’s erroneous definition of a term “impermissibly broadened” the meaning of an element). .In deciding to give the instruction, the court relied on the recording of the call Mr. Brown made from j

2009“The Constitution as construed in Bruton ... is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for ‘full and effective’ cross-examination.” Ellsworth v. United States, 300 A.2d 456, 458 (D.C.1973) (quoting Nelson v. O’Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627 , 91 S.Ct. 1723 , 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971)).

2009"The Constitution as construed in Bruton ... is violated only where the out-of-court hearsay statement is that of a declarant who is unavailable at the trial for `full and effective' cross-examination." Ellsworth v. United States, 300 A.2d 456, 458 (D.C.1973) (quoting Nelson v. O'Neil, 402 U.S. 622, 627 , 91 S.Ct. 1723 , 29 L.Ed.2d 222 (1971)).

1995See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). [24] "While Notes of the Advisory Committed on Rules which accompany proposed rules are not authoritative, they are somewhat analogous to a Congressional Committee Report in determining the intention of the framers of the rules." In re D.M.R., 373 A.2d 235, 237 (D.C.1977). [25] The arrest warrant was valid despite the error in D.H.'s date of birth under the " Leon good faith exception." See Dailey v. United States, 611 A.2d 963, 967 (D.C.1992); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677

1995See McNeil v. Wisconsin, 501 U.S. 171 , 111 S.Ct. 2204 , 115 L.Ed.2d 158 (1991). [24] "While Notes of the Advisory Committed on Rules which accompany proposed rules are not authoritative, they are somewhat analogous to a Congressional Committee Report in determining the intention of the framers of the rules." In re D.M.R., 373 A.2d 235, 237 (D.C.1977). [25] The arrest warrant was valid despite the error in D.H.'s date of birth under the " Leon good faith exception." See Dailey v. United States, 611 A.2d 963, 967 (D.C.1992); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 , 104 S.Ct. 3405 , 82 L.Ed.2d 677

1987In Hawkins , for example, we said that the sixth amendment requirement for a unanimous verdict [2] requires that "[w]here one charge encompasses two separate incidents, the judge must instruct the jury that if a guilty verdict is returned the jurors must be unanimous as to which incident or incidents they find the defendant guilty." 434 A.2d at 449 (citation omitted).

1987In Hawkins , for example, we said that the sixth amendment requirement for a unanimous verdict 2 requires that “[wjhere one charge encompasses two separate incidents, the judge must instruct the jury that if a guilty verdict is returned the jurors must be unanimous as to which incident or incidents they find the defendant guilty.” 434 A.2d at 449 (citation omitted).

1984See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 , 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634 , 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion) (“Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored.”); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 , 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (in face of clear evidence that panel members were biased, trial court committed constitutional error in refusing to strike them for cause); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 333-35 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 , 100 S.Ct. 1059 , 62 L.Ed.2d 781 (

1984See also Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 , 101 S.Ct. 1629, 1634 , 68 L.Ed.2d 22 (1981) (plurality opinion) (" Voir dire plays a critical function in assuring the criminal defendant that his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury will be honored."); Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 , 81 S.Ct. 1639 , 6 L.Ed.2d 751 (1961) (in face of clear evidence that panel members were biased, trial court committed constitutional error in refusing to strike them for cause); Khaalis v. United States, 408 A.2d 313, 333-35 (D.C.1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1092 , 100 S.Ct. 1059 , 62 L.Ed.2d 781

2013The government argues that Mr. Euceda did not sufficiently develop his Sixth Amendment claim, but if he did the error was harmless because the court’s response to the note was “substantively correct.” In the government’s view, we should evaluate the alleged error under the standard for nonconstitutional error, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1289 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), while Mr. Euceda argues for the more exacting harmlessness standard for constitutional trial error, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 16 We begin by

2013The government argues that Mr. Euceda did not sufficiently develop his Sixth Amendment claim, but if he did the error was harmless because the court’s response to the note was “substantively correct.” In the government’s view, we should evaluate the alleged error under the standard for nonconstitutional error, see Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 750 , 66 S.Ct. 1289 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946), while Mr. Euceda argues for the more exacting harmlessness standard for constitutional trial error, see Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967). 16 We begin by

2006We found no Sixth Amendment violation because the chemist’s reports, which we said were properly admitted pursuant to both D.C.Code § 33-556 and the “business record” exception to the rule against hearsay, 9 were “sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the purpose of the Confrontation *10 Clause.” Howard, 473 A.2d at 839. 10 Although the chemist in Howard actually was available to testify in person, we excused his absence, citing a statement in Roberts that the usual prerequisite of the declarant’s unavailability may be relaxed where “the utility of trial confrontation” is perceived to be “remote

2006We found no Sixth Amendment violation because the chemist’s reports, which we said were properly admitted pursuant to both D.C.Code § 33-556 and the “business record” exception to the rule against hearsay, 9 were “sufficiently trustworthy to satisfy the purpose of the Confrontation *10 Clause.” Howard, 473 A.2d at 839. 10 Although the chemist in Howard actually was available to testify in person, we excused his absence, citing a statement in Roberts that the usual prerequisite of the declarant’s unavailability may be relaxed where “the utility of trial confrontation” is perceived to be “remote

2001Under Cuyler and Strickland , the question of whether Malede is entitled to relief for a Sixth Amendment violation turns on whether his counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and whether “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

2001Under Cuyler and Strickland , the question of whether Malede is entitled to relief for a Sixth Amendment violation turns on whether his counsel “actively represented conflicting interests” and whether “an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ; Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 .

