Sixth Amendment claim in Indiana

2019Moreover, to the extent Templin suggests trial counsel failed to adequately apprise the court of mental-health considerations, counsel 8 To the extent Templin was concerned he would waive the claim by omitting it, “a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, if not raised on direct appeal, may be presented in postconviction proceedings.” Woods, 701 N.E.2d at 1220 .

2019Moreover, to the extent Templin suggests trial counsel failed to adequately apprise the court of mental-health considerations, counsel 8 To the extent Templin was concerned he would waive the claim by omitting it, “a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, if not raised on direct appeal, may be presented in postconviction proceedings.” Woods, 701 N.E.2d at 1220 .

2005Finally, regarding Davis's sentence, I disagree with the majority that he waived his claim of a.Sixth Amendment violation by failing to object during a sentencing hearing conducted before our Supreme Court decided Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679 (Ind.2005).

2005See Smylie v. State, 823 N.E.2d 679, 690 (Ind.2005) (finding failure to raise Sixth Amendment objection to trial court does not constitute forfeiture of a Blakely issue for purposes of appellate review).

2002See also Sawyer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Ind.1997)("[The defendant], having once litigated his Sixth Amendment claim concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, is not entitled to litigate it again, by alleging different grounds."); Morris v. State, 466 N.E.2d 13, 14 (Ind.1984)("Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner gave several additional examples of his counsel's alleged ineffective, ness during the post-conviction hearing, a consideration of the ineffectiveness issue would constitute review of an issue already decided on direct appeal.").

2001In either case, the earlier ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective is res judicata."); Sawyer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Ind.1997) ("[The defendant], having once litigated his Sixth Amendment claim concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, is not entitled to litigate it again, by alleging different grounds."); Morris v. State, 466 N.E.2d 13, 14 (Ind.1984) ("Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner gave several additional examples of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness during the post-conviction hearing, a consideration of the ineffectiveness issue would constitute review of

2025We cannot agree. [14] The trial court correctly informed Hill that he had waived his right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. “[A] defendant who chooses to proceed pro se must accept the burdens and hazards of self- representation and may not assert a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Warr v. State, 877 N.E.2d 817, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 1987)).

2025We cannot agree. [14] The trial court correctly informed Hill that he had waived his right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. “[A] defendant who chooses to proceed pro se must accept the burdens and hazards of self- representation and may not assert a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Warr v. State, 877 N.E.2d 817, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 1987)).

2002See also Sawyer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Ind.1997)("[The defendant], having once litigated his Sixth Amendment claim concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, is not entitled to litigate it again, by alleging different grounds."); Morris v. State, 466 N.E.2d 13, 14 (Ind.1984)("Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner gave several additional examples of his counsel's alleged ineffective, ness during the post-conviction hearing, a consideration of the ineffectiveness issue would constitute review of an issue already decided on direct appeal.").

2001In either case, the earlier ruling that trial counsel was not ineffective is res judicata."); Sawyer v. State, 679 N.E.2d 1328, 1329 (Ind.1997) ("[The defendant], having once litigated his Sixth Amendment claim concerning ineffective assistance of counsel, is not entitled to litigate it again, by alleging different grounds."); Morris v. State, 466 N.E.2d 13, 14 (Ind.1984) ("Notwithstanding the fact that petitioner gave several additional examples of his counsel's alleged ineffectiveness during the post-conviction hearing, a consideration of the ineffectiveness issue would constitute review of

2019A.M. contends his ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim must be evaluated under the Supreme Court’s well-established Sixth Amendment standard in Strickland v. Washington—i.e., deficient attorney performance that prejudices the client’s criminal defense.3 See 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

2017The Cronic Court further Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 49A02-1702-PC-279 | December 5, 2017 Page 9 of 17 explained that “only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.” Id. at 662, 104 S. Ct. at 2048, 80 L.Ed.2d at 670.

2019See, e.g., Lewis, 730 N.E.2d at 690 (rejecting defendant’s assertion of Sixth Amendment violation when request to change counsel came on the morning of trial).

2013See Washington, 902 N.E.2d at 287 (holding that in waiting until the morning of trial to request a continuance for the purpose of hiring private counsel, defendant failed to exercise his right to hire counsel of his choice at an appropriate stage); cf. Lewis, 730 N.E.2d at 688-89 (holding there was neither a Sixth Amendment violation nor an abuse of discretion in denying defendant’s day-of-trial motion for continuance because defendant had indicated eight months prior to trial that he intended to hire private counsel but did not do so, his appointed public defender was ready for trial and priv

2015“Rather, some showing of prejudice is a necessary element of a Sixth Amendment claim based on an invasion of the attorney-client relationship.” Id. (citing United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 267 (4th Cir.1990)).

