61 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1974–2026 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Gable v. State of Oregon, 353 Or 750, 758 , 305 P3d 85 (2013) (stating standard for Article I, section 11, claim); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 , 104 S Ct 2052 , 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (stating standard for Sixth Amendment claim). 2021See, e.g., Gable v. State of Oregon, 353 Or 750, 758 , 305 P3d 85 (2013) (stating standard for Article I, section 11, claim); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 , 104 S Ct 2052 , 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (stating standard for Sixth Amendment claim). | 5 | 11 |
Montez v. Czerniakgreen2 sentences2016To prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel,” a petitioner must prove that counsel performed ineffectively under “prevailing professional norms” and that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,” there is a “reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 US at 688, 694 . “[T]he standards for determining the adequacy of legal counsel under the state constitution are functionally equivalent to those for determining the effectiveness of counsel under the federal constitution.” Montez, 355 Or at 6-7. 2016To prevail on a Sixth Amendment claim of “ineffective assistance of counsel,” a petitioner must prove that counsel performed ineffectively under “prevailing professional norms” and that, “but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,” there is a “reasonable probability” that “the result of the proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 US at 688, 694 . “[T]he standards for determining the adequacy of legal counsel under the state constitution are functionally equivalent to those for determining the effectiveness of counsel under the federal constitution.” Montez, 355 Or at 6-7. | 3 | 4 |
State v. Turnidgegreen2 sentences2025See Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or at 3 As we explain in addressing defendant’s fifth assignment of error, at the hearing on defendant’s pretrial motion to sever, defense counsel alerted the court to the potential need for a limiting instruction with respect to McGinnis’s state- ments as “a separate issue which we would ask to reserve,” but ultimately never requested one. 2025See Turnidge (S059155), 359 Or at 3 As we explain in addressing defendant’s fifth assignment of error, at the hearing on defendant’s pretrial motion to sever, defense counsel alerted the court to the potential need for a limiting instruction with respect to McGinnis’s state- ments as “a separate issue which we would ask to reserve,” but ultimately never requested one. | 2 | 2 |
Jose Garcia-Martinez v. Jefferson Sessionsgreen2 sentences2023In its written judgment, the court concluded, 2 The Oregon Supreme Court likewise has held that “if the immigration con- sequences of pleading guilty to certain crimes are ‘truly clear,’ * * * the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise their clients not merely that a conviction ‘may result’ in adverse immigration consequences but that deportation and other adverse immigration consequences will be ‘virtually inevitable’ as a result of the plea.” Chavez v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 654, 661 , 438 P3d 381 (2019). 330 Cazun v. State of Oregon following Ninth Circuit case law, that Diaz-L 2023In its written judgment, the court concluded, 2 The Oregon Supreme Court likewise has held that “if the immigration con- sequences of pleading guilty to certain crimes are ‘truly clear,’ * * * the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise their clients not merely that a conviction ‘may result’ in adverse immigration consequences but that deportation and other adverse immigration consequences will be ‘virtually inevitable’ as a result of the plea.” Chavez v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 654, 661 , 438 P3d 381 (2019). 330 Cazun v. State of Oregon following Ninth Circuit case law, that Diaz-L | 2 | 2 |
Michigan v. Lucasgreen2 sentences2009Although a defendant’s right to present evidence and to have the jury hear that evidence is fundamental, the right “does *196 not automatically trump other legitimate concerns and may, for example, be subjected to a state’s established rules of evidence and procedure.” Beeler, 166 Or App at 283 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302 , 93 S Ct 1038 , 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973)); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 US 145, 149 , 111 S Ct 1743 , 114 L Ed 2d 205 (1991) (denying the defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge to the exclusion of evidence regarding his prior sexual relationship with the 2009Although a defendant’s right to present evidence and to have the jury hear that evidence is fundamental, the right “does *196 not automatically trump other legitimate concerns and may, for example, be subjected to a state’s established rules of evidence and procedure.” Beeler, 166 Or App at 283 (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 US 284, 302 , 93 S Ct 1038 , 35 L Ed 2d 297 (1973)); see also Michigan v. Lucas, 500 US 145, 149 , 111 S Ct 1743 , 114 L Ed 2d 205 (1991) (denying the defendant’s Sixth Amendment challenge to the exclusion of evidence regarding his prior sexual relationship with the | 1 | 3 |
