Sixth Amendment violation in California

2024As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125 , 1132, “to the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the the Sixth Amendment analysis” applied by our high court in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 79

2024As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125 , 1132, “to the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the the Sixth Amendment analysis” applied by our high court in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 79

2022(Silva, supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 520; see also People v. James (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 610–611 [defendant was not entitled to jury trial to determine whether he was eligible for relief under section 1172.6]; see also People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [The “retroactive relief they are afforded by Senate Bill [No.] 1437 is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis.”].) Without citation to case law, appellant argues Howard’s analysis is erroneous because “requiring the superior court to resentence a defendant on a strike offense that he did not plead guilty or nolo contender

2022(E.g., People v. James 10 (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 604 , 609, and cases cited therein; see People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727 , 740 [court order redesignating conviction as one for first degree burglary without a jury trial, following vacatur of murder conviction, did not violate petitioner’s constitutional rights]; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [requiring defendant to utilize postjudgment procedure specified in former section 1170.95, which does not provide for a jury trial, was constitutional; the retroactive relief afforded by Senate Bill 1437 “is not subject to Si

2021(See People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055 , 1063–1064; People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727 , 740 [“The retroactive relief provided by section 1170.95 reflects an act of lenity by the Legislature” and does not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights]; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [“the retroactive relief . . . afforded by Senate Bill 1437 is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis” and defendants had no right to a jury trial on a section 1170.95 petition].) 10 The first, prebriefing prima facie review of a petition under section 1170.95 is not a critical sta

2021(See People v. Perez (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1055 , 1063–1064; People v. Howard (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 727 , 740 [“The retroactive relief provided by 10 section 1170.95 reflects an act of lenity by the Legislature” and does not implicate a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights]; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [“the retroactive relief . . . afforded by Senate Bill 1437 is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis” and defendants had no right to a jury trial on petition].) The first, prebriefing prima facie review of a petition under section 1170.95 is not a critical stage of the proceedi

2026This constitutional right includes the correlative right to representation free from any conflict of interest that undermines counsel’s loyalty to his or her client.” (People v. 8 Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 (Doolin); see People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 739 (Woodruff).) “ ‘Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘Conflicts may also arise in situations in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and cu

2025“The Legislature has clarified that the moving party need not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. (§ 1473.7 subd. (a)(1).) It follows therefore, that even if the motion is based upon errors by counsel, the moving party need not also establish a Sixth Amendment violation as by demonstrating that ‘counsel’s representation “fell below an objective standard of reasonableness”’ . . . ‘“under prevailing professional norms,”’ as stated in Padilla, supra, 559 U.S. at pages 366, 368–369, quoting Strickland, supra, 466 U.S. at pages 688, 694 . . . .” (People v. Camacho (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 998

2013He maintains that defense counsel's "failure to conduct a pretrial investigation or even look at the forensic discovery provided by the state effectively denied [him] counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings" and meant that "the defense failed to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Generally, there is "no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt. [Citations.]" (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, fn. 26 .) Cronic's rule of presumed prejudice and autom

2013He maintains that defense counsel's "failure to conduct a pretrial investigation or even look at the forensic discovery provided by the state effectively denied [him] counsel at a critical stage of the proceedings" and meant that "the defense failed to subject the state's case to meaningful adversarial testing." Generally, there is "no basis for finding a Sixth Amendment violation unless the accused can show how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the finding of guilt. [Citations.]" (Cronic, supra, 466 U.S. at p. 659, fn. 26 .) Cronic's rule of presumed prejudice and autom

2023(Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 164, 174 [ 120 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 ] (Mickens); People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1137 ; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 837-838 .) As summarized by our Supreme Court, Mickens “confirmed that claims of Sixth Amendment violation based on conflicts of interest are a category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that . . . generally require a defendant to show (1) counsel’s deficient performance, and (2) a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficiencies, the 29 result of the proceeding would have been different. ([Peopl

2023(Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 164, 174 [ 120 S.Ct. 1237 , 152 L.Ed.2d 291 ] (Mickens); People v. Jones (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1115, 1137 ; People v. Bonin (1989) 47 Cal.3d 808, 837-838 .) As summarized by our Supreme Court, Mickens “confirmed that claims of Sixth Amendment violation based on conflicts of interest are a category of ineffective assistance of counsel claims that . . . generally require a defendant to show (1) counsel’s deficient performance, and (2) a reasonable probability that, absent counsel’s deficiencies, the 29 result of the proceeding would have been different. ([Peopl

2026(In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035 ; People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858 , 864.) If constitutional error occurred, we assess prejudice under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires us to find prejudice unless we “can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) “This prejudice inquiry does not allow us to uphold the trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence based on some subset of aggravating fac

2026(In re Taylor (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1019, 1035 ; People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858 , 864.) If constitutional error occurred, we assess prejudice under Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 , which requires us to find prejudice unless we “can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) “This prejudice inquiry does not allow us to uphold the trial court’s imposition of an upper term sentence based on some subset of aggravating fac

2026(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 748.) In that context, the court found, based in part on its prior holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , that it would be a Sixth Amendment violation for the court to rely on facts underlying aggravating factors that were not stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt.

