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15 South Dakota opinions name it 1 courts 1969–2026 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Dakota courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Crowe v. Stategreen2 sentences1994However, the legal counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to “investigate and consider possible defenses” and “other procedures” and to “exercise his good faith judgment thereon.” Crowe v. State, 86 S.D. 264, 271 , 194 N.W.2d 234, 238 (1972). 1994However, the legal counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to “investigate and consider possible defenses” and “other procedures” and to “exercise his good faith judgment thereon.” Crowe v. State, 86 S.D. 264, 271 , 194 N.W.2d 234, 238 (1972). | 2 | 2 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1994“While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria ... it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2693 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 531 (1992) (citation omitted). 1994“While such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria ... it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay.” Doggett v. United States, — U.S. -, -, 112 S.Ct. 2686, 2693 , 120 L.Ed.2d 520, 531 (1992) (citation omitted). | 1 | 2 |
State v. Kihegagreen2 sentences2019"This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness'[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness'[s] testimony." Id. (quoting State v. Carothers , 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610 , 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that "the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of no 2019“This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness’[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’[s] testimony.” Id. (quoting State v. Carothers, 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610, 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that “the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of non- | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Donville Jamesgreen2 sentences2019"This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness'[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness'[s] testimony." Id. (quoting State v. Carothers , 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610 , 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that "the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of no 2019“This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness’[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’[s] testimony.” Id. (quoting State v. Carothers, 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610, 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that “the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of non- | 1 | 2 |
State v. Steffesgreen2 sentences2025Id. (quoting State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 613 (N.D. 1993)). [¶66.] Regarding bad faith, the circuit court found that “the defense cannot show that the Spearfish Police Department, the State’s Attorney’s Office, or the Rapid City Police Department engaged in any bad faith.” Rogers claims that this finding is erroneous in light of the circuit court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress where it found that law enforcement intentionally and knowingly violated Rogers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by arranging for a jail visit between Derrek and Rogers, who was represented by counsel, 2025Id. (quoting State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 613 (N.D. 1993)). [¶66.] Regarding bad faith, the circuit court found that “the defense cannot show that the Spearfish Police Department, the State’s Attorney’s Office, or the Rapid City Police Department engaged in any bad faith.” Rogers claims that this finding is erroneous in light of the circuit court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress where it found that law enforcement intentionally and knowingly violated Rogers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by arranging for a jail visit between Derrek and Rogers, who was represented by counsel, | 1 | 1 |
State v. Fraziergreen2 sentences2007See State v. Herrmann, 2004 SD 53, ¶ 23 , 679 N.W.2d 503, 510 (finding that any Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error); State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶¶ 27-33 , 622 N.W.2d 246, 257-259 (finding that confrontation error in the admission of hearsay was not harmless). [¶ 19.] “The harmless error doctrine preserves the essential purpose of criminal trials: to decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence. 2007See State v. Herrmann, 2004 SD 53, ¶ 23 , 679 N.W.2d 503, 510 (finding that any Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error); State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶¶ 27-33 , 622 N.W.2d 246, 257-259 (finding that confrontation error in the admission of hearsay was not harmless). [¶ 19.] “The harmless error doctrine preserves the essential purpose of criminal trials: to decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence. | 1 | 1 |
