51 Wisconsin opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 10 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Wisconsin courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences2022"A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 . ¶73 Because we conclude that there was no Sixth Amendment violation, it is necessarily true that Arrington's counsel was not deficient in failing to object to the admission of the recordings. 1985In Strickland, - U.S. -, 104 S. Ct. at 2062 , the United States Supreme Court for the first time fully and directly addressed a sixth amendment claim of “actual ineffectiveness” of counsel’s assistance outside the area of conflict of interest. | 2 | 4 |
Florida v. Nixongreen2 sentences2021The trial court noted that was not the case here, instead finding this case to be more in line with Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175 (2004), where the defendant “was found to be largely ‘nonresponsive’ to discussions about trial strategy and did not complain until after verdicts were reached.” Furthermore, the court observed that while Grant had “[c]learly … objected on the record to the tactics of trial counsel after the case had been argued and sent to the jury for deliberations” there was “[n]o other on-the- record protestation by Grant[.]” As a result, the court found that there was no Sixth 2017Cronic , however, "recognized a narrow exception" to Strickland's holding, Florida v. Nixon, 543 U.S. 175, 190 (2004), in which a Sixth Amendment violation may be found "without inquiring into counsel's actual performance or requiring the defendant to show the effect it had on the trial," Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 695 (2002). | 2 | 2 |
Michigan v. Harveygreen2 sentences1999The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that "once a criminal defendant invokes his [or her] Sixth Amendment right to coun *507 sel, a subsequent waiver of that right — even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards — is presumed invalid if secured pursuant to police-initiated interrogation." Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345 (1990); Jackson, 475 U.S. at 625 ; see also Jackson at 635, where the Court stated that "Ijlust as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so t 1999The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that "once a criminal defendant invokes his [or her] Sixth Amendment right to coun *507 sel, a subsequent waiver of that right — even if voluntary, knowing, and intelligent under traditional standards — is presumed invalid if secured pursuant to police-initiated interrogation." Michigan v. Harvey, 494 U.S. 344, 345 (1990); Jackson, 475 U.S. at 625 ; see also Jackson at 635, where the Court stated that "Ijlust as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so t | 2 | 2 |
Doggett v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2025LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2(e) (4th ed. 2024) (“[C]ourts ‘generally have found presumed prejudice only in cases in which the post-indictment delay lasted at least five years,’ except where the government was responsible for the delay by virtue of something beyond simple negligence.” (citations omitted)). ¶34 Even if the delay was prejudicial as a matter of law, “such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655–56. 2025LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 18.2(e) (4th ed. 2024) (“[C]ourts ‘generally have found presumed prejudice only in cases in which the post-indictment delay lasted at least five years,’ except where the government was responsible for the delay by virtue of something beyond simple negligence.” (citations omitted)). ¶34 Even if the delay was prejudicial as a matter of law, “such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria.” Doggett, 505 U.S. at 655–56. | 1 | 2 |
State v. MacHnergreen2 sentences2022I need not reach these claims or address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2018AP942-CR.awb deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense." State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68 , 291 Wis. 2d 673 , 717 N.W.2d 74 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70 , 349 Wis. 2d 327 , 833 N.W.2d 126 .7 ¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of the jury. 2022I need not reach these claims or address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2018AP942-CR.awb deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense." State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68 , 291 Wis. 2d 673 , 717 N.W.2d 74 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70 , 349 Wis. 2d 327 , 833 N.W.2d 126 .7 ¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of the jury. | 1 | 2 |
Maine v. Moultongreen2 sentences2022Compare Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176-77 (finding Sixth Amendment violation when a wired informant actively questioned defendant on details of a crime at request of police) with Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 439 (finding no Sixth Amendment violation when informant was told by police to just "keep his ears open" to what the defendant said). ¶68 Here, the detectives did not direct or control Miller's questioning of Arrington. 2022The U.S. Supreme Court has explained that even when the police do not purposely place an informant in jail with the defendant, their "knowing exploitation" of such "an opportunity to confront the accused without counsel being present is as much a [Sixth Amendment violation] as is the intentional creation of such an opportunity." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 . | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Cronicgreen2 sentences2014"Thus, only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662 (footnote omitted). 2014"Thus, only when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial." Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662 (footnote omitted). | 1 | 2 |