State v. Francogreen2 sentences2005Defendant also points out that the cases he cited in his argument before the trial court —State v. Nielsen, 316 Or 611 , 853 P2d 256 (1993); Campbell, 299 Or 633 ; State v. Jones, 171 Or App 375 , 15 P3d 616 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 56 (2001); State v. Franco, 151 Or App 472 , 950 P2d 348 (1997), rev den, 326 Or 465 (1998)—include discussion of federal Sixth Amendment doctrine and therefore raised that issue to the trial court as a basis for exclusion. *78 Finally, defendant points out that the entire discussion about guarantees of trustworthiness, regardless of its lack of explicit reference t 2005Defendant also points out that the cases he cited in his argument before the trial court —State v. Nielsen, 316 Or 611 , 853 P2d 256 (1993); Campbell, 299 Or 633 ; State v. Jones, 171 Or App 375 , 15 P3d 616 (2000), rev den, 332 Or 56 (2001); State v. Franco, 151 Or App 472 , 950 P2d 348 (1997), rev den, 326 Or 465 (1998)—include discussion of federal Sixth Amendment doctrine and therefore raised that issue to the trial court as a basis for exclusion. *78 Finally, defendant points out that the entire discussion about guarantees of trustworthiness, regardless of its lack of explicit reference t | 1 | 2 |
Shillinger v. Haworthgreen2 sentences2024The Tenth Circuit adopted a per se rule of prejudice in a case where it concluded: “[W]e believe this case presents a situation unlike Weatherford in that the intrusion here was not only intentional, but also lacked a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir 1995).3 Reasoning that Weatherford “recognized that under some circumstances a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights may be violated by the state’s intrusion into the attorney-client relationship[,]” and noting Weatherford’s emphasis on “both the absence of purposefulness in the prosecutor’s intr 2024The Tenth Circuit adopted a per se rule of prejudice in a case where it concluded: “[W]e believe this case presents a situation unlike Weatherford in that the intrusion here was not only intentional, but also lacked a legitimate law enforcement purpose.” Shillinger v. Haworth, 70 F3d 1132, 1139 (10th Cir 1995).3 Reasoning that Weatherford “recognized that under some circumstances a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights may be violated by the state’s intrusion into the attorney-client relationship[,]” and noting Weatherford’s emphasis on “both the absence of purposefulness in the prosecutor’s intr | 1 | 1 |
United States v. William Dennis Danielson v. United States v. William Dennis Danielsongreen2 sentences2024The Court later struck a balance between “the fundamental importance of the right to counsel in crimi- nal cases” and “society’s interest in the administration of 2 Other courts refer to those three factors as the “Weatherford factors” or the “Weatherford test,” used “to determine whether a violation of the sixth amend- ment’s right to privileged communication has occurred.” See, e.g., U.S. v. Dyer, 821 F2d 35, 38 (1st Cir 1987) (“In Weatherford, the Court looked for (i) tainted evidence; (ii) communication of defense strategy to the prosecution; and (iii) pur- poseful intrusion by the governm 2024See U.S. v. Steele, 727 F2d 580, 586 (6th Cir 1984), cert den, 467 US 1209 (1984) (“Even where there is an intentional intrusion by the government into the attorney-client relationship, prejudice to the defendant must be shown before any remedy is granted.”); U.S. v. Singer, 785 F2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir 1986) (explaining that a Sixth Amendment violation alone does not require dismissal, and affirming the district court’s decision to permit government agents with knowledge of the file to testify because defendant had not identified any 182 State v. Greenwood testimony that indicated knowledge o | 1 | 1 |
Cardenas v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2024See U.S. v. Steele, 727 F2d 580, 586 (6th Cir 1984), cert den, 467 US 1209 (1984) (“Even where there is an intentional intrusion by the government into the attorney-client relationship, prejudice to the defendant must be shown before any remedy is granted.”); U.S. v. Singer, 785 F2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir 1986) (explaining that a Sixth Amendment violation alone does not require dismissal, and affirming the district court’s decision to permit government agents with knowledge of the file to testify because defendant had not identified any 182 State v. Greenwood testimony that indicated knowledge o 2024See U.S. v. Steele, 727 F2d 580, 586 (6th Cir 1984), cert den, 467 US 1209 (1984) (“Even where there is an intentional intrusion by the government into the attorney-client relationship, prejudice to the defendant must be shown before any remedy is granted.”); U.S. v. Singer, 785 F2d 228, 234-35 (8th Cir 1986) (explaining that a Sixth Amendment violation alone does not require dismissal, and affirming the district court’s decision to permit government agents with knowledge of the file to testify because defendant had not identified any 182 State v. Greenwood testimony that indicated knowledge o | 1 | 1 |
State v. Kincheloegreen2 sentences2021See State v. Kincheloe, 367 Or 335, 339 , 478 P3d 507 (2020) (affirm- ing two convictions entered on unanimous guilty verdicts, where, after being instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict, the jury returned nonunani- mous guilty verdicts on some charges but returned unani- mous guilty verdicts on two charges); State v. Dilallo, 367 Or 340 , 478 P3d 509 (2020) (affirming conviction, where the jury was instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict but no jury poll was taken). 2 Defendant states in his supplemental briefing that the jury re 2021See State v. Kincheloe, 367 Or 335, 339 , 478 P3d 507 (2020) (affirm- ing two convictions entered on unanimous guilty verdicts, where, after being instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict, the jury returned nonunani- mous guilty verdicts on some charges but returned unani- mous guilty verdicts on two charges); State v. Dilallo, 367 Or 340 , 478 P3d 509 (2020) (affirming conviction, where the jury was instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict but no jury poll was taken). 2 Defendant states in his supplemental briefing that the jury re | 1 | 1 |