State v. Herrmanngreen2 sentences2007See State v. Herrmann, 2004 SD 53, ¶ 23 , 679 N.W.2d 503, 510 (finding that any Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error); State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶¶ 27-33 , 622 N.W.2d 246, 257-259 (finding that confrontation error in the admission of hearsay was not harmless). [¶ 19.] “The harmless error doctrine preserves the essential purpose of criminal trials: to decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence. 2007See State v. Herrmann, 2004 SD 53, ¶ 23 , 679 N.W.2d 503, 510 (finding that any Sixth Amendment violation was harmless error); State v. Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶¶ 27-33 , 622 N.W.2d 246, 257-259 (finding that confrontation error in the admission of hearsay was not harmless). [¶ 19.] “The harmless error doctrine preserves the essential purpose of criminal trials: to decide a defendant’s guilt or innocence. | 1 | 1 |
Delaware v. Van Arsdallgreen2 sentences2007The rule ‘promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.’ ” Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶ 30 , 622 N.W.2d at 258 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 684-685 (1986)). 2007The rule ‘promotes public respect for the criminal process by focusing on the underlying fairness of the trial rather than on the virtually inevitable presence of immaterial error.’ ” Frazier, 2001 SD 19, ¶ 30 , 622 N.W.2d at 258 (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 , 106 S.Ct. 1431, 1436 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674, 684-685 (1986)). | 1 | 1 |
Matter of Chamleygreen2 sentences1997See, In re Chamley, 349 N.W.2d 56 (S.D.1984) (at one point, Chamley tore up his state bar license and mailed pieces to various individuals, including the Chief Justice of this Court). 28 [II75.] In addition, Chamley has played the other side of this Sixth Amendment issue ■with the Court before. 1997See, In re Chamley, 349 N.W.2d 56 (S.D.1984) (at one point, Chamley tore up his state bar license and mailed pieces to various individuals, including the *626 Chief Justice of this Court). [28] [¶ 75.] In addition, Chamley has played the other side of this Sixth Amendment issue with the Court before. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Dakota. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Carothers
green
2 sentences2019"This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness'[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness'[s] testimony." Id. (quoting State v. Carothers , 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610 , 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that "the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of no 2019“This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness’[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’[s] testimony.” Id. (quoting State v. Carothers, 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610, 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that “the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of non- | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2019“We have also noted that when this kind of out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, ‘the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the person repeating the out-of-court statement.’” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 2009 S.D. 67, ¶ 23 , 771 N.W.2d 360, 369 ). [¶15.] We need not address Podzimek’s assertion that the statements admitted by the circuit court were testimonial hearsay which violated Podzimek’s Confrontation Clause rights. 2019“We have also noted that when this kind of out-of-court statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, ‘the Confrontation Clause is satisfied if the defendant had the opportunity to cross-examine the person repeating the out-of-court statement.’” Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 2009 S.D. 67, ¶ 23 , 771 N.W.2d 360, 369 ). [¶15.] We need not address Podzimek’s assertion that the statements admitted by the circuit court were testimonial hearsay which violated Podzimek’s Confrontation Clause rights. | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Spaniol
green
2 sentences2019"This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness'[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness'[s] testimony." Id. (quoting State v. Carothers , 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610 , 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that "the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of no 2019“This right is generally satisfied when the defense is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose a witness’[s] infirmities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight to the witness’[s] testimony.” Id. (quoting State v. Carothers, 2006 S.D. 100 , ¶ 16, 724 N.W.2d 610, 617 ). [¶14.] This Court has stated, however, that “the Sixth Amendment does not bar out-of-court statements when the statement is not offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted; thus, the Sixth Amendment poses no bar to the admission of non- | 2 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Jones
green
2 sentences2026Jones, 521 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 ). 2026Jones, 521 N.W.2d at 668 (quoting Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656 ). | 1 | 2026–2026 |
State v. Bousum
green
