76 Iowa opinions name it 2 courts 1980–2025 12 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Iowa courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Strickland v. Washingtongreen2 sentences1986To obtain relief on a sixth amendment claim that counsel was ineffective a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the failure caused such prejudice as to constitute “a denial of the accused’s due process right to a fair trial, a fundamental miscarriage of justice, or an equivalent constitutional deprivation.” State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Iowa 1984); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , .695, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984) (accused must show that counsel’s unprofessional errors caused a 1986To obtain relief on a sixth amendment claim that counsel was ineffective a defendant must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that counsel failed to perform an essential duty and that the failure caused such prejudice as to constitute “a denial of the accused’s due process right to a fair trial, a fundamental miscarriage of justice, or an equivalent constitutional deprivation.” State v. Miles, 344 N.W.2d 231, 234 (Iowa 1984); see Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 , .695, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 2069 , 80 L.Ed.2d 674, 698 (1984) (accused must show that counsel’s unprofessional errors caused a | 6 | 6 |
State of Iowa v. Craig Anthony Finneygreen2 sentences2016Id. (“Recourse to the entire record is appropriate because, unlike a claim of due process involuntariness, the relevant inquiry for purposes of determining the Sixth Amendment claim presented by [the defendant] does not involve an examination of his subjective state of mind at the time the trial court accepted the plea, but instead involves an examination of whether counsel performed poorly by allowing [the defendant] to plead guilty to a crime for which there was no objective factual basis in the record.”). 6 During the plea colloquy between Harris and the court for the going- armed-with-inte 2016Id. (“Recourse to the entire record is appropriate because, unlike a claim of due process involuntariness, the relevant inquiry for purposes of determining the Sixth Amendment claim presented by [the defendant] does not involve an examination of his subjective state of mind at the time the trial court accepted the plea, but instead involves an examination of whether counsel performed poorly by allowing [the defendant] to plead guilty to a crime for which there was no objective factual basis in the record.”). 6 During the plea colloquy between Harris and the court for the going- armed-with-inte | 3 | 5 |
State v. Ondayoggreen2 sentences2021See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006) (“The fact that a particular decision was made for tactical reasons does not, however, automatically immunize the decision from a Sixth Amendment challenge. 2021See State v. Ondayog, 722 N.W.2d 778, 786 (Iowa 2006) (“The fact that a particular decision was made for tactical reasons does not, however, automatically immunize the decision from a Sixth Amendment challenge. | 3 | 4 |
State of Iowa v. Kelvin Plain Sr.green2 sentences2022Following proper development of the record pertaining to that challenge, the district court shall determine whether Plain’s right to a representative jury under the Sixth Amendment was violated.” Plain I, 898 N.W.2d at 829 (emphases added). 2018See State v. Nitcher, 720 N.W.2d 547, 560 (Iowa 2006) (affirming convictions but remanding case to the district court to rule on motion for new trial under the correct weight-of- the-evidence standard); see also State v. Plain, 898 N.W.2d 801, 829 (Iowa 2017) (conditionally affirming conviction and remanding for development of the record on his Sixth Amendment challenge). | 2 | 3 |
Kuhlmann v. Wilsongreen2 sentences2016Id. at 456, 106 S. Ct. at 2628, 91 L. 2016Id. at 456, 106 S. Ct. at 2628, 91 L. | 2 | 3 |
Duren v. Missourigreen2 sentences2022When faced with a Sixth-Amendment claim of unconstitutional underrepresentation of a racial group in a jury pool, Iowa follows the three-part test set forth in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). 2022When faced with a Sixth-Amendment claim of unconstitutional underrepresentation of a racial group in a jury pool, Iowa follows the three-part test set forth in Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Smithermangreen2 sentences2023Id. (internal citations omitted); accord Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 347 (“[W]hen the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry (or even if it did conduct an inquiry), the Supreme Court required the defendant to show his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by the conflict of interest before it would presume prejudice and find a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal.”). 2023Id. (internal citations omitted); accord Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d at 347 (“[W]hen the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry (or even if it did conduct an inquiry), the Supreme Court required the defendant to show his counsel’s performance was adversely affected by the conflict of interest before it would presume prejudice and find a Sixth Amendment violation warranting reversal.”). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Tejedagreen2 sentences2019Cf. State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 753 (Iowa 2004) (affirming judgment without adjudicating Sixth Amendment claim due to “scant record” and “availability of an adequate remedy in postconviction”). 2017State v. Tejeda, 677 N.W.2d 744, 749 (Iowa 2004). 6 Leonhard’s Fifth and Sixth Amendment claim that the court should have appointed him substitute counsel sua sponte will be reviewed de novo. | 2 | 2 |
