22 Maine opinions name it 1 courts 1973–2023 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
State v. Schofieldgreen2 sentences2020See State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶¶ 28-36 , 895 A.2d 927 ; Clewley v. Whitney, 2 Westgate seems to characterize this error as a Sixth Amendment violation. 2020See State v. Schofield, 2005 ME 82, ¶¶ 28-36 , 895 A.2d 927 ; Clewley v. Whitney, 2 Westgate seems to characterize this error as a Sixth Amendment violation. | 2 | 2 |
Williams v. Stategreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., id. at 153; Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind.1997) (establishing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred requires “some showing that the court, by order or otherwise, physically prevented the public from attending”); State v. Cross, 771 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.2009) (“A voluntary decision by a member of the public to avoid courtroom security procedures designed merely to record the identities of persons attending a hearing does not constitute a ‘closure’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.”). [¶ 31] Here, the policy of prohibiting spectator 2014See, e.g., id. at 153; Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind.1997) (establishing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred requires “some showing that the court, by order or otherwise, physically prevented the public from attending”); State v. Cross, 771 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.2009) (“A voluntary decision by a member of the public to avoid courtroom security procedures designed merely to record the identities of persons attending a hearing does not constitute a ‘closure’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.”). [¶ 31] Here, the policy of prohibiting spectator | 2 | 2 |
Bucci v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2014Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir.2011). 2014Bucci v. United States, 662 F.3d 18, 29 (1st Cir.2011). | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Maldonadogreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., id. at 153; Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind.1997) (establishing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred requires “some showing that the court, by order or otherwise, physically prevented the public from attending”); State v. Cross, 771 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.2009) (“A voluntary decision by a member of the public to avoid courtroom security procedures designed merely to record the identities of persons attending a hearing does not constitute a ‘closure’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.”). [¶ 31] Here, the policy of prohibiting spectator 2014See, e.g., id. at 153; Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind.1997) (establishing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred requires “some showing that the court, by order or otherwise, physically prevented the public from attending”); State v. Cross, 771 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.2009) (“A voluntary decision by a member of the public to avoid courtroom security procedures designed merely to record the identities of persons attending a hearing does not constitute a ‘closure’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.”). [¶ 31] Here, the policy of prohibiting spectator | 2 | 2 |
State v. Crossgreen2 sentences2014See, e.g., id. at 153; Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind.1997) (establishing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred requires “some showing that the court, by order or otherwise, physically prevented the public from attending”); State v. Cross, 771 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.2009) (“A voluntary decision by a member of the public to avoid courtroom security procedures designed merely to record the identities of persons attending a hearing does not constitute a ‘closure’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.”). [¶ 31] Here, the policy of prohibiting spectator 2014See, e.g., id. at 153; Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168-69 (Ind.1997) (establishing that a Sixth Amendment violation occurred requires “some showing that the court, by order or otherwise, physically prevented the public from attending”); State v. Cross, 771 N.W.2d 879, 882 (Minn.App.2009) (“A voluntary decision by a member of the public to avoid courtroom security procedures designed merely to record the identities of persons attending a hearing does not constitute a ‘closure’ for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to a public trial.”). [¶ 31] Here, the policy of prohibiting spectator | 2 | 2 |
State v. Jewettgreen2 sentences2023Hence, unless we specifically In his petitions, Winchester did not identify whether he was making a claim under the Maine or 4 United States Constitutions; nor did his counsel delineate between the two before the PCR court; nor did the PCR court delineate when ruling on the petitions. 10 indicate otherwise, we discuss federal precedent only to the extent that we find it persuasive. [¶13] Although Winchester’s failure to develop his speedy trial claim under the Maine Constitution at the trial level potentially foreclosed his ability to raise the claim on appeal, see State v. White, 2022 ME 54 , 2023Hence, unless we specifically In his petitions, Winchester did not identify whether he was making a claim under the Maine or 4 United States Constitutions; nor did his counsel delineate between the two before the PCR court; nor did the PCR court delineate when ruling on the petitions. 10 indicate otherwise, we discuss federal precedent only to the extent that we find it persuasive. [¶13] Although Winchester’s failure to develop his speedy trial claim under the Maine Constitution at the trial level potentially foreclosed his ability to raise the claim on appeal, see State v. White, 2022 ME 54 , | 1 | 1 |