2 sentences2025Id. (quoting State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 613 (N.D. 1993)). [¶66.] Regarding bad faith, the circuit court found that “the defense cannot show that the Spearfish Police Department, the State’s Attorney’s Office, or the Rapid City Police Department engaged in any bad faith.” Rogers claims that this finding is erroneous in light of the circuit court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress where it found that law enforcement intentionally and knowingly violated Rogers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by arranging for a jail visit between Derrek and Rogers, who was represented by counsel, 2025Id. (quoting State v. Steffes, 500 N.W.2d 608, 613 (N.D. 1993)). [¶66.] Regarding bad faith, the circuit court found that “the defense cannot show that the Spearfish Police Department, the State’s Attorney’s Office, or the Rapid City Police Department engaged in any bad faith.” Rogers claims that this finding is erroneous in light of the circuit court’s ruling on a pretrial motion to suppress where it found that law enforcement intentionally and knowingly violated Rogers’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel by arranging for a jail visit between Derrek and Rogers, who was represented by counsel, | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Podzimek
green
1 sentence2020Therefore, when viewed against the cumulative nature of other evidence in this case, we “may confidently say, on the whole record” that even if the court erred by admitting the transcript of Agnes’s testimony, Rodriguez’s alleged Sixth Amendment violation was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Podzimek, 2019 S.D. 43, ¶ 15 , 932 N.W.2d at 146 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Podzimek
green
1 sentence2020Therefore, when viewed against the cumulative nature of other evidence in this case, we “may confidently say, on the whole record” that even if the court erred by admitting the transcript of Agnes’s testimony, Rodriguez’s alleged Sixth Amendment violation was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.” See Podzimek, 2019 S.D. 43, ¶ 15 , 932 N.W.2d at 146 . | 1 | 2020–2020 |
State v. Chamley
green
2 sentences1997In State v. Chamley, 310 N.W.2d 153 (S.D.1981), Chamley was charged with a misdemeanor assault, and the trial court granted Chamley’s request to represent himself. 1997In State v. Chamley, 310 N.W.2d 153 (S.D.1981), Chamley was charged with a misdemeanor assault, and the trial court granted Chamley's request to represent himself. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Dominic Lasonto Warren
green
1 sentence1996Warren, 16 F.3d at 252 (citing Garcia, 991 F.2d at 492 , which examined Iowa’s jury-selection process). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
United States v. Carlos Javier Garcia
green
1 sentence1996Warren, 16 F.3d at 252 (citing Garcia, 991 F.2d at 492 , which examined Iowa’s jury-selection process). | 1 | 1996–1996 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences1992Thus, we require a more searching or formal inquiry before ■permitting an accused to waive his right to counsel at trial than we require for a Sixth Amendment waiver during post-indictment questioning — not because post-indictment questioning is “less important” than a trial (the analysis that petitioner’s “hierarchical” approach would sug gest) — but because the full “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, ” Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct., at 2541 , during questioning are less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial. 1992Thus, we require a more searching or formal inquiry before ■permitting an accused to waive his right to counsel at trial than we require for a Sixth Amendment waiver during post-indictment questioning — not because post-indictment questioning is “less important” than a trial (the analysis that petitioner’s “hierarchical” approach would sug gest) — but because the full “dangers and disadvantages of self-representation, ” Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 835 , 95 S.Ct., at 2541 , during questioning are less substantial and more obvious to an accused than they are at trial. | 1 | 1992–1992 |
Maine v. Moulton
green
2 sentences1987Id., 474 U.S. at - - -, 106 S.Ct. at 487 -488 n. 12, 88 L.Ed.2d at 496 n. 12, citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). 1987Id., 474 U.S. at - - -, 106 S.Ct. at 487 -488 n. 12, 88 L.Ed.2d at 496 n. 12, citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
United States v. Henry
green
2 sentences1987Id., 474 U.S. at - - -, 106 S.Ct. at 487 -488 n. 12, 88 L.Ed.2d at 496 n. 12, citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). 1987Id., 474 U.S. at - - -, 106 S.Ct. at 487 -488 n. 12, 88 L.Ed.2d at 496 n. 12, citing United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 , 100 S.Ct. 2183 , 65 L.Ed.2d 115 (1980). | 1 | 1987–1987 |
United States v. Garland Jeffers
green
2 sentences1978United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1066 , 96 S.Ct. 805 , 46 L.Ed.2d 656 . 1978United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1066 , 96 S.Ct. 805 , 46 L.Ed.2d 656 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Clark v. Hilliard
green
2 sentences1978United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1066 , 96 S.Ct. 805 , 46 L.Ed.2d 656 . 1978United States v. Jeffers, 520 F.2d 1256 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied 423 U.S. 1066 , 96 S.Ct. 805 , 46 L.Ed.2d 656 . | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Schmerber v. California
green
2 sentences1969Schmerber v. California, 1966, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 . 1969Schmerber v. California, 1966, 384 U.S. 757 , 86 S.Ct. 1826 , 16 L.Ed.2d 908 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.