12 South Carolina opinions name it 2 courts 1975–2019 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by South Carolina courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
William Barnes v. Carlton Joynergreen1 sentence2019See Barnes v. Joyner , 751 F.3d 229 (4th Cir. 2014) (Section 2254 habeas action; holding North Carolina state post-conviction court contravened clearly established federal law by failing to follow Remmer 's rebuttable presumption approach and requirement that hearing be held on juror **236 misconduct claim). | 1 | 1 |
Ard v. Catoegreen2 sentences2017Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 ; Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331 , 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007). 2017Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 ; Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331 , 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sterlinggreen2 sentences2015See Sterling, 377 S.C. at 480 , 661 S.E.2d at 101 (noting a defendant suffered a Sixth Amendment violation when counsel acted under a conflict of interest from the pre-indictment stage until the conclusion of the defendant’s trial). 2015See Sterling, 377 S.C. at 480 , 661 S.E.2d at 101 (noting a defendant suffered a Sixth Amendment violation when counsel acted under a conflict of interest from the pre-indictment stage until the conclusion of the defendant’s trial). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Cross v. William Li, and Danny Hogan, Defendant-Crossgreen2 sentences2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) 2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) | 1 | 1 |
Bernard Depree v. A.G. Thomas, Warden and Michael J. Bowersgreen2 sentences2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) 2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) | 1 | 1 |
Lynn Murphy Creel v. Gary L. Johnson, Director, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, Institutional Divisiongreen2 sentences2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) 2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) | 1 | 1 |
Mickens v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2008See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (recognizing that until a defendant shows that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of a Sixth Amendment violation); Fuller v. State, 347 S.C. 630 , 557 S.E.2d 664 (2001) (holding an actual conflict of interest occurs where an attorney owes a duty to a party whose interests are adverse to the defendant’s interests). 2008See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (recognizing that until a defendant shows that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of a Sixth Amendment violation); Fuller v. State, 347 S.C. 630 , 557 S.E.2d 664 (2001) (holding an actual conflict of interest occurs where an attorney owes a duty to a party whose interests are adverse to the defendant’s interests). | 1 | 1 |
John R. Hoffman v. William D. Leeke, Commissionergreen2 sentences2008See United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.1991) (presuming prejudice where actual conflict adversely affected pretrial strategies as well as the defense at trial); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 290 (4th Cir.1990) (holding defendant suffered a Sixth Amendment violation where counsel acted under a conflict of interest from the pre-indictment stage until the conclusion of defendants trial). 2008See United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.1991) (presuming prejudice where actual conflict adversely affected pretrial strategies as well as the defense at trial); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 290 (4th Cir.1990) (holding defendant suffered a Sixth Amendment violation where counsel acted under a conflict of interest from the pre-indictment stage until the conclusion of defendants trial). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Gordon R. Tatum, Jr.green2 sentences2008See United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.1991) (presuming prejudice where actual conflict adversely affected pretrial strategies as well as the defense at trial); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 290 (4th Cir.1990) (holding defendant suffered a Sixth Amendment violation where counsel acted under a conflict of interest from the pre-indictment stage until the conclusion of defendants trial). 2008See United States v. Tatum, 943 F.2d 370, 380 (4th Cir.1991) (presuming prejudice where actual conflict adversely affected pretrial strategies as well as the defense at trial); Hoffman v. Leeke, 903 F.2d 280, 290 (4th Cir.1990) (holding defendant suffered a Sixth Amendment violation where counsel acted under a conflict of interest from the pre-indictment stage until the conclusion of defendants trial). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Gregorygreen2 sentences2008See State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150 , 612 S.E.2d 449 (2005) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at trial); Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140 , 551 S.E.2d 254 (2001) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at the plea hearing). 2008See State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150 , 612 S.E.2d 449 (2005) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at trial); Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140 , 551 S.E.2d 254 (2001) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at the plea hearing). | 1 | 1 |
Pope v. Pategreen2 sentences2003See Ex parte Foster, 350 S.C. 238 , 565 S.E.2d 290 (2002) ("The unnecessary appointment of lawyers to serve as counsel or GALs places an undue burden on the lawyers of this State... [A] lawyer should not be appointed as counsel for an indigent unless the indigent has a right to appointed counsel under the state or federal constitution, a statute, a court rule or the case law of this State"). [4] The concurring opinion would engraft the Sixth Amendment standard of effective assistance of counsel onto an attorney appointed pursuant to the Due Process clause. 2003See Ex parte Foster, 350 S.C. 238 , 565 S.E.2d 290 (2002) ("The unnecessary appointment of lawyers to serve as counsel or GALs places an undue burden on the lawyers of this State... [A] lawyer should not be appointed as counsel for an indigent unless the indigent has a right to appointed counsel under the state or federal constitution, a statute, a court rule or the case law of this State"). [4] The concurring opinion would engraft the Sixth Amendment standard of effective assistance of counsel onto an attorney appointed pursuant to the Due Process clause. | 1 | 1 |
Gagnon v. Scarpellired2 sentences2003See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 & n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1756 . 2003See Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 & n. 3, 93 S.Ct. 1756 . | 1 | 1 |