Gable v. Stategreen2 sentences2021See, e.g., Gable v. State of Oregon, 353 Or 750, 758 , 305 P3d 85 (2013) (stating standard for Article I, section 11, claim); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 , 104 S Ct 2052 , 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (stating standard for Sixth Amendment claim). 2021See, e.g., Gable v. State of Oregon, 353 Or 750, 758 , 305 P3d 85 (2013) (stating standard for Article I, section 11, claim); Strickland v. Washington, 466 US 668, 687 , 104 S Ct 2052 , 80 L Ed 2d 674 (1984) (stating standard for Sixth Amendment claim). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Copelandgreen1 sentence2020Most significantly, Copeland teaches that the state confrontation right extends to all “wit- ness statements,” in comparison to the Sixth Amendment confrontation right, which covers only those “out-of-court statements that are testimonial in nature.” 353 Or at 842 (discussing Sixth Amendment analysis). | 1 | 1 |
| Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| People v. Slaytongreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Leroy Roosevelt Mackgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Pereida-Alba v. Courseygreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Castrogreen | 1 | 1 |
| North v. Cuppgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Ailes v. Portland Meadows, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Lilly v. Virginiagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crawford v. Washington
green
2 sentences2020The Sixth Amendment provides that, “[i]n all crimi- nal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right * * * to be confronted with the witnesses against him * * *.” In Crawford v. Washington, 541 US 36 , 124 S Ct 1354 , 158 L Ed 2d 177 (2004), the United States Supreme Court announced a new interpretation of that constitutional provision, rejecting its prior interpretation. 2014In Crawford , the Court explained that the Sixth Amendment requirement that, in all criminal prosecutions, the accused *748 “shall enjoy the right *** to be confronted with the witnesses against him” is not limited to “in-court testimony.” Id. at 50 . | 3 | 2013–2020 |
Chavez v. State
green
2 sentences2023In its written judgment, the court concluded, 2 The Oregon Supreme Court likewise has held that “if the immigration con- sequences of pleading guilty to certain crimes are ‘truly clear,’ * * * the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise their clients not merely that a conviction ‘may result’ in adverse immigration consequences but that deportation and other adverse immigration consequences will be ‘virtually inevitable’ as a result of the plea.” Chavez v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 654, 661 , 438 P3d 381 (2019). 330 Cazun v. State of Oregon following Ninth Circuit case law, that Diaz-L 2023In its written judgment, the court concluded, 2 The Oregon Supreme Court likewise has held that “if the immigration con- sequences of pleading guilty to certain crimes are ‘truly clear,’ * * * the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to advise their clients not merely that a conviction ‘may result’ in adverse immigration consequences but that deportation and other adverse immigration consequences will be ‘virtually inevitable’ as a result of the plea.” Chavez v. State of Oregon, 364 Or 654, 661 , 438 P3d 381 (2019). 330 Cazun v. State of Oregon following Ninth Circuit case law, that Diaz-L | 2 | 2023–2023 |
Holland v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1996“The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 , 110 S.Ct. 803, 807 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990). 1996“The Sixth Amendment requirement of a fair cross section on the venire is a means of assuring, not a representative jury (which the Constitution does not demand), but an impartial one (which it does).” Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 480 , 110 S.Ct. 803, 807 , 107 L.Ed.2d 905 (1990). | 2 | 1996–2021 |
Ramos v. Louisiana
green
2 sentences2020Because defendant was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, the nonunanimous verdict does not implicate the Sixth Amendment issue recently decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). 438 State v. Gutierrez See State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28, 41-42 , 176 P3d 380 (2008) (complainant’s statement to investigating officers that the defendant had struck her in the eye was testimonial); State v. Mendoza-Lazaro, 225 Or App 57, 61 , 200 P3d 167 (2008) (domestic violence victim’s statements to police that her children had witnessed the defendant assault her were testi 2020Because defendant was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, the nonunanimous verdict does not implicate the Sixth Amendment issue recently decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). 438 State v. Gutierrez See State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28, 41-42 , 176 P3d 380 (2008) (complainant’s statement to investigating officers that the defendant had struck her in the eye was testimonial); State v. Mendoza-Lazaro, 225 Or App 57, 61 , 200 P3d 167 (2008) (domestic violence victim’s statements to police that her children had witnessed the defendant assault her were testi | 2 | 2020–2021 |
White v. Illinois
green
2 sentences2009White, 502 US at 356-57 . 2009White, 502 US at 356-57 . | 2 | 2009–2009 |
DeAngelo v. Schiedler
green