Montejo v. Louisianagreen2 sentences2011In support of its abrogation of the Jackson rule, the Court explained that "[s]ince the right under both sources is waived using the same procedure, doctrines ensuring voluntariness of the Fifth Amendment waiver simultaneously ensure the voluntariness of the Sixth Amendment waiver." Montejo, 129 S. Ct. at 2090 (internal citations omitted). 2011Even more directly, the Court explicitly provided that "there is no reason categorically to distinguish an unrepresented defen dant (Fifth Amendment) from a represented one (Sixth Amendment)." Id. at 2092 (parentheticals added). | 1 | 2 |
United States v. Mark A. Varca and Anthony Joseph Varcagreen1 sentence2023See United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation resulting 28 No. 2021AP177-CR from eleven-month delay occasioned by defendant’s need to obtain counsel); but see Hadley v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 350, 362-63 , 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (illness of judge not intrinsic to case); Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 636-37 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (overburdened court system weighs against the state, but not “heavily”). | 1 | 1 |
United States of America, Cross v. William Li, and Danny Hogan, Defendant-Crossgreen2 sentences2022The Court concluded that the defendant in Kuhlmann did not "demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 . ¶46 From these cases, courts have determined that in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, "the statements in question must have been (1) deliberately elicited (2) by a government agent." United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995). 2022The Court concluded that the defendant in Kuhlmann did not "demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 . ¶46 From these cases, courts have determined that in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, "the statements in question must have been (1) deliberately elicited (2) by a government agent." United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Harrisgreen2 sentences2022See State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839 , 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶50 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 2022See State v. Harris, 229 Wis. 2d 832, 839 , 601 N.W.2d 682 (Ct. App. 1999); State v. Spencer, No. 2018AP942-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶50 (Wis. Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2021) (White, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). | 1 | 1 |
United States v. Thomas Yorkgreen2 sentences2022"What matters in forming an agency relationship is that the principal has the right to control that conduct." Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627 , ¶30. ¶50 In the specific context of examining the work of a government informant for purposes of an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, federal courts have determined that "there is no [Sixth Amendment] infringement unless the informant was a government agent, and there is no agency absent the government's agreement to reward the informant for his services." United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Willia 2022"What matters in forming an agency relationship is that the principal has the right to control that conduct." Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627 , ¶30. ¶50 In the specific context of examining the work of a government informant for purposes of an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, federal courts have determined that "there is no [Sixth Amendment] infringement unless the informant was a government agent, and there is no agency absent the government's agreement to reward the informant for his services." United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Willia | 1 | 1 |
State v. Johnsongreen2 sentences2022See State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶24 , 273 Wis. 2d 626 , 681 N.W.2d 901 . 2022See State v. Johnson, 2004 WI 94, ¶24 , 273 Wis. 2d 626 , 681 N.W.2d 901 . | 1 | 1 |
Kuhlmann v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2022The Court concluded that the defendant in Kuhlmann did not "demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 . ¶46 From these cases, courts have determined that in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, "the statements in question must have been (1) deliberately elicited (2) by a government agent." United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995). 2022The Court concluded that the defendant in Kuhlmann did not "demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks." Kuhlmann, 477 U.S. at 459 . ¶46 From these cases, courts have determined that in order to find a Sixth Amendment violation, "the statements in question must have been (1) deliberately elicited (2) by a government agent." United States v. Li, 55 F.3d 325, 328 (7th Cir. 1995). | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Owengreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bullcoming v. New Mexicogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bell v. Conegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Williams v. Illinoisred | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. James Louis Surridgegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blue v. Stategreen | 1 | 1 |