State v. Caouettegreen2 sentences2023We review whether Winchester had meritorious speedy trial claims under the Maine Constitution. [¶12] In his appeal of the PCR court’s denial of his petitions, Winchester’s claim rests solely on the Maine Constitution.4 See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120 , 1121 n.2 (Me. 1982) (“The Sixth Amendment claim was not pursued on appeal and we have no occasion to discuss it.”). 2023We review whether Winchester had meritorious speedy trial claims under the Maine Constitution. [¶12] In his appeal of the PCR court’s denial of his petitions, Winchester’s claim rests solely on the Maine Constitution.4 See State v. Caouette, 446 A.2d 1120 , 1121 n.2 (Me. 1982) (“The Sixth Amendment claim was not pursued on appeal and we have no occasion to discuss it.”). | 1 | 1 |
cluster 748877green1 sentence2016See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 76-78 (1st Cir.2015) (upholding a trial court's exclusion of a defendant’s wife from criminal trial proceedings because a witness had seen her “moving her lips at the witness with great distaste” (quotation marks omitted)); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 154, 167-75 (4th Cir.2000) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a trial court closed the courtroom while the minor victim testified during a criminal trial based on over fifty-eight counts of sexual misconduct committed by the defendant against that minor victim, who was also his st | 1 | 1 |
Ernest Sutton Bell v. Mack Jarvis Robert Smithgreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 76-78 (1st Cir.2015) (upholding a trial court's exclusion of a defendant’s wife from criminal trial proceedings because a witness had seen her “moving her lips at the witness with great distaste” (quotation marks omitted)); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 154, 167-75 (4th Cir.2000) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a trial court closed the courtroom while the minor victim testified during a criminal trial based on over fifty-eight counts of sexual misconduct committed by the defendant against that minor victim, who was also his st | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Laureano-Perezgreen1 sentence2016See, e.g., United States v. Laureano-Pérez, 797 F.3d 45, 76-78 (1st Cir.2015) (upholding a trial court's exclusion of a defendant’s wife from criminal trial proceedings because a witness had seen her “moving her lips at the witness with great distaste” (quotation marks omitted)); Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 154, 167-75 (4th Cir.2000) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when a trial court closed the courtroom while the minor victim testified during a criminal trial based on over fifty-eight counts of sexual misconduct committed by the defendant against that minor victim, who was also his st | 1 | 1 |
Crawford v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2015See Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial. report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. 2015See Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial. report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. | 1 | 1 |
Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen2 sentences2015See Bullcoming, 131 S. Ct. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. 2015See Bullcoming, 131 S.Ct. at 2715 (“[T]he comparative reliability of an analyst’s testimonial. report drawn from machine-produced data does not overcome the Sixth Amendment bar.”); Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62 , 124 S.Ct. 1354 (“Dispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Workgreen1 sentence2011See Work, 409 F.3d at 491 . | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Bookergreen2 sentences2009Hutchinson contends that before a court can impose a basic sentence of life in prison, a jury must specifically find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the Shortsleeves factors are present. [¶ 35] The Sixth Amendment is not violated by statutes that “permit judges genuinely to exercise broad discretion ... within a statutory range.” Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 , 127 S.Ct. 856 , 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) (quotation marks omitted); see also Libby, 2007 ME 80 , ¶ 6 n. 9, 926 A.2d at 726 (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a 2009Hutchinson contends that before a court can impose a basic sentence of life in prison, a jury must specifically find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the Shortsleeves factors are present. [¶ 35] The Sixth Amendment is not violated by statutes that “permit judges genuinely to exercise broad discretion ... within a statutory range.” Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 , 127 S.Ct. 856 , 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) (quotation marks omitted); see also Libby, 2007 ME 80 , ¶ 6 n. 9, 926 A.2d at 726 (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a | 1 | 1 |