2026(Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 748.) In that context, the court found, based in part on its prior holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , that it would be a Sixth Amendment violation for the court to rely on facts underlying aggravating factors that were not stipulated to or found true beyond a reasonable doubt.

2014A. Massiah Error Under Massiah, “when, after adversarial judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated and in the unwaived absence of counsel, a government agent deliberately elicits from a defendant incriminating statements, those statements are inadmissible at a trial on the charges to which the statements pertain.” (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 33 ; and see also Fellers v. United States (2004) 540 U.S. 519, 523 ; Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 170, 180 ; Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206 .) “[A] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the government intentionally creates

2014A. Massiah Error Under Massiah, “when, after adversarial judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated and in the unwaived absence of counsel, a government agent deliberately elicits from a defendant incriminating statements, those statements are inadmissible at a trial on the charges to which the statements pertain.” (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 33 ; and see also Fellers v. United States (2004) 540 U.S. 519, 523 ; Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 170, 180 ; Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206 .) “[A] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the government intentionally creates

2023Initially, we cannot conclude defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. “[A] court properly rejects a Sixth Amendment claim based on surreptitious state participation in communications between a defendant and his or her attorney or the attorney’s agent when the record demonstrates there was no realistic possibility of injury to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846 , 888–889; accord, Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 552 [“when conversations with counsel have been overheard, the constitutionality of the conviction dep

2023Initially, we cannot conclude defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated. “[A] court properly rejects a Sixth Amendment claim based on surreptitious state participation in communications between a defendant and his or her attorney or the attorney’s agent when the record demonstrates there was no realistic possibility of injury to the defendant or benefit to the prosecution.” (People v. Alexander (2010) 49 Cal.4th 846 , 888–889; accord, Weatherford v. Bursey (1977) 429 U.S. 545, 552 [“when conversations with counsel have been overheard, the constitutionality of the conviction dep

2026This constitutional right includes the correlative right to representation free from any conflict of interest that undermines counsel’s loyalty to his or her client.” (People v. 8 Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 (Doolin); see People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 739 (Woodruff).) “ ‘Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘Conflicts may also arise in situations in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and cu

2026This constitutional right includes the correlative right to representation free from any conflict of interest that undermines counsel’s loyalty to his or her client.” (People v. 8 Doolin (2009) 45 Cal.4th 390, 417 (Doolin); see People v. Woodruff (2018) 5 Cal.5th 697, 739 (Woodruff).) “ ‘Conflicts of interest broadly embrace all situations in which an attorney’s loyalty to, or efforts on behalf of, a client are threatened by his responsibilities to another client . . . .’ [Citation.] ‘Conflicts may also arise in situations in which an attorney represents a defendant in a criminal matter and cu

2005“In order to make out the Sixth Amendment claim, defendant had the burden of ‘demonstrating] that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 364 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 ].) Applying independent review, we conclude Deputy Munson did not deliberately elicit defendant’s incriminating comments and thus did not violate his Massiah rights. 41 7.

2005“In order to make out the Sixth Amendment claim, defendant had the burden of ‘demonstrating] that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.’ ” (Ibid., quoting Kuhlmann v. Wilson (1986) 477 U.S. 436, 459 [ 91 L.Ed.2d 364 , 106 S.Ct. 2616 ].) Applying independent review, we conclude Deputy Munson did not deliberately elicit defendant’s incriminating comments and thus did not violate his Massiah rights. 41 7.

2026We find no violation of the key principles set forth in McCoy in the instant case. “[F]or a Sixth Amendment violation to 8 lie, a defendant must make his intention to maintain innocence clear to his counsel, and counsel must override that objective by conceding guilt.” (People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891 ; see McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 23 .) There are no facts to support such the contention that Aguilera was set on maintaining his innocence at all costs.2 If such facts exist outside the record, Aguilera is, of course, free to pursue a habeas petition.

2026We find no violation of the key principles set forth in McCoy in the instant case. “[F]or a Sixth Amendment violation to 8 lie, a defendant must make his intention to maintain innocence clear to his counsel, and counsel must override that objective by conceding guilt.” (People v. Franks (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 883, 891 ; see McCoy, supra, 584 U.S. at p. 23 .) There are no facts to support such the contention that Aguilera was set on maintaining his innocence at all costs.2 If such facts exist outside the record, Aguilera is, of course, free to pursue a habeas petition.

