Sixth Amendment claim in Georgia

2013Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 307 (2) ( 509 SE2d 618 ) (1998).

2013Slade v. State, 270 Ga. 305, 307 (2) ( 509 SE2d 618 ) (1998).

2022Thus, this case involves a criminal defendant who is seeking to challenge the closure of a courtroom solely through a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2022Thus, this case involves a criminal defendant who is seeking to challenge the closure of a courtroom solely through a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U. S. 668 (104 SCt 2052, 80 LE2d 674) (1984).

2015In its order denying Munna’s motion for new trial, the trial court did not specifically address the Sixth Amendment challenge, but found that “each error complained of by [Munna] to be without merit.” Every constitutional speedy trial claim is subject to a two-tiered analysis as set forth in the United States Supreme Court decisions Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972) and Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 (II) ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2015In its order denying Munna’s motion for new trial, the trial court did not specifically address the Sixth Amendment challenge, but found that “each error complained of by [Munna] to be without merit.” Every constitutional speedy trial claim is subject to a two-tiered analysis as set forth in the United States Supreme Court decisions Barker v. Wingo, 407 U. S. 514 ( 92 SCt 2182 , 33 LE2d 101) (1972) and Doggett v. United States, 505 U. S. 647 (II) ( 112 SCt 2686 , 120 LE2d 520) (1992).

2007See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (III) (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980) (addressing conflict of interest as a Sixth Amendment claim); OCGA § 9-14-42 (a) (making habeas relief available for the substantial denial of state and federal constitutional rights).

2007See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U. S. 335 (III) (100 SC 1708, 64 LE2d 333) (1980) (addressing conflict of interest as a Sixth Amendment claim); OCGA § 9-14-42 (a) (making habeas relief available for the substantial denial of state and federal constitutional rights).

2021To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”29 And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant “must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”30 Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”31 So, t

2021To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”29 And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant “must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”30 Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”31 So, t

2021To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”29 And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant “must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”30 Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”31 So, t

2021To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”29 And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant “must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”30 Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”31 So, t

2021To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”29 And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant “must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”30 Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”31 So, t

2021To prevail on his Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance, a claimant “must show both that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficient performance prejudiced [him].”29 And with respect to deficient performance, a claimant “must show that his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”30 Moreover, when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a strong presumption that counsel’s representation was “within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”31 So, t

2024A violation of this right is not automatically established by virtue of an extended delay, because “none of the[] four factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 455 ( 667 SE2d 361 ) (2008); see also Fallen, supra, 289 Ga. at 248 (1) (“[T]he presumptive prejudice arising from delay cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.

2024A violation of this right is not automatically established by virtue of an extended delay, because “none of the[] four factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 455 ( 667 SE2d 361 ) (2008); see also Fallen, supra, 289 Ga. at 248 (1) (“[T]he presumptive prejudice arising from delay cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.

2019Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Terry v. State , 284 Ga. 119 , 120 (2), 663 S.E.2d 704 (2008).

2019Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 , 687 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) ; Terry v. State , 284 Ga. 119 , 120 (2), 663 S.E.2d 704 (2008).

2026Faretta hearing,” he maintains it is “not clear . . . that [he] did not subsequently invoke [that] right.” Indeed, Clay claims that immediately following the Faretta hearing, he filed a “convoluted” motion for “stand[-]by counsel.” And while Clay (rightly) concedes that he does not have a right to stand-by counsel,12 he nevertheless claims it “is not entirely clear [from his] filing that he meant ‘stand[-]by 11 Wilkerson, 286 Ga. at 204 (2)(b) (citations omitted). 12 See Simpson v. Battaglia, 458 F3d 585, 597 (II)(B)(2) (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Faretta right and the appointment of standby counsel

2021Still got a right to an attorney.”4 Wright 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tyner v. State, 334 Ga. App. 890, 894 (1) ( 780 SE2d 494 ) (2015), quoting Wilkerson v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 204 (2) (b) ( 686 SE2d 648 ) (2009). 4 The full conversation between the trial court and Wright is as follows: - WRIGHT: Your Honor, I have not been able to have my motion to suppress evidence.

2015See Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. at 583 (Fletcher, P. J., dissenting) (noting that “defense counsel’s obligation to his client in entering a guilty plea is not defined by a trial court’s duties in accepting a guilty plea,” and “[w]hile the two concepts are interrelated,... the more logical approach is to recognize that a defendant’s sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is separate from a due process claim that a plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made”).

2015See Williams v. Duffy, 270 Ga. at 583 (Fletcher, P. J., dissenting) (noting that "defense counsel's obligation to his client in entering a guilty plea is not defined by a trial court's duties in accepting a guilty plea," and "[w]hile the two concepts are interrelated, . . . the more logical approach is to recognize that a defendant's sixth amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is separate from a due process claim that a plea was not knowingly and voluntarily made").

1989His failure ‘to establish either the performance or the prejudice component results in denial of his Sixth Amendment claim.’ [Cit.] A reviewing court need not ‘address both components if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one,’ [cit.], nor must the components be addressed in any particular order. [Cit.]” Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 85 ( 335 SE2d 567 ) (1985).

