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36 Utah opinions name it 2 courts 1983–2026 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Utah courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2012See, e.g., Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 (explaining that "a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different" with the assistance of counsel, and stating that "defects in assistance that have no probable effect upon the trial's outcome do not establish a constitutional violation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 (explaining that the "privilege of presence is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow" 2012See, e.g., Mickens, 535 U.S. at 166 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 (explaining that "a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate a reasonable probability that ... the result of the proceeding would have been different" with the assistance of counsel, and stating that "defects in assistance that have no probable effect upon the trial's outcome do not establish a constitutional violation" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Stincer, 482 U.S. at 745 , 107 S.Ct. 2658 (explaining that the "privilege of presence is not guaranteed when presence would be useless, or the benefit but a shadow" | 2 | 3 |
United States v. Aquartgreen2 sentences2025As our court of appeals recognized, “although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctanc 2025As our court of appeals recognized, “although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctanc | 2 | 2 |
State v. Hintzegreen2 sentences2025As our court of appeals recognized, “although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctanc 2025As our court of appeals recognized, “although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctanc | 1 | 2 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2022Thus, “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial,” and “[w]hile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim . . . , it is part of the mix of relevant facts.” Id. at 655–56. 2022Thus, “excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial,” and “[w]hile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim . . . , it is part of the mix of relevant facts.” Id. at 655–56. | 1 | 2 |
State v. Webbgreen2 sentences1991State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 72 (Utah Ct.App.1990). 1990Id. at 72 n. 3 (citing Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776 , 107 S.Ct. 3114, 3120 , 97 L.Ed.2d 638 (1987)); see also Martinez v. Sullivan, 881 F.2d 921, 930 (10th Cir.1989). 3 . | 1 | 2 |
State v. Hintzegreen2 sentences2026It is true that “a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation.” Hintze, 2025 UT 3, ¶ 65 (cleaned up). 2026It is true that “a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation.” Hintze, 2025 UT 3, ¶ 65 (cleaned up). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Marty Martinezgreen2 sentences2025As our court of appeals recognized, “although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctanc 2025As our court of appeals recognized, “although a showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, courts have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” Hintze, 2022 UT App 117, ¶ 43 (cleaned up); see also United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (“[T]his court generally has been reluctant to find a speedy trial violation in the absence of genuine prejudice.” (cleaned up)); United States v. Martinez, 776 F.2d 1481, 1483 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[I]n the absence of prejudice, we have great reluctanc | 1 | 1 |
Barker v. Wingogreen1 sentence2025Hintze was bound over at a preliminary hearing in early July, and he entered a plea of not guilty. ¶16 About one month later, in early August, Hintze filed two motions: a motion to dismiss based on an alleged violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, and a motion to suppress based on an alleged violation of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable seizures. ¶17 In support of his Sixth Amendment claim, Hintze cited Barker v. Wingo, a landmark case that “identif[ied] some of the factors . . . courts should assess in determining whether a particular defendant has be | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Jeffrey Olsengreen2 sentences2023See United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that COVID-related delay was justified under the Speedy Trial Act); see also United States v. Perez, No. 4:22-cr-00002- DN-PK, 2022 WL 1004216 , at *4 (D. 2023See United States v. Olsen, 21 F.4th 1036, 1047 (9th Cir. 2022) (holding that COVID-related delay was justified under the Speedy Trial Act); see also United States v. Perez, No. 4:22-cr-00002- DN-PK, 2022 WL 1004216 , at *4 (D. | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gouldgreen2 sentences2022This factor—along with the second one, as noted above—is a crucial factor: although a “showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation,” courts “have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” See United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation simplified). ¶44 In some cases, the length of delay is so egregious that prejudice is presumed to have occurred, and the defendant is relieved of any burden to demonstrate specific prejudice. 2022This factor—along with the second one, as noted above—is a crucial factor: although a “showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation,” courts “have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” See United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation simplified). ¶44 In some cases, the length of delay is so egregious that prejudice is presumed to have occurred, and the defendant is relieved of any burden to demonstrate specific prejudice. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Bucknergreen1 sentence2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Friasgreen2 sentences2022The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that although a “showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation,” courts should “have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation simplified); see also United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where all but the fourth Barker factor weighed at least slightly in the defendant’s favor); cf. United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1329 (10th 2022The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that although a “showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation,” courts should “have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation simplified); see also United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where all but the fourth Barker factor weighed at least slightly in the defendant’s favor); cf. United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1329 (10th | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Lainez-Leivagreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the delay in federal prosecution impaired the defendant’s ability to receive state “good time credits,” thereby violating the defendant’s speedy trial right, reasoning that “the possibility that [the defendant] would have served a shorter sentence absent the pending federal complaint is speculative at best, and will not support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation”); United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036 , 1043 n.1 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting a 20200787-CA 44 2022 UT App 117 State 2022See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the delay in federal prosecution impaired the defendant’s ability to receive state “good time credits,” thereby violating the defendant’s speedy trial right, reasoning that “the possibility that [the defendant] would have served a shorter sentence absent the pending federal complaint is speculative at best, and will not support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation”); United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036 , 1043 n.1 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting a 20200787-CA 44 2022 UT App 117 State | 1 | 1 |
| Pereida v. Wilkinsongreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gonzalez-Avinagreen2 sentences2022See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the delay in federal prosecution impaired the defendant’s ability to receive state “good time credits,” thereby violating the defendant’s speedy trial right, reasoning that “the possibility that [the defendant] would have served a shorter sentence absent the pending federal complaint is speculative at best, and will not support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation”); United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036 , 1043 n.1 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting a 20200787-CA 44 2022 UT App 117 State 2022See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the delay in federal prosecution impaired the defendant’s ability to receive state “good time credits,” thereby violating the defendant’s speedy trial right, reasoning that “the possibility that [the defendant] would have served a shorter sentence absent the pending federal complaint is speculative at best, and will not support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation”); United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036 , 1043 n.1 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting a 20200787-CA 44 2022 UT App 117 State | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Haymondgreen2 sentences2022See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2376 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact which the law makes essential to a punishment that a judge might later seek to impose.” (cleaned up)); see also Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 765 (2021) (pointing out “the Sixth Amendment rule in criminal cases that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime must be proved to a jury” (cleaned up)). 2022See United States v. Haymond, 139 S. Ct. 2369, 2376 (2019) (plurality opinion) (“A jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt every fact which the law makes essential to a punishment that a judge might later seek to impose.” (cleaned up)); see also Pereida v. Wilkinson, 141 S. Ct. 754, 765 (2021) (pointing out “the Sixth Amendment rule in criminal cases that any fact that increases the penalty for a crime must be proved to a jury” (cleaned up)). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Battisgreen1 sentence2022Other courts that have looked at it, however, have recognized (persuasively, I think) that this factor turns on whether and when “the government and the court were put on notice that a defendant has asserted his right to a speedy trial.” United States v. Black, 918 F.3d 243, 263 (2d Cir. 2019) (quotation simplified); accord United States v. Battis, 589 F.3d 673, 681 (3d Cir. 2009) (focusing on whether the defendant made “a reasonable assertion of the right so as to put authorities on notice of his Sixth Amendment claim” (quotation simplified)); State v. Buckner, 738 S.E.2d 65, 72 (Ga. 2013) (h | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Blackgreen | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Margheimgreen2 sentences2022The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that although a “showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation,” courts should “have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation simplified); see also United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where all but the fourth Barker factor weighed at least slightly in the defendant’s favor); cf. United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1329 (10th 2022The Tenth Circuit, for example, has held that although a “showing of prejudice may not be absolutely necessary in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation,” courts should “have great reluctance to find a speedy trial deprivation where there is no prejudice.” United States v. Gould, 672 F.3d 930, 939 (10th Cir. 2012) (quotation simplified); see also United States v. Frias, 893 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2018) (finding no Sixth Amendment violation where all but the fourth Barker factor weighed at least slightly in the defendant’s favor); cf. United States v. Margheim, 770 F.3d 1312, 1329 (10th | 1 | 1 |
| McMann v. Richardsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Candedogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mickens v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Robert Lee Caver v. Dennis M. Straub, Wardengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Clarkgreen | 1 | 1 |
| PYPER v. Bondgreen | 1 | 1 |
| In re Bondurantgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Gonzalez-Lopezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Monroegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bryan v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Heatongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Dominguezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Ruplegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Chandler v. Floridagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wong Sun v. United Statesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Allengreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Ronald J. Goldberggreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Billings v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Marsdengreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Gordongreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Bargas-Perezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Utah. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Shillinger v. Haworth
green
2 sentences2026As he did below, Camara argues that the State’s actions violated both his Sixth Amendment rights and various rules of procedure relating to discovery. ¶35 With respect to his Sixth Amendment claim, Camara relies heavily on Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995). 2025As he did below, Camara argues that the State’s actions violated both his Sixth Amendment rights and various rules of procedure relating to discovery. ¶24 With respect to his Sixth Amendment claim, Camara relies heavily on Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 1995). | 2 | 2025–2026 |
Weatherford v. Bursey
green
2 sentences2026The Court instead held that unless there is “at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. at 558 ; see also 3 Wayne R. 2025The Court instead held that unless there is “at least a realistic possibility of injury to [the defendant] or benefit to the State, there can be no Sixth Amendment violation.” Id. at 558 ; see also 3 Wayne R. | 2 | 2025–2026 |
United States v. Morrison
green
2 sentences2026On appeal, Camara says that he is challenging the denial of both motions. 20220502-CA 14 2026 UT App 5 State v. Camara Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment based on an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” 449 U.S. 361 , 363–65 (1981); see also 3 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.8(b) (explaining that Morrison has been understood to require a showing of prejudice for even an “unjustified inva 2026On appeal, Camara says that he is challenging the denial of both motions. 20220502-CA 14 2026 UT App 5 State v. Camara Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment based on an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” 449 U.S. 361 , 363–65 (1981); see also 3 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.8(b) (explaining that Morrison has been understood to require a showing of prejudice for even an “unjustified inva | 2 | 2025–2026 |
State v. Garcia
green
2 sentences2026But regardless of the rule 30 standard, the United States Supreme Court determines the Sixth Amendment standard, and as the State points out, Harrington v. Richter has since made clear that “the difference (continued . . .) 10 Cite as: 2026 UT 12 Opinion of the Court context of an alleged error in a self-defense jury instruction, a “proper analysis . . . needs to focus on the evidence before the jury and whether the jury could reasonably have found that [defendant] acted in imperfect [or perfect] self-defense such that a failure to instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdic 2026But regardless of the rule 30 standard, the United States Supreme Court determines the Sixth Amendment standard, and as the State points out, Harrington v. Richter has since made clear that “the difference (continued . . .) 10 Cite as: 2026 UT 12 Opinion of the Court context of an alleged error in a self-defense jury instruction, a “proper analysis . . . needs to focus on the evidence before the jury and whether the jury could reasonably have found that [defendant] acted in imperfect [or perfect] self-defense such that a failure to instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdic | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Low