2 sentences2005It is not certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section 11. 6 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95 , 757 P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment because defendant did not suggest different analysis under state and federal constitutions). 2005It is not certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section 11. 6 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95 , 757 P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment because defendant did not suggest different analysis under state and federal constitutions). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
State v. Rogers
green
2 sentences2005It is not certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section 11. 6 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95 , 757 P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment because defendant did not suggest different analysis under state and federal constitutions). 2005It is not certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section 11. 6 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95 , 757 P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment because defendant did not suggest different analysis under state and federal constitutions). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
Zimmerman v. Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance
green
2 sentences2005It is not certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section 11. 6 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95 , 757 P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment because defendant did not suggest different analysis under state and federal constitutions). 2004It is not certain that the Oregon Supreme Court would adopt the Parke rule for purposes of Article I, section ll. 6 See, e.g., DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91, 95 , 757 P2d 1355 (1988) (declining to reach Sixth Amendment claim where Oregon Constitution provided protection sought by post-conviction petitioner); cf. State v. Rogers, 313 Or 356, 363 , 836 P2d 1308 (1992), cert den, 507 US 974 (1993) (presuming same analysis of venue issue under Article I, section 11, and Sixth Amendment because defendant did not suggest different analysis under state and federal constitutions). | 2 | 2004–2005 |
cluster 10839346
neutral
2 sentences2026However, our review of the record before us, coupled with ODHS’s explicit disclaimer of reliance on an implied waiver argument, leads us to conclude that the record Cite as 348 Or App 398 (2026) 411 is insufficient to establish that mother implicitly waived her right to counsel based on her conduct under the Sixth Amendment standard. 2026However, our review of the record before us, coupled with ODHS’s explicit disclaimer of reliance on an implied waiver argument, leads us to conclude that the record Cite as 348 Or App 398 (2026) 411 is insufficient to establish that mother implicitly waived her right to counsel based on her conduct under the Sixth Amendment standard. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
cluster 10865704
neutral
1 sentence2026Nonprecedential Memo Op: 350 Or App 135 (2026) 137 about the blood testing, and Anderson’s report was admitted into evidence. | 1 | 2026–2026 |
People v. Delgado
green
2 sentences2024The court, thus, concluded that the defendant had not established a Sixth Amendment violation and that, even if he had, he “failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent any alleged violation, the trial’s outcome would have been more favorable.” Id. at 568, 389 P3d at 823 . 2024The court, thus, concluded that the defendant had not established a Sixth Amendment violation and that, even if he had, he “failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, absent any alleged violation, the trial’s outcome would have been more favorable.” Id. at 568, 389 P3d at 823 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Greenwood
neutral
1 sentence2024Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024) 181 criminal justice” explaining that “Sixth Amendment depri- vations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional vio- lation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” Morrison, 449 US at 364 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
United States v. Morrison
green
1 sentence2024Cite as 332 Or App 166 (2024) 181 criminal justice” explaining that “Sixth Amendment depri- vations are subject to the general rule that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional vio- lation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests.” Morrison, 449 US at 364 . | 1 | 2024–2024 |
State v. Dilallo
green
2 sentences2021See State v. Kincheloe, 367 Or 335, 339 , 478 P3d 507 (2020) (affirm- ing two convictions entered on unanimous guilty verdicts, where, after being instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict, the jury returned nonunani- mous guilty verdicts on some charges but returned unani- mous guilty verdicts on two charges); State v. Dilallo, 367 Or 340 , 478 P3d 509 (2020) (affirming conviction, where the jury was instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict but no jury poll was taken). 2 Defendant states in his supplemental briefing that the jury re 2021See State v. Kincheloe, 367 Or 335, 339 , 478 P3d 507 (2020) (affirm- ing two convictions entered on unanimous guilty verdicts, where, after being instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict, the jury returned nonunani- mous guilty verdicts on some charges but returned unani- mous guilty verdicts on two charges); State v. Dilallo, 367 Or 340 , 478 P3d 509 (2020) (affirming conviction, where the jury was instructed incorrectly that only 10 jurors needed to agree on a verdict but no jury poll was taken). 2 Defendant states in his supplemental briefing that the jury re | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Montez v. Czerniak
