Sixth Amendment violation in New Jersey

2021See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) ("[W]hen surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness . . . a Sixth Amendment claim [can] be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial.").

2021See, e.g., United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984) ("[W]hen surrounding circumstances justify a presumption of ineffectiveness . . . a Sixth Amendment claim [can] be sufficient without inquiry into counsel's actual performance at trial.").

1986See, Comment to Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8, citing United States v. Callabrass, 458 F.Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y.1978).

1986We expressly do not address the efficacy of the waiver where there is retained counsel. [2] This issue was also implicated in State v. Darby, 103 N.J. 493 (1986), where the Supreme Court in summary order, granted certification and remanded to this court the issue of a "defendant's Sixth Amendment claim that his right to counsel was violated by the post-conviction interrogation ... by representation of the prosecutor," citing the comment to RPC 3.8 and United States v. Callabrass, 458 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

2025Cf. United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 365 (1981) ("The . . . [alleged Sixth Amendment violation] identified [must have] had or threaten[ed] some adverse effect upon the effectiveness of counsel's representation or ha[ve had] produced some other prejudice to the defense.

2015However, even when there is a Sixth Amendment violation, "the general rule [applies] that remedies should be tailored to the injury suffered from the constitutional violation and should not unnecessarily infringe on competing interests." United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364 , 101 S. Ct. 665, 668 , 66 L.

2016Michigan has “largely extended the right to a jury trial to petty offenses, without precisely addressing whether Sixth Amendment analysis applies!,]” People v. Antkoviak [ 242 Mich.App. 424 ], 619 N.W.2d 18, 41 (Mich.Ct.App.2000), and classifies a first offense as a misdemeanor punishable by up to ninety-three days in jail, Mich. Comp.

2016Michigan has “largely extended the right to a jury trial to petty offenses, without precisely addressing whether Sixth Amendment analysis applies!,]” People v. Antkoviak [ 242 Mich.App. 424 ], 619 N.W.2d 18, 41 (Mich.Ct.App.2000), and classifies a first offense as a misdemeanor punishable by up to ninety-three days in jail, Mich. Comp.

2013Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics In An Adversary System 8 (1975)); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 , 97 S.Ct. 837, 843 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1977) (noting Sixth Amendment could be violated by prosecution receipt of defense trial preparation details acquired from informant present at defendant’s meeting with counsel); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254-57 (3d Cir.1984) (applying Weatherford but finding no Sixth Amendment violation).

2013Ed. 2d 30, 39 (1977) (noting Sixth Amendment could be violated by prosecution receipt of defense trial preparation details acquired from informant present at defendant’s meeting with counsel); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254-57 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying Weatherford but finding no Sixth Amendment violation).

1986To prove a Sixth Amendment violation, defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which the juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).

1986To prove a Sixth Amendment violation, defendant must demonstrate: (1) that the group alleged to be excluded is a “distinctive group in the community; (2) that the representation of this group in venires from which the juries are selected is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of persons in the community; and (3) that this underrepresentation is due to systematic exclusion of the group in the jury selection process.” Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 , 99 S.Ct. 664, 668 , 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979).

2025The Court added there was "no Sixth Amendment violation in the sentencing court's consideration of objective facts about defendant's prior convictions, such as the A-0532-22 18 dates of convictions, his age when the offenses were committed, and the elements and degrees of the offenses, in order to determine whether he qualifies as a 'persistent offender.'" Id. at 163 .

2024The Court added there was "no Sixth Amendment violation in the sentencing court's consideration of objective facts about defendant's prior convictions, such as the dates of convictions, his age when the offenses were committed, and the elements and degrees of the offenses, in order to determine whether he qualifies as a 'persistent offender.'" Id. at 163 .

2019Consideration of this issue begins with a recognition that a non-indigent criminal defendant has a right to obtain counsel of his or her choice, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006), State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 395 (2014), and [w]here the right to be assisted by counsel of one's choice is wrongly denied, . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.

2019Consideration of this issue begins with a recognition that a non-indigent criminal defendant has a right to obtain counsel of his or her choice, United States v. Gonzalez-Lopez, 548 U.S. 140, 146 (2006), State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 395 (2014), and [w]here the right to be assisted by counsel of one's choice is wrongly denied, . . . it is unnecessary to conduct an ineffectiveness or prejudice inquiry to establish a Sixth Amendment violation.

2015"Because intrusions into the attorney-client relationship are not per se unconstitutional, establishing a Sixth Amendment violation requires some showing of prejudice in terms of injury to the defendant or benefit to the State." United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (S.D.

2015"Because intrusions into the attorney-client relationship are not per se unconstitutional, establishing a Sixth Amendment violation requires some showing of prejudice in terms of injury to the defendant or benefit to the State." United States v. Noriega, 764 F. Supp. 1480, 1488 (S.D.

2006In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 , 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2351 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 442 (2000), the United States Supreme Court considered a Sixth Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s “hate crime” statute that had permitted imposition of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum if the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had acted “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(e) (repealed 2001).

2006In Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 468-69 , 120 S.Ct. 2348, 2351 , 147 L.Ed.2d 435, 442 (2000), the United States Supreme Court considered a Sixth Amendment challenge to New Jersey’s “hate crime” statute that had permitted imposition of a sentence beyond the statutory maximum if the court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the defendant had acted “with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation, or ethnicity.” N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(e) (repealed 2001).