green
2 sentences2026“Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to any crime, while imperfect self-defense is a partial defense, which reduces a charge of murder to manslaughter.” State v. Hogue, 2025 UT App 88, ¶ 22 , 572 P.3d 1147 (cleaned up). “[P]erfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense require the defendant to present the same evidence: that the defendant had a reasonable belief that force was necessary to defend himself.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 32 , 192 P.3d 867 ; see also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(1)(b) (2015) (perfect self-defense requires the defendant to present evidence that he “reasonably believ 2026“Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to any crime, while imperfect self-defense is a partial defense, which reduces a charge of murder to manslaughter.” State v. Hogue, 2025 UT App 88, ¶ 22 , 572 P.3d 1147 (cleaned up). “[P]erfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense require the defendant to present the same evidence: that the defendant had a reasonable belief that force was necessary to defend himself.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 32 , 192 P.3d 867 ; see also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(1)(b) (2015) (perfect self-defense requires the defendant to present evidence that he “reasonably believ | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Tuinman
green
2 sentences2026But such instances are rare, see, e.g., id., and appellate courts will not infer prejudice where a defendant “fail[s] to articulate prejudice from the delay in his trial with any specificity,” United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1071 (2025). 20240188-CA 9 2026 UT App 45 State v. Aden pending proceedings.” See Tuinman, 2023 UT App 83, ¶ 72 . 2026But such instances are rare, see, e.g., id., and appellate courts will not infer prejudice where a defendant “fail[s] to articulate prejudice from the delay in his trial with any specificity,” United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1071 (2025). 20240188-CA 9 2026 UT App 45 State v. Aden pending proceedings.” See Tuinman, 2023 UT App 83, ¶ 72 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Hogue
green
2 sentences2026“Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to any crime, while imperfect self-defense is a partial defense, which reduces a charge of murder to manslaughter.” State v. Hogue, 2025 UT App 88, ¶ 22 , 572 P.3d 1147 (cleaned up). “[P]erfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense require the defendant to present the same evidence: that the defendant had a reasonable belief that force was necessary to defend himself.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 32 , 192 P.3d 867 ; see also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(1)(b) (2015) (perfect self-defense requires the defendant to present evidence that he “reasonably believ 2026“Perfect self-defense is a complete defense to any crime, while imperfect self-defense is a partial defense, which reduces a charge of murder to manslaughter.” State v. Hogue, 2025 UT App 88, ¶ 22 , 572 P.3d 1147 (cleaned up). “[P]erfect self-defense and imperfect self-defense require the defendant to present the same evidence: that the defendant had a reasonable belief that force was necessary to defend himself.” State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ¶ 32 , 192 P.3d 867 ; see also UTAH CODE § 76-2-402(1)(b) (2015) (perfect self-defense requires the defendant to present evidence that he “reasonably believ | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Camara
green
2 sentences2026On appeal, Camara says that he is challenging the denial of both motions. 20220502-CA 14 2026 UT App 5 State v. Camara Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment based on an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” 449 U.S. 361 , 363–65 (1981); see also 3 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.8(b) (explaining that Morrison has been understood to require a showing of prejudice for even an “unjustified inva 2026On appeal, Camara says that he is challenging the denial of both motions. 20220502-CA 14 2026 UT App 5 State v. Camara Supreme Court reversed the dismissal of an indictment based on an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that “absent demonstrable prejudice, or substantial threat thereof, dismissal of the indictment is plainly inappropriate, even though the violation may have been deliberate.” 449 U.S. 361 , 363–65 (1981); see also 3 LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 11.8(b) (explaining that Morrison has been understood to require a showing of prejudice for even an “unjustified inva | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10833271
green
2 sentences2026But such instances are rare, see, e.g., id., and appellate courts will not infer prejudice where a defendant “fail[s] to articulate prejudice from the delay in his trial with any specificity,” United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1071 (2025). 20240188-CA 9 2026 UT App 45 State v. Aden pending proceedings.” See Tuinman, 2023 UT App 83, ¶ 72 . 2026But such instances are rare, see, e.g., id., and appellate courts will not infer prejudice where a defendant “fail[s] to articulate prejudice from the delay in his trial with any specificity,” United States v. Aquart, 92 F.4th 77, 99 (2d Cir. 2024) (cleaned up), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 1071 (2025). 20240188-CA 9 2026 UT App 45 State v. Aden pending proceedings.” See Tuinman, 2023 UT App 83, ¶ 72 . | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10854664
