Sixth Amendment claim in Pennsylvania

2024See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2006) (“a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of state PCRA review under § -8- J-A10030-24 9544(a)(2)”).

2024See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2006) (“a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of state PCRA review under § -8- J-A10030-24 9544(a)(2)”).

2002Moreover, although this Court obviously cannot dilute the substantive standard governing claims of counsel ineffectiveness, particularly when the Sixth Amendment right to counsel is at issue, Williams, 782 A.2d at 525 n. 5 (“we make no suggestion here that there should be a relaxation of the substantive Sixth Amendment standard”), we indicated in Williams that we would continue to afford some latitude in construing the pleadings in capital PCRA appeals. 782 A.2d at 525 .

2002See Williams, 782 A.2d at 525 & n. 5 ("we make no suggestion here that there should be a relaxation of the substantive Sixth Amendment standard").

2025See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (“Although a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim ... a good Fourth Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief.”).

2025See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 (1986) (“Although a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is necessary to the success of a Sixth Amendment claim ... a good Fourth Amendment claim alone will not earn a prisoner federal habeas relief.”).

2014Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001), our Supreme Court “interpreted the language from Section 9543(a)(2)(ii) requiring proof that counsel’s ineffectiveness ‘so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place’ as embodying the prejudice element of the Sixth Amendment standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” Id. at 129, quoting -6- J-S41037-14 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

2014Dadario v. Goldberg, 773 A.2d 126 (Pa. 2001), our Supreme Court “interpreted the language from Section 9543(a)(2)(ii) requiring proof that counsel’s ineffectiveness ‘so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place’ as embodying the prejudice element of the Sixth Amendment standard for ineffectiveness claims articulated in Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)].” Id. at 129, quoting -6- J-S41037-14 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(ii).

2021See Commonwealth v. Belak, 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n. 10 (Pa. 2003) (concluding that no Apprendi relief should be due based upon failure to submit question to jury regarding whether victims were home during burglaries, when the appellant previously stipulated to that fact).

2020Accord Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 274-75 (2007) (citing Apprendi, supra) (“As this Court’s decisions instruct, the Federal Constitution’s jury-trial guarantee proscribes a sentencing scheme that allows a judge to impose a sentence above the statutory maximum based on a fact, other than a prior conviction, not found by a jury or admitted by the defendant.”); Commonwealth v. Belak, 825 A.2d 1252 , 1256 n.10 (Pa. 2003) (where defendant challenged enhancement because fact was not submitted to jury, Court found no Apprendi relief due since defendant stipulated at sentencing that victim

2004See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claims; thus, while a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment issue, a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v.

2004See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claims; thus, while a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment issue, a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v.

2010See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 53-61 , 888 A.2d 564, 568-73 (2005) (after sua sponte directing parties to brief issue of whether to modify approach to PCRA's previous litigation provision, Court revisited precedent and recognized that, in accordance with Supreme Court case law, a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of review under the PCRA); Cimaszewski v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 582 Pa. 27, 45 , 868 A.2d 416, 427 (2005) (in light of United States Supreme Court case law, sua sponte reconsidering and overruling year-old decision i

2010See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45, 53-61 , 888 A.2d 564, 568-73 (2005) (after sua sponte directing parties to brief issue of whether to modify approach to PCRA's previous litigation provision, Court revisited precedent and recognized that, in accordance with Supreme Court case law, a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness raises a distinct legal ground for purposes of review under the PCRA); Cimaszewski v. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 582 Pa. 27, 45 , 868 A.2d 416, 427 (2005) (in light of United States Supreme Court case law, sua sponte reconsidering and overruling year-old decision i

2019Kennedy, 959 A.2d at 922 (finding Sixth Amendment issue waived where defendant failed to raise objection on this basis at trial).

2019Kennedy , 959 A.2d at 922 (finding Sixth Amendment issue waived where defendant failed to raise objection on this basis at trial).

2017See Commonwealth v. Hanible, 612 Pa. 183 , 30 A.3d 426, 442 (2011) (Sixth Amendment claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raises issue cognizable under PCRA even if underlying claim of error has been previously litigated), citing Commonwealth v. Collins, 585 Pa. 45 , 888 A.2d 564, 573 (2005).

2017See Commonwealth v. Hanible, 30 A.3d 426, 442 (Pa. 2011) (Sixth Amendment claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel raises issue cognizable under PCRA even if underlying claim of error has been previously litigated), citing Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005).

2026Cronic held that a Sixth Amendment violation may be found when “circumstances [exist] that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 , (2008), citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 .

2026Cronic held that a Sixth Amendment violation may be found when “circumstances [exist] that are so likely to prejudice the accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.” Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S. 120, 124 , (2008), citing Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658 .

2004See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claims; thus, while a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment issue, a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v.