1989His failure ‘to establish either the performance or the prejudice component results in denial of his Sixth Amendment claim.’ [Cit.] A reviewing court need not ‘address both components if the defendant makes an insufficient showing on one,’ [cit.], nor must the components be addressed in any particular order. [Cit.]” Ford v. State, 255 Ga. 81, 85 ( 335 SE2d 567 ) (1985).

2019See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 692 (III) (B), 104 S.Ct. 2052 (identifying an "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether" as one of the rare instances in which prejudice is legally presumed for a Sixth Amendment claim); United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648 , 659 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ("[I]f [defense] counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.

2019See Strickland , 466 U.S. at 692 (III) (B), 104 S.Ct. 2052 (identifying an "[a]ctual or constructive denial of the assistance of counsel altogether" as one of the rare instances in which prejudice is legally presumed for a Sixth Amendment claim); United States v. Cronic , 466 U.S. 648 , 659 (III), 104 S.Ct. 2039 , 80 L.Ed.2d 657 (1984) ("[I]f [defense] counsel entirely fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process itself presumptively unreliable.

2019While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. 5 (Citation omitted.) Smith, 338 Ga. App. at 72 (1) (d).

2019While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay. 5 (Citation omitted.) Smith, 338 Ga. App. at 72 (1) (d).

2026Accord Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 362 (3) ( 696 SE2d 381 ) (2010). 8 Sixth Amendment violation and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal . . . .”11 In this case, although Clay concedes he “clearly waived his right to counsel [during] the . . .

2026Accord Davis v. State, 304 Ga. App. 355, 362 (3) ( 696 SE2d 381 ) (2010). 8 Sixth Amendment violation and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal . . . .”11 In this case, although Clay concedes he “clearly waived his right to counsel [during] the . . .

2025This was sufficient proof of the [his] commission of the other acts to authorize the admission of this evidence.”). 24 performance prejudiced [him].”37 And as to deficient performance, a claimant must show that “his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”38 And when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a “strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”39 So, to show he was prejudiced by the performance of his coun

2025This was sufficient proof of the [his] commission of the other acts to authorize the admission of this evidence.”). 24 performance prejudiced [him].”37 And as to deficient performance, a claimant must show that “his attorney performed at trial in an objectively unreasonable way considering all the circumstances and in the light of prevailing professional norms.”38 And when reviewing counsel’s performance, we apply a “strong presumption that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of reasonable professional assistance.”39 So, to show he was prejudiced by the performance of his coun

2021Still got a right to an attorney.”4 Wright 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tyner v. State, 334 Ga. App. 890, 894 (1) ( 780 SE2d 494 ) (2015), quoting Wilkerson v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 204 (2) (b) ( 686 SE2d 648 ) (2009). 4 The full conversation between the trial court and Wright is as follows: - WRIGHT: Your Honor, I have not been able to have my motion to suppress evidence.

2021Still got a right to an attorney.”4 Wright 3 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Tyner v. State, 334 Ga. App. 890, 894 (1) ( 780 SE2d 494 ) (2015), quoting Wilkerson v. State, 286 Ga. 201, 204 (2) (b) ( 686 SE2d 648 ) (2009). 4 The full conversation between the trial court and Wright is as follows: - WRIGHT: Your Honor, I have not been able to have my motion to suppress evidence.

2019As should be apparent from the principles enunciated in Descamps and Mathis , Nordahl's jury trial waiver extends only to the elements of the crime for which he was sentenced, not to any underlying or "brute" facts that were not necessarily resolved by the entry of his plea. "[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, he waives his right to a jury determination of only that offense's elements; whatever he says, or fails to say, about superfluous facts cannot license a later sentencing court to impose extra punishment." Descamps, 570 U. S. at 270 (III) (A), 133 S.Ct. 2276 .

2019As should be apparent from the principles enunciated in Descamps and Mathis , Nordahl's jury trial waiver extends only to the elements of the crime for which he was sentenced, not to any underlying or "brute" facts that were not necessarily resolved by the entry of his plea. "[W]hen a defendant pleads guilty to a crime, he waives his right to a jury determination of only that offense's elements; whatever he says, or fails to say, about superfluous facts cannot license a later sentencing court to impose extra punishment." Descamps, 570 U. S. at 270 (III) (A), 133 S.Ct. 2276 .

2009If an examination of the record reveals that a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a post-waiver request for counsel during trial, it is a structural Sixth Amendment violation, Leveto, 540 F.3d at 207-208 , and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal, United States v. Proctor, 166 F.3d 396, 406, n. 13 (1st Cir.1999); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 149 , 126 S.Ct. 2557 , 165 L.Ed.2d 409 (2006).

2009If an examination of the record reveals that a trial court has abused its discretion in denying a post-waiver request for counsel during trial, it is a structural Sixth Amendment violation, Leveto, 540 F3d at 207-208 , and is not subject to a harmless error analysis on direct appeal, United States v. Proctor, 166 F3d 396, 406, n. 13 (1st Cir. 1999); United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U. S. 140, 149 (126 SC 2557, 165 LE2d 409) (2006).