2015“Rather, some showing of prejudice is a necessary element of a Sixth Amendment claim based on an invasion of the attorney-client relationship.” Id. (citing United States v. Chavez, 902 F.2d 259, 267 (4th Cir.1990)).

2007See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 , 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding that facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences do not violate the Sixth Amendment or the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because they do not increase the statutory maximum sentence available to the court).

2007See Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 558 , 122 S.Ct. 2406 , 153 L.Ed.2d 524 (2002) (holding that facts triggering mandatory minimum sentences do not violate the Sixth Amendment or the rule announced in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 , 120 S.Ct. 2348 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435 (2000), because they do not increase the statutory maximum sentence available to the court).

2015Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth amendment is to be meaningful.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3rd Cir.1978)). -Our supreme court has held that “[t]here is no per se rule that every intrusion by the prosecution into the relationship between a criminal defendant and his attorney constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation.” Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1081 (Ind.2003) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 550-51 , 97 S.Ct. 837, 841 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)).

2015Free two-way communication between client and attorney is essential if the professional assistance guaranteed by the sixth amendment is to be meaningful.’ ” Id. (quoting United States v. Levy, 577 F.2d 200, 209 (3rd Cir.1978)). -Our supreme court has held that “[t]here is no per se rule that every intrusion by the prosecution into the relationship between a criminal defendant and his attorney constitutes a Sixth Amendment violation.” Malinski v. State, 794 N.E.2d 1071, 1081 (Ind.2003) (citing Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 550-51 , 97 S.Ct. 837, 841 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30 (1977)).

2001While a Sixth Amendment issue is raised when a defendant is prohibited from cross-examining a crucial witness for the State on an area of his credibility, see Crull v. State, 540 N.E.2d 1195, 1198-1200 (Ind.1989); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 , 89 L.Ed.2d 674 (1986); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 315-18 , 94 S.Ct. 1105 , 39 L.Ed.2d 347 (1974), the right to cross-examination is not absolute and is not without limitation, see Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. at 679 , 106 S.Ct. 1431 (reaffirming that the Sixth Amendment “ ‘guarantees an opportunity for effective cross-examina

1989Crull v. State (1989), Ind., 540 N.E.2d 1195 .

2026See e.g., Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (appellant waived review of his Sixth Amendment claim that was not raised before the trial court), trans. denied; Plank v. Comm. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013) (“[T]he general rule is that failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute at trial results in waiver of review on appeal[.]”).

2026See Small v. State, 736 N.E.2d 742, 747 (Ind. 2000) (defendant waived confrontation issue where his trial objection was based solely on other grounds).

2026See e.g., Washington v. State, 840 N.E.2d 873, 880 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (appellant waived review of his Sixth Amendment claim that was not raised before the trial court), trans. denied; Plank v. Comm. Hosps. of Ind., Inc., 981 N.E.2d 49, 53 (Ind. 2013) (“[T]he general rule is that failure to challenge the constitutionality of a statute at trial results in waiver of review on appeal[.]”).

2026However, “appellate courts Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 25A-CR-1616 | January 21, 2026 Page 8 of 13 are not prohibited from considering the constitutionality of a statute even though the issue otherwise has been waived[,] [a]nd indeed a reviewing court may exercise its discretion to review a constitutional claim on its own accord.” Plank, 981 N.E.2d at 53-54.

2025“Whether a defendant may claim ineffective assistance from standby counsel depends on whether hybrid representation is more akin to a defendant proceeding pro se or is more akin to a defense controlled by counsel.” Id. (citing Henson v. State, 798 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

2025“Whether a defendant may claim ineffective assistance from standby counsel depends on whether hybrid representation is more akin to a defendant proceeding pro se or is more akin to a defense controlled by counsel.” Id. (citing Henson v. State, 798 N.E.2d 540, 546 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003)).

2025We cannot agree. [14] The trial court correctly informed Hill that he had waived his right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. “[A] defendant who chooses to proceed pro se must accept the burdens and hazards of self- representation and may not assert a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Warr v. State, 877 N.E.2d 817, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 1987)).

2025We cannot agree. [14] The trial court correctly informed Hill that he had waived his right to pursue a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal. “[A] defendant who chooses to proceed pro se must accept the burdens and hazards of self- representation and may not assert a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.” Warr v. State, 877 N.E.2d 817, 823 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (citing Carter v. State, 512 N.E.2d 158, 162 (Ind. 1987)).