14 Nevada opinions name it 2 courts 1982–2023 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hymon v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52 , 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately conduct a Faretta canvass). 2023See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52 , 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately conduct a Faretta canvass). | 3 | 3 |
Hooks v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52 , 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately conduct a Faretta canvass). 2023See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52 , 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately conduct a Faretta canvass). | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Shawn Ricegreen2 sentences2023See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52, 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13, 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately conduct a Faretta canvass). 2023See Hooks v. State, 124 Nev. 48, 52 , 176 P.3d 1081, 1083 (2008) (concluding that "the district court's failure to conduct a thorough canvass does not per se require reversal"); Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212-13 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005); see also Rice, 776 F.3d at 1025-26 (concluding no Sixth Amendment violation occurred despite the court's failure to immediately conduct a Faretta canvass). | 2 | 2 |
Weatherford v. Burseygreen2 sentences2022See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 (1977) (suggesting a Sixth Amendment violation is possible where the prosecution learns details of defense trial preparations); United States v. Elbaz, 396 F. Supp. 3d 583 , 595 (D. 2022See Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 (1977) (suggesting a Sixth Amendment violation is possible where the prosecution learns details of defense trial preparations); United States v. Elbaz, 396 F. Supp. 3d 583 , 595 (D. | 2 | 2 |
McKaskle v. Wigginsgreen2 sentences2023Rather, "the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way." McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177. 2023Rather, "the primary focus must be on whether the defendant had a fair chance to present his case in his own way." McKaskle, 465 U.S. at 177 . | 1 | 3 |
State v. Svobodagreen2 sentences2022Maryland 2019) (reviewing prosecution's inadvertent access to em ails containing privileged materials relating to defendant's trial strategy for Sixth Amendment violation and finding no prejudice where the prosecutors who were to conduct the trial had not learned of the contents of the emails); State v. Svoboda, 180 N.E.3d 1277, 1295-96 (Ct. App. Ohio 2021) (recognizing that prosecutor's interception of defense trial strategy information could result in a Sixth Amendment violation, but finding no violation because appointment of special prosecutor neutralized any possible prejudice). 2022Maryland 2019) (reviewing prosecution's inadvertent access to em ails containing privileged materials relating to defendant's trial strategy for Sixth Amendment violation and finding no prejudice where the prosecutors who were to conduct the trial had not learned of the contents of the emails); State v. Svoboda, 180 N.E.3d 1277, 1295-96 (Ct. App. Ohio 2021) (recognizing that prosecutor's interception of defense trial strategy information could result in a Sixth Amendment violation, but finding no violation because appointment of special prosecutor neutralized any possible prejudice). | 1 | 1 |
Robert Moss (99-1951 01-1797) and Ronald Kohn (01-1610) v. United Statesgreen1 sentence2018See Moss v. United States, 323 F.3d 445, 463-64 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that there is no Sixth Amendment violation if "the conflict is as to a matter that is irrelevant"). | 1 | 1 |
Padilla v. Kentuckygreen1 sentence2013Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. „ , 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2011Johnson, 118 Nev. at 802-03 , 59 P.3d at 460 (internal quotations omitted). 2011Johnson, 118 Nev. at 802-03 , 59 P.3d at 460 (internal quotations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Tanksley v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P 2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P | 1 | 1 |
Mazzan v. Warden, Ely State Prisongreen2 sentences2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P 2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P 2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P | 1 | 1 |
Graves v. Stategreen2 sentences2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P 2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P | 1 | 1 |
Chapman v. Californiared2 sentences1999See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). 1999See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences1998He dispenses with this factor by citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992), for the proposition that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.” However, “such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria,” and “its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id. at 656 . 1998He dispenses with this factor by citing Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655 (1992), for the proposition that “affirmative proof of particularized prejudice is not essential to every speedy trial claim.” However, “such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria,” and “its importance increases with the length of delay.” Id. at 656 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Brady v. Maryland
green
2 sentences2013We further conclude that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), regarding disclosure of evidence. 4 The preliminary hearing is a “critical” stage at which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to counsel, U.S. Const. amend. 2013We further conclude that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), regarding disclosure of evidence. 4 The preliminary hearing is a “critical” stage at which a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant’s right to counsel, U.S. Const. amend. | 2 | 2007–2013 |
Garcia v. State
green