2004See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 382 , 106 S.Ct. 2574, 2586-87 , 91 L.Ed.2d 305 (1986) (constitutional ineffectiveness standard under Strickland v. Washington “differs significantly from the elements of proof applicable to” Fourth Amendment claims; thus, while a meritorious Fourth Amendment issue is essential to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffectiveness arising from failure to pursue a Fourth Amendment issue, a meritorious Fourth Amendment claim alone does not prove ineffectiveness; Strickland “gross incompetence” test must be met to prevail on Sixth Amendment claim); Commonwealth v.

2018The instant facts are largely identical to the situation examined in Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2004).

2018The instant facts are largely identical to the situation examined in Commonwealth v. Gribble, 863 A.2d 455 (Pa. 2004).

2006See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831, 844 (2003) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific and does not attach until initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings.... ”); Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271 , 639 A.2d 421, 436 (1994) (where informant’s remark did not deliberately elicit incriminating statement, appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim must fail).

2006See Commonwealth v. Bomar, 573 Pa. 426 , 826 A.2d 831, 844 (2003) (Sixth Amendment right to counsel is “offense-specific and does not attach until initiation of adversarial judicial proceedings.... ”); Commonwealth v. Mayhue, 536 Pa. 271 , 639 A.2d 421, 436 (1994) (where informant’s remark did not deliberately elicit incriminating statement, appellant’s Sixth Amendment claim must fail).

2016The dissent in Hurrell-Harring rejected the premise that systematic underfunding creates a Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that “constructive denial of counsel is a branch from the Strickland tree, with Cronic applying only when the appointed attorney’s representation is so egregious that it’s as if [the] defendant had no attorney at all.” Hurrell-Harring, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 , 930 N.E.2d at 229 (Pigott, J., dissenting).

2016The dissent in Hurrell-Harring rejected the premise that systematic underfunding creates a Sixth Amendment violation, explaining that “constructive denial of counsel is a branch from the Strickland tree, with Cronic applying only when the appointed attorney’s representation is so egregious that it’s as if [the] defendant had no attorney at all.” Hurrell-Harring, 904 N.Y.S.2d 296 , 930 N.E.2d at 229 (Pigott, J., dissenting).

2023Having to stand trial, not 28 Whereas we apply a three-prong test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Pierce, 527 A.2d at 975-76 , the Sixth Amendment’s test is two-prong.

2023Having to stand trial, not 28 Whereas we apply a three-prong test to evaluate ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Pierce, 527 A.2d at 975-76 , the Sixth Amendment’s test is two-prong.

2002The Court today stunningly grants state collateral relief from two death sentences based upon a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel while completely ignoring the governing constitutional standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 1 Rather than following the two-part test for appellate counsel ineffectiveness reaffirmed in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-89 , 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)), the Court applies a per se test.

2002The Court today stunningly grants state collateral relief from two death sentences based upon a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of direct appeal counsel while completely ignoring the governing constitutional standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court. 1 Rather than following the two-part test for appellate counsel ineffectiveness reaffirmed in Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 285-89 , 120 S.Ct. 746 , 145 L.Ed.2d 756 (2000) (applying Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984)), the Court applies a per se test.

2026Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (citation and footnote omitted); see Tedford, 960 A.2d at 14 (where PCRA court improperly disposes of ineffective assistance claim as previously litigated, remand to PCRA court to consider separate Sixth Amendment merits of claim is not required where claim is “obviously deficient for other reasons”) (citation omitted).

2026Commonwealth v. Collins, 888 A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (citation and footnote omitted); see Tedford, 960 A.2d at 14 (where PCRA court improperly disposes of ineffective assistance claim as previously litigated, remand to PCRA court to consider separate Sixth Amendment merits of claim is not required where claim is “obviously deficient for other reasons”) (citation omitted).

2023See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 . -8- J-A09032-22 Here, the parties agree that the Sixth Amendment analysis in Cobb is instructive.

2023See Cobb, 532 U.S. at 168 . -8- J-A09032-22 Here, the parties agree that the Sixth Amendment analysis in Cobb is instructive.

2002See id. at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2538 . 11 Second, the Court has determined that certain hearsay statements marked with sufficient indicia of reliability may be admitted despite the absence of the witness from trial over a Sixth Amendment challenge.

2002See id. at 65 , 100 S.Ct. at 2538 . 11 Second, the Court has determined that certain hearsay statements marked with sufficient indicia of reliability may be admitted despite the absence of the witness from trial over a Sixth Amendment challenge.

2011Commonwealth's Brief at 28 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) and Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 ). [30] The Commonwealth further notes the relevant standard for determining if a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred set forth by the high Court in the case of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), which expressly barred the use of statements "deliberately elicited" by police from an indicted individual in the absence of counsel.

2011Commonwealth's Brief at 28 (citing Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 , 101 S.Ct. 1880 , 68 L.Ed.2d 378 (1981) and Jackson, 475 U.S. at 636 , 106 S.Ct. 1404 ). [30] The Commonwealth further notes the relevant standard for determining if a Sixth Amendment violation has occurred set forth by the high Court in the case of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), which expressly barred the use of statements "deliberately elicited" by police from an indicted individual in the absence of counsel.