B. Frank Thomas v. J.D. Cox, Wardengreen2 sentences2000In Thomas v. Cox, 708 F.2d 132 (4th Cir.1983), the Fourth Circuit likewise found no Sixth Amendment violation where the inmate/informant was “self-initiated” and had no prior arrangement with the government. 2000The court noted [F]or whatever reason [the informant] acted — whether “conscience,” as the state court found, or “curiosity,” as he testified, or even conceivably from an unencouraged hope to curry favor — he could not properly be characterized, as could the informant in Henry , as “a Government agent expressly commissioned to secure evidence.” Id. at 136 (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Smithgreen2 sentences1998See, e.g., Smith, 315 S.C. at 552-53 , 446 S.E.2d at 414 (finding any Sixth Amendment violation harmless in part because witness was impeached with general pending charges). 1998See, e.g., Smith, 315 S.C. at 552-53 , 446 S.E.2d at 414 (finding any Sixth Amendment violation harmless in part because witness was impeached with general pending charges). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in South Carolina. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washington
green
2 sentences2017Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 ; Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331 , 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007). 2017Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 , 104 S.Ct. at 2066 , 80 L.Ed.2d at 695 ; Ard v. Catoe, 372 S.C. 318, 331 , 642 S.E.2d 590, 596 (2007). | 4 | 2008–2017 |
United States v. Lawson
green
1 sentence2019The scope and currency of the Remmer presumption has split the federal circuits, but it "remains [a]live and well in the Fourth Circuit," United States v. Lawson , 677 F.3d 629 , 642 (4th Cir. 2012), and therefore controls our approach to the Sixth Amendment issue Green raises. | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Massiah v. United States
green
2 sentences2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) 2010In Massiah v. U.S., 377 U.S. 201, 206 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964) the United States Supreme Court held “that the petitioner was denied the basic protections of that guarantee when there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words, which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been indicted and in the absence of his counsel.” That language has given rise to a two-part test to *621 determine whether a violation of the Sixth Amendment has occurred: “[t]o find a Sixth Amendment violation, the statements in question must have been (1) | 1 | 2010–2010 |
Fuller v. State
green
2 sentences2008See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (recognizing that until a defendant shows that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of a Sixth Amendment violation); Fuller v. State, 347 S.C. 630 , 557 S.E.2d 664 (2001) (holding an actual conflict of interest occurs where an attorney owes a duty to a party whose interests are adverse to the defendant’s interests). 2008See Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 175 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 (2002) (recognizing that until a defendant shows that counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of a Sixth Amendment violation); Fuller v. State, 347 S.C. 630 , 557 S.E.2d 664 (2001) (holding an actual conflict of interest occurs where an attorney owes a duty to a party whose interests are adverse to the defendant’s interests). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Thomas v. State
green
2 sentences2008See State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150 , 612 S.E.2d 449 (2005) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at trial); Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140 , 551 S.E.2d 254 (2001) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at the plea hearing). 2008See State v. Gregory, 364 S.C. 150 , 612 S.E.2d 449 (2005) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at trial); Thomas v. State, 346 S.C. 140 , 551 S.E.2d 254 (2001) (finding a per se Sixth Amendment violation where attorney acted under an actual conflict of interest at the plea hearing). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cuyler v. Sullivan
green
2 sentences2008Stated differently, “prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). 2008Stated differently, “prejudice is presumed only if the defendant demonstrates that counsel ‘actively represented conflicting interests’ and that ‘an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer’s performance.’ ” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 692 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 350 , 100 S.Ct. 1708 , 64 L.Ed.2d 333 (1980)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
State v. Quattlebaum
green
2 sentences2007Id. at 448 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 . 2007Id. at 448 , 527 S.E.2d at 109 . | 1 | 2007–2007 |
In Re Issac J.
green
2 sentences2003In support of this proposition, that opinion cites a California Court of Appeals decision, In re Issac J., 4 Cal.App.4th 525 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (4th Dist.1992), and an opinion from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, In re Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39 , 573 A.2d 1077 (1990). 2003In support of this proposition, that opinion cites a California Court of Appeals decision, In re Issac J., 4 Cal.App.4th 525 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (4th Dist.1992), and an opinion from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, In re Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39 , 573 A.2d 1077 (1990). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Matter of Smith
green
2 sentences2003In support of this proposition, that opinion cites a California Court of Appeals decision, In re Issac J., 4 Cal.App.4th 525 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (4th Dist.1992), and an opinion from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, In re Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39 , 573 A.2d 1077 (1990). 2003In support of this proposition, that opinion cites a California Court of Appeals decision, In re Issac J., 4 Cal.App.4th 525 , 6 Cal.Rptr.2d 65 (4th Dist.1992), and an opinion from the Superior Court of Pennsylvania, In re Smith, 393 Pa.Super. 39 , 573 A.2d 1077 (1990). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Weatherford v. Bursey
green
2 sentences2000Id. at 558 , 97 S.Ct. 837 . 2000Id. at 558 , 97 S.Ct. 837 . | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Parker v. Levy
green
2 sentences1975The Sixth Amendment requirement is not to be applied in a hypertechnical, artificial manner, Parker v. Levy , 417 U.S. 733 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed. (2d) 439 (1974); Smith v. Goguen , 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed. (2d) 605 (1974). 1975The Sixth Amendment requirement is not to be applied in a hypertechnical, artificial manner, Parker v. Levy , 417 U.S. 733 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed. (2d) 439 (1974); Smith v. Goguen , 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed. (2d) 605 (1974). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Smith v. Goguen
green
2 sentences1975The Sixth Amendment requirement is not to be applied in a hypertechnical, artificial manner, Parker v. Levy , 417 U.S. 733 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed. (2d) 439 (1974); Smith v. Goguen , 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed. (2d) 605 (1974). 1975The Sixth Amendment requirement is not to be applied in a hypertechnical, artificial manner, Parker v. Levy , 417 U.S. 733 , 94 S.Ct. 2547 , 41 L.Ed. (2d) 439 (1974); Smith v. Goguen , 415 U.S. 566 , 94 S.Ct. 1242, 1247 , 39 L.Ed. (2d) 605 (1974). | 1 | 1975–1975 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.