2025(Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274 .) “[U]nder the current statute a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Lynch also held that “The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved

2025(Cunningham, supra, 549 U.S. at p. 274 .) “[U]nder the current statute a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 768.) Lynch also held that “The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved

2021(See, e.g., People v. Falcon (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 272 , 279, review granted Jan. 27, 2021, S266041; People v. Cornelius (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 54 , 58, review granted Mar. 18, 2020, S260410; Smith, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at 92, rev. gr.; see also Dillon v. United States (2010) 560 U.S. 817, 828-829 [holding Sixth Amendment inapplicable to sentence modification proceedings]; People v. Anthony (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 1102, 1156 [“[T]he retroactive relief . . . afforded by Senate Bill 1437 is not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis”]; In re Clark (1993) 5 Cal.4th 750, 780 [constitutional due process

2021Section 1170.95 “is an act of lenity not subject to Sixth Amendment analysis.” (People v. James (Apr. 27, 2021, A159207) ___ Cal.App.5th ___, ___ [ 2021 WL 1625015 , p. 1]; see People v. Perez (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 896 , 908, review granted Dec. 9, 2020, S265254; People v. Lopez (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 1087 , 1114-1115, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S258175.) Once the petitioner makes a prima facie showing under section 1170.95, subdivision (c), he or she has a right to court-appointed counsel (see Verdugo, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 332, review granted; People v. Lewis, supra, 43 Cal.App.5th a

2025(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–47 [defendant did not forfeit Sixth Amendment claim by failing to object or request jury trial on aggravating circumstances because defendant must enter an “express waiver” of the constitutional right to a jury trial].) And “[a] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an 6 We deny Murray’s request made at oral argument for supplemental briefing on the issue. 12 upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal

2025(People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36 , 46–47 [defendant did not forfeit Sixth Amendment claim by failing to object or request jury trial on aggravating circumstances because defendant must enter an “express waiver” of the constitutional right to a jury trial].) And “[a] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven aggravating facts to impose an 6 We deny Murray’s request made at oral argument for supplemental briefing on the issue. 12 upper term sentence, even if some other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal

2024Specifically, Seumanu argues, the “substantial impairment” standard for excluding potential jurors in capital cases, developed by the United States Supreme Court under a Sixth Amendment framework enunciated in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 is inconsistent with current Sixth Amendment standards established in a series of later cases including Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 , Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 , as well as with common law princ

2024Specifically, Seumanu argues, the “substantial impairment” standard for excluding potential jurors in capital cases, developed by the United States Supreme Court under a Sixth Amendment framework enunciated in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 is inconsistent with current Sixth Amendment standards established in a series of later cases including Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 , Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 , as well as with common law princ

2016(Delaware v. Van Arsdall (1986) 475 U.S. 673, 680 ; People v. Frye (1998) 18 Cal.4th 894, 946 .) No Sixth Amendment violation will be found if the jury is exposed to the essential facts from which it could appropriately draw inferences relating to the reliability of the witness.

2010The *246 first—although perhaps the least important for present purposes—is the principle enunciated by the United States Supreme Court that "a defendant alleging a Sixth Amendment violation must demonstrate `a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" ( Mickens v. Taylor (2002) 535 U.S. 162, 166 [ 152 L.Ed.2d 291 , 122 S.Ct. 1237 ], quoting Strickland v. Washington (1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694 [ 80 L.Ed.2d 674 , 104 S.Ct. 2052 ].) Our Supreme Court has consistently articulated the law similarly, holding that in

2024Specifically, Seumanu argues, the “substantial impairment” standard for excluding potential jurors in capital cases, developed by the United States Supreme Court under a Sixth Amendment framework enunciated in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 is inconsistent with current Sixth Amendment standards established in a series of later cases including Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 , Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 , as well as with common law princ

2024Specifically, Seumanu argues, the “substantial impairment” standard for excluding potential jurors in capital cases, developed by the United States Supreme Court under a Sixth Amendment framework enunciated in Adams v. Texas (1980) 448 U.S. 38 is inconsistent with current Sixth Amendment standards established in a series of later cases including Jones v. United States (1999) 526 U.S. 227 , Apprendi v. New Jersey (2000) 530 U.S. 466 , Ring v. Arizona (2002) 536 U.S. 584 , Crawford v. Washington (2004) 541 U.S. 36 , and Blakely v. Washington (2004) 542 U.S. 296 , as well as with common law princ