| Commonwealth v. Richmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Riskgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Liulamagreen | 1 | 1 |
| Alexander v. City of Anchoragegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Sanchezgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Joaquin Aguilargreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. William J. Ashfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Joseph R. Kollergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Iowa v. Tovargreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Petersgreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hahngreen | 1 | 1 |
| Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Scheffergreen | 1 | 1 |
| United States v. Valenzuela-Bernalgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Michigan v. Jacksonred | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Hadley v. Stategreen2 sentences2023See United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation resulting 28 No. 2021AP177-CR from eleven-month delay occasioned by defendant’s need to obtain counsel); but see Hadley v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 350, 362-63 , 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (illness of judge not intrinsic to case); Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 636-37 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (overburdened court system weighs against the state, but not “heavily”). 2023See United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation resulting 28 No. 2021AP177-CR from eleven-month delay occasioned by defendant’s need to obtain counsel); but see Hadley v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 350, 362-63 , 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (illness of judge not intrinsic to case); Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 636-37 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (overburdened court system weighs against the state, but not “heavily”). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Love
green
2 sentences2020And Parise, like Love’s counsel, had no recollection of his previous involvement in Henyard’s case in another role. 12 No. 2019AP548-CR divergent”—“Street desired an acquittal and [the detective] had an interest in a conviction.” Id. ¶23 Despite the actual conflict of interest, we found no Sixth Amendment violation because Street had “[failed to] demonstrate[] by clear and convincing evidence that the conflict adversely affected” counsel’s representation. 2004However, trial counsel acknowledged that he never informed the court that he had received a portion of his attorney's fee from Thompson. ¶26 In State v. Love, 227 Wis. 2d 60 , 594 N.W.2d 806 (1999), our supreme court set out the principles governing a conflict of interest claim when first raised in a postconviction setting: In order to establish a Sixth Amendment violation on the basis of a conflict of interest, a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual conflict of interest. | 3 | 2004–2020 |
State v. Street
green
2 sentences2023For the reasons set forth previously, see infra, ¶¶9-11, 15 n.7, we conclude these ineffective assistance claims fail. 14 No. 2021AP1347-CR A. Conflict of Interest ¶30 Tuchel argues her trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because he engaged in the joint representation of Tuchel and B.M.13 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, “a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected his o 2023For the reasons set forth previously, see infra, ¶¶9-11, 15 n.7, we conclude these ineffective assistance claims fail. 14 No. 2021AP1347-CR A. Conflict of Interest ¶30 Tuchel argues her trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because he engaged in the joint representation of Tuchel and B.M.13 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, “a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected his o | 2 | 1998–2023 |
Padilla v. Kentucky
green
2 sentences2016No. 2013AP2433-CR ¶2 In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. 2016In Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010), the Supreme Court of the United States held that the Sixth Amendment requires defense counsel to inform a client whether his plea to a criminal charge carries a risk of deportation. | 2 | 2016–2017 |
State v. Forbush
green
2 sentences2015State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25 , 332 Wis. 2d 620 , 769 N.W.2d 741 . 2015State v. Forbush, 2011 WI 25 , 332 Wis. 2d 620 , 769 N.W.2d 741 . | 2 | 2015–2015 |
Arizona v. Mauro
green
1 sentence2025Even if the officer may hope that the suspect will incriminate himself or herself, this does not by itself render the officer’s words and actions the functional equivalent of an “interrogation.” Id. ¶44 Clark’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment challenge rests solely on his assertion that, contrary to the circuit court’s conclusion, when police reinitiated contact with Clark, they engaged in the functional equivalent of interrogation. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
State v. Medina
green
2 sentences2023For the reasons set forth previously, see infra, ¶¶9-11, 15 n.7, we conclude these ineffective assistance claims fail. 14 No. 2021AP1347-CR A. Conflict of Interest ¶30 Tuchel argues her trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because he engaged in the joint representation of Tuchel and B.M.13 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, “a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected his o 2023For the reasons set forth previously, see infra, ¶¶9-11, 15 n.7, we conclude these ineffective assistance claims fail. 14 No. 2021AP1347-CR A. Conflict of Interest ¶30 Tuchel argues her trial counsel was constitutionally deficient because he engaged in the joint representation of Tuchel and B.M.13 To establish a Sixth Amendment violation based on a conflict of interest, “a defendant who did not raise an objection at trial must demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that his or her counsel had an actual conflict of interest and that the actual conflict of interest adversely affected his o | 1 | 2023–2023 |