neutral
2 sentences2026But regardless of the rule 30 standard, the United States Supreme Court determines the Sixth Amendment standard, and as the State points out, Harrington v. Richter has since made clear that “the difference (continued . . .) 10 Cite as: 2026 UT 12 Opinion of the Court context of an alleged error in a self-defense jury instruction, a “proper analysis . . . needs to focus on the evidence before the jury and whether the jury could reasonably have found that [defendant] acted in imperfect [or perfect] self-defense such that a failure to instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdic 2026But regardless of the rule 30 standard, the United States Supreme Court determines the Sixth Amendment standard, and as the State points out, Harrington v. Richter has since made clear that “the difference (continued . . .) 10 Cite as: 2026 UT 12 Opinion of the Court context of an alleged error in a self-defense jury instruction, a “proper analysis . . . needs to focus on the evidence before the jury and whether the jury could reasonably have found that [defendant] acted in imperfect [or perfect] self-defense such that a failure to instruct the jury properly undermines confidence in the verdic | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Thompson-Jacobson
green
2 sentences2022Thus, this factor weighs in Thompson-Jacobson’s favor. ¶23 Examining all four of these factors and considering them in the light of all the circumstances, we conclude that the State of Utah violated Thompson-Jacobson’s speedy trial right by 20190743-CA 11 2022 UT App 29 State v. Thompson-Jacobson waiting for seven-and-a-half years to take action on the charges filed in 2006. ¶24 A court’s “toleration of . . . negligence varies inversely with its protractedness and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused’s trial.” Id. at 657 (quotation simplified). 2022Thus, this factor weighs in Thompson-Jacobson’s favor. ¶23 Examining all four of these factors and considering them in the light of all the circumstances, we conclude that the State of Utah violated Thompson-Jacobson’s speedy trial right by 20190743-CA 11 2022 UT App 29 State v. Thompson-Jacobson waiting for seven-and-a-half years to take action on the charges filed in 2006. ¶24 A court’s “toleration of . . . negligence varies inversely with its protractedness and its consequent threat to the fairness of the accused’s trial.” Id. at 657 (quotation simplified). | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Butner
green
2 sentences2022See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the delay in federal prosecution impaired the defendant’s ability to receive state “good time credits,” thereby violating the defendant’s speedy trial right, reasoning that “the possibility that [the defendant] would have served a shorter sentence absent the pending federal complaint is speculative at best, and will not support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation”); United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036 , 1043 n.1 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting a 20200787-CA 44 2022 UT App 117 State 2022See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Avina, 234 F. App’x 758, 760 (9th Cir. 2007) (rejecting a claim that the delay in federal prosecution impaired the defendant’s ability to receive state “good time credits,” thereby violating the defendant’s speedy trial right, reasoning that “the possibility that [the defendant] would have served a shorter sentence absent the pending federal complaint is speculative at best, and will not support a finding of a Sixth Amendment violation”); United States v. Butner, 350 F. Supp. 3d 1036 , 1043 n.1 (D.N.M. 2018) (rejecting a 20200787-CA 44 2022 UT App 117 State | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Matthews v. State
neutral
2 sentences2022App. 2020) (rejecting a concurrent-sentences-based prejudice claim as “speculative” because there was “no guarantee that the circuit court would have ordered” the sentences to run concurrently); Matthews v. State, 325 A.2d 897 , 901–02 (Md. 2022App. 2020) (rejecting a concurrent-sentences-based prejudice claim as “speculative” because there was “no guarantee that the circuit court would have ordered” the sentences to run concurrently); Matthews v. State, 325 A.2d 897 , 901–02 (Md. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Thornton green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| State v. Griffin green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Kentucky v. Stincer green | 1 | 2012–2012 |
| Lucero v. Kennard green | 1 | 2007–2007 |
| Crawford v. Washington green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
| Iowa v. Tovar green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Bakalov green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| Sullivan v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Petty green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Valencia green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. Frampton green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| State v. McDonald green | 1 | 2004–2004 |
| McMillan v. Pennsylvania red | 1 | 1997–1997 |
| Batson v. Kentucky green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| Holland v. Illinois green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
| State v. Lafferty green | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.