Lane v. Stategreen2 sentences2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com 2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com | 2 | 2 |
State v. Rossgreen2 sentences2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com 2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com | 2 | 2 |
State v. Willoughbygreen2 sentences2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com 2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com | 2 | 2 |
State v. Curringtongreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 905 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); 38 Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (Pa. 1998) (Castille, J 2016See, e.g.; Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F,3d 877, 905 (3d Cir,1999) (McKee, J.,- concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012,1027 (11th Cir.1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in'part and dissenting in part); United States v, Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012,1018 (10th Cir.1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 113 Idaho 538 , 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho CtApp.1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 551, Pa. 376, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (199 | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Tamer Trad Mourad, Joseph Hargrave, and Adnan Yacteengreen2 sentences2016For instance, in United States v. Mourad, the court found no deliberate elicitation when the government agents overheard the defendant make incriminating statements to his wife on the telephone. 729 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1984). 2016For instance, in United States v. Mourad, the court found no deliberate elicitation when the government agents overheard the defendant make incriminating statements to his wife on the telephone. 729 F.2d 195, 201 (2d Cir. 1984). | 2 | 2 |
| Ian Lightbourne v. Richard L. Dugger, Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections, Robert A. Butterworth, Attorney Generalgreen | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Anthony Taylorgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 905 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); 38 Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (Pa. 1998) (Castille, J 2016See, e.g.; Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F,3d 877, 905 (3d Cir,1999) (McKee, J.,- concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012,1027 (11th Cir.1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in'part and dissenting in part); United States v, Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012,1018 (10th Cir.1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 113 Idaho 538 , 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho CtApp.1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 551, Pa. 376, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (199 | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Kevin E. Watsongreen2 sentences2016United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1348 (D.C. 2016United States v. Watson, 894 F.2d 1345, 1348 (D.C. | 2 | 2 |
Commonwealth v. Franciscusgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 905 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); 38 Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (Pa. 1998) (Castille, J 2016See, e.g.; Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F,3d 877, 905 (3d Cir,1999) (McKee, J.,- concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012,1027 (11th Cir.1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in'part and dissenting in part); United States v, Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012,1018 (10th Cir.1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 113 Idaho 538 , 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho CtApp.1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 551, Pa. 376, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (199 | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Rootgreen2 sentences2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com 2016Ed. 897, 898 (1916))); United States v. Root, 585 F.3d 145, 156 (3d Cir. 2009) (rejecting a Sixth Amendment challenge and noting that “Congress has the power to lay out the elements of a crime to permit prosecution in one or any of the districts in which the crucial elements are performed” (emphasis added)); United States v. Ramirez, 420 F.3d 134, 139 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding under Sixth Amendment that “venue is properly laid in any of the districts where an essential conduct element of the crime took place”) (emphasis added); State v. Ross, 646 A.2d 1318, 1333 (Conn. 1994) (“[A] person who com | 2 | 2 |
State v. Leadinghamgreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 905 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); 38 Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (Pa. 1998) (Castille, J 2016See, e.g.; Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F,3d 877, 905 (3d Cir,1999) (McKee, J.,- concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012,1027 (11th Cir.1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in'part and dissenting in part); United States v, Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012,1018 (10th Cir.1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 113 Idaho 538 , 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho CtApp.1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 551, Pa. 376, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (199 | 2 | 2 |
| Anthony N. Matteo v. Superintendent, Sci Albion the District Attorney of the County of Chester the Attorney General of the State of Pennsylvaniagreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Angela Jane Johnsongreen | 2 | 2 |
| United States v. Silverio Ramirez and Angelica Vituggreen | 2 | 2 |
United States v. Jacquesgreen2 sentences2016Yet the court found no Sixth Amendment violation because the jailhouse informant was “entirely passive.” Id. at 331–32. 2016See, e.g., United States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324 , 330–32 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that no violation of the right to counsel occurred when a friend of the defendant cooperated with the FBI in speaking to the defendant through a series of monitored phone calls and the friend asked no more than a few questions that were not of “a probing nature”); Whitten, 610 F.3d at 192– 94 (denying Sixth Amendment claim when the defendant volunteered incriminating information during conversation that the defendant 6Obviously, cross-examination is more an art than a science. | 2 | 2 |
State Ex Rel. Juv. Dept. v. SPgreen2 sentences2016Dep’t of Multnomah Cty. v. S.P., 215 P.3d 847, 865 (Or. 2009) (en banc) (finding, pre-Clark, a Sixth Amendment violation when a three-year-old’s statements during an interview with a child abuse response center were admitted at trial). 2016Dep’t of Multnomah Cty. v. S.P., 215 P.3d 847, 865 (Or. 2009) (en banc) (finding, pre-Clark, a Sixth Amendment violation when a three-year-old’s statements during an interview with a child abuse response center were admitted at trial). | 2 | 2 |
Wallace v. Pricegreen2 sentences2016And unlike the trial judge, we did not have the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. 97 initiated); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 , 895–96 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding no deliberate elicitation when the defendant had reached out to informant and the informant had largely just listened, asking only “a few clarifying questions”); Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1021 (finding that an alleged Sixth Amendment violation was not supported by sufficient evidence where the informant “took no actions to stimulate the incriminating remarks”); Wallace v. Price, 265 F. Supp. 2d 545, 569 (W.D 2016And unlike the trial judge, we did not have the opportunity to see and hear the witnesses. 97 initiated); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877 , 895–96 (3d Cir. 1999) (finding no deliberate elicitation when the defendant had reached out to informant and the informant had largely just listened, asking only “a few clarifying questions”); Lightbourne, 829 F.2d at 1021 (finding that an alleged Sixth Amendment violation was not supported by sufficient evidence where the informant “took no actions to stimulate the incriminating remarks”); Wallace v. Price, 265 F. Supp. 2d 545, 569 (W.D | 2 | 2 |
Hartman v. Stategreen2 sentences2016See, e.g., Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F.3d 877, 905 (3d Cir. 1999) (McKee, J., concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); 38 Lightbourne v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012, 1027 (11th Cir. 1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); United States v. Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012, 1018 (10th Cir. 1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (Pa. 1998) (Castille, J 2016See, e.g.; Johnson, 338 F.3d at 923 (Bye, J., dissenting); Matteo v. Superintendent, SCI Albion, 171 F,3d 877, 905 (3d Cir,1999) (McKee, J.,- concurring) (finding Sixth Amendment analysis contrary to Massiah but error harmless); Lightboume v. Dugger, 829 F.2d 1012,1027 (11th Cir.1987) (Anderson, J., concurring in'part and dissenting in part); United States v, Taylor, 800 F.2d 1012,1018 (10th Cir.1986) (McKay, J., dissenting); State v. Currington, 113 Idaho 538 , 746 P.2d 997, 1005 (Idaho CtApp.1987) (Swanstrom, J., dissenting); Commonwealth v. Franciscus, 551, Pa. 376, 710 A.2d 1112, 1122 (199 | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Hackgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Schminkeygreen | 2 | 2 |
| Pippins v. Stategreen | 2 | 2 |
| Donald Eugene Lambert v. James Blodgett, Donald Eugene Lambert v. James Blodgettgreen | 2 | 2 |
| State v. Nelsengreen | 2 | 2 |
State v. Barsnessgreen2 sentences2016As we explain below, Minnesota departed from the Sixth Amendment analysis in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 , 836–37 (Minn. 1991). 2016As we explain below, Minnesota departed from the Sixth Amendment analysis in Friedman v. Commissioner of Public Safety, 473 N.W.2d 828 , 836–37 (Minn. 1991). | 1 | 3 |
Mickens v. Taylorgreen2 sentences2014See id. at 849 . (“The record shows Connor filed an ethics 1 In State v. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Iowa 2007), the court noted “[i]n [State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 2000)], we held that under the Sixth Amendment we could presume prejudice when there was an actual conflict the trial court should have known about, and yet failed to inquire into.” Watson, however, “was impacted” by the United States Supreme Court ruling in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172-73 (2002) (“[W]hen the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry (or even if it did conduct an inquiry), the Supreme Court req 2014See id. at 849 . (“The record shows Connor filed an ethics 1 In State v. Smitherman, 733 N.W.2d 341, 347 (Iowa 2007), the court noted “[i]n [State v. Watson, 620 N.W.2d 233 (Iowa 2000)], we held that under the Sixth Amendment we could presume prejudice when there was an actual conflict the trial court should have known about, and yet failed to inquire into.” Watson, however, “was impacted” by the United States Supreme Court ruling in Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 172-73 (2002) (“[W]hen the trial court failed to conduct an inquiry (or even if it did conduct an inquiry), the Supreme Court req | 1 | 3 |
State of Iowa v. Peter Leroy Vealgreen2 sentences2022See Lilly, 930 N.W.2d at 308 (“Because the parties did not have the benefit of these refinements to the Duren/Plain standards, we have decided today to follow the same course of action as in Plain.”); Veal, 930 N.W.2d at 330 (“As in Plain and Lilly, we believe the 5 On remand, Plain failed to establish the third Duren prong, advancing only “run- of-the-mill jury management practices,” which are within the state’s broad discretion and will not sustain a cross-section challenge. 2019Veal maintains that the jury selection process used in Webster County violated the Sixth Amendment requirement that juries be drawn so as to represent a fair cross section of the community. 5 We addressed a similar claim today in Lilly , 930 N.W.2d 293 . | 1 | 2 |
| State v. Watsongreen | 1 | 2 |
| Patterson v. Illinoisgreen | 1 | 2 |
| Satterwhite v. Texasgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Maryland v. Craiggreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Rupegreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Hensleygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Iowa. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Watkins
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 334 ; cf. State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 411 , 412-13 (Iowa 1990) (finding no waiver when a Sixth Amendment challenge was made after the panel had been sworn). 2019Id. at 334 ; cf. State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 411 , 412-13 (Iowa 1990) (finding no waiver when a Sixth Amendment challenge was made after the panel had been sworn). | 3 | 1992–2019 |
State v. Johnson
green
2 sentences2019Id. at 334 ; cf. State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 411 , 412-13 (Iowa 1990) (finding no waiver when a Sixth Amendment challenge was made after the panel had been sworn). 2019Id. at 334 ; cf. State v. Watkins , 463 N.W.2d 411 , 412-13 (Iowa 1990) (finding no waiver when a Sixth Amendment challenge was made after the panel had been sworn). | 2 | 2019–2019 |
United States v. Whitten
green
2 sentences2016See, e.g., United States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324 , 330–32 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that no violation of the right to counsel occurred when a friend of the defendant cooperated with the FBI in speaking to the defendant through a series of monitored phone calls and the friend asked no more than a few questions that were not of “a probing nature”); Whitten, 610 F.3d at 192– 94 (denying Sixth Amendment claim when the defendant volunteered incriminating information during conversation that the defendant 6Obviously, cross-examination is more an art than a science. 2016See, e.g., United States v. Jacques, 684 F.3d 324 , 330–32 (2d Cir. 2012) (holding that no violation of the right to counsel occurred when a friend of the defendant cooperated with the FBI in speaking to the defendant through a series of monitored phone calls and the friend asked no more than a few questions that were not of “a probing nature”); Whitten, 610 F.3d at 192– 94 (denying Sixth Amendment claim when the defendant volunteered incriminating information during conversation that the defendant 6Obviously, cross-examination is more an art than a science. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
United States v. Henry
green
2 sentences2016Henry, 447 U.S. at 270 , 100 S. Ct. at 2186–87, 65 L. 2016Henry, 447 U.S. at 270 , 100 S. Ct. at 2186–87, 65 L. | 2 | 2016–2016 |
Ohio v. Clark
green
2 sentences2016Thus, A.W.’s age alone may settle . the Sixth Amendment inquiry. 5 Also, A.W.’s statements were made to a physician, with no law enforcement representative in. the room or even observing the encounter remotely. 'In Clark , the Supreme Court stressed “that- the relationship between a student and teacher is very different from-that between a citizen and the police.” Id, at -, 135 S.Ct. at 2182 , 192 L.Ed.2d at 317 . 2016Thus, A.W.’s age alone may settle . the Sixth Amendment inquiry. 5 Also, A.W.’s statements were made to a physician, with no law enforcement representative in. the room or even observing the encounter remotely. 'In Clark , the Supreme Court stressed “that- the relationship between a student and teacher is very different from-that between a citizen and the police.” Id, at -, 135 S.Ct. at 2182 , 192 L.Ed.2d at 317 . | 2 | 2016–2016 |
| State of Iowa v. Robert Lynn Vaughan green | 1 | 2023–2023 |
| Apprendi v. New Jersey green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| United States v. Ronald Titlbach green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| In Re Miller green | 1 | 2022–2022 |
| State of Iowa v. Antoine Tyree Williams green | 1 | 2020–2020 |
| Brewer v. State green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State v. Jones green | 1 | 2019–2019 |
| State of Iowa v. Allen Bradley Clay green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| United States v. Rosen green | 1 | 2018–2018 |
| Friedrichs v. California Teachers Assn. green | 1 | 2017–2017 |
| Ayers v. Hudson green | 1 | 2015–2015 |
| State v. Findling green | 1 | 2014–2014 |
| People v. Salsman green | 1 | 2003–2003 |
| Cuyler v. Sullivan green | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.