2012State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 507 ( 696 SE2d 613 ) (2010).

2012State v. Lattimore, 287 Ga. 505, 507 ( 696 SE2d 613 ) (2010).

2010This presumptive prejudice, however, “cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kramer, supra, 287 Ga. App. at 800-801 (1).

2010This presumptive prejudice, however, “cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Kramer, supra, 287 Ga. App. at 800-801 (1).

2001The trial court was primarily concerned about the seven-year delay and the loss of evidence which was potentially very helpful to the defense. [T]he Supreme Court [of the United States] in Doggett held that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable." [Cit.] The Court held that the presumption of prejudice that arises from the passage of time strengthens with the length of the delay and may tilt the prejudice factor in a defendant's favor, although it may not alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria. [Cit.] Boseman v. Stat

2001The trial court was primarily concerned about the seven-year delay and the loss of evidence which was potentially very helpful to the defense. [T]he Supreme Court [of the United States] in Doggett held that "consideration of prejudice is not limited to the specifically demonstrable." [Cit.] The Court held that the presumption of prejudice that arises from the passage of time strengthens with the length of the delay and may tilt the prejudice factor in a defendant's favor, although it may not alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria. [Cit.] Boseman v. Stat

2016(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pickett, supra, 288 Ga. at 677 (2) (c) (4). 19 (i) In this case, Smith correctly asserts that the trial court erred by failing to take into account the presumption of prejudice arising from the five-year delay in this case when considering this phase of the balancing test.

2016(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Pickett, supra, 288 Ga. at 677 (2) (c) (4). 19 (i) In this case, Smith correctly asserts that the trial court erred by failing to take into account the presumption of prejudice arising from the five-year delay in this case when considering this phase of the balancing test.

2024A violation of this right is not automatically established by virtue of an extended delay, because “none of the[] four factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 455 ( 667 SE2d 361 ) (2008); see also Fallen, supra, 289 Ga. at 248 (1) (“[T]he presumptive prejudice arising from delay cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.

2024A violation of this right is not automatically established by virtue of an extended delay, because “none of the[] four factors is either a necessary or sufficient condition to the finding of a deprivation of the right.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Harris v. State, 284 Ga. 455, 455 ( 667 SE2d 361 ) (2008); see also Fallen, supra, 289 Ga. at 248 (1) (“[T]he presumptive prejudice arising from delay cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.

2019No specific showing of prejudice [is] required" in such a case. (citations omitted)); Charleston v. State , 292 Ga. 678 , 682-683 (4) (a), 743 S.E.2d 1 (2013) ( Cronic established a narrow exception to the general Strickland standard, which exception applies only when counsel's failure to subject the State's case to adversarial testing is complete and occurs throughout the proceeding, not merely at specific points).

2019No specific showing of prejudice [is] required" in such a case. (citations omitted)); Charleston v. State , 292 Ga. 678 , 682-683 (4) (a), 743 S.E.2d 1 (2013) ( Cronic established a narrow exception to the general Strickland standard, which exception applies only when counsel's failure to subject the State's case to adversarial testing is complete and occurs throughout the proceeding, not merely at specific points).

2010See id. at 87, n. 13 (noting, but declining to address, the possibility that a trial court’s denial of expert funds might raise Sixth Amendment concerns, in addition to due process concerns, that could be considered on direct appeal); Strickland, supra, 466 U. S. at 686 (noting that there are Sixth Amendment claims regarding governmental interference with the right to counsel that are distinct from claims regarding trial counsel’s own deficient performance).

2009But see Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 , 87 n. 13, 105 S.Ct. 1087 , 84 L.Ed.2d 53 (1985) (noting, but declining to address, the possibility that a trial court's denial of expert funds might raise Sixth Amendment concerns, in addition to due process concerns, that could be considered on direct appeal); Strickland v. Washington, supra, 466 U.S. at 686 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 (noting that there are Sixth Amendment claims regarding governmental interference with the right to counsel that are distinct from claims regarding trial counsel's own deficient performance); Head v. Ferrell, 274 Ga. 399, 401 (III),

2010See Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 692 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000).

2010See Morrow v. State, 272 Ga. 691, 692 (1), 532 S.E.2d 78 (2000).

2000In this case, that "same compensation" is broken down on an hourly basis and is paid only for the actual time Reddick spends performing the limited duties of the DA pro tem as outlined in the court's order of appointment. [4] Compare Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (finding that despite waiver, defendant's unwise choice of counsel who had a conflict of interest resulted in a Sixth Amendment violation because of inadequate assistance). [5] See Reese v. Ga. Power Co., su

2000In this case, that "same compensation" is broken down on an hourly basis and is paid only for the actual time Reddick spends performing the limited duties of the DA pro tem as outlined in the court's order of appointment. [4] Compare Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153 , 108 S.Ct. 1692 , 100 L.Ed.2d 140 (1988); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 344 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980) (finding that despite waiver, defendant's unwise choice of counsel who had a conflict of interest resulted in a Sixth Amendment violation because of inadequate assistance). [5] See Reese v. Ga. Power Co., su