2 sentences2013Id. (noting that sufficient cause would be "a complete collapse of the attorney-client relationship"). 2013Id. (noting that sufficient cause would be "a complete collapse of the attorney-client relationship"). | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Jackson v. Denno
green
2 sentences2013We further conclude that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), regarding disclosure of evidence. 4 4Patterson also seeks reversal of his conviction on the grounds that (1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied Patterson's motion to suppress his arrest warrant because it did not set forth specific factual or legal findings in its order; (2) the arrest warrant did not contain sufficient probable cause; and (3) the district court improperly denied Patterson a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), regarding the voluntariness of his 2013We further conclude that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), regarding disclosure of evidence. 4 4Patterson also seeks reversal of his conviction on the grounds that (1) the district court abused its discretion when it denied Patterson's motion to suppress his arrest warrant because it did not set forth specific factual or legal findings in its order; (2) the arrest warrant did not contain sufficient probable cause; and (3) the district court improperly denied Patterson a hearing pursuant to Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964), regarding the voluntariness of his | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Faretta v. California
green
2 sentences2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P 2007Specifically, the statutes at issue in Kaua and Cunningham both require the district court to find additional facts before the defendant is exposed to an extended term. 29 422 U.S. 806 (1975). 30 Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1000 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997). 31 Hymon v. State, 121 Nev. 200, 212 , 111 P.3d 1092, 1101 (2005) (citing McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168 , 177 n.8 (1984)). 32 Id. 33 Id. (quoting Johnson v. State, 117 Nev. 153, 164 , 17 P.3d 1008, 1016 (2001) (citing Tanksley v. State, 113 Nev. 997, 1001 , 946 P.2d 148, 150 (1997) (quoting Graves v. State, 112 Nev. 118, 124 , 912 P | 1 | 2007–2007 |
People v. Wojtkowski
green
2 sentences1985In People v. Wojtkowski, 167 Cal. App.3d 1077 , 213 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1985), the defendant placed a call from county jail to his wife who was the victim of his criminal assaults. 1985In People v. Wojtkowski, 167 Cal. App.3d 1077 , 213 Cal. Rptr. 846 (1985), the defendant placed a call from county jail to his wife who was the victim of his criminal assaults. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Massiah v. United States
green
2 sentences1985In People v. Whitt, 36 Cal.3d 724 , 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 (1984), no decision was made concerning the use of informants under the Fifth Amendment and the opinion was decided on the basis of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), a Sixth Amendment issue. 1985In People v. Whitt, 36 Cal.3d 724 , 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 (1984), no decision was made concerning the use of informants under the Fifth Amendment and the opinion was decided on the basis of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), a Sixth Amendment issue. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Riley v. Illinois
green
2 sentences1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. 1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
People v. Whitt
green
2 sentences1985In People v. Whitt, 36 Cal.3d 724 , 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 (1984), no decision was made concerning the use of informants under the Fifth Amendment and the opinion was decided on the basis of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), a Sixth Amendment issue. 1985In People v. Whitt, 36 Cal.3d 724 , 205 Cal. Rptr. 810 , 685 P.2d 1161 (1984), no decision was made concerning the use of informants under the Fifth Amendment and the opinion was decided on the basis of Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 , 84 S.Ct. 1199 , 12 L.Ed.2d 246 (1964), a Sixth Amendment issue. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
State v. Travis
green
2 sentences1985State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678 , 360 A.2d 548 (1976), involved a suspect who expressly refused to speak to police without first consulting an attorney; thereafter, a trained, undercover police officer was placed in the cell to obtain incriminating information. 1985State v. Travis, 116 R.I. 678 , 360 A.2d 548 (1976), involved a suspect who expressly refused to speak to police without first consulting an attorney; thereafter, a trained, undercover police officer was placed in the cell to obtain incriminating information. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
United States v. Patricia Campbell Hearst
green
2 sentences1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. 1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Joseph Allen Wilson v. Hon. Robert J. Henderson, Superintendent, Auburn Correctional Facility
green
2 sentences1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. 1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Clyburn v. United States
green
2 sentences1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. 1985In the case of Wilson v. Henderson, 584 F.2d 1185 (2d Cir.1978) involving a jail cell informant and a defendant who sought to suppress his admissions under a Sixth Amendment challenge, the court said: Furthermore, the admission of an in-custody statement voluntarily made to an informant seems less egregious than the use of a statement intercepted by an electronic eavesdropping device as was upheld in United States v. Hearst [ 563 F.2d 1331 (C.A.9, 1977), cert. den. 435 U.S. 1000 , 98 S.Ct. 1656 , 56 L.Ed.2d 90 (1978)]. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
Ben Lee Brown v. Walter E. Craven
green
1 sentence1982We agree with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals that under such circumstances a trial judge should “take the necessary time and conduct such necessary inquiry as might. . . [ease the defendant’s] dissatisfaction, distrust and concern.” Brown v. Craven, supra, at 1170 . | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.