Sixth Amendment violation in North Carolina

2021See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (“[O]nly when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.”); State v. Rogers, 352 N.C. 119, 126 (2000).

2021See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (“[O]nly when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.”); State v. Rogers, 352 N.C. 119, 126 (2000).

2025“Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366 , 371–72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976) (citation omitted); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 336 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1981); State v. Covington, 205 N.C.

2025“Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366 , 371–72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976) (citation omitted); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 336 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1981); State v. Covington, 205 N.C.

2021See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (“[O]nly when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.”); State v. Rogers, 352 N.C. 119, 126 (2000).

2021See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) (“[O]nly when surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness can a Sixth Amendment claim be sufficient without inquiry into counsel’s actual performance at trial.”); State v. Rogers, 352 N.C. 119, 126 (2000).

2025“Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366 , 371–72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976) (citation omitted); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 336 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1981); State v. Covington, 205 N.C.

2025“Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366 , 371–72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976) (citation omitted); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 336 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1981); State v. Covington, 205 N.C.

2020See State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 525, 857 , 591 S.E.2d 846, 857 (2003) (holding that defendant waived Sixth Amendment issue by failing to raise the issue at trial); see also State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 355 , 378 S.E.2d at 761 (1989) (holding that “[a]ssuming arguendo that defendant’s constitutional right of assistance of counsel at the lineup was violated, defendant waived that error by failing to object when the witness later identified him before the jury as the man he had picked out of the lineup”).

2020See State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 525, 857 , 591 S.E.2d 846, 857 (2003) (holding that defendant waived Sixth Amendment issue by failing to raise the issue at trial); see also State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 355 , 378 S.E.2d at 761 (1989) (holding that “[a]ssuming arguendo that defendant’s constitutional right of assistance of counsel at the lineup was violated, defendant waived that error by failing to object when the witness later identified him before the jury as the man he had picked out of the lineup”).

2020State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 646-47 , 457 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1994).

2020State v. Hunt, 339 N.C. 622, 646-47 , 457 S.E.2d 276, 290 (1994).

2020See State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 525, 857 , 591 S.E.2d 846, 857 (2003) (holding that defendant waived Sixth Amendment issue by failing to raise the issue at trial); see also State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 355 , 378 S.E.2d at 761 (1989) (holding that “[a]ssuming arguendo that defendant’s constitutional right of assistance of counsel at the lineup was violated, defendant waived that error by failing to object when the witness later identified him before the jury as the man he had picked out of the lineup”).

2020See State v. Valentine, 357 N.C. 512, 525, 857 , 591 S.E.2d 846, 857 (2003) (holding that defendant waived Sixth Amendment issue by failing to raise the issue at trial); see also State v. Hunt, 324 N.C. at 355 , 378 S.E.2d at 761 (1989) (holding that “[a]ssuming arguendo that defendant’s constitutional right of assistance of counsel at the lineup was violated, defendant waived that error by failing to object when the witness later identified him before the jury as the man he had picked out of the lineup”).

2017Prejudice to Defendant In considering whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a delay, the United States Supreme Court has explained that "we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify[,]" and that "[w]hile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay." Doggett , 505 U.S. at 655 -56 , 112 S.Ct. at 2693 ,

2017Prejudice to Defendant In considering whether a defendant has been prejudiced by a delay, the United States Supreme Court has explained that "we generally have to recognize that excessive delay presumptively compromises the reliability of a trial in ways that neither party can prove or, for that matter, identify[,]" and that "[w]hile such presumptive prejudice cannot alone carry a Sixth Amendment claim without regard to the other Barker criteria, it is part of the mix of relevant facts, and its importance increases with the length of delay." Doggett , 505 U.S. at 655 -56 , 112 S.Ct. at 2693 ,

2009In State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328 , 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005), our Supreme Court refused to review a defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to testimony offered by a police officer because the defendant had failed to object on constitutional grounds to its admission at trial.

2009In State v. Chapman, 359 N.C. 328 , 611 S.E.2d 794 (2005), our Supreme Court refused to review a defendant's Sixth Amendment challenge to testimony offered by a police officer because the defendant had failed to object on constitutional grounds to its admission at trial.

2005Justice Breyer's suggestion that "application of the harmless-error doctrine" may determine "whether resentencing is warranted" is expressly limited to " cases not involving a Sixth Amendment violation." Id. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 769 , 160 L.Ed.2d at 665 (emphasis added).

2005Justice Breyer's suggestion that "application of the harmless-error doctrine" may determine "whether resentencing is warranted" is expressly limited to " cases not involving a Sixth Amendment violation." Id. at ___, 125 S.Ct. at 769 , 160 L.Ed.2d at 665 (emphasis added).

