13 Arkansas opinions name it 2 courts 1988–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arkansas courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen2 sentences2022This was so because when the “right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006)). 2022This was so because when the “right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006)). | 1 | 2 |
Wayne Kieser v. The People of the State of New Yorkgreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Kieser v. People of New York, 56 F.3d 16 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir.1984); Derringer v. United States, 441 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir.1971); United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1956). | 1 | 1 |
Paul Peter Solina, Jr. v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2005See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1983) (representation by person who had failed twice to pass the New York state bar examination and was not a member of any other bar was a per se violation of the right to counsel); cf. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.1990) (representation by attorney who gained law license through fraud was a per se Sixth Amendment violation). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Yelverton, Willie L.green2 sentences2004Therefore, it is highly inappropriate to base this decision on a due process argument. [3] In United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531 (D.C.App.1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in a footnote that "mere generalized anxiety is insufficient to establish prejudice, even when such anxiety is due to a pre-trial delay in excess of four years.... [A]bsent evidence of severe anxiety ..., we are left with what amounts to rank speculation about Yelverton's general state of mind, and this is insufficient to establish a Sixth Amendment violation." Yelvert 2004Therefore, it is highly inappropriate to base this decision on a due process argument. [3] In United States v. Yelverton, 197 F.3d 531 (D.C.App.1999), the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit noted in a footnote that "mere generalized anxiety is insufficient to establish prejudice, even when such anxiety is due to a pre-trial delay in excess of four years.... [A]bsent evidence of severe anxiety ..., we are left with what amounts to rank speculation about Yelverton's general state of mind, and this is insufficient to establish a Sixth Amendment violation." Yelvert | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Loud Hawkgreen2 sentences2004While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, see Loud Hawk, supra, at 315 [ 106 S.Ct. 648 ], it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. 2004While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, see Loud Hawk, supra, at 315 [ 106 S.Ct. 648 ], it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. | 1 | 1 |
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2003Generally, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofesr sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 2003Generally, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofesr sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
Mickens v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2003Generally, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofesr sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). 2003Generally, a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofesr sional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 166 (2002) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arkansas. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2026Johnson’s remark was a casual observation made to his cousin during a private phone call—precisely the kind of nontestimonial statement that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), place outside the Confrontation Clause’s reach—made with no purpose of creating evidence for prosecution and with no reasonable anticipation that the exchange would ever be used at trial. 2015Id. | 2 | 2015–2026 |
Davis v. Washington
green
1 sentence2026Johnson’s remark was a casual observation made to his cousin during a private phone call—precisely the kind of nontestimonial statement that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), and Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006), place outside the Confrontation Clause’s reach—made with no purpose of creating evidence for prosecution and with no reasonable anticipation that the exchange would ever be used at trial. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
Arroyo v. State
green
2 sentences2022This was so because when the “right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006)). 2022This was so because when the “right to be assisted by counsel of one’s choice is wrongly denied . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. (quoting United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 148 (2006)). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Cronic
green
2 sentences2018In Cronic , the Supreme Court held, "Only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial." Id. at 667 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 . 2018In Cronic , the Supreme Court held, "Only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial." Id. at 667 , 104 S.Ct. 2039 . | 1 | 2018–2018 |
Harris v. State
green
2 sentences2012This court rejected this argument and held that “the matter clearly does not fall within any of the Wicks exceptions.” Harris, 363 Ark. at 505 , 215 S.W.3d at 668 . 2012This court rejected this argument and held that “the matter clearly does not fall within any of the Wicks exceptions.” Harris, 363 Ark. at 505 , 215 S.W.3d at 668 . | 1 | 2012–2012 |
United States v. Robert Bradford
green
1 sentence2005See, e.g., Kieser v. People of New York, 56 F.3d 16 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir.1984); Derringer v. United States, 441 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir.1971); United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1956). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States of America in No. 83-5233 v. Anthony J. Costanzo. Appeal of Anthony J. Costanzo in Nos. 82-5767, 83-5341/42
green
1 sentence2005See, e.g., Kieser v. People of New York, 56 F.3d 16 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir.1984); Derringer v. United States, 441 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir.1971); United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1956). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
United States v. John Novak
green
2 sentences2005Likewise, in U.S. v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1990), the federal appellate court followed a similar rationale in holding that representation by a lawyer who had been admitted to the bar only on the basis of false representations regarding his legal education constituted a per se Sixth Amendment violation. 2005See, e.g., Solina v. United States, 709 F.2d 160 (2d Cir.1983) (representation by person who had failed twice to pass the New York state bar examination and was not a member of any other bar was a per se violation of the right to counsel); cf. United States v. Novak, 903 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.1990) (representation by attorney who gained law license through fraud was a per se Sixth Amendment violation). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Parrish Cole v. United States
green
1 sentence2005For instance, in Cole v. United States, 162 F.3d 957 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals addressed the very question at issue here. | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Louis A. Derringer and Gerald D. Peterson v. United States
green
1 sentence2005See, e.g., Kieser v. People of New York, 56 F.3d 16 (2d Cir.1995); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251 (3d Cir.1984); Derringer v. United States, 441 F.2d 1140 (8th Cir.1971); United States v. Bradford, 238 F.2d 395 (2d Cir.1956). | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Doggett v. United States
green
2 sentences2004Id. at 655-56, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (emphasis added). 2004Id. at 655-56, 112 S.Ct. 2686 (emphasis added). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Massiah v. United States
green
2 sentences1994In addition, certain violations of the right to counsel may be disregarded as harmless error. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court held that where a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred the defendant’s own incriminating statements could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial. 1994In addition, certain violations of the right to counsel may be disregarded as harmless error. [Citations omitted.] Similarly, in Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964), the Court held that where a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred the defendant’s own incriminating statements could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution as evidence against him at his trial. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Idaho v. Wright
green
2 sentences1992Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Smith v. State, supra. Killcrease did not raise the Sixth Amendment issue below. 1992Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 , 110 S.Ct. 3139 , 111 L.Ed.2d 638 (1990); Smith v. State, supra. Killcrease did not raise the Sixth Amendment issue below. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
State Ex Rel. Stephan v. Smith
green
2 sentences1991Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336 , 747 P.2d 816 (1987), the petitioners advanced a Sixth Amendment challenge which argued that: [T]he system for appointing counsel adopted by the State violates the right to effective assistance of counsel for two reasons: (1) it creates an inherent conflict of interest between the attorney and client because the more hours an attorney spends on the case, the greater the personal cost to the attorney; and (2) it requires attorneys who are without criminal law experience or expertise to represent indigent criminal defendants. 1991Stephan v. Smith, 242 Kan. 336 , 747 P.2d 816 (1987), the petitioners advanced a Sixth Amendment challenge which argued that: [T]he system for appointing counsel adopted by the State violates the right to effective assistance of counsel for two reasons: (1) it creates an inherent conflict of interest between the attorney and client because the more hours an attorney spends on the case, the greater the personal cost to the attorney; and (2) it requires attorneys who are without criminal law experience or expertise to represent indigent criminal defendants. | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences1988Conflict and ineffective assistance The Supreme Court’s decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), defined the issue which arises when a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on an allegation of counsel’s conflict of interests. 1988Conflict and ineffective assistance The Supreme Court’s decision in Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980), defined the issue which arises when a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is based on an allegation of counsel’s conflict of interests. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.