Libby v. Stategreen2 sentences2009Noting that the Shortsleeves opinion states that “a life sentence may not be imposed unless there are aggravating circumstances,” id. at 150 , Hutchinson thus argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was given the maximum sentence based on factual findings made by the court, applying the less demanding preponderance of the evidence standard, in accordance with the Short-sleeves criteria. 16 In Libby , in the face of a similar Sixth Amendment challenge, we upheld the imposition of a forty-year sentence for murder because it was well within the prescribed statutory range, 2009Noting that the Shortsleeves opinion states that “a life sentence may not be imposed unless there are aggravating circumstances,” id. at 150 , Hutchinson thus argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was given the maximum sentence based on factual findings made by the court, applying the less demanding preponderance of the evidence standard, in accordance with the Short-sleeves criteria. 16 In Libby , in the face of a similar Sixth Amendment challenge, we upheld the imposition of a forty-year sentence for murder because it was well within the prescribed statutory range, | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Osoriogreen2 sentences2009Osorio, 801 F.Supp. at 978 . 2009Id. at 978-79. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kirkpatrickgreen2 sentences2008State v. Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d 873 , 161 P.3d 990, 997-98 (2007). 2008State v. Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d 873 , 161 P.3d 990, 997-98 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. James Thomas McBridegreen1 sentence2006Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). [3] The federal courts of appeals "uniformly apply a de novo standard of review to a District Court's conclusion of law that a defendant has waived his right to counsel." United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir.2004). | 1 | 1 |
| Blakely v. Washingtongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Apprendi v. New Jerseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Truegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Schad v. Arizona
green
2 sentences2020Although we have never addressed the issue, the United States Supreme Court has described the right to a particular “level of verdict specificity” as a “due process right [rather] than one under the Sixth Amendment.” Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 , 634 n.5 (1991). 2020Although we have never addressed the issue, the United States Supreme Court has described the right to a particular “level of verdict specificity” as a “due process right [rather] than one under the Sixth Amendment.” Schad v. Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 , 634 n.5 (1991). | 2 | 2020–2020 |
Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia
green
2 sentences2014The restriction was no broader than necessary to accomplish these purposes, see Maldonado, 2 N.E.3d at 154 , as evidenced by the fact that only one spectator was affected but was ultimately permitted to enter the courthouse after agreeing to turn his shirt inside out. 4 The screening procedure represented a reasonable exercise of the court’s ability to exert control over the courtroom, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 2814 , especially in light of defense counsel’s knowledge of and agreement to the measures. 2014The restriction was no broader than necessary to accomplish these purposes, see Maldonado, 2 N.E.3d at 154 , as evidenced by the fact that only one spectator was affected but was ultimately permitted to enter the courthouse after agreeing to turn his shirt inside out. 4 The screening procedure represented a reasonable exercise of the court’s ability to exert control over the courtroom, see Richmond Newspapers, Inc., 448 U.S. at 581 n. 18, 100 S.Ct. 2814 , especially in light of defense counsel’s knowledge of and agreement to the measures. | 2 | 2014–2014 |
State of Maine v. Jomo White
green
2 sentences2023Hence, unless we specifically In his petitions, Winchester did not identify whether he was making a claim under the Maine or 4 United States Constitutions; nor did his counsel delineate between the two before the PCR court; nor did the PCR court delineate when ruling on the petitions. 10 indicate otherwise, we discuss federal precedent only to the extent that we find it persuasive. [¶13] Although Winchester’s failure to develop his speedy trial claim under the Maine Constitution at the trial level potentially foreclosed his ability to raise the claim on appeal, see State v. White, 2022 ME 54 , 2023Hence, unless we specifically In his petitions, Winchester did not identify whether he was making a claim under the Maine or 4 United States Constitutions; nor did his counsel delineate between the two before the PCR court; nor did the PCR court delineate when ruling on the petitions. 10 indicate otherwise, we discuss federal precedent only to the extent that we find it persuasive. [¶13] Although Winchester’s failure to develop his speedy trial claim under the Maine Constitution at the trial level potentially foreclosed his ability to raise the claim on appeal, see State v. White, 2022 ME 54 , | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Waller v. Georgia
green
2 sentences2016Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet opined on the standard to be used in evaluating a partial closure of the courtroom, most federal circuit courts have applied a less stringent standard to partial closures than the standard for complete closures announced by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). 2016Although the United States Supreme Court has not yet opined on the standard to be used in evaluating a partial closure of the courtroom, most federal circuit courts have applied a less stringent standard to partial closures than the standard for complete closures announced by the United States Supreme Court in Waller v. Georgia, 467 U.S. 39, 48 , 104 S.Ct. 2210 , 81 L.Ed.2d 31 (1984). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts
green