Green v. State
green
2 sentences2023See United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation resulting 28 No. 2021AP177-CR from eleven-month delay occasioned by defendant’s need to obtain counsel); but see Hadley v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 350, 362-63 , 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (illness of judge not intrinsic to case); Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 636-37 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (overburdened court system weighs against the state, but not “heavily”). 2023See United States v. Varca, 896 F.2d 900, 904-05 (5th Cir. 1990) (no Sixth Amendment violation resulting 28 No. 2021AP177-CR from eleven-month delay occasioned by defendant’s need to obtain counsel); but see Hadley v. State, 66 Wis. 2d 350, 362-63 , 225 N.W.2d 461 (1975) (illness of judge not intrinsic to case); Green v. State, 75 Wis. 2d 631, 636-37 , 250 N.W.2d 305 (1977) (overburdened court system weighs against the state, but not “heavily”). | 1 | 2023–2023 |
State v. Lamont L. Travis
green
2 sentences2022Thus, assuming the harmless error analysis8 applies to these communications between the circuit court and juror, the error was certainly not harmless as the majority claims. 8 Although in other circumstances courts have determined that deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal, see State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶61 , 347 Wis. 2d 142 , 832 N.W.2d 491 , I do not decide whether structural error should apply to this Sixth Amendment violation. 2022Thus, assuming the harmless error analysis8 applies to these communications between the circuit court and juror, the error was certainly not harmless as the majority claims. 8 Although in other circumstances courts have determined that deprivation of the right to counsel at a critical stage constitutes a structural error requiring automatic reversal, see State v. Travis, 2013 WI 38, ¶61 , 347 Wis. 2d 142 , 832 N.W.2d 491 , I do not decide whether structural error should apply to this Sixth Amendment violation. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Gerrod R. Bell
green
1 sentence2022This necessarily means that we need not consider whether, if the recordings had been improper, the impropriety "would have been so obvious, substantial, and fundamental that it would necessitate a new trial[.]" Bell, 380 Wis. 2d 616, ¶59 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2022I need not reach these claims or address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2018AP942-CR.awb deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense." State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68 , 291 Wis. 2d 673 , 717 N.W.2d 74 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70 , 349 Wis. 2d 327 , 833 N.W.2d 126 .7 ¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of the jury. 2022I need not reach these claims or address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2018AP942-CR.awb deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense." State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68 , 291 Wis. 2d 673 , 717 N.W.2d 74 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70 , 349 Wis. 2d 327 , 833 N.W.2d 126 .7 ¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of the jury. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. George E. Savage
green
2 sentences2022For different reasons than the majority, however, I conclude that counsel's error did not prejudice Arrington. ¶103 An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires the defendant to show both prongs of the Strickland test: "that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, ¶27 , 395 15 No. 2019AP2065-CR.rfd Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838 . 2022For different reasons than the majority, however, I conclude that counsel's error did not prejudice Arrington. ¶103 An ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim requires the defendant to show both prongs of the Strickland test: "that counsel's performance was deficient" and "that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Savage, 2020 WI 93, ¶27 , 395 15 No. 2019AP2065-CR.rfd Wis. 2d 1, 951 N.W.2d 838 . | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Jackie Wilson v. James K. Williams
green
2 sentences2022"What matters in forming an agency relationship is that the principal has the right to control that conduct." Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627 , ¶30. ¶50 In the specific context of examining the work of a government informant for purposes of an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, federal courts have determined that "there is no [Sixth Amendment] infringement unless the informant was a government agent, and there is no agency absent the government's agreement to reward the informant for his services." United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Willia 2022"What matters in forming an agency relationship is that the principal has the right to control that conduct." Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627 , ¶30. ¶50 In the specific context of examining the work of a government informant for purposes of an alleged Sixth Amendment violation, federal courts have determined that "there is no [Sixth Amendment] infringement unless the informant was a government agent, and there is no agency absent the government's agreement to reward the informant for his services." United States v. York, 933 F.2d 1343, 1357 (7th Cir. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Wilson v. Willia | 1 | 2022–2022 |