2014A. Massiah Error Under Massiah, “when, after adversarial judicial criminal proceedings have been initiated and in the unwaived absence of counsel, a government agent deliberately elicits from a defendant incriminating statements, those statements are inadmissible at a trial on the charges to which the statements pertain.” (People v. Dement (2011) 53 Cal.4th 1, 33 ; and see also Fellers v. United States (2004) 540 U.S. 519, 523 ; Maine v. Moulton (1985) 474 U.S. 159, 170, 180 ; Massiah, supra, 377 U.S. at p. 206 .) “[A] Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the government intentionally creates

2013A preexisting arrangement may be inferred from a prior working relationship with law enforcement; however, “[o]nce the defendant establishes „a preexisting arrangement,‟ the „defendant must demonstrate that the police and their informant took some action, beyond merely listening, that was designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks.‟ [Citation.]” (People v. Fairbank, supra, 16 Cal.4th at p. 1247 ; see, e.g., In re Neely (1993) 6 Cal.4th 901, 916-818 ; United States v. Henry (1980) 447 U.S. 264, 266-268 .) Thus, “a Sixth Amendment violation occurs when the government intentionally cre

2015Even when the issue is narrowed to a Sixth Amendment violation, dismissal is still appropriate because here there is a ‘substantial threat of demonstrable prejudice’ as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 1251, citing Morrison, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 365 .) This case bears no comparison to Morrow; here, the prosecutor engaged in no misconduct, and indeed demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trial court that nothing in the privileged materials was or would be used to the prejudice of defendant.

2015Even when the issue is narrowed to a Sixth Amendment violation, dismissal is still appropriate because here there is a ‘substantial threat of demonstrable prejudice’ as a matter of law.” (Id. at p. 1251, citing Morrison, supra, 449 U.S. at p. 365 .) This case bears no comparison to Morrow; here, the prosecutor engaged in no misconduct, and indeed demonstrated to the satisfaction of the trial court that nothing in the privileged materials was or would be used to the prejudice of defendant.

2024As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125 , 1132, “to the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the the Sixth Amendment analysis” applied by our high court in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 79

2024As our Supreme Court explained in People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 840 , superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v. Lewis (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1125 , 1132, “to the extent a potential aggravating circumstance at issue in a particular case rests on a somewhat vague or subjective standard, it may be difficult for a reviewing court to conclude with confidence that, had the issue been submitted to the jury, the jury would have assessed the facts in the same manner as did the the Sixth Amendment analysis” applied by our high court in People v. Black (2007) 41 Cal.4th 79

2026Thus, at trial, counsel denied Fechner’s guilt as to both charges. “[F]or a Sixth Amendment violation to lie, a defendant must make his intention to maintain innocence clear to his counsel, and counsel must override that objective by conceding guilt.” (In re Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 377 , 388, citing McCoy, supra, 22 584 U.S. at p. 423 .) That did not happen here.

2026Thus, at trial, counsel denied Fechner’s guilt as to both charges. “[F]or a Sixth Amendment violation to lie, a defendant must make his intention to maintain innocence clear to his counsel, and counsel must override that objective by conceding guilt.” (In re Smith (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 377 , 388, citing McCoy, supra, 22 584 U.S. at p. 423 .) That did not happen here.

2023“The denial of the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances is reviewed under the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 838 (Sandoval); see Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110; Wandrey, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 981, review granted.) If the reviewing court concludes, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury, the Sixth Amendment

2023“The denial of the right to a jury trial on aggravating circumstances is reviewed under the harmless error standard set forth in Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18 .” (People v. Sandoval (2007) 41 Cal.4th 825, 838 (Sandoval); see Zabelle, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 1110; Wandrey, supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 981, review granted.) If the reviewing court concludes, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the jury, applying the beyond-a- reasonable-doubt standard, unquestionably would have found true at least a single aggravating circumstance had it been submitted to the jury, the Sixth Amendment

2023(See People v. Harris (1994) 9 Cal.4th 407, 438 [“jury instructions in a state criminal trial omitting the requirement of proof of every element of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt are erroneous under the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause”].) The due process “requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt and the Sixth Amendment requirement of a jury verdict are interrelated.” (Sullivan v. Louisiana (1993) 508 U.S. 275, 278 .) Chapman applies to a jury instruction that omits an element of an offense.

1998"The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment denies states the power to deprive the accused of liberty unless the prosecution proves beyond a reasonable doubt every element of the charged offense. [Citation.] Jury instructions relieving states of this burden violate a defendant's due process rights, [citations.] Such directions subvert the presumption of innocence accorded to accused persons and also invade the truth-finding task assigned solely *24 to juries in criminal cases." ( Carella v. California (1989) 491 U.S. 263, 265 , 109 S.Ct. 2419, 2420 , 105 L.Ed.2d 218 .) Accordingly, the