2019E.g. , Blanton , 489 U.S. at 545 n.12, 109 S.Ct. 1289 (in determining whether defendants who were first-time offenders had Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, court did not consider higher penalties applicable to repeat offenders); Bado , 186 A.3d at 1256 ("[W]hat is relevant to the Sixth Amendment analysis are the potential penalties to which the particular defendant is exposed upon conviction.").

2019E.g. , Blanton , 489 U.S. at 545 n.12, 109 S.Ct. 1289 (in determining whether defendants who were first-time offenders had Sixth Amendment right to jury trial, court did not consider higher penalties applicable to repeat offenders); Bado , 186 A.3d at 1256 ("[W]hat is relevant to the Sixth Amendment analysis are the potential penalties to which the particular defendant is exposed upon conviction.").

2011In Sullivan, the Court observed that "the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt," inherent in due process, and "the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated." Id. at 278 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 .

2011In Sullivan, the Court observed that "the Fifth Amendment requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt," inherent in due process, and "the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated." Id. at 278 , 113 S.Ct. 2078 .

2023In Bado, the en banc court considered whether deportation is a penalty for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis and held that “the penalty of deportation, when viewed together with the 180-day maximum period of incarceration for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, overc[ame] the 13 presumption that [the] appellant was charged with a petty offense and trigger[ed] the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.” 186 A.3d at 1262 . 1 The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty,”’ equating it to ‘banishment.’” Id. at 1251 (qu

2023In Bado, the en banc court considered whether deportation is a penalty for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis and held that “the penalty of deportation, when viewed together with the 180-day maximum period of incarceration for misdemeanor sexual abuse of a minor, overc[ame] the 13 presumption that [the] appellant was charged with a petty offense and trigger[ed] the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury.” 186 A.3d at 1262 . 1 The court noted that “[t]he Supreme Court has ‘long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe “penalty,”’ equating it to ‘banishment.’” Id. at 1251 (qu

2022See, e.g., Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 318 (1974) (Sixth Amendment violation where counsel was permitted to ask witness whether he was biased, but not to demonstrate why he might be); Jenkins v. United States, 617 A.2d 529, 532 (D.C. 1992) (Sixth Amendment violation where “the exact nature of the crime” was not disclosed, meaning the jury “was without knowledge if the crime committed carried a significant sentence which might induce [the witness] to shade his trial testimony to curry the government’s favor in the future”).

1978United States v. Agurs, supra. We believe that this conclusion is mandated by the Brady principle and supported by the Supreme Court’s analogous, Sixth Amendment analysis in Davis v. Alaska, supra, where the Court concluded when bias was an issue: “The State’s policy interest in protecting the confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record cannot require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse witness.” Id. 415 U.S. at 320 , 94 S.Ct. at 1112 .

2010As appellant notes, "erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as structural error,” making it "unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation,” because such an error "bears directly on the framework within which the trial proceeds.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 150 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2010As appellant notes, "erroneous deprivation of the right to counsel of choice, with consequences that are necessarily unquantifiable and indeterminate, unquestionably qualifies as structural error,” making it "unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation,” because such an error "bears directly on the framework within which the trial proceeds.” United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148, 150 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

2009Neither in the trial court nor in this court has the government suggested that appellant waived his right to object to the admission of the chemist's reports by failing to request them in pretrial discovery or by failing to pursue his request for them. [14] The government disputes whether appellant preserved his Sixth Amendment claim, an issue that we consider moot. [15] Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). [16] O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-40 , 115 S.Ct. 992 , 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); see also, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725

2009Neither in the trial court nor in this court has the government suggested that appellant waived his right to object to the admission of the chemist's reports by failing to request them in pretrial discovery or by failing to pursue his request for them. [14] The government disputes whether appellant preserved his Sixth Amendment claim, an issue that we consider moot. [15] Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 , 66 S.Ct. 1239 , 90 L.Ed. 1557 (1946). [16] O'Neal v. McAninch, 513 U.S. 432, 436-40 , 115 S.Ct. 992 , 130 L.Ed.2d 947 (1995); see also, e.g., United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725

1996Under Cuyler, supra, and its progeny, “[ejven in cases where a defendant does not object at trial to an attorney’s representation, a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal will be established if a convicted defendant demonstrates on appeal that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected, his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136 (quoting Cuyler, supra, 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. at 1718 ) (footnote omitted); see also Jackson v. United States, 623 A.2d 571, 585 (D.C.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 , 114 S.Ct. 649 , 126 L.Ed.2d 607 (1993) (quoting Douglas and Cu

1996Under Cuyler, supra, and its progeny, “[ejven in cases where a defendant does not object at trial to an attorney’s representation, a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal will be established if a convicted defendant demonstrates on appeal that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected, his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Douglas, supra, 488 A.2d at 136 (quoting Cuyler, supra, 446 U.S. at 348 , 100 S.Ct. at 1718 ) (footnote omitted); see also Jackson v. United States, 623 A.2d 571, 585 (D.C.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1030 , 114 S.Ct. 649 , 126 L.Ed.2d 607 (1993) (quoting Douglas and Cu