green
2 sentences2021Montez v. Czerniak, 355 Or 1, 6-7 , 322 P3d 487 , adh’d to as modified, 355 Or 598 , 330 P3d 595 (2014). 2021Montez v. Czerniak, 355 Or 1, 6-7 , 322 P3d 487 , adh’d to as modified, 355 Or 598 , 330 P3d 595 (2014). | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Snodgrass green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Johnson v. Premo green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Williams neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Williams green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Ulery
green
2 sentences2020Held: (1) To the extent that defendant’s failure to present the Sixth Amendment issue on appeal would be a barrier to review, there was good cause to waive the Rules of Appellate Procedure under the circumstances of this case; (2) for the reasons given in State v. Ulery, 366 Or 500 , 464 P3d 1123 (2020), issued this same day, the court accepts the state’s concession that the issue qualified for plain error review and exercises its discretion to correct the error. 2020Held: (1) To the extent that defendant’s failure to present the Sixth Amendment issue on appeal would be a barrier to review, there was good cause to waive the Rules of Appellate Procedure under the circumstances of this case; (2) for the reasons given in State v. Ulery, 366 Or 500 , 464 P3d 1123 (2020), issued this same day, the court accepts the state’s concession that the issue qualified for plain error review and exercises its discretion to correct the error. | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Apodaca v. Oregon red | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Camarena
green
2 sentences2020Because defendant was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, the nonunanimous verdict does not implicate the Sixth Amendment issue recently decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). 438 State v. Gutierrez See State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28, 41-42 , 176 P3d 380 (2008) (complainant’s statement to investigating officers that the defendant had struck her in the eye was testimonial); State v. Mendoza-Lazaro, 225 Or App 57, 61 , 200 P3d 167 (2008) (domestic violence victim’s statements to police that her children had witnessed the defendant assault her were testi 2020Because defendant was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, the nonunanimous verdict does not implicate the Sixth Amendment issue recently decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). 438 State v. Gutierrez See State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28, 41-42 , 176 P3d 380 (2008) (complainant’s statement to investigating officers that the defendant had struck her in the eye was testimonial); State v. Mendoza-Lazaro, 225 Or App 57, 61 , 200 P3d 167 (2008) (domestic violence victim’s statements to police that her children had witnessed the defendant assault her were testi | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| State v. Mendoza-Lazaro neutral | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Graves
green
2 sentences2020Because defendant was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, the nonunanimous verdict does not implicate the Sixth Amendment issue recently decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). 438 State v. Gutierrez See State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28, 41-42 , 176 P3d 380 (2008) (complainant’s statement to investigating officers that the defendant had struck her in the eye was testimonial); State v. Mendoza-Lazaro, 225 Or App 57, 61 , 200 P3d 167 (2008) (domestic violence victim’s statements to police that her children had witnessed the defendant assault her were testi 2020Because defendant was convicted of a Class B misdemeanor, the nonunanimous verdict does not implicate the Sixth Amendment issue recently decided in Ramos v. Louisiana, 590 US ___ , 140 S Ct 1390 , 206 L Ed 2d 583 (2020). 438 State v. Gutierrez See State v. Camarena, 344 Or 28, 41-42 , 176 P3d 380 (2008) (complainant’s statement to investigating officers that the defendant had struck her in the eye was testimonial); State v. Mendoza-Lazaro, 225 Or App 57, 61 , 200 P3d 167 (2008) (domestic violence victim’s statements to police that her children had witnessed the defendant assault her were testi | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Iowa v. Tovar green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| In Re GAULT green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| State v. Brian Schneider green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Blockburger v. United States green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Alston v. Commonwealth green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| Padilla v. Kentucky green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Evans green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Agee green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Haynes v. Cupp green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| Weatherford v. Bursey green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| State v. Montez green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Chapman v. California red | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Arteaga v. Superior Court of California green | 1 | 2011–2011 |
| Kimmelman v. Morrison green | 1 | 2010–2010 |
| State v. Beeler green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Chambers v. Mississippi green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.