City of Milwaukee v. NL Industries
green
2 sentences2022We conclude that he was not. ¶47 Initially, a brief review of general agency principles will be helpful to our discussion.11 We note that "a person or business acting on behalf of another, and subject to control of another, is an agent and the person or business they are acting on behalf of, a principal." Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627 , ¶25. ¶48 An agency relationship is based on an agreement between the principal and agent that expresses three elements: "(1) the conduct of the principal showing that the agent is to act for him or her; (2) the conduct of the agent showing that he or she accepts the un 2022We conclude that he was not. ¶47 Initially, a brief review of general agency principles will be helpful to our discussion.11 We note that "a person or business acting on behalf of another, and subject to control of another, is an agent and the person or business they are acting on behalf of, a principal." Lang, 390 Wis. 2d 627 , ¶25. ¶48 An agency relationship is based on an agreement between the principal and agent that expresses three elements: "(1) the conduct of the principal showing that the agent is to act for him or her; (2) the conduct of the agent showing that he or she accepts the un | 1 | 2022–2022 |
State v. Demone Alexander
green
2 sentences2022I need not reach these claims or address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2018AP942-CR.awb deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense." State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68 , 291 Wis. 2d 673 , 717 N.W.2d 74 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70 , 349 Wis. 2d 327 , 833 N.W.2d 126 .7 ¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of the jury. 2022I need not reach these claims or address whether they were forfeited because, as noted, I would reverse on the basis of the Sixth Amendment violation. 6 State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797 , 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979). 5 No. 2018AP942-CR.awb deliberations may be necessary to a meaningful defense." State v. Anderson, 2006 WI 77, ¶68 , 291 Wis. 2d 673 , 717 N.W.2d 74 , overruled on other grounds by State v. Alexander, 2013 WI 70 , 349 Wis. 2d 327 , 833 N.W.2d 126 .7 ¶65 Although not precisely defined, a critical stage generally includes proceedings that determine the composition of the jury. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
United States v. Henry
green
2 sentences2022Rausch therefore contends that the events “cannot be separated for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis.” For this proposition, Rausch relies on United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s incriminatory statements should be suppressed because they were obtained during conversations with a fellow inmate who was functioning as a paid government informant. 14 No. 2020AP1972-CR ¶31 The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Henry rested on a specious factual distinction the government attempted to draw between an informant who deliberately elic 2022Rausch therefore contends that the events “cannot be separated for purposes of the Sixth Amendment analysis.” For this proposition, Rausch relies on United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), in which the Supreme Court concluded that the defendant’s incriminatory statements should be suppressed because they were obtained during conversations with a fellow inmate who was functioning as a paid government informant. 14 No. 2020AP1972-CR ¶31 The Supreme Court’s conclusion in Henry rested on a specious factual distinction the government attempted to draw between an informant who deliberately elic | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State v. Witkowski green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| McCoy v. Louisiana green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Knight green | 1 | 2021–2021 |
| State v. Lindell green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Davis v. Washington green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ohio v. Clark green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Pennsylvania v. Ritchie green | 1 | 2016–2016 |
| People v. West green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Moran v. Burbine green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Arias green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Hanson green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Mazur green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Dubose red | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Hornung green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| State v. Knapp green | 1 | 2009–2009 |
| Washington v. Recuenco green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Washington v. Texas green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| McMorris v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Delaware v. Van Arsdall green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Bangert green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Johnson green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Bentley green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| Nelson v. State green | 1 | 2006–2006 |
| State v. Blanck green | 1 | 2005–2005 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.