2005A central purpose of the harmless-error doctrine is to "block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967).

2005A central purpose of the harmless-error doctrine is to "block setting aside convictions for small errors or defects that have little, if any, likelihood of having changed the result of the trial." Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 , 87 S.Ct. 824 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 709 (1967).

2005Nonetheless, deciding whether a particular type of Sixth Amendment violation may be reviewed for harmlessness requires courts to strike a "balance between `society's interest in punishing the guilty [and] the method by which decisions of guilt are to be made.'" Id. at 18, 119 S.Ct. at 1838, 144 L.Ed.2d at 53 (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 86 , 103 S.Ct. at 977 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 834 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original)).

2005Nonetheless, deciding whether a particular type of Sixth Amendment violation may be reviewed for harmlessness requires courts to strike a "balance between `society's interest in punishing the guilty [and] the method by which decisions of guilt are to be made.'" Id. at 18, 119 S.Ct. at 1838, 144 L.Ed.2d at 53 (quoting Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. at 86 , 103 S.Ct. at 977 , 74 L.Ed.2d at 834 (plurality opinion) (alterations in original)).

2025Accordingly, we held “[i]n order to conclude there has been a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the trial court must examine and consider all the Barker factors listed above.” Id. at 618 , 711 S.E.2d at 449 (citation omitted).

2025Accordingly, we held “[i]n order to conclude there has been a Sixth Amendment violation of a defendant’s right to a speedy trial, the trial court must examine and consider all the Barker factors listed above.” Id. at 618 , 711 S.E.2d at 449 (citation omitted).

2024Id. at 305 .

2024Id. at 305 .

1987Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 (1975); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 631 ; State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110 , 353 S.E. 2d 352 (1987).

1987Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 , 45 L.Ed. 2d 562 (1975); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 , 89 L.Ed. 2d 631 ; State v. Reese, 319 N.C. 110 , 353 S.E. 2d 352 (1987).

2025Ruling against a defendant’s motion to dismiss for an alleged Sixth Amendment violation where there is not presumptive prejudice, however, allows our justice system to run its course efficiently and is a matter “initially within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Pippin, 72 N.C.

2025Ruling against a defendant’s motion to dismiss for an alleged Sixth Amendment violation where there is not presumptive prejudice, however, allows our justice system to run its course efficiently and is a matter “initially within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Pippin, 72 N.C.

2025“Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366 , 371–72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976) (citation omitted); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 336 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1981); State v. Covington, 205 N.C.

2025“Unless a Sixth Amendment violation is shown, whether to appoint a different lawyer for an indigent criminal defendant who expresses dissatisfaction with his court-appointed counsel is a matter committed to the sound discretion of the district court.” State v. Sweezy, 291 N.C. 366 , 371–72, 230 S.E.2d 524, 529 (1976) (citation omitted); State v. Hutchins, 303 N.C. 321, 336 , 279 S.E.2d 788, 798 (1981); State v. Covington, 205 N.C.

2024App. 143, 148 , 726 S.E.2d 185, 189 (2012) (“Absent a showing of a Sixth Amendment violation, we review the denial of a motion to appoint substitute counsel under an abuse of discretion.” (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).

2024App. 143, 148 , 726 S.E.2d 185, 189 (2012) (“Absent a showing of a Sixth Amendment violation, we review the denial of a motion to appoint substitute counsel under an abuse of discretion.” (citations, quotation marks, and brackets omitted)).

2023Since defendant did not meet the two-pronged Strickland test, it follows that the denials of defendant’s motions were not ‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’” Id. at 416–17, 584 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (emphasis added).

2023Since defendant did not meet the two-pronged Strickland test, it follows that the denials of defendant’s motions were not ‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’” Id. at 416–17, 584 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (emphasis added).

2023See id. at 413, 584 S.E.2d at 754 .

2023Since defendant did not meet the two-pronged Strickland test, it follows that the denials of defendant’s motions were not ‘manifestly unsupported by reason.’” Id. at 416–17, 584 S.E.2d at 756 (quoting State v. T.D.R., 347 N.C. 489, 503 , 495 S.E.2d 700, 708 (1998) (emphasis added).

2023“Pursuant to Recuenco, our Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment error committed in North Carolina when a judge, rather than a jury, finds an aggravating factor is subject to harmless error review.” State v. Speight, 186 N.C.

2023“Pursuant to Recuenco, our Supreme Court has held that the Sixth Amendment error committed in North Carolina when a judge, rather than a jury, finds an aggravating factor is subject to harmless error review.” State v. Speight, 186 N.C.