2 sentences2015This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”) (quoted by Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 317-18 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 ). [¶ 32] Nor am I persuaded by the suggestion that Intoxilyzer results must be characterized as beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause simply because the instrument itself cannot be cross-examined. 2015This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”) (quoted by Melendez-Diaz, 557 U.S. at 317-18 , 129 S.Ct. 2527 ). [¶ 32] Nor am I persuaded by the suggestion that Intoxilyzer results must be characterized as beyond the reach of the Confrontation Clause simply because the instrument itself cannot be cross-examined. | 1 | 2015–2015 |
Cunningham v. California
green
2 sentences2009Hutchinson contends that before a court can impose a basic sentence of life in prison, a jury must specifically find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the Shortsleeves factors are present. [¶ 35] The Sixth Amendment is not violated by statutes that “permit judges genuinely to exercise broad discretion ... within a statutory range.” Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 , 127 S.Ct. 856 , 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) (quotation marks omitted); see also Libby, 2007 ME 80 , ¶ 6 n. 9, 926 A.2d at 726 (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a 2009Hutchinson contends that before a court can impose a basic sentence of life in prison, a jury must specifically find beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the Shortsleeves factors are present. [¶ 35] The Sixth Amendment is not violated by statutes that “permit judges genuinely to exercise broad discretion ... within a statutory range.” Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 294 , 127 S.Ct. 856 , 166 L.Ed.2d 856 (2007) (quotation marks omitted); see also Libby, 2007 ME 80 , ¶ 6 n. 9, 926 A.2d at 726 (“[W]hen a trial judge exercises his discretion to select a specific sentence within a | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Shortsleeves
green
2 sentences2009Noting that the Shortsleeves opinion states that “a life sentence may not be imposed unless there are aggravating circumstances,” id. at 150 , Hutchinson thus argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was given the maximum sentence based on factual findings made by the court, applying the less demanding preponderance of the evidence standard, in accordance with the Short-sleeves criteria. 16 In Libby , in the face of a similar Sixth Amendment challenge, we upheld the imposition of a forty-year sentence for murder because it was well within the prescribed statutory range, 2009Noting that the Shortsleeves opinion states that “a life sentence may not be imposed unless there are aggravating circumstances,” id. at 150 , Hutchinson thus argues that his Sixth Amendment rights were violated because he was given the maximum sentence based on factual findings made by the court, applying the less demanding preponderance of the evidence standard, in accordance with the Short-sleeves criteria. 16 In Libby , in the face of a similar Sixth Amendment challenge, we upheld the imposition of a forty-year sentence for murder because it was well within the prescribed statutory range, | 1 | 2009–2009 |
United States v. Mario Biaggi, Stanley Simon, Richard Biaggi, Peter Neglia, John Mariotta, and Bernard Ehrlich
green
1 sentence2009In Osorio , *236 the court acknowledged that, applying the absolute numbers test, the result was, under Second Circuit precedent, citing United States v. Biaggi, 909 F.2d 662 (2d Cir.1990), insignificant, indicating no Sixth Amendment violation. | 1 | 2009–2009 |
State v. Kirkpatrick
green
2 sentences2008State v. Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d 873 , 161 P.3d 990, 997-98 (2007). 2008State v. Kirkpatrick, 160 Wash.2d 873 , 161 P.3d 990, 997-98 (2007). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Kronich
green
2 sentences2008Id. at 987 . [¶ 17] In a separate opinion issued on the same day, the Washington Supreme Court applied similar reasoning to reject a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission of a certified letter verifying that a defendant did not have a valid license to operate a motor vehicle within the state. 2008Id. at 987 . [¶ 17] In a separate opinion issued on the same day, the Washington Supreme Court applied similar reasoning to reject a Sixth Amendment challenge to the admission of a certified letter verifying that a defendant did not have a valid license to operate a motor vehicle within the state. | 1 | 2008–2008 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2006"Thus, only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.” Id. at 662 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 . 2006"Thus, only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.” Id. at 662 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
Patterson v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2006Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). [3] The federal courts of appeals "uniformly apply a de novo standard of review to a District Court's conclusion of law that a defendant has waived his right to counsel." United States v. McBride, 362 F.3d 360, 365 (6th Cir.2004). 2006Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). . | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Snyder v. Massachusetts green | 1 | 1998–1998 |
| Michigan v. Harvey green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Walder v. United States green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Harris v. New York green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| State v. Clark green | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Parker v. Randolph red | 1 | 1981–1981 |
| State v. Carlson green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Davis v. Alaska green | 1 | 1977–1977 |
| Klopfer v. North Carolina green | 1 | 1974–1974 |
| Gilbert v. California green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
| United States v. Wade green | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.