2021To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must A-0843-20 11 demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Id. at 348 .

2021To establish a Sixth Amendment violation, "a defendant who raised no objection at trial must A-0843-20 11 demonstrate that an actual conflict of interest adversely affected his lawyer's performance." Id. at 348 .

2013Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics In An Adversary System 8 (1975)); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 , 97 S.Ct. 837, 843 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1977) (noting Sixth Amendment could be violated by prosecution receipt of defense trial preparation details acquired from informant present at defendant’s meeting with counsel); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254-57 (3d Cir.1984) (applying Weatherford but finding no Sixth Amendment violation).

2013Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics In An Adversary System 8 (1975)); see also Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 554 , 97 S.Ct. 837, 843 , 51 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1977) (noting Sixth Amendment could be violated by prosecution receipt of defense trial preparation details acquired from informant present at defendant’s meeting with counsel); United States v. Costanzo, 740 F.2d 251, 254-57 (3d Cir.1984) (applying Weatherford but finding no Sixth Amendment violation).

1999When an error is of constitutional dimensions, the Court must be convinced “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Satterwhite, supra, 486 U.S. at 258-59 , 108 S.Ct. at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 295 (reversing defendant’s death sentence because of Sixth Amendment violation in penalty phase) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)); see also Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 114-15, 548 A.2d 846 (Handler, J., concurring).

1999When an error is of constitutional dimensions, the Court must be convinced “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Satterwhite, supra, 486 U.S. at 258-59 , 108 S.Ct. at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 295 (reversing defendant’s death sentence because of Sixth Amendment violation in penalty phase) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)); see also Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 114-15, 548 A.2d 846 (Handler, J., concurring).

1999When an error is of constitutional dimensions, the Court must be convinced “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Satterwhite, supra, 486 U.S. at 258-59 , 108 S.Ct. at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 295 (reversing defendant’s death sentence because of Sixth Amendment violation in penalty phase) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)); see also Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 114-15, 548 A.2d 846 (Handler, J., concurring).

1999When an error is of constitutional dimensions, the Court must be convinced “ ‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the error complained of did not contribute to the verdict obtained.’ ” Satterwhite, supra, 486 U.S. at 258-59 , 108 S.Ct. at 1798 , 100 L.Ed.2d at 295 (reversing defendant’s death sentence because of Sixth Amendment violation in penalty phase) (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 , 87 S.Ct. 824, 827 , 17 L.Ed.2d 705, 710 (1967)); see also Bey II, supra, 112 N.J. at 114-15, 548 A.2d 846 (Handler, J., concurring).

1993The Court said, "[j]ust as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis." Id. at 635 , 106 S.Ct. at 1411, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 642 .

1993The Court said, "[j]ust as written waivers are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Fifth Amendment analysis, so too they are insufficient to justify police-initiated interrogations after the request for counsel in a Sixth Amendment analysis." Id. at 635 , 106 S.Ct. at 1411, 89 L.Ed. 2d at 642 .

1992Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever — by luck or happenstance — the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached," 474 U.S. at 176 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 481 [496], 106 S.Ct. 477 [487], citing United States v. Henry, supra, 447 U.S. at 276 , 65 L.Ed. 2d 115 [125], 100 S.Ct. 2183 [2189] (Powell, J., concurring), a defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police.

1992Since "the Sixth Amendment is not violated whenever — by luck or happenstance — the State obtains incriminating statements from the accused after the right to counsel has attached," 474 U.S. at 176 , 88 L.Ed. 2d 481 [496], 106 S.Ct. 477 [487], citing United States v. Henry, supra, 447 U.S. at 276 , 65 L.Ed. 2d 115 [125], 100 S.Ct. 2183 [2189] (Powell, J., concurring), a defendant does not make out a violation of that right simply by showing that an informant, either through prior arrangement or voluntarily, reported his incriminating statements to the police.

1986We expressly do not address the efficacy of the waiver where there is retained counsel. [2] This issue was also implicated in State v. Darby, 103 N.J. 493 (1986), where the Supreme Court in summary order, granted certification and remanded to this court the issue of a "defendant's Sixth Amendment claim that his right to counsel was violated by the post-conviction interrogation ... by representation of the prosecutor," citing the comment to RPC 3.8 and United States v. Callabrass, 458 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

1986See, Comment to Rule of Professional Conduct 3.8, citing United States v. Callabrass, 458 F. Supp. 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)." The Supreme Court 103 N.J. 493 remanded this matter to us and did not retain jurisdiction.

2025Absent such impact on the criminal proceeding, however, there is no basis for imposing a remedy in that proceeding[.]") The suicide, or attempted suicide, of a pretrial detainee may support recovery pursuant to the NJCRA or Section 1983 if "(1) the detainee had a 'particular vulnerability to suicide,' (2) the custodial officer or officers knew or should have known of that vulnerability, and (3) those officers 'acted with reckless indifference' to the detainee's particular vulnerability." Colburn v. Upper Darby Township, 946 F.2d 1017, 1023